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Abstract
BRINGING DOWN THE HOUSE: GAMBLING, SPECULATION AND THE MAKING OF THE SMALL INVESTOR
IN COLONIAL INDIA, 1867-1943Baishakh Chakrabarti Projit Mukharji Daud Ali
My dissertation uses the history of gambling and speculation to narrate the growth of commodity
exchanges and markets that emerged in colonial India during the early twentieth century and the clientele
they attracted. My project intervenes in a number of major existing debates in the histories of law and
governmentality, finance and political economy and ‘vernacular’ knowledge and networks of circulation in
South Asia. Existing works in these fields have tended to depict state engagements with practices such
as ‘commodity speculation’ and ‘gambling’ within a framework of ‘colonial governmentality’, ‘market
rationality’ and the ‘legal standardization’ of market behavior. By closely following the anti-gaming laws of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this dissertation moves beyond the regulative ideals of
colonial policing and interrogates the actual operations of colonial laws, their anxieties and the
inconsistent categories they generated. In the process, I historicize the shifting definitions regarding
native gambling, which passed through multiple regimes of legal classifications during this period. I show
how the practice of gambling, which earlier corresponded to precise legal definitions became undefined
when commercial actors and native business communities became its major practitioners. Additionally,
the project reveals the impact of extra-legal, normative discourses that transformed the once criminalized
‘petty gambler’ into the ‘useful’ ‘small investor’. While the histories of twentieth century Indian capitalism
have focused largely on the contributions of large business houses and post-colonial state planning, my
dissertation accounts for the tactics that helped liberate petty capital away from ‘savings’ and redirected
them towards risky speculation. I do so by showing how the prognostic literature of astro-meteorological
weather manuals that predicted the chances of rainfall, reoriented themselves to predict the future prices
of commodities like cotton, jute and grain. In doing so, they were able to turn a section of working class
gamblers off the ‘rain betting’ houses of Calcutta, Delhi and Bombay and onto options and derivative
markets in commodities.
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ABSTRACT

BRINGING DOWN THE HOUSE: GAMBLING, SPECULATION AND THE MAKING
OF THE SMALL INVESTOR IN COLONIAL INDIA, 1867-1943
Baishakh Chakrabarti
Projit Mukharji

My dissertation uses the history of gambling and speculation to narrate the growth of
commodity exchanges and markets that emerged in colonial India during the early
twentieth century and the clientele they attracted. My project intervenes in a number of
major existing debates in the histories of law and governmentality, finance and political

economy and ‘vernacular’ knowledge and networks of circulation in South Asia. Existing
works in these fields have tended to depict state engagements with practices such as
‘commodity

speculation’

and

‘gambling’

within

a

framework

of

‘colonial

governmentality’, ‘market rationality’ and the ‘legal standardization’ of market behavior.
By closely following the anti-gaming laws of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, this dissertation moves beyond the regulative ideals of colonial policing and
interrogates the actual operations of colonial laws, their anxieties and the inconsistent
categories they generated. In the process, I historicize the shifting definitions regarding
native gambling, which passed through multiple regimes of legal classifications during this
period. I show how the practice of gambling, which earlier corresponded to precise legal
viii

definitions became undefined when commercial actors and native business communities
became its major practitioners. Additionally, the project reveals the impact of extra-legal,
normative discourses that transformed the once criminalized ‘petty gambler’ into the
‘useful’ ‘small investor’. While the histories of twentieth century Indian capitalism have
focused largely on the contributions of large business houses and post-colonial state
planning, my dissertation accounts for the tactics that helped liberate petty capital away

from ‘savings’ and redirected them towards risky speculation. I do so by showing how the
prognostic literature of astro-meteorological weather manuals that predicted the chances of
rainfall, reoriented themselves to predict the future prices of commodities like cotton, jute
and grain. In doing so, they were able to turn a section of working class gamblers off the
‘rain betting’ houses of Calcutta, Delhi and Bombay and onto options and derivative
markets in commodities.
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Preface
Indian cricketers advertise everything. From soft drinks, clothes, cars, and real estate, they
have moved onto mutual funds and online gaming leagues. Quite routinely on Indian
television, Virat Kohli dances in the background of the ‘Mobile Premier League’,
Harbajhan Singh popularizes ‘Rummy culture’ and Yuvraj Singh informs you of the money

to be made on ‘Howzatt’. Simultaneously, Sachin Tendulkar and Mahendra Singh Dhoni
urge a sluggish middle class to abandon their traditional savings in fixed deposits and
redirect their capital towards more risky investments through systematic investment plans
or SIPs. They encourage the young to abandon unregulated markets and appeal to a riskaverse generation to invest in mutual funds that promise higher returns along with higher
risk. To that end, these advertisements end by directing their audience to a website called
mutualfundssahihai.com, where they can access further literature and information in order
to make an informed decision. The final seconds close with a breathless reading where the
audience is informed that ‘mutual funds are subject to market risks’ and that they should
‘read the offer documents carefully before investing’.1

These pedagogical advertisements cautiously encourage market speculation while gently
exposing its potential pitfalls. Online rummy or other money-making fantasy games,
however, carry no such caveat. Instead, their disclaimer loosely translates to ‘this game is
subject to financial risk and can lead to addiction; please play responsibly and at your own

1

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A1PwW9CnFBg

xi

risk’.2 They titillate their audience, exciting them with prospects of winning big with
minimum effort. Money is to be made through play, not work, and so, no further research
or reference is needed on part of the player. In essence, however, both sets of
advertisements build towards a common goal - a familiar and overlapping cast of characters
emphasize the needs and advantages of risk-taking to a hesitant class of petty capital.
Discursively, risk functions on layered registers and acts through multiple technologies; at

one moment it presents itself as an unadulterated instinct for play, at another, it is a
sophisticated form of work. While both gambling and speculation engage these different
aspects of risk, they are putatively differentiated in form and connotation. Accordingly, the
disclaimer to ‘rummy play’ cautions its audience of both financial risk and that of
addiction, a warning that goes surprisingly missing when it comes to market speculation.
More than a legal distinction, it is the medicalized deployment of ‘addiction’ that erects a
palpable boundary between a social activity (play) and a commercial practice (work) under
the conditions of finance capitalism; after all, it’s a good thing to be ‘addicted’ to work.

This dissertation categorically asserts that the legal points of difference between gambling
and speculation remained nebulous and undefined in the period under study. Though
gambling had long carried the tag of being a wasteful and improvident activity, such
connotations became particularly amplified when commodity, equity and stock speculation
began attracting people from non-commercial and non-mercantile backgrounds to their
markets in early twentieth century. Correspondingly, as the burgeoning leisure industry of

2

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RsHn0EPv1LA
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gaming expanded its footprint amongst the working class, the discursive contours of ‘work’
and ‘play’ also grew deeper. This distinction, however, was largely impressionistic since
the legal definitions of gambling and speculation continued to result in a fair bit of slippage,
showing only hints of clarity after an event or rupture. Let me provide a contemporary
example of this. During the financial crash of 2007-08, where predatory lending and the
collapse in the value of mortgage-backed securities effected a crash in global markets,

analysts were quick to point out that the practices of certain bankers, especially that of the
Lehman Brothers, was ‘nothing but gambling’. When did the switch occur; when did
prudent and legitimate commerce turn to risky and illegitimate play? If the housing bubble
had not burst as explosively as it did, would the actions of the bankers still be described as
gambling? The answer to this neoteric Sorites paradox is still awaited.3

What the paradox does indicate, however, is the difficulty of differentiating between
gambling and commercial speculation, both historically and as practice, through a legal
definition alone. Rather, the implied differences in their putative representations draw on
a plethora of extra-legal political, discursive, and normative technologies. This dissertation
explicates these technologies by narrating the history of ‘criminalized’ gambling and
‘commercial’ speculation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in India. It
does so by recounting the legal and discursive strategies that sequestered commodity

The Sorites paradox points to the problems encountered when quantifying vague predicates. It is typically
illustrated through the example of a heap of sand, with the assumption r that removing one grain of sand
would not result in the transformation or destruction of the heap. The paradox proceeds to asks, given that
removing one grain of sand does not change the character of the heap, how many times can one remove a
grain before the heap can no longer be called a heap?
3
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speculation from gambling, while also narrating the incompleteness of this process. I
emphasize that this incompleteness did not stem from a failure in execution or by the
resistance faced by the processes of economic standardization from unwieldy ‘precapitalist’ agents and institutions. Rather, I argue that the legal, political and commercial
intentions to separate play from work, gambling from speculation, were only apparent and
chimeric. In fact, the money of non-market actors and petty capitalists only entered the

commodity exchanges of the early twentieth century when their agents harnessed familiar
tropes and rationalities surrounding gambling and ‘play’ and moved them towards
speculation on derivatives, which in turn, allowed such exchanges to expand.

My dissertation uses the history of gambling and commodity speculation to intervene in a
number of major existing debates in the histories of law and governmentality, finance and
political economy and ‘vernacular’ knowledge and networks of circulation in South Asia.
Existing works in these fields have tended to depict state engagements with practices such
as ‘commodity speculation’ and ‘gambling’ within a framework of colonial
governmentality, market rationality and the legal standardization of market behavior.4
South Asian legal and economic histories have argued that the ‘modern’ colonial economy
See Ritu Birla, Stages of Capital Law, Culture, and Market Governance in Late Colonial India, New Delhi:
Orient Blackswan 2011; “Jurisprudence of Emergence: Neoliberalism and the Public as Market in India”,
Journal of South Asian Studies, 38:3, 466-480, DOI; “Failure via Schumpeter: Market Globality , Empire,
and the Ends of Capitalism”, Social Research, Vol. 83, No. 3: Fall 2016, pp. 645-671; “Maine (and Weber)
Against the Grain: Towards a Postcolonial Genealogy of the Corporate Person”, Journal of Law and Society,
Volume 40, Number 1, March 2013, pp. 92-114; See also, Sudipto Sen, Empire of Free Trade: The East
India Company and the Making of the Colonial Marketplace, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1998; See also Anand A. Yang, Bazaar India : markets, society, and the colonial state in Gangetic Bihar,
Berkeley : University of California Press, 1998; See also, Tirthankar Roy; Anand V. Swamy, Law and the
Economy in Colonial India, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017; See Tirthankar Roy, A Business
History of India: Enterprise and the Emergence of Capitalism from 1700, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2018.
4
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was produced by the twin efforts of colonial legal intervention, which produced the
economy as an object of governance, and nationalist critiques, which rendered India as a
distinct, homogenous economic unit that suffered from colonial ‘drain’.5 Alongside ‘the
economy’ such histories have also traced the constitution of a distinctly colonial ‘economic
subject’ through the regulative bifurcation of ‘economy’ and ‘culture’.6 My project moves
beyond these regulative ideals and interrogates the actual operations of colonial laws, their

anxieties and the inconsistent categories they generated. In the process, I historicize the
shifting definitions and policies regarding native gambling, which passed through multiple
regimes of legal classifications in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I show
how the practice of gambling, which earlier corresponded to precise legal definitions
became undefined when commercial actors and native business communities became its
major practitioners. While taking the practices of business communities like the Marwaris
and Gujaratis as an entry point, I also aim to move past the established historiography on
Indian capitalism that has largely focused on the contributions of major entrepreneurs, large
business houses and post-colonial state planning. My dissertation accounts for the stated
strategies and unstated tactics that helped liberate the petty capital of non-commercial
subjects away from ‘savings’ and redirected them towards risky market investment.
Crucially, the process led to the transformation of the once criminalized ‘petty gambler’
into the ‘useful’ ‘small speculator’ who served the needs of the commodity exchanges of
the twentieth century. In demonstrating this claim, this dissertation differs from the body

Manu Goswami, Producing India : From Colonial Economy to National Space, Chicago, IL : University of
Chicago Press, 2010.
6
Birla, Stages of Capital.
5
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of historical scholarship that studies the evolution of commercial activity during the
colonial period by focusing exclusively on the motivations and practices of established
commercial agents and communities. Instead, I disclose the methods that made speculative
markets both appealing and approachable to non-mercantile and non-commercial subjects
as well.

As stated already, the difference between gambling and commodity speculation in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were construed in the absence of a set legal
definition that differentiated between the practices. This ambiguity signals the need to
revise and rethink the relationship between law and economy as constituted by economic
histories of South Asia. Such historiography has urged readers to understand the ‘key
institutions’ of Indian commerce through both endogenous (caste norms and community
networks) and exogenous (colonial legislation) factors.7 This endogenous realm of
‘symbolic capital’, one where caste and communal networks facilitated the privileged flow
of capital for commercial actors, mutated its practices gradually and displayed a fair bit of
resistance to the externality of colonial law. Nonetheless, it is generally acknowledged that
colonialism and colonial law in particular, circumscribed native commerce, dividing it into
the private sphere of culture and the public, ‘unmarked space of universal capital’.8 Such
histories convincingly demonstrate how the colonial legal apparatus first labelled and then
disembedded pre-capitalist economic practices from their autochthonous social structures

Tirthankar Roy, ‘Monsoon and the Market for Money in Late-colonial India’, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, published on behalf of the Business History Conference, January 22, 2016, pp. 324-357.
8
Birla, Stages of Capital, p. 13.
7
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and cultural processes.9 Ritu Birla, for example, sees the distinctions between illegitimate
gambling and legitimate commercial speculation as the economic and cultural binaries
effected by the work of colonial governmentality on native commercial practices.10 Birla
situates Foucault in the colony to demonstrate how ‘the relation between the concept of
economy as a model for governing and the economy as an object of governance’ emerged
during the latter half of the nineteenth century.11 As the objectified reality of the ‘colonial

economy’ emerged, certain native commercial activities drawing on ‘symbolic capital’,
were progressively demarcated and marked as ‘private’ or cultural matters. Rain gambling
and other forms of native gaming were slotted accordingly. Birla resists interpreting
‘community’ and ‘culture’ as either political or discursive deployments against the
regulative actions of the colonial state or colonial law. Instead, the sophistication in her
framework allows for the logic of culture to be the product of the bifurcations effected by
colonial power itself. While theoretically subtle and substantive, her narrative produces an
unintended teleology, one where the histories of law and economy evolve in a parallel,
albeit imperfect sequence. No matter how one cuts it, such readings cannot help but see
colonial law as an agent that shepherds ‘the economy’, making it ‘modern’.

A central aim of this thesis, however, is to revise the relationship between legal apparatus
that standardized and ‘modernized’ economic activity and the ‘pre-capitalist’ practices that
were coded as social and cultural activities in the process. So, instead of outlining the

Karl Polyani, The Great Transformation: the Political and Economic Origins of our Time, Boston : Beacon
Press, 2007.
10
Birla, Stages of Capital.
11
Ibid, p. 21.
9
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impact that agents of modernity—colonial law, political economy, contracts—had in
regulating, categorizing and transforming ‘pre-capitalist’ socio-economic practices into a
universally recognizable form of ‘commerce’, my dissertation exposes the manner in which
‘pre-capitalist’ practices and rationalities were intentionally preserved and operationalized
by a discourse that claimed ‘modernization’ and standardization as its stated objective.
Here, I take my cues from Jairus Banaji, who, over a series of publications has urged

readers to revise their understanding of both capitalism and more distinctly, colonialcapitalism as a mode of production.12 Through his comprehensive analysis of merchant
financing through the ‘putting out system’, Banaji establishes how this putative mode of
production and acquisition functioned uninterruptedly even within developed and
industrialized economies. Accordingly, Banaji sees ‘commercial capitalism’ as a distinct
system and not as an ancillary to European industrialization and in doing so, he partly
rejects a stadial teleology of capital. In his formulation, mercantile or commercial capital,
organized through a putting-out system, should not be seen as the ‘pre-history’ of an
industrial mode of production, nor as a ‘pre-capitalist’ form of appropriation.13 The
argument appears even more forceful when read alongside Marxist and revisionist agrarian

Jairus Banaji, A Brief History of Commercial Capitalism, Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2020; Jairus Banaji,
Theory as History : Essays on Modes of Production and Exploitation, Chicago: Haymarket, 2011; “Merchant
Capitalism”, in The SAGE Handbook of Marxism, ed. Beverly Skeggs, Sara R. Farris, Albert Toscano,
12

Svenja Bromberg, London: Sage Publication, 2021; ‘Merchant Capitalism, Peasant Households and
Industrial Accumulation: Integration of a Model.” in Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol. 16, No. 3, July 2016,
pp. 410-431.
13
Banaji, Theory as History. p. 3. Accordingly, ‘the widespread use of slaves in the early Middle Ages certainly
implies a continuance of slavery as a form of exploitation but surely not the survival or persistence of slave
mode of production, however, that is construed.’ So, ‘the historical forms of exploitation of labor (slavery,
serfdom, wage labour is the usual trinity in most discussions; Marx ended to add ‘Asiatic production’) cannot
be assimilated to the actual deployment of labor, as if these were interchangeable levels of theory. Since the
latter is defined by immensely greater complexity, a conflation o these levels would mean endless confusion in
terms of a strictly Marxist characterization.’
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histories produced in the late eighties and early nineties in India that demonstrated the
efficacy of the role of mercantile debt financing in the context of commercial agriculture.14
By putting the entirety of colonial-capitalist expropriation on trial, Banaji exposes how a
modernizing discourse that appeared eager to parse systems and communities into noncoeval temporalities—pre-capital and capital— relied quite significantly on the former for
building global commodity markets and the industries that relied on them in the first place.

Similarly, I use the history of gambling to argue how a practice, which apparently fell
outside the conventional narrative of capital, did not in fact impede its homogenizing logic;
rather, ‘pre-capitalist’ and ‘cultural’ practices like gambling were central to the unfolding
logic of the market, which instrumentalized its rationalities, even while claiming to
overcome or regulate it. The thesis therefore asserts that practices deemed ‘pre-capitalist’,
‘cultural’ or ‘pre-modern’ are not to be found in the ‘waiting room of history’, rather they

David Hardiman, Feeding the Baniya: Peasants and Usurers in Western India, Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 2000; Sugata Bose, Agrarian Bengal: Economy, Social Structure and Politics, 1919-1947, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1986; B.B Chaudhuri, “Commercialization of Agriculture”, IESHR, March 1,
1970; B.B. Chaudhuri, “The Process of De-peasantization in Bengal and Bihar, 1885-1947”, Indian
Historical Review, 21, 1(1975), pp. 105-65. 7 (1); 25-60; Omkar Goswami, Industry, Trade and Peasant
Society: The Jute Economy of Eastern India, 1900-1947, Delhi: Oxford University Press 1991; Goswami,
Agriculture in slump: the peasant economy of East and North Bengal in the 1930s, Indian Economic &
Social History Review, v21 n3 (08/1984): 335-364; Partha Chatterjee, Bengal, 1920-1947. Volume1; The
Land Question, Calcutta: Bagchi, 1984; Rajat Ray, “The Crisis of Bengal Agriculture, 1870-1927— the
Dynamics of Immobility” The Indian Economic & Social History Review. 1973;10(3):244-279; Credit,
Markets and The Agrarian Economy of Colonial India, Ed. Sugar Bose, Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1994; Neeladri Bhattacharya, “Lendors and Debtors: Punjab Countryside, 1880-1940, Studies in History, 1,2,
n.s. (1985) Sage Publication, New Delhi; Eric Stokes, The Peasant and the Raj: Studies in Agrarian Society
and Peasant Rebellion in Colonial India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980; Neeladri
Bhattacharya, The Great Agrarian Conquest; The Colonial Reshaping of a Rural World, Delhi: Permanent
Black; Fahad Ahmed Bishara, A Sea of Debt Law and Economic Life in the Western Indian Ocean, 17801950, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
14
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occupy the engine room that propels economic and commercial activities towards an
undefined, and unclear ‘modernity’.15

Re-emplotting the ‘stages of capital’ involves revisiting the history of colonial legal
codification as well. Radhika Singha notes with irony that following the revolt of 1857,
when a chorus of British voices advocated for firm ‘paternalist executive’ rule in India, the

Crown chose to embark on a manic spree of legislative codification.16 Statutory laws like
the Public Gaming Act (1867) and the Indian Contracts Act (1872) also fell within this
process. My thesis pays close attention to these two sets of legislation. The thesis is
accordingly divided into two sections, the first dealing with prohibitory anti-gambling laws
and the second that looks at the operative theories of contract, especially when read through
the differences between illegal gaming and wagering contracts as opposed to legal
‘commercial’ contracts.

By looking at prohibitory and regulative laws like the Public Gaming Act (Act III of 1867
and subsequent anti-gaming laws) the first two chapters excavate the underlying
assumptions and rationales that informed the writing of statutes in the first place, exposing,
also, their illusions of omnipotence and the gaps in their prohibitory logic. Aligned closely
to Homi Bhabha’s observations regarding colonial power itself, the dissertation exposes
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how colonial law enjoyed both a phobic and phantasmic existence in the colony; it
overestimated its regulative functions and routinely underestimated the generative powers
of social practice.17 As a result, the legislative discussions surrounding the implementation
of various anti-gambling laws were optimistic regarding their effectiveness while
exhibiting paranoia regarding their cogency. The constant drafting and re-drafting of antigaming statutes exhibit the sanguine attitude of nineteenth century legislatures regarding

the strength of ‘precision writing’, a practice that informed the early period of
codification.18 The repeated amendments to anti-gaming laws also opens a window into the
intentions and motivations of nineteenth century jurists and legislators and to belief they
carried regarding the power of statutory definitions. Often depicted as a place ‘empty of
law’, the colony remained an inviting beacon for British jurists from a Benthamite tradition
to write statutory codes that were thought to be incompatible with the common law
tradition in England.19 Yet, as shown through the example of the Public Gaming Act
(1867), more than regulate and criminalize gambling, such prohibitory laws only
encouraged the efflorescence of multifarious gaming activities. Paraphrasing Michel
Foucault’s observations regarding the prohibitory injunctions placed on sexual discourse
from the 17th century, which he read as an ‘incitement to discourse’, I term the operation
of such regulative laws as an ‘incitement to capital’. Foucault’s unique reading of
prohibition repositioned his understanding of power as something that was more productive
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than it was repressive. He demonstrated this through his study of Victorian prudishness
surrounding the ‘moral discourse’ of sex, which resulted in birthing multiple ‘rational’
studies and ways of talking about sex where, alongside pleasure, sexuality was constituted
as an object of knowledge.20 I have read prohibitory gaming laws in a similar manner.
Looking past their stated objectives of both defining and regulating ‘illegal’ gambling, I
see how the implementation of prohibitory anti-gaming laws led to the mutation and

multiplication of various types of gaming and betting activities. For example, when ‘rain
gambling’ (betting on the probability of rain on a given day) was banned in Bengal in 1897,
it was replaced by newer and more sophisticated forms of betting that drew a greater pool
of players and their capital into both gambling and commodity speculation.

The dissertation also reformulates the relation between state and economy, as well as the
putative understanding of colonial governmentality, especially when it is seen as an index
of and model for governance and self-regulation. To that end, I show how towards the
second decade of the twentieth century, various provincial governments, wary of their
regulative functions, gradually withdrew from defining and prosecuting commercial
gambling. Instead, they preferred that such matters be handled by established members of
the trade itself. The disruptions following the First World War had forced several European
Managing Houses and export firms to withdraw from the inland commodity trade, a

‘Rather than the uniform concern to hide sex, rather than a general prudishness of language, what
distinguishes these last three centuries is the variety, the wide dispersion of devices that were invented for
speaking about it…Rather than a massive censorship, beginning with the verbal proprieties imposed by the
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process that was aggrandized by the onset of the Great Depression.21 This was also the
period when business communities like the Marwaris firmed their grip in the movement
and exchange of commercial commodities like jute and cotton. As a result, several newly
founded native associations like the East India Cotton Association came to establish a
growing monopoly over the trade and its speculative exchange in commercially produced
crops like cotton, jute and sugarcane. Subsequently, such Associations, headed by

influential entrepreneurs, began setting the standards of ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’
commerce for the trade as whole. I employ a genealogical method of reconstruction, one
that places weighted emphasis on the role of personal rivalries, competition and
contingencies as prime movers in a historical process that, on the surface, appears to
emanate from a place of the standardization of native commerce. Accordingly, I show how,
from being an accusation leveled against native commerce, by the second decade of the
twentieth century, both the discourse on gambling as well as anti-gaming laws had become
a tool in the hands of native commercial agents to target intracommunity rivals.

The method compels me to rework some of the established ideas regarding the term
‘community’ as well, which remains both a foundational category and a conceptual tool
for understanding Indian commercial histories.22 In the global narrative of capital, one
where its liberation is seen through the emergence of the individuating logic of civil society
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- the ‘arrangement of economic men’ collating to form a market society, community is
often relegated to capital’s pre-history.23 This has been signaled in a rich body of South
Asian economic histories, which have pointed to the manner in which native capital was
organized around communal institutions like caste and kin. Such studies point to the ways
in which community behaved as an enabling entity, one that facilitated networks of credit
and the circulation of capital. By focusing on the Marwaris in particular, my thesis

complicates this notion of commercial ‘communities’ as a homogenous organizing
principle. Instead, it searches for individual contracting members within the community,
those who acted in self-interest and against its own members. In destabilizing the ascriptive
myth of commercial communities, it also speaks against the endogamous/exogamous
binary. It demonstrates how members from within coherent communities used the colonial
legal apparatus to make internal interventions and, in the process, defined standards of
legitimacy and illegitimacy in commercial practices. To that end, Mitra Sharafi
demonstrates how the Parsis, a major commercial community of India, were highly
litigious and much of Parsi personal law was the product of the community bringing suits
against one another. She thus establishes how the Parsis experienced colonial law as a
forum that resolved internal questions of community instead of as a manifestation of
colonial rule that only acted upon communal practices.24 Similarly, this thesis cautions
against overdetermining colonial state/law and community as an oppositional binary. One
of its aims is to underplay the role of an interventionist state that interfered with the
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institutions and practices of indigenous commerce. Instead, I focus on the numerous ways
in which the colonial legal apparatus was appropriated and operationalized by native agents
themselves.

By looking at the differences between gaming and ‘commercial’ contracts, the second
section of the dissertation draws out the epistemic foundations of contract law and the

function it served for the interests of Empire. As stated previously, I inspect a host of
discursive and normative strategies that worked alongside law to produce the differences
between ‘gaming’, ‘wagering’ and ‘commercial’ contracts, even though their fundamental
structure remained largely similar. I argue that such differences were produced keeping in
mind the economic requirements, civilizing discourses and political concerns of provincial
governments. I pick out particular topics of discussion related to debt, fraud and
‘ignorance’, which allows me to interrogate the manner in which the idea of ‘free
contracting’ and ‘free bargaining’ were dismissed in the field of ‘gaming’ and ‘wagering’
but defended in commerce. Parsing the field of ‘contracting’ in this manner allowed
administrators to constitute gambling and wagering as social problems that needed to be
tackled through political action and moral reform. So, while the legal and technical
differences between gambling and commodity speculation remained unsettled,
discursively at least, gambling was constituted as a wasteful activity, a generator of debt, a
source of crime and prostitution and as a trap for conning ‘ignorant’ and ‘weak’ colonial
subjects of their money.

xxv

I concurrently trace the discussions leading to the Amendment to the Contract Act (1899)
that also attempted to protect ‘ignorant’ peasants from the unequal and ‘hard bargains’ of
native rural usurers. While a significant section of the government machinery felt that the
small peasant’s ‘ignorance’ and illiteracy disqualified him as a rational contracting subject,
the discussions concluded that such ignorance or illiteracy could not invalidate the terms
of written agreements. Usurious contracts were therefore described as economic

necessities, both for the functional purposes of commercial agriculture and as pedagogical
tools for native commercial progress. This bifurcation allowed the government to hold
diachronic positions regarding the suitability of contract law in the colony; its paternalist
stand on gambling confessed that poor and ‘ignorant’ subjects were unprepared for its
principles, while the doctrines and rhetoric of political economy defended ‘free
contracting’ as an essential tool for instructing ‘ignorant’ peasants in the ways of commerce
which went towards building a modern market society. Thus conceived, the contract acted
on two registers; in its pedagogical form, it behaved as a modernizing agent for precapitalist economies, and functionally, it was a tool for only mediating such differences
and not annulling them. In the absence of equality, the contract generated equivalence
between the socio-economic position, intelligence, and the information (regarding the
contract) that was available to contracting members. It was thus synecdochic for the
‘strategic’ logic of the market, which established the ‘logic of connections between the
heterogeneous and not the logic of the homogenization of the contradictory’.25
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My reading of the contract as the nucleus of market logic also allows me to locate the
numerous heterogeneous rationalities that were assimilated within the market framework.
Accordingly, the thesis shows how market forces harnessed non-commercial rationalities
to draw in petty capital into the newly emergent commodity exchanges of the early
twentieth century. Just as the ‘ignorance’ of the peasant was functionally generative for
binding them to unequal agreements that fueled commercial agriculture, it was the

‘ignorance’ of non-market actors that was used to incite capital for the speculative markets
of the early twentieth century. Thus, I locate a number of astrological texts written in Hindi,
Bengali, Gujarati and English which did the work of informing a non-mercantile class of
speculators on the futures price of commodities and of ways to invest in the derivative
markets of cotton, jute, silver, sugar and grains. I argue that these manuals formed an
epistemic regime parallel to the type of economic studies being produced and
commissioned by research scholars and market agents respectively. These economic
studies attempted to ground commercial speculation as an object of scientific study as well
as defend its functional uses in the expansion of the market economy during the very same
period. I argue, however, that it was the astrological literature that served as an effective
entry point for petty capital to enter speculative commodity exchanges, as it provided an
easier pathway for laymen to identify with risk and negotiate a technical world that they
may not have otherwise understood. The participation of such ‘small speculators’ was
greatly valued by the emergent markets of the twentieth century, as they provided them
with liquidity, elongated the chain of intermediary contract holders and therefore stabilized
price fluctuation of commodities. Importantly, small speculators also formed a ready pool
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of buyers onto whom established market makers could offset derivatives and thus hedge
their own liabilities. The motives and knowledge systems of these small speculators have
been either overlooked or are assumed to align with the ‘rational’ epistemic models crafted
by financial agents in order to demonstrate the importance of speculation within the
disciplinary field of economics. However, once we place these two archives—astrology
and economic studies—next to each other, we are forced to substantiate the public that

such markets drew upon. If the effect of colonial governmentality was to push business
houses and indigenous commercial bodies to constitute themselves as ‘rational economic
subjects’, I argue that such astrological literature, which had previously informed the
practices of the ‘petty gamblers’, was recast to produce the ‘small speculator’, who, while
also being a market actor, was drawn to the market through a range of previously
unrecognized commercial strategies.
****
Chapters
My dissertation investigates the period following the transfer of power from the East India
Company to the British Crown in 1857. In the chapter I, I look at the operation of the Public
Gaming Act (Act III) of 1867, an Act specifically designed to tackle the problem of illegal
gambling in British India, along with Section 294 A of the Indian Penal Code, which made
the conduct and advertising of unauthorized lotteries illegal. I track the effect of these laws
in controlling illegal gambling in British Burma in the late nineteenth century. At this time,
gambling was treated as a problem of petty crime and ‘nuisance’, not an organized system
that mimicked or challenged the very premise of ‘legitimate’ economic activity.
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Importantly, the Public Gaming Act, the legal template for several provincial Acts of the
nineteenth century, did not define gambling or make it illegal. Attentive to the ties British
subjects had with horse racing, whist, and private lotteries, the Act spent its energy in
defining and criminalizing ‘public places’ and the ‘common gaming house’ (a house that
charged commission on games that involved money), and ‘instruments of gambling’ - and
not gambling itself. The first chapter closely interrogates this choice, one that refrained

from criminalizing gambling as practice, and displaced it onto the spaces where it was
conducted, which then became the object of criminalization. Subsequently, I look at the
discussions that informed the drafting of the Burmese Gaming Act (1884), a law that was
necessitated after the Judicial Commissioner of Burma ruled that a game called ti was
neither a game or a lottery and should be regarded as a wager instead. Popularized by
Chinese gamblers in the Burmese countryside, the decision to de-criminalize ti proved to
be a problem for police officials and district magistrates, who complained of their inability
to act against a form of ‘gambling’ they knew to be harmful to the local Burmese
population. The discussions related to the making of the Act of 1884 exemplify the faith
that the executive and judicial branches of government had in the powers of statutory
definitions, which was reflected through their demands for a lucid and flexible definition
of the term ‘place’. They were convinced that framing such definitions was both easy and
that it would help them secure a higher number of convictions. I argue that this faith in
legislative definitions, especially regarding the word ‘place’ was bred by a technocratic
belief that space was a ‘mental’ or ‘Euclidean’ object of knowledge and that its features
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and potential uses could be successfully captured through statutory language alone.26
However, as the chapter demonstrates, this belief undervalued the generative powers of
gamblers, who repeatedly exposed the limitations of statutory classifications when it
encountered actual practice.

While the first chapter focuses on the problems encountered in criminalizing ‘places’ of

gambling in British Burma, chapter II moves to Bombay and recounts another process of
objectification that aimed to define and criminalize gambling through the ‘instruments’
used in its practice. A common figure runs through these two chapters, that of Justice John
Jardine. The Judicial Commissioner of Burma till 1885 and a Judge of the Bombay High
Court thereafter, it was Jardine’s ruling that de-criminalized ti in Burma and it was his
observations regarding the ‘rain gauge’ that helped acquit the ‘rain gamblers’ Narotamdas
Motiram and Hemraj Khemjee in Bombay in 1889. In keeping with the arguments laid out
in the first chapter, the second chapter demonstrates how Jardine’s formal interpretation of
colonial anti-gaming statutes left an indelible mark on the history of native gambling and
the approach of various legislative and judicial branches of government in tackling this
problem. Jardine feared that if ‘wagering’, ‘betting’ and ‘gambling’ were not formally
separated through the precision of statutory language then commercial and actuarial
contracts could fall within the purview of gaming laws, especially if the latter were
interpreted as a form of wager. So, if in Burma Jardine had ruled ti to be a case of wagering
(a legal but unenforceable contract), in the case of ‘rain gambling’ in Bombay (a game

26

Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, Oxford: Blackwell, 2009.

xxx

where bets were taken on the probability of rain during a circumscribed period), Jardine
showed similar fidelity to the meaning of ‘instrument of gambling’ as conceived by the
provincial legislature. The chapter discusses the reasons for Jardine’s strict adherence in
interpreting statutory law and its correct method of application. I read his judgments as a
form of judicial ‘formalism’, a legal practice that upheld legislative authority in the
lawmaking process as opposed to ‘judge made law’ of the common law tradition.

Importantly, I see Jardine’s formalist method to be adjacent to the rationales for the process
of codification in the first place - the effectiveness of statutory codes could only be realized
when accompanied by a formal method of application. As the chapter goes on to
demonstrate, in spite of the laborious precision through which the Legislature expressed its
intentionality, it was impossible for a code of law to standardize judicial decisions,
especially in the case of illegal gambling. Accordingly, I delve into another case of rain
gambling brought before the Bombay High Court in 1892, to show how justice K.T. Telang
interpreted the language of anti-gaming statutes and assigned for it a different purpose and
intentionality. While Jardine had legally defined ‘instruments of gambling’ as only those
devices that were designed for the purposes of gaming, Telang’s judgement from 1892
expanded this category when he ruled that a ‘clock’ used by rain gamblers to record the
timings of their bets fell within the category of such ‘instruments’. I take this to be crucial
moment in the history of anti-gaming laws. In bringing the ‘clock’ within the definition of
‘instruments of gambling’, Telang severed the formal criteria that identified and constituted
a ‘common gaming house’. Concurrently, he also loosened the conceptual grip of the
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gatekeepers that differentiated ‘gambling’ from similar practices of wagering, betting and
speculation.

From rain gambling, chapter II moves onto the early practices of commodity speculation
as practiced in the ‘bucket shops’ of Bengal, Bombay and the Punjab during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth. While rain gambling was criminalized in the last decade of

the nineteenth century in both Bengal and Bombay, I show how similar practices of betting
on the price of commodities like opium and cotton carried on uninterrupted during the same
period. Through the example of ‘cotton gambling’ in Bengal in 1911, I show how a regime
of strict legal classification, one that laid out meticulous differences between various types
of ‘legal’ wagering and ‘illegal’ gambling, gradually transitioned to rule by ‘executive
authority’. The challenge of maintaining formal distinctions between legal and illegal
practices was particularly difficult in the case of business communities like the Marwaris,
who were crucial intermediaries in the commercial agricultural trade, the early architects
of ‘futures’ and ‘options’ markets in grain, cotton and opium and ran the gaming houses
for rain betting and price wagering in Calcutta, Bombay and Delhi. As the demographics,
practices and spaces of gambling began mutating during the first decade of the twentieth
century, colonial law responded to these proliferating challenges by abandoning its
legislative search for a general law and a lasting definition for gambling. Instead, it adopted
a more discretionary approach. As a result, twentieth century provincial governments no
longer justified punitive action against gambling by referring to a precise activity and used
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executive authority and the power of ordinance to selectively target practices that
temporarily threatened the moral, civic or economic order of the State.

As the formal distinctions between gambling, betting, wagering and speculation grew
ambiguous in the legal archive, their putative representations began ossifying in the realm
of public discourse. In historicizing this extra-legal process of reification, chapter III pays

close attention to the debates, discussions and motivations for the ban placed on ‘rain
gambling’ in Bengal in 1897. In doing so, I go through the official discussions of the Bengal
Legislative Council, the opinions of both native and British newspapers, and the case
presented by a vocal section of the Marwari population of Calcutta, who defended the
practice of rain gambling while accusing the government of partisan action by allowing
horse racing to continue uninterrupted. By highlighting the role of S.N Banerjee in
aggressively championing the Bengal Rain-gambling Act through the Council, I show how
a section of nationalist political actors took up the problem of gambling as an internal
question of reform, holding it responsible for ruining native work ethic, encouraging crime
and cheating poor and naive subjects of their paltry capital.

As opposed to such accounts, I emphasize the latent commercial logic underlying the
Marwari defense of their practice, who presented rain gambling as another and equally
valid form of commercial betting like teji-mandi, or options speculation on opium.
Differing here from Anne Hardgrove’s approach, I resist reading rain gambling as a
Marwari ‘cultural’ practice. Instead, by highlighting the socio-economic position of the
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proprietors of such gambling houses, I argue for a reading of rain gambling through the
commercial logic of the bazaar itself.27 I do this by showing how rain gambling and
commodity speculation were often carried on in the same premises and that the proprietors
of such ‘gaming houses’ were in all probability arhitiyas and goladaars - bazaar
intermediaries who were crucial in financing the commodity trade as well storing and
speculating on commodities. Informed by the works of Tirthankar Roy and Rajat Ray, I

suggest that one of the ways in which to read the spirited defense of the Marwaris regarding
rain gambling was the role that such gaming houses played in raising capital for its
proprietors during the monsoons, when it was in high demand for the purposes of
agricultural production. Since the money for rural moneylending circulated in cash and not
through negotiable instruments like the hundi, I suggest that we our rethink our
understanding of practices like rain gambling and relocate it from the ascriptive domain of
culture and custom and onto the sphere of conventional commerce.

While the chapter re-situates gambling beyond ‘culture’ and onto commerce, it works in
the opposite direction when it comes to commercial actors who acted through and within
the framework of ‘community’. As mentioned previously, following the First World War,
provincial governments abdicated their responsibilities in defining and regulating
commercial gambling to newly formed indigenous commercial bodies like the East India
Cotton Association, or EICA (1922). In sequestering the field of legitimate and illegitimate
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commerce, these Associations utilized anti-gaming laws to target their commercial rivals
by accusing their exchanges as sites for ‘gambling’. Through the emblematic case history
of Emperor vs. Thavarmal Rupchand, (1928) the chapter demonstrates how resemblant
practices of futures and options trading in cotton, conducted on the respective exchanges
of the EICA and the Shree Mahajan Association, were represented differently, both in court
and to the public. The rivalry between these two commercial bodies substantiates the

manner in which anti-gaming laws transformed into punitive tools in the hands of the native
business communities, who used such laws for personal ends. Additionally, I show the
number of private member bills that were introduced during the same period that tried to
criminalize ‘wagering’ and ‘gambling’ and define ‘futures’ and legitimate ‘commercial
speculation. Moving past the political and moral rationales of the State, I show how by the
1920s, the moral and economic charges related to ‘harmful’ gambling came from nonofficial and non-governmental forces, who channeled these accusations to secure
monopolies in the commodity trade. I therefore argue that the distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate, as seen through the difference between speculation and
gambling, was shaped more by rivalry and private interest than any substantive difference
in the actual practices of rival commercial actors.

Chapter III concludes with a discussion of the representative image of gambling and
gamblers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as constituted through official
discourse and by the debates staged in the public sphere. I pick out topics related to debt,
ignorance and fraud and how these themes helped leech out state paternalism in the context
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of gambling. Nationalist and protectionist administrators repeatedly emphasized that
gaming houses targeted those they coded as the ‘vulnerable’ members from ‘lower social
orders’. More directly, the category corresponded to purdahnasheen women, children and
the poor. The harmful impact of gambling was amplified by the effect that the practice had
on such groups, who, it was believed, being unsound financial and economic agents,
regularly fell prey to the tricks of the conman and the sharper. The results were described

as terrible. I show how in the discussions surrounding the Bengal Rain-gambling Act
(1897), gambling related debt and bankruptcy bled into talks of suicide, theft and
prostitution. These accusations, however, only circulated as rumors and anecdotes and in
spite of repeated inquiries for evidence that backed these claims, official sources refrained
from furnishing specific details. I see this silence as part of an unfolding narrative of
scandal, which generated a public image of gambling as a wasteful, deleterious and often
disastrous ‘social’ activity. Crucially, at time when the legal distinctions between gambling
and commodity speculation grew more and more nebulous, the portentous notion of debt
served as an important distinction for separating the two practices.

Chapter IV juxtaposes this impression built around gambling and gaming contracts with
the discussions that led to the Amendment of the Contract Act (1899). The Amendment
deliberated expanding the term ‘undue influence’ so as to include categories of ‘simplicity’
and ‘ignorance’: Could contracts struck between a peasant and a moneylender be declared
void if the lender had exploited the borrower’s ‘ignorance’ and committed the latter to
blatantly unfair terms? I use the details of these discussions, the reports of Provincial
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Banking Enquiry Committees that documented the problem of small peasant debt in the
1920s and agrarian histories of the 1980s and 90s to show how the rhetoric of political
economy and commercial modernization were marshaled to defend agrarian usury and its
role in promoting ‘free contracting’ and the ‘free bargaining’ in the colony. The chapter
recounts how debt financing was instrumental in the cheap production and acquisition of
commercially produced crops like cotton, jute, sugarcane, oilseeds etc. and how the

colonial legal machinery and powerful native intermediaries were successful in dominating
the price of commodities and thereby maintaining a monopsony over the peasant’s produce.
The chapter also elaborates on the multiple ideological divisions amongst colonial officials
who, in addressing the problem of small peasant debt, attempted to balance their paternal
instincts that germinated from the fear of political instability, and the economic imperatives
of Empire, which was tied to the process of wealth extraction. The chapter briefly covers
the government’s own attempts of turning to rural lending and documents the main reasons
for its failure. Eventually, while the terms of rural usury induced official sympathy for
‘ignorant’ and ‘simple’ subjects, unlike in the case of wagering or gaming contracts, this
class of agriculturalists received no legal protections. So, even as administrative and
judicial officials confessed that moneylending contracts often violated the principles of
equity and justice, given its centrality to commercial cultivation, its operations could not
be hindered by reworking the terms of contract law. I therefore argue that the
criminalization of gaming and wagering contracts produced a field for state action where
its paternal and protectionist instincts could be channeled in a manner that did not threaten
the exploitative needs of colonial extraction.
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One of the central aims of this dissertation is to show how practices and rationalities
deemed ‘pre-capitalist’, ‘cultural’ or ‘pre-modern’ remained central and instrumental
forces within the discursive and historical process that claimed ‘modernization’ and
standardization of commercial practice as its stated aim. Emblematically, this is narrated
through the way in which a legal, juridical and political process coded the resemblant
practices of gambling and commercial speculation as different (illegal and legal), while

simultaneously operationalizing the tropes and rationalities of gambling for economic and
commercial ends. The conclusion to the dissertation reinforces this claim by drawing an
epistemic connection between the pedagogical literature related to gambling and
speculation on derivatives in commodity exchanges. Accordingly, I show how the
knowledge of a body of astro-meteorological texts from the nineteenth century, were
repurposed for predicting the futures price of commodities like cotton, jute, grain, sugar
and silver during the early twentieth century. I argue that a genre of oral histories was
converted into texts like the Bhaḍalīvākyo, Bhaḍalī tārī varṣāvāṇī, Khanār vacana and
Ḍāker vacana and Bhaḍḍarī and Ghāgha, which drew on folk sayings, astral sciences and
observed phenomena to predict rain, weather calamities, portentous omens and signs of
good fortune. Crucially, I argue that some of this literature instructed the ‘rain gamblers’
of both Bombay and Bengal in the late nineteenth century. However, following the ban on
rain gambling by the early twentieth century, I show how the astral knowledge forms of
these texts were retooled for the needs of the newly emergent commodity exchanges in
both Bengal and Bombay. So, by the early twentieth century, Gujarati and Hindi texts like
the Tejī-mandī Prakāśa, Tejī-mandī Darpaṇa and Tejī-mandī Vigyāna, harnessed the
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knowledge of phalit jyotiṣa in order to provide useful tips for market speculation,
especially in the options (teji-mandi) markets in cotton, grains, silver and sugar. Though
published privately, often these texts carried some connection to a brokerage house as the
authors would invite their readers to send in money which would then be invested in
options and commodity exchanges. Such investments would be advertised as a lottery,
where readers were told that a sum as little as 1 rupee could translate into untold fortunes.

While these texts referred to their audience as businessmen or traders (vyaparis), I show
how their intended targets were anything but men of commerce. Instead, their mode of
advertising, their promises of a quick turnover of capital and their inductive astrological
models attracted a non-mercantile and non-commercial working class into the field of
speculation. In doing so, they instrumentalized the logic of gambling and spot betting to
induce a similar demography into a ‘legitimate’ and recognizable field of ‘commerce’.
Importantly, because the participation and capital of such actors remained crucial for the
expansion of the market economy, the interests and liabilities of this class of speculators,
who were previously coded as the ‘vulnerable’ ‘lower classes’ in the discourse of
gambling, were ignored by the government machinery and by the leading members of the
commodity trade and civil society as well.

xxxix

CHAPTER 1
Write, Define, Legislate: Producing the ‘Common Gaming House’
This chapter interrogates the faith placed by the colonial government on legislative
language and the power of statutory definitions to tackle the problem of illegal gambling
in colonial India and British Burma in the late nineteenth century. In order to do this, I

draw on Legislative, Police and Judicial records of colonial India and Burma from the
period between 1870 and 1895.

As we shall see, there was never a blanket ban on gambling as practice, because of the
longstanding ties the British had with horse racing, private sweeps, lotteries as well as card
games like whist, bridge and rummy. Instead, legislation like the Public Gaming Act of
1867 and all subsequent anti-gambling acts criminalized certain spaces in which gambling
was conducted, including ‘public places’ and the ‘common gaming house’.28 Why did
nineteenth century provincial governments choose to criminalize space, rendered as object,
instead of the practice of gambling itself? This chapter recounts both the silent and stated
reasonings for doing so. It therefore retraces the workings of a statist imagination, one that
James Scott has labelled ‘high modernist’ thinking.29 Colonial administrators, both in the
judiciary and the executive, remained sanguine that precise statutory definitions produced
by legislative departments could capture the ‘common gaming house’, ‘public place’ and
The ‘common gaming house was a place where the house earned profit through lease and commission.
Subsequently, in 1870, Section 294-A of the Indian Penal Code criminalized ‘unauthorized’ lotteries and
prosecuted those who aided and abetted in the conduct of such lotteries, by advertising it publicly.
29
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‘place’ in their exact and potential forms. This propelled state legislatures to both expand
and sharpen their descriptive language in order to better apprehend the features of a ‘public
place’ or a ‘common gaming house’. However, as the chapter narrates, they underestimated
the generative powers of actual practice. Gamblers repeatedly exposed the shortcomings
of the classificatory imagination when faced with multi-pronged tactics of subversion.

Splitting Hairs: Gaming, Betting, Wagering
In her book Stages of Capital, Ritu Birla identifies the Bombay presidency case Emperor
vs. Motiram Narotamdas and Hemraj Khimjee from 1889 as a turning point in the history
of gaming laws across the subcontinent.30 Recounting the manner in which the fine
distinctions between wagering and gambling were teased out during the Narotamdas case,
Birla argues that it was one of the earliest instances of judicial deliberation on distinctions
in gaming practices, and the first major attempt to distinguish legal and illegal gambling.
In the following section, I show that the justifications presented in the Narotamdas case
were in fact the second iteration of a debate that had been staged in Burma six years
previously, involving the same set of actors, most notably, the Chief Justice of the Bombay
High Court from 1889, Justice John Jardine. Before Bombay, Jardine had been the Judicial
Commissioner of British Burma till 1885. For our purposes it is crucial to track the impact
Jardine had on anti-gambling history of British Burma, which would then go on to serve
as the historical template for his future rulings in Bombay. Both in Burma and Bombay,
these cases served as platforms for Jardine to work out the legal definitions of gambling,
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lotteries and betting, as well as the role of key elements that distinguished them, such as
notions of ‘skill’ and ‘chance’ and the ‘instruments of gaming’. Additionally, Jardine, who
was firmly opposed to judge-made law, recommended statutory revisions in both rulings
and concluded that it was the role of state legislatures to formulate more precise laws and
unmistakable legal definitions if they wished to curb the menace of illegal gambling.
And so, our story begins in Rangoon, in September 1883, with Queen Empress vs. Nga Po
Thit and others.31 Nga Po Thit was one of the many Chinese gamblers present in Rangoon
during the end of the nineteenth century, popularizing the game of Ti, amongst the local
Burmese. Ti or the thirty-six-animal game, centred around a list of thirty-six animals, from
which bettors chose the name of one each. The chosen names were written down on little
slips of paper that the prosecutor had described as lottery slips, which the banker or daing,
and his agents would go around gathering. The agents would then register the wagered

amount and collect the money on behalf of the daing. At the start of the day, the daing
would select an animal name from aforementioned list and place it in a hollowed-out
bamboo receptacle or ti.32 In the evening, the slip was retrieved by the daing and announced
as the winning animal of the day. Those who had selected the animal so declared would be
offered thirty times their original bet. Variations of ti were also popular in Thailand and
the Straits Settlements during the same period.33
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When Nga Po Thit was arrested by the police without warrant in a zayat34 by a public road,
he was moments away from declaring the name of the day’s winning animal. The
magistrate present at the time of conviction, Maung Shwe Myat, convicted three men
involved, including Nga Po Thit, under section thirteen of the Public Gaming Act of 1867
- gambling in a ‘public place’. Interestingly, however, the betting agents of ti were
described as ‘lottery clerks’, the pieces of paper on which the bets were registered, as

‘lottery tickets”. The magistrate went on to characterize the game of ti itself as a lottery. In
keeping with this description, papers indicating a lottery plan and lottery tickets were found
on the person of the accused. Under the circumstances, Myat’s decision to convict under
section 13 (gambling in a public place), and not Section 294 A of the Indian Penal Code,
which actually criminalized public lotteries, appeared strange. It was at this point that
Jardine requested this run-of-the-mill case be transferred to him at the Special Court so that
he could review some of its finer aspects. Jardine’s first move was the appropriate
categorization of the facts of the case. Was ti a game? Or was it, like the magistrate had
reiterated in his characterization of its various constituents, a lottery?
It should be noted here that till 1876, ti was considered a form of gambling and was
penalized by the provisions of the Public Gaming Act of 1867 35, a classification that had
been officially ratified by the Calcutta High Court in 1869. However, in 1876, the rulings

of Justice Quinton and Wilkinson of the Calcutta High Court directed the government to
now bring ti under the provisions of the newly drafted Indian Penal Code (IPC). Section

34
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Rest house.
Act III of 1867, the Public Gaming Act.
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294 A of the IPC dealt exclusively with the illegal advertising and conduct of unauthorized
lotteries. As C.P Ilbert, one of the architects of the Burma Prevention of Gambling Act
(1884), explained, this ruling annulled previous convictions of ti under the Public Gaming
Act. When the Po Thit case was reviewed, Jardine agreed with the decision of Quinton and
Wilkinson. Ti was, indeed, not a game. Crucially, he did not believe it was a lottery either.36
Ti, according to Jardine, was not a ‘game of skill’ - there was hardly any element of play
involved. So, was ti a game at all? Here Jardine cited Tollet vs. Thomas, a case from
London, where the accused had visited the races with a machine called the pari-mutuel, a
device which threw up numbers from zero to nine hundred and ninety-nine on the turning
of a key. The proprietors offered bettors the chance to bet on a given number that would
correspond to one of the horses running on the day. If the horse won, they would be paid
their winnings. Jardine took this to be a miniaturized instance of a horse race itself - instead

of betting on actual horses, players wagered on the results thrown up by the pari-mutuel,
strictly speaking, the pari-mutuel was not the same as betting. Jardine argued that in this
game, the owners of the pari-mutuel were using ‘an instrument designed for the purposes
of a game’. Added to this, they functioned as a house or banker, as they made their money
off commission. Jardine stressed on the putative meaning of ‘instruments of gambling’
when he drew attention to the function of the pari-mutuel. For him, what made the device

a ‘proper’ instrument was that it was designed and operated exclusively for the purpose of
registering bets. In ti, Jardine failed to identify a corresponding instrument. Five years later,
while serving in the Bombay High Court during the Narotamdas case, Jardine’s opinions
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remained unchanged. In that instance, the accused were charged with running a rain
gambling stall, a game where players bet on the chance and quantity of rainfall on a given
day. Accordingly, the public prosecutor had presented a rain gauge as an ‘instrument of
gaming,’ which Jardine disregarded because:
It registers quantity just as the watch in the hand of a Judge registers time, or as a
thermometer is used to register heat or a barometer the pressure of the atmosphere.
Its use resembles further the use of these instruments in that it does not introduce
any element of chance into betting.37
As mentioned earlier, Jardine had broadly agreed with Justice Quinton and Wilkinson when
they described ti as a lottery, since it was played by the drawing of lots, but he once more
pushed past their conclusions. The crucial difference between the ti and a lottery was that
while a lottery combined the capital of all players into one common pot, in ti the daing
placed individual bets with every contestant. In this sense, it resembled a single wager.

Interestingly and quite counterintuitively, he also insisted that ti was not a game of chance.
His judgment, therefore, presented a formal interpretation of what ‘chance’ could mean in
the context of gambling. How, then, was it possible to conceive of a game that was
informed neither by skill nor chance? Jardine argued that the result of the game was not
settled by external phenomenon, or what could be interpreted as an event of ‘pure chance’.
Instead, the daing consciously chose one of the animals amongst the 36, which he
proceeded to place within the bamboo stalk, ti. The fact that the animal was selected with
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prior knowledge and not drawn, as was common with lotteries, in a random manner, was
what compelled Jardine to interpret the draw as an act of ‘free will’.
Thus, Jardine summarized his observations into a verdict. Ti had neither discernible
instruments nor rules like a game and the ‘draw’ that decided the winner was settled not by
chance but ‘free will’. The banker did not combine every bettor’s money in a collective
pot; rather, he offered every player an individual bet with himself. For Jardine, ti was,
ultimately, a simple wager:
Unless we are prepared to hold that all betting is gaming, we cannot support
the present convictions under section 13 of the Gaming Act. But betting does
not appear to me to be within the mischief contemplated by the statute. If the
legislature had intended to deal with betting in Act III of 1867 we may safely
infer from the language of the acts of parliament that it would have
mentioned betting.38
The accused were acquitted and Jardine passed a circular on the 14th of September, 1883

describing ti as ‘similar to betting with a professional bet maker as to which of 36 horses
might win a race.’39 And since betting was not illegal, he found nothing criminally wrong
with ti and concluded that it ‘was not a game nor a lottery, and the papers on which the
memorandum of the bet was written were wrongly described as lottery tickets.’40
As Judicial Commissioner, Jardine’s ruling was to be the new standard of interpretation
through the province. However, it was challenged almost instantly. In November of the
same year, in Queen Empress v. Ah Choung (alias Kyauk Seen Let Kauk), the Magistrate
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at Rangoon, Mr. Irwin arrested a ti agent under the provisions of Section 294-A of the IPC.
So, unlike in the case of Nga Po Thit, the charge this time was not of illegal gambling, but
rather, the conduct of an unauthorized lottery. In passing his sentence on the matter, the
Recorder of Rangoon remarked.
If I have correctly apprehended and stated the facts, I cannot see what can be gained
by drawing distinctions between gaming and betting, or between both and lotteries
or between gambling in one form or fashion and gambling in another, except the
broad distinctions drawn in the law as a fact that some forms of gaming are under
certain circumstances offenses, some are not, and those that are, some are
punishable in different ways or under different Acts.41
The Recorder therefore attempted to rescue the broad legislative ‘intent’ to which antigaming laws were meant to respond. He appealed to substantive claims during arbitration,
arguing that each judgment was dependent on the nature of the particular case. Principally,
if it appeared illegal then it was useless to split hairs or assign a finer point to the matter.
The decision, however, contradicted the reasoning put forward by Jardine in the Nga Po
Thit case, as well as the directive of his circular. Accordingly, the case was referred back
to a Special Court, presided over by Jardine and Justice Allen.
Allen’s sympathies lay with the Recorder. He also endorsed the Magistrate’s decision to
convict Ah Choung under Section 294-A of the IPC. After all, it was difficult to impose
the provisions of Act III of 1867 onto ti, as it was ‘a form of gambling which is carried on
not by the body collection of the gamblers but by advertisement and correspondence.’42
Since it was impossible to physically catch gamblers in the act of gambling or in a ‘common
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gaming house’, treating it as lottery was the only way to secure conviction. Altering the
verdict slightly, Allen concluded that Ah Choung be convicted under clause 2 of Section
294-A, which concerned, not the conducting, but the aiding and abetting, of an
unauthorized lottery.
Jardine disagreed. Faced with this disregard for both his ruling and his circular, his
observations appeared cantankerous, and he proceeded to expose the gaps in the logic
presented by the Government Advocate, Mr. VanSomeren. What was particularly irksome
for Jardine was the faulty classification, a matter he believed he had already settled during
the Po Thit case. Yet VonSomeren’s arguments continued to function with a nomenclature
that displayed very little consideration for statutory law or formal procedure.
Mr. VanSomeren did argue pertinaciously that one necessary ingredient of a
‘lottery’, as the word is used in Section 294-A, is a game. But for this argument he
could cite no authority, and I know of none […] I believe Mr. VanSomeren’s
contention is made for the first time: he stated that it is based only upon his own
construction of statues and has no judicial sanction.43
The Judge appeared personally offended by VanSomeren’s contravention of his previous
reasonings. Especially in view of that, the errors, particularly on the question of ‘chance’
and ‘free will’. Jardine rehearsed the difference with the example of the act of drawing a
card from a full pack. Even if no overt motive could be ascribed to why one chose the ten
of clubs rather than the ace of clubs, Jardine contended that such a selection was still
different from drawing a card out in random from a pack where the cards were placed face
down. Exasperated, he asked VanSomeren ‘if I and another man have a bet, Rs 6 to 1, that
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if I throw a dice, ace will turn up, is that a lottery, all your three ingredients being
present?’44 Possibly just to vex Jardine, VanSomeren answered with a “yes”. As the
subtleties of his reasoning and the care in his distinctions hit a brick wall, it occurred to
Jardine that the prosecution along with most of the government machinery appeared
unconcerned with the correct interpretation and application of law in the way that he
understood it; they were concerned instead with finding a quick solution to the problem of

ti. While expressing his antipathy toward such mockery of statutes, Jardine confessed that
he too was bound by procedure, since section 76 of Burma Courts Act stated that in the
case of a difference of opinion, it was the ruling of the Court that sought the opinion that
would finally prevail, and not the one that reviewed it.
The result is that one doctrine has been applied to Po Thit, who was ultimately
acquitted, and now the person accused has a conviction upheld in substantially the
same circumstance. If the learned Recorder applies the opinion stated in these two
cases, the law enforced in Rangoon will differ entirely from that now in force from
the other Courts in Burma.45
A second circular was published by Jardine on the 25th of November 1883, reminding the
courts outside Rangoon that ‘the Judicial Commissioner’s judgment affirms judgments
given in the Special Court, especially that of the Judicial Commissioner in ‘Queen Empress
v. Nga Po Thit.’46 This was the law that was to be followed, one where ti was treated neither
as a game nor a lottery, just a simple wager.
What led Jardine to so tenaciously and woodenly read the definitions in the Public Gaming
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Act (Act III) and those of Section 294-A of the IPC? Was it an official position, a judicial
ideology, or the reflection of a personal idiosyncrasy? His insistent adherence to the letter
of the law echoed a familiar Utilitarian position, one that valued positive law as the
reflection of legislative sovereignty, which was the branch of government that held final
authority when it came to lawmaking. As Shyamkrishna Balganesh argues, for Utilitarians
like Thomas Macaulay, the first law member to the Governor General and the earliest

architect of the Indian Penal Code, precision writing was the stated objective of law
making. In a letter sent to the Governor General in 1837, Macaulay confessed that:
We have repeatedly found ourselves under the necessity of sacrificing neatness and
perspicuity to precision and of using harsh expressions because we could find no
other expression which would convey our whole meaning, and no more than our
whole meaning. Such definitions standing by themselves might repel and perplex
the reader … [yet] must be found, in every system of law which aims at accuracy.
If this necessary but most disagreeable work be not performed by the lawgiver once
and for all, it must be constantly performed in a rude and imperfect manner by every
judge in the empire and will probably be performed by no two judges in the same
way.47
If the goal of precision was to eliminate judicial discrepancy, it also demanded a symbiotic
method of judicial interpretation and application. On the face of it, Jardine’s judicial
practice strove to reproduce similar precision, and in doing so, it resembled what legal
scholars have characterized and often caricatured as a legal ‘formalism’. Originating in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century in England and America, ‘Legal Formalism’
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was a normative theory regarding judicial application of written laws.48 It was criticized by
American jurists of the Realist school in the early twentieth century, who often confused
formalism with the Analytical school of jurisprudence made famous by John Austin in the
nineteenth century. Perceptibly, formalism was simply the practical application of
analytical principles. In congruence with analytical jurisprudence, formalism demanded
mechanical rule application to minimize the occurrence of ‘judge made law’, an

emblematic feature of the English common law tradition. The substantive rationality of a
legal rule or its moral purpose is set aside by the formalist judge since no individual case
completely adheres to the general purpose of the rule. To that end, Duncan Kennedy has
argued that legal formalism works with the assumption that the world of rules and facts are
inherently orderly, and the formal application of rules makes any system objective and
predictable.49 In order to remain faithful to legislative intent, a formalist judge usually
follows the rules of ordinary language when interpreting statutes. For Frederick Schaur,
this means that judicial formalism adheres to a higher order of rules where ‘choice is
masked by the language of linguistic inexorability’.50
For a formalist judge any hermeneutic reading of law is confined to reading statutes and
selecting the correct method of rule application. For Kennedy, the formalist approach is
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best maintained when:
Decision according to rule means, in the ideal typical case, the application of per se
rules, that is, decision by the selection of one (or very few) identifiable aspect of
the situation, and the justification of the decision uniquely by appeal to the presence
or absence of that element.51
This is precisely what Jardine was interested in presenting. Unlike the Recorder in
Rangoon, for Jardine the question of ‘legislative intent’ held little meaning outside the

language of the actual law. As we have seen at length, his considerations stemmed from
the question of classification - was ti a game, was there an involvement in it of chance and
did its ‘instruments of gaming’ fall within prescribed legal categories? Even when directing
his questions at the Government Advocate, he had insisted that the decision be made based
on the presence or absence of certain ‘ingredients’ in ti, which determined its status as a
game, lottery or a wager. Thus, Jardine’s reading and interpretation of statute was the
discernment of its constituent elements. Mechanistically, these parts constituted the whole
and vice versa - the whole (of the law) was reducible to the verification of each individual
part. Thus, Justice Allen’s appeal in favour of a focus on similitude and intention were
contrary to his formalist considerations. Within the paradigm, the validity of rule
application was not derived from an ethical deliberation of ‘justice’ or ‘right’. More
importantly, since a formalist application of law was congruent with an utilitarian
perspective, one that viewed aggregated data in the long term, it did not concern itself with
a particular case that acted as an anomaly. Allen’s appeal regarding the ‘spirit’ or
‘intention’ of the gaming law would hold little water for a formalist, since:
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The notion of an appeal to the “spirit” of an original compromise—that is, to its
purposes against the manifestation in the form of rules—makes no sense because
the rules, in the conception involved here, have no spirit. Particular rules have no
purpose except as pieces in a larger compromise of interest.52
The formalist judge was required to stay away from the logic of purposive ends in the
course of a specific case, and any substantive consideration remained the imperative of the
legislature, onto whom Jardine placed the onus of corrective; it was their job to provide
purpose and objective.
Far from being a stick in the mud, Jardine felt that it was crucial to interpret and apply law
from this perspective, since his reading carried repercussions onto other spheres. For
instance, a legitimate contract between two private parties could be read as a form of wager
- the fulfillment of a certain act resulted in the payment of a certain sum. So, Jardine asked,
did the legislature, in their assault on illegal gaming, also plan to ban private contracts that
could be read as wagers? In particular some forms of actuary and marine insurance were
‘merely betting against the happening of certain events.’53 Were these to be considered acts
of gambling? Of course not. Therefore, any decision that outlawed wagering in one fell
swoop would correspondingly determine the legal sanctity of all private contracts. Thus,
from the formalist standpoint, every judicial decision was an act of balancing alternate
substantive claims. For Jardine, it was important to differentiate between events that were
brought about for the purposes of betting and those that occurred independently. Ti, he felt,
corresponded to the latter, and therefore fell within the purview of betting.

52

Ibid., p.383.

53

K J Aiyar, Syed Maqsud Ali Sami, Gambling in India, Law Book Company, Lahore 1947, p.45.

14

As we move here to the next section that revisits the historiography on codification in
colonial India, it should be noted that Jardine’s formalist judicial approach to statutory law
was emblematic of a larger debate regarding ‘rule of law’ in colonial legal discourse in the
late nineteenth century. Regarded as the backbone of Empire, ‘rule of law’ was taken as an
agent of social transformation, revenue management and administrative efficiency in the
colony. However, if ‘rule of law’ implied procedural and substantive equality, how did the

state justify racial inequality and the violence of colonialism through the very institution
of law? Scholars like Upendra Baxi remain unconvinced by triumphant legal narratives
that have equated the success of anti-colonial struggles to the ultimate unfolding of liberal
values, coded as ‘equality before law’. For Baxi, the colonial discourse surrounding ‘rule
of law’ erased its normative pre-colonial history and expunged its dominant tendencies.54
Is it even possible, then, to retrieve an essentialist philosophy of colonial law and its
promises of justice? To answer this, we must turn to the history of legal codification in
India and explore its unique relation to ‘rule of law’.

Codification and the Colonial Rule of Law
The early stage of colonial expansion responded to the revenue needs of the British East
India Company which, in turn, required the establishment of a normative legal order. The
first attempt at systematization came with Warren Hastings’ establishment of the Sadar
Diwani Adalat and the Sadar Nizamat Adalat, the highest civil and criminal courts of
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justice, respectively. By defining the private sphere of native law as personal or religious,
and that of commerce and property as public, Hastings formally separated the legal field.55
The private sphere of law was not to be interfered with, rather it was to be governed
according to the prevalent customs of Hindu and Muslim communities. To aid legal
administration, Hastings commissioned Orientalist scholars like Nathaniel Halhead to
compile codes of native law. These codes relied heavily on the knowledge of Brahmin

interlocutors and their claims that shastric texts were the autochthonous legal codes already
operational in India. The effort was later criticized by jurists like Henry Maine, who
accused Orientalists of misdiagnosing the source of native law which was not to be found
in canonical literature but in fluid and contextual customary practice. More recently,
scholars like Donald Davis, insist that the codes of law on which early Orientalist scholars
had placed weighted emphasis were more like guiding principles. For Davis, such codes
were like the spirit of law, and could be actualized only through contextual application,
consistent with the social and political conditions in which they were applied.56
Hastings’ tenure was marked by issues of official accountability and corruption, resulting
in his resignation and a public trial that brought the question of company ‘despotism’
before the British public. The policies of Lord Cornwallis towards the end of the nineteenth
century attempted to correct this image. Cornwallis separated the executive and judicial

functions vested in administrative positions like the collector; the collector was no longer
in charge of administering civil justice and operated only as a revenue official. [This step
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would have met with the approval of future Whig jurists like A.V Dicey, for whom the rule
of law was synonymous with the separation of the branches of government.] Cornwallis
also standardized revenue collection through the Permanent Settlement in Bengal and set
in motion crucial judicial and police reforms. These early attempts in reforming the
administration of the Company State were putatively referred to as the Cornwallis Codes.57
The reforms were short-lived, however, as Cornwallis’ successor, Lord Wellesley and his
protégés, brought with them a new imperial ideology. This ‘romantic generation’, as Eric
Stokes referred to them, amalgamated Cornwallis’ authoritarian reforms with Edmund
Burke’s plea for historical continuity.58 Figures like John Malcolm, Thomas Munro,
Charles Metcalfe and Mountstuart Elphinstone were apprehensive of a tiered bureaucratic
structure, preferring instead to centralize power in the hands of paternalist figures like the
collector. Charles Metcalfe wanted a ‘discretionary government’, which he believed was

similar to the structure of Mughal authority, while Munro wished to simplify administrative
procedures, since small landholding peasants (ryots) were better served when appealing to
one official instead of many.
By the second decade of the nineteenth century, figures like James Mill, Charles Metcalfe
and most notably, Thomas Macaulay, brought the Utilitarian legal theories of Jeremy
Bentham to the colony and provided fresh impetus for codification on Anglicist lines.
According to C.P Ilbert, law member to the Viceroy’s Council, the term ‘codification’ was
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a Benthamite invention.59 In his General View of a Complete Code of Laws, Bentham
declared that the objective of legal codes was to democratize the legal process by allowing
the common man to access and consult the laws applicable to his needs. Bentham believed
that English law had taken a cabalistic turn in the hands of judges and lawyers of the
common law tradition. His call for democratization was reinforced by his belief in the
universality of positive or man-made laws coupled with his belief in the sovereignty of the

legislature. Firmly averse to ‘judge made law’, Bentham opposed the citation of legal
commentaries made in judgments, adding that ‘if a judge or advocate thinks he sees an
error or omission, let him certify his opinion to the legislature’.60 This stand was echoed in
Jardine’s position regarding the classification of ti as well. According to Nathan Isaacs,
Bentham’s ‘constructivist’ discourse could be fairly summarized as ‘the duty to legislate’.61
In India, however, jurists like C. P. Ilbert readily admitted that Bentham’s views regarding
legislative codes were idealistic and overestimated the powers of government.62
Nonetheless, the colonies remained an beacon for several Utilitarian jurists, looking to cut
legal codes from whole cloth.
The first concrete steps towards codification in India were taken in 1829 by Sir Charles
Metcalfe, in consultation with the judges of Bengal. Subsequently, the Charter Act of 1833
established a Law Commission that would assess the nature and operation of the laws of

British India. The assessment resulted in another ideological shift. Utilitarians like James
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Mill argued that the closest approximation to rule of law in the colony was the ‘rule of
personal discrimination’, backed by an effective judiciary.63 For others like Macaulay, the
first Law Member to the Governor General’s council, the goal was to “give a good
government to a people to whom we cannot give a free government.”64
Macaulay arrived in India in 1834 and started work on framing the Indian Penal Code. The
first draft was ready by 1836 and after several revisions, it was passed as an Act in 1860.
A true disciple of Utilitarian thinking, Macaulay’s legal approach was grounded within its
ideological framework. In a letter to the Governor General in 1837, he stated the objective
of the law commission was to sacrifice ‘neatness and perspicuity for precision’, such that
legislative intention was made unmistakable and judicial exegesis, minimized.65 His
emphasis on legislative sovereignty was a direct reflection of the influence of John Austin’s
legal positivism, which in opposition to the tenets of natural law, advocated for a morally

neutral and descriptive theory of law. Austin agreed with David Hume’s observations
regarding the epistemological slip between what is and what ought to be and warned that
the confusion was often repeated in legal practice and philosophy. He was open to the
moral and political objectives of law but in essence, law was the command of the sovereign
and not a reflection of moral beliefs. Similarly, as Eric Stokes noted, ‘for Macaulay, the
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theory of government rested on certain unquestioned assumptions, rather than a theory that
had to be elaborated or defended.’66 So, alongside championing legislative sovereignty,
Macaulay ensured legal legibility through the passage of Act X of 1835, thus ensuring that
written laws were printed in an official gazette and were accessible to both judges and
magistrates. The measure spoke directly to the issue of inconsistent adjudication, a problem
that expedited codification in the first place. Company administrators felt that in the

absence of a code, executive and judicial decisions relied on a patchwork of native
customary law and English case laws, giving the framework an unpredictable and
discordant form. Even in the 1870s, the Law Member to the Imperial Legislative Council,
James Fitzjames Stephen, argued that codes of law would instruct ‘unprofessional’ native
judges and magistrates while also aiding British officials who were unable to access case
laws from English law libraries in the mofussil.67

In order to correct the unevenness of judicial decision making, the code and its formality
increasingly became an important consideration for colonial jurists. The template for
codified law were based on the Roman and Norman law codes of the past, whose formal
rather than substantive features had earlier guided British legal reforms in the eighteenth
century. According to Karuna Mantena, the formality of Roman jurisprudence allowed
legal rules to invent hypothetical and analogical explanations to clarify the meaning of
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general rules instead of being limited to the precedents set by particular cases.68 This was
crucial for those judges and magistrates who were placed outside Calcutta and Madras and
were thus unable to refer to an extensive stock of case laws while making their decisions.
Legal codes, however, were not limited to the question of administrative convenience; they
were also pedagogical tools for native administration. The putative opinion of colonial
officials was that native judges and practicing lawyers of India were deficient in their
knowledge of case law and in the application of western legal principles. Unlike India, in
a socially and politically advanced nation like England, codification was deemed
ineffectual since it was law that played catch-up to the progressive social standards of the
country. As a result, Fitzjames Stephens, the architect of transformative Acts like the
Criminal Procedure Code, the Contract Act, and the Evidence Act in India, found it difficult
to reproduce his statutory abilities in England itself. Stephens had drawn a bill for an

Evidence Act in England, modeled on the one he had drafted for India, but the law did not
advance beyond a first reading.69 In fact, by the end of the nineteenth century, the only
codified Acts passed by British Parliament were the Bills of Exchange Act of 1882, The
Sale of Goods Act of 1893 and the Partnership Act of 1890. In the colony, however, the
substance of codified law was considered an agent of social and political progress. While
scholars like Partha Chatterjee and Sabyasachi Bhattacharya have shown how foundational

liberal tenets, like the constitution of a free press, free markets and private property, were
abandoned in the colony, on the question of codification, what fell through in England was
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considered essential for the ‘rule of law’ in India.70
Ideologically, ‘rule of law’ was presented as an imperial gift, similar in scope to
technologies like the railways and the telegraph.71 Accordingly, the objectives of English
Utilitarian theories were also redrawn. Bentham and Austin imagined a legal system that
broke with traditional forms of legitimacy (moral and providential), while James Mill and
Macaulay laid weighted emphasis on the moral purposes of substantive law. Their
arguments were bolstered by Evangelical depictions that presented India as a lawless and
barbaric society. As a result, imperialism based on the rule of law could break with India’s
‘despotic’ past, a past described as a period ‘empty of law’.72 Significantly, as a gift of
British benevolence, law rescued imperial conquest from the throes of unreasoned
violence. Law was ‘civilizing’ and in order to be an effective agent of social transformation,
its principles were declared to be ‘universal’.
The universal principles dormant in codified and statutory law were built on Bentham’s
conceptualization of the ‘pannomian’—a code of law based on abstract, universal and
scientific principles.73 The connection between functional law and abstract principles was
once again drawn through Roman jurisprudence and its ideas regarding ‘equity’ or ‘natural
law’. Principles of equity or ‘natural reason’ held a significant grip over English philosophy
and literature during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, manifest most starkly in the
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writings of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Natural law sought general principles, true in
every context. It exceeded human-made or positive law, and as famously articulated by the
eminent jurist William Blackstone, its principles were to be discovered, not made. The
sentiment of this age was captured by Alexander Pope in An Essay in Criticism:
rules of old discovered, not devised; Are Nature still, but Nature methodized
Nature, like liberty, is but restrained; By the same laws which first herself ordained.

Utilitarians were enthused by the abstract universals of natural law and believed that such
universals could also be reproduced in positive or written law. Austin’s analytical
jurisprudence built on the study of abstractions, to transform English law into a rigorous
and scientific profession. According to the Frederic Harrison, an eminent jurist of
nineteenth century England, the turn to abstraction through ‘scientific jurisprudence’ was
crucial to the political needs of an expanding empire as well. The more systematic and
abstract the principles of law became, the easier it was to apply them in various colonial
contexts, without considering the specific cultural or social variations of each colony.74
Armed with this spirit of universalism, Macaulay began work on the Indian Penal Code in
1834. He believed that criminal legal reform would meet with the lesser resistance from
the local population, as opposed to civil law. However, it was not the natives but the white
settlers of British India who first objected to Macaulay’s efforts. As Elizabeth Kolsky
argues, alongside social transformation and legal efficiency, the objectives of codification
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also addressed the criminal activities of non-official Europeans of India, whose numbers
grew after the East India Company’s monopoly over the Indian trade was abolished by the
Charter Act of 1813.75 These settlers were placed under the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in the Presidency town of Calcutta and local courts higher than the zilla (province)
that were headed by European Judges. While the Sadr-Dewani Adalat (highest civil court)
was the court of appeal for native subjects, British born non-official subjects were allowed

appeal to the Supreme Court in Calcutta. As Kolsky suggests, logistical reasons, and the
expense involved, often prevented natives from the interior to litigate in Calcutta, thus
allowing European civil and criminal infractions to go unpenalized. The problem was most
acute for the native workers in indigo and tea plantations, where extreme violence and
brutalization by British managers was a common occurrence. Magistrates placed in the
mofussil were also helpless in cases of assault where both parties were European.76
Acclimated to legal exemption, white settlers guarded their privileges jealously. So, when
the Exemption from Jurisdiction Act was passed in 1836 (Act XI), forcing Europeans to
appeal civil matters in the Sadr-Dewani Adalat and not the Supreme Court in Calcutta, they
rose unanimously to denounce it as a ‘Black Act’. For Macaulay, the protests against the
Act were a rebellion against the rule of law itself. He rebuked his fellow Englishmen and
emphasized that:

The distinction [of separate courts] seems to indicate a notion that the natives of
India may well put up with something less than justice or that Englishmen in India
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have a title to something more than justice.77
The transformative ambitions of liberalism had hit a roadblock as did the universal promise
of the rule of law. British born subjects asserted the possession of inviolable rights as
Englishmen and drew a distinction between them and the ‘Indian Human Nature’.78 Kolsky
notes that white citizens secured certain “rights and privileges” like milder punishments
and being tried by exclusively by white judges and jurors when the Criminal Procedure

Code of India was first passed in 1861. However, the resentment that initially germinated
against Act XI of 1836 eventually culminated in a ‘White Mutiny’ when the Ilbert Bill was
first introduced in 1883. The bill, which sought to amend the Criminal Procedure Code by
giving Indian magistrates and sessions judges jurisdiction over British-born citizens, was
met by fierce resistance by a majority of white settlers and was finally aborted. For Partha
Chatterjee, the controversy surrounding the Ilbert bill made clear that racial difference
would fundamentally impede the moral goals of the Enlightenment, and according to him,
this ‘colonial difference' signaled an ‘impossibility of completing the project of the modern
state without superseding the conditions of colonial rule.’79
Even before the controversies of 1883, the revolt of 1857, part of a series of global uprisings
against British colonialism during the mid-nineteenth century, had already exacerbated the
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problems of race. As Karuna Mantena has argued, the experience of the revolt deeply
altered the universal liberal project. The immediacy of the political event was interpreted
by British ideologues as the unpreparedness of a resentful colony to accept British social
and legal reform.80 Through a detailed study of Henry Maine’s term as the law member in
the Council of India, Mantena argues that the post-1857 period witnessed a conspicuous
ideological turn which privileged cultural relativism over the idea of social transformation.

Yet it was Maine himself who accelerated colonial legal codification, as he was
instrumental in passing the Succession Act of 1865 and in formalizing the Contract Act of
1872.81 Maine believed that one of the ‘unintended’ consequences of colonialism was the
dissolution of native institutions of property and law. He argued that western jurisprudence
was grounded in civil contractual law while the legal convention in India was based on
‘customary’ law; the former was emblematic of a society of individuals while the latter
reflected communal ties sustained through the kinship. Given that the authority of
customary law had weakened under British rule, Maine insisted on the need for statutory
law as its replacement. He argued that the codification of customary law was not the
alternative, since formalizing the flexible practices of custom would prove deleterious to
the institution as a whole.82 Unconvinced by the Utilitarian claim regarding the universality
of modern law, Maine was persuaded by the cultural arguments of the Historical school of
jurisprudence, made famous by Karl von Savigny. Accordingly, he believed that the legal
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system of a nation was reflective of its historically and culturally determined social form.
In India, this meant that customary laws were ‘observed’ rather than being ‘obeyed’.83 Yet
he was also convinced by the ‘stadial thesis’ in English political economy, which argued
that social evolution moved in tandem with the formalization of private property. As the
social moved from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ Maine argued that law also evolved from status
to contract. Through this argument, he relocated British law’s universality from a position

of transcendence and reconciled it with a process of historical evolution. The legal theorist
Peter Fitzpatrick codes this as maneuver where European law now became ‘the ascent from
savagery instead of descent from Gods’. This meant that modernity, when understood as a
rule of law, remained a concept that was both universal in application yet exclusive to the
epistemic domain of European history.84
After the Revolt of 1857, administration of India passed from Company to Crown rule.

Mantena suggests that the ruling ideology correspondingly transitioned to a period of
‘indirect rule’, where social transformation through law was abandoned as an imperial
objective, although scholars like Ritu Birla have argued that the transformative ambitions
of colonial law remained largely undisturbed in the field of property and the market
economy.85 Importantly, even as indirect rule arrested British interference in the social field
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of customary law, both custom and statute continued to operate within a “parasitical
economy”.86 Neeladri Bhattacharya, for example, exposes how the Military Transport Act
of 1903 in Punjab appropriated the customary practice of begar (forced labour), which
allowed the government to alienate labour and draught animals from pastoralists for British
military purposes.87 As Bhattacharya observes, by citing ‘need’ and ‘urgency’, “officials
no longer had to be plagued by the language of liberalism…or be embarrassed about

continuing a practice that was not authorized as legal.”88 Other postcolonial scholars like
Bhavani Raman and Nasser Hussain have also questioned liberalism’s promised equality,
enfolded in the sanctity of law. For Raman, the constant invocations of emergency staged
through counter-insurgent military campaigns reduced large parts of India into a place
where the rule of law was neither in operation nor in suspension.89 Similarly, Hussain
believes that some of the core propositions of modern law like equality and transparency
were fungible in the colony. Formal procedural elements gave the colonial legal system the
appearance of being a marker of civilization, but in its actual working, the system ceded to
the needs of political power.90 Even Macaulay, who had championed the moral virtues of
British law, left room for political despotism. This has been noted by scholars like Radhika
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Singha, who has observed that in spite of his emphasis on precise definitions, the Thugeee
Act of 1836, passed during Macaulay’s tenure as Law member, “made it an offense to
belong to any gang of Thugs without explaining what exactly a thug or the crime of
Thuggee was.”91
The steep task of reconciling ‘highest might with highest right’ should have disheartened
British jurists in their effort to establish a codified justice system. In reality, it was quite
the opposite—they celebrated colonial absolutism as a condition that granted them freedom
to paint their vision without being encumbered by public opinion. A notable example of
this thinking is gleaned from the papers of Charles Hay Cameron, who took part in a
Commission tasked with investigating and making recommendations regarding the judicial
system of Sri Lanka. In his report, Cameron gleefully declared:
A fairer field than the island of Ceylon can never be presented to a legislator for the
establishment of a system of judicature and procedure, of which the sole end is the
attainment of cheap and expeditious justice.92
When it came to experimenting with legal reform, no one appreciated the fecundity of
colonial soil more than James Fitzjames Stephen. Stephen had helped Maine draft the
Native Marriage Act and the Indian Contracts Act which were passed in 1872. As a
legislator, he is best remembered for drafting the Indian Evidence Act which was also
passed in the same year. Having seen his attempt at codification fall through in England,
Stephen lionized his Indian accomplishments. He drew comparisons between the legal
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systems of both countries, describing the Indian Penal Code as ‘cosmos’ and English
criminal law as ‘chaos’. E.P Thompson had noted, in the context of the passage of the
Black Act of 1723, that law has a unique ability to maintain quasi-autonomy from the
power structures within which it operates.93 This was not true in the colony, as Stephen
knew that it was the real conditions political absolutism which made his efforts in
codification possible in the first place. Thus, in a letter written to The Times in March 1883,

he condemned the provisions of the Ilbert Bill and declared that:
It [colonial government] is essentially an absolute government, founded not on
consent but on conquest. It does not represent the native principles of government,
nor can it do so until it represents heathenism and barbarism.94

Political conquest was the indispensable condition for Stephen to actualize his legal
revolution; a revolution bereft of compassion.95 However, questions of political might
quickly ceded to the moral benefits when he claimed that:
The establishment of a system of law… constitutes in itself a moral conquest more
striking, more durable and far more solid than the physical conquest which renders
it possible…Our law is in fact the sum and substance of what we have to teach
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them. It is, so to speak, the gospel of the English, and it is a compulsory gospel
which admits of no dissent and no disobedience.96

This statement by Stephen captures the contradictions and ambivalence of colonial
statutory codes and the idea of ‘rule of law’. The establishment of British law in India was
made possible by violent conquest. Yet the establishing violence of law was erased and
rehabilitated through the moral claims of civilization.97 Far from an inconsistency,

Stephen’s views regarding the conflict between ‘might and right’ were reflective of the
fetishistic nature of colonial political authority itself. Homi Bhabha characterizes this as ‘a
non-repressive form of knowledge that allows for the possibility of simultaneously
embracing two contradictory beliefs, one official and one secret, one archaic and one
progressive’.98

Therefore, in spite of its inventive claims, colonial law and British codification failed to
achieve a complete erasure of past practices and legal conventions. As Radhika Singha
argues, even at the height of Utilitarianism it remained ‘despotic’ and borrowed
haphazardly from India’s Hindu and Islamic pre-colonial past.99 Still, colonies continued
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to behave as an idealist beacon for codification, providing legislators and officials the
perfect conditions for legal experimentation. They offered jurists an opportunity to
construct order from scratch, leading law makers, as Nathan Isaac quipped, ‘to draw
constitutions for commonwealths they had never seen.’100 As Greg Grandin masterfully
narrates in Fordlandia, the fantasy of barbarism often rendered colonies as empty sites for
building idealist societies from the bottom up, societies ordered by law.101

Such statutory order could only be actualized if performed alongside a similar code of
judicial application. Codes were only effective if judges applied the provisions of statutes
and did not exceed their authority by legislating through their rulings. Scholars like Janaki
Nair and Mitra Sharafi have flagged the ‘lack of fit’ in historical analysis in how colonial
legislative ideologies translated into actual judicial practice.102 From Jardine’s restrained
reading of the various anti-gaming laws we get a sense of exactly that. In the face of all
opposition, he complimented precision writing with limited interpretation. Perhaps, to him
this is what constituted a ‘rule of law’.

A Plan for a New Act
Jardine’s second circular issued in 1883 triggered a debate amongst Burmese officials.
Though many thought it easier to work with the Recorder’s ruling in Rangoon, they were
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limited by the authority that came with the post of Judicial Commissioner. This, however,
did not stop them from expressing their displeasure in official correspondence. The Chief
Commissioner of Burma, Charles Crosthwaite, particularly irked, responded by assembling
a committee to draft a regional gambling law for Burma in 1884.
Crosthwaite did not consider himself a moral puritan. He even endorsed the opinion of
several police officials, who claimed that certain sports, most of which concerned wagering
on races, and were considered to be popular cultural events, should be exempted from the
contemplated Act.103 Crosthwaite’s liberal stand regarding gambling was reinforced by C.
P Ilbert, who made it clear to the members tasked with the drafting that Crosthwaite was
‘not at all in favor of a crusade against gambling of every kind. A people like the Burmese
must have an amusement of some sort’.104
But Jardine’s judgment had presented Crosthwaite with an unforeseen problem. In his letter
to Alexander Mackenzie, who in fifteen years would lead a crusade against rain gambling
in Calcutta, he went as far as to say, 'if Jardine is wrong and I think he is wrong, then we
must either alter the law or alter Jardine- whichever you like.’105 Jardine was, in fact not
opposed to this - the alteration of the law. Nor was he averse to the possibility of
prosecuting ti gamblers. In his opinion, however, the framework of the rules and the
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language of the law had to be altered by the legislature and could not be left to the whims
of a sitting judge.
Though he would have liked to alter Jardine, Crosthwaite’s settled on altering the law
instead. Shortly after the ruling, he circulated a memorandum with a list of questions to
district magistrates, police commissioners, loogyees, principals of village schools and a list
of other ‘respectable’ citizens of Burmese society that sought their opinions regarding the
state of illegal gambling in the province, the prevalence of ti in their districts, and the
problems that the local police encountered in prosecuting such gamblers. Along with the
questionnaire, a copy of the Gaming Ordinance from the Strait Settlements was also
circulated, where Chinese gamers had posed similar problems earlier. He informed the
readers of the memorandum that:
It is a generally admitted that the present law is ineffectual for the repression
of gambling especially that kind which takes the form of a lottery. This sort
of gambling is very prevalent over the country and is practically carried on
with impunity. By most Burmans and by many Englishmen, gambling in this
country is believed to do serious harm. If it is wished to put down
professional or public gambling, the law will have to be considerably altered.
No doubt a local Gambling act will be required.106

The memorandum generated an assortment of opinions. ‘Respectable members’ of society
reported that several of the games they encountered in the countryside were organized by
a ‘syndicate’ and drew in untutored ‘villagers’ who then became the cause of moral and
social problems. In some cases, it was the economic problems associated with gambling
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that took precedence over its moral threat. In the opinion of the Extra Assistant
Commissioner of Sundoway, gambling was a form of addiction that corrupted the younger
generation, ‘who then become lazy and would not desire to work and earn their
livelihood.’107 The Municipal Committee of Prome reported obstacles ti had generated in
his direct duties, complaining that ‘thoogyees (collectors) find it hard to collect taxes’, and
money lenders had difficulty acquiring debts from people’ who were already in the grip of

a daing.108

Based on the responses, a Select Committee, headed by Ilbert and Crosthwaite, introduced
a draft proposal for a local gaming law in Burma. The bill was designed to combat the
problems that emerged from the responses to the memorandum, particularly with regard to
the precision of legal definitions and categories. Foremost among the demands for clarity
of definition, was a more lucid understanding of the term ‘place’.

What, Where, How?
The Public Gaming Act of 1867 prohibited gaming in a ‘common gaming house’. The
‘common gaming house’ was marked as a room, a house, or an enclosure in which gaming
for profit took place. The ‘owner’ or a ‘keeper’ of a common gaming house was the one
who acted as banker and charged a commission for use of the house for play. Games
conducted in private houses, however, were not illegal. Games of skill such as bridge,
rummy, poker, and whist were allowed in private homes or clubs, amongst acquaintances
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or friends, as long as no one profited through commission. Raffles or lotteries, too, were
allowed when they received government sanction through permit; permits were given to
organizers who conducted the lottery amongst known acquaintances and refrained from
advertising the event in local newspapers, through fliers and posters.109 However,
irrespective of whether conducted privately, and without commission among friends and
acquaintances, gaming in ‘public places’ - streets, thoroughfares, markets and other places

‘to which the public had access’110 was deemed illegal. Occasionally, gambling in carnivals
or local fairs were ignored, though district magistrates retained the discretion to
prosecute.111

Now, in Burma, the diligence of Chinese gamers had forced Burmese administrators to
move beyond putative definitions. Streets and markets were easier to recognize under the
stated definition of public place, but what of paddy fields, jungles, and gardens? In his
reply to Crosthwaite, the Deputy commissioner of Thonogus wrote,
It was held by most Magistrates that when section 13 of Act III of 1867 authorized
a police officer to arrest any person found playing for money with any ‘instruments
of gaming’ in any public place, the authority extended to any place which was not
private and to which the public had access. The consequences of the ruling that a
paddy field, after the crop has been removed, is not a public place, is that gamblers
can and do in some places defy the authorities.112
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Paddy fields was just one example of a legally contested, even liminal space. Timber
merchants who complained that their workers were going off to gamble on rafts were
reminded by district magistrates of their inability to prosecute players on water bodies.
Perhaps, for this reason, one of the more unusual suggestions to Crosthwaite’s
memorandum was for the inclusion of the words ‘ashore or afloat’ in the new definition of
‘place’.

Jungles, forests, and orchards were another ambiguous category. The Burmese government
granted permits to private timber merchants for felling, which meant that such spaces were
accessed by the labourers they employed. Additionally, others were granted use and
passage rights in forests. On the other hand, if a paddy field shorn of crops was private,
could forests be private too? Section 13 of the Act had defined a public place as any space
to which the public had access. The statement and object of the act clarified that the ban
was designed to discourage the public from being drawn into games of chance. So, it stood
to reason that gambling would be permitted in only such places to which the public did not
have ready access. If people were caught gambling in a market, they were to be arrested;
if they were discovered in the corner of a forest, they could, in theory, left to their
devices.113

The dilemma regarding ‘public place’, points to the unsettled nature of the spatial
categories in anti-gaming laws. Crucially, the legal vocabulary that determined private and
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public spoke outside the language of property. When it came to illegal gaming, private and
public spaces strictly concerned questions of accessibility and visibility. This forced state
legislatures to abandon settled terms and fashion a distinct vocabulary for space determined
along these lines. The term ‘public places’ could not be understood as the residue of all
things that were private. In fact, fundamentally, little could be said about what marked
space as public or private. What made a paddy field private property after cultivation but

public property before? The over-determining concept here was, of course, of access. If the
public had access to a property, even if the property was owned or managed privately, the
‘place’ had to be considered ‘public’. For example, orchards and groves were, in the
language of property laws, private property. However, since it was customary for people
to sit in such groves without seeking the owner’s permission, in terms of surveillance such
spaces were to be determined ‘public’. I should clarify here that it is not my intention to
posit a dyad; I do not wish to argue that the gamblers who read the law creatively were
doing so in an act of resistance, and that the actions of gamblers should be read as supple
and evasive while that of the state be looked upon as rigid and procedural. Instead, what I
want to draw attention to, in the exchange between legislators and gamblers, is the dialogue
between practitioners and administrators regarding the stability and suitability of spatial
categories and definitions. A few examples illustrate this point.

To repeat, Section 4 of the Public Gaming Act struck down gaming in a ‘common gaming
house’, while section 13 made it illegal to gamble in ‘public places’. So, in the case of Abbi
vs. Queen Empress, when gamblers were presented in court, the question that the
38

magistrate faced was whether a garden fell within either category.114 Since the garden was
an extension of the house, Section 4 could be applied, although in the absence of a profit
motive, it was decided that the space was not a common gaming house. Next, the provisions
of section 13 were considered, since gaming had taken place in the open and could have
attracted the attention of the public. The magistrate, however, decided that the space was
not an ‘open space’ since there was a hedge that skirted the garden. So, even though

passers-by could see that a game was in progress, a hedge or a drain formed a conceptual
separation. Consigned to liminality, the place was neither a common gaming house nor a
public place. Though liminal, the case was not exceptional, as was made evident B.K.S
McDermot, the district Superintendent of Police in the Kyaukpyu Province of Burma, who
insisted that gardens and paddy fields be put in one category or the other.115

In another case, Emperor vs. Chotey Lal (1895), the chabutra (raised platform) of a temple
was determined to be a public place.116 The remarkable aspect of this case was the argument
of the defense, who claimed that the temple was in fact a private space, since it prohibited
the entry of the ‘lowest classes’, namely Dalits. Since all forms of the ‘public’ did not have
access to the space, the place could not be considered a place to which the public had
access. This bit of ingenuity was struck down by the presiding magistrate who proceeded
to convict the gamblers. Interestingly, the gamblers, or at least their legal defense, did not
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invoke the language of ownership or property when making their case. Their determination
of ‘not public’ rested on the question of accessibility determined by caste injunctions.

Zooming out briefly, is it not strange to imagine that in the history of gambling in South
Asia, a legal articulation actually established a principle and mark for whether a chabutra
was a public or private place? These were not isolated or exceptional forms of deliberation.

In Hari Singh vs. Jadu Nandan Singh, the judge had to decide whether ‘a compound of a
press consisting of open space of land without any fence situated one cubit from the bazar’,
was a ‘public place’.117 While in this case the place was adjudged to be public, in Badr-uddin v Emperor, it was concluded that the accused arrested near the water tank of a railway
station were not in violation of section 13 of the gaming act, since the place was not public.
Again, in Maula vs. Emperor, it was decided that ‘where the accused were gambling at a
place near a public street and exposed to public view but which was not part of the public
street, they could not be convicted of gambling in a public place.’118 Each of the cases laid
a fresh precedent regarding the meaning of the term ‘public place’. I lay weight on this
history because popular imagination often overestimates the omnipresence of statist
categories. Outside the ambiguous realms of public and private ‘spheres’ exist more settled
notions regarding public and private space. When produced by state authorities like a
municipal corporation or any other administrative body, these places are clearly marked as
‘public places’, and carry with them rules that define use and conduct. A bus station, a
courthouse, a public park are common examples of the spaces I am referring to. Laws
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regarding conduct tend to universalize these spaces and present them with legal
homogeneity in a way that lends itself to abstraction. Subsequently, abstraction becomes a
naturalized legacy of statist aggrandizement. When speaking of rules of governing conduct
in public places such as parks and streets by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, Sudipto
Kaviraj has argued:
What became crucial, through constant intervention, was the reinforcement of the
conceptual distinction between the legal and illegal, the reassuring fixity of the
shops on the streets and chaos of vendors on the pavement.119
According to Kaviraj, the ‘reinforcement of conceptual distinctions between the legal and
illegal’, is aimed towards public conduct. But are such distinctions clear to those who
produce them in the first place? Assuming that a railway station is a public place, how
much work does abstraction perform if a judge is left in a quandary over the water tank in
that very railway station? Put differently, from the perspective of conceptual history, how
complete is the work of abstraction when it encounters everyday practices? Such cases beg
the question: are legal abstractions the expression of state sovereignty or are they the
expression of sovereign anxiety? Either way, the actual deliberative process was an
encumbered one. Histories that have assumed the modern state’s infinite ability to abstract,
surely overlook how tedious the procedure actually was.
From Space to Place
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In most of the incidents related to Burma, clarification was not aimed at the word ‘public’
as much as it was put on the term “place”. What was ‘a place’ or just ‘place’? In a note to
Crosthwaite a judicial officer wrote:
I have read the case referred to, and I confess that it leaves me in an absolute maze
of doubt as to what is and what isn’t a “place”. I think […] an effort should be made
to clear up the wording of the section as to make the intention of the Legislature
unmistakable.120

As was made evident administrators were desperate to marry police sight with legal
writing, the latter being woefully insufficient in securing convictions. Captain F. D Raikes,
the officiating deputy commissioner of Kyaukyu, left nothing to chance. He responded to
Crosthwatite’s questionnaire with his own bill, drafted in a manner, so he felt, would
address the concerns of the police officers on the ground. On the question of place, he was
quite resolute:
“‘Place’, means any place whatever; it includes places afloat as well as on shore, it
also includes any place used temporarily.121

The district Superintendent of Police in the Kyaukpyu, B.K.S McDermot, supported Raikes
suggestion, arguing that ‘a place wants defining, it should be anywhere.’122

Anywhere as opposed to everywhere! It was impossible to express ‘place’ being
everywhere since gaming was allowable in many places. By requesting that place should
mean ‘anywhere’, McDermot had insisted that ‘place’ behave more like an activity than an
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object. ‘Anywhere’ referred to practice - the practice of placing discerning sight, since the
problem was that what could be seen was difficult to reproduce in a court of law. Instead
of blinkering the scopic within descriptive forms, would it not be more liberating to turn
writing into a visual act?

Crucially, this was also a response to the gamblers themselves. The police and the

legislature were aware that it was no accident that the anti-gaming laws were not fulfilling
their intended purpose. The Chinese daings were always one step ahead, which meant that
they were not the targets of law as much as they were its audience. P.H Martyr, the Extra
Assistant Commissioner in charge of Myoungmya, wrote in his reply that the provisions
of Section 294 A were being ‘skillfully evaded’ and that it was nearly impossible to procure
convictions in ti cases. This knowledge and use of law irked officers to no end as the law
found more creative purpose in the hands of the gamblers:
If the Burmese have been quick to detect flaws in the lottery laws, they have long
ago found out where they fall within and where they are exempt from the provisions
of the gambling Act. The instance mentioned by the Inspector General of Police of
policemen finding themselves unable to arrest a gambling “waine” of one or two
hundred people in a paddy field away from the public road is much to the point.
During the sea fishing season in this sub-division, it is the practice to hold large
gambling meetings, which are advertised, in the paddy field…and hitherto, the
police have been unable to do anything to them, unless they happen to be near a
village or a public road.123

Brazen acts of transgression such as the above were not just limited to open fields. Daings
were aware that Section 294 A could only come into effect if one were to keep a house or
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a room for drawing lotteries. Accordingly, they would draw the lot from one house and
declare the winner from another; neither of the houses could then be described as a lottery
office. Faced with such open cunning, suspicion escalated that some judges were actually
making it easier for the gamblers to hide behind technicalities. When the police had the
misfortune of encountering a literal jurist, their task was made all the more cumbersome.
For example, the Extra Assistant Commissioner of Prome expressed difficulty in

convicting ti gamblers after the judgment of the legal recorder in the case Moon Tsain vs.
Ah Lone:
I am now of the opinion that before a person can be found guilty of keeping a place
for the purposes of drawing a lottery, it must be proved that the drawing did in fact
take place in such place. With such a construction the law is easily evaded.124
This particular ruling appeared to have caused problems for more than one officer, as the
complaint also found its way into the report sent by the Assistant Commissioner of

Punugdeh to his senior at Prome:
In the present state of law it is absolutely impossible to suppress tis. It is only when the
‘dine’ is so careless as to declare the winning animal in the same house or place in which
he receives subscriptions and keeps his accounts that the law has a right to interfere.125
The sternest condemnation of judicial nitpicking came from Mr. W DeCourcy Ireland, the
Inspector General of British Burma:
Owing to the rulings connected with the expression “public place” […] the police
have found it impossible to interfere with gambling ‘wines’ […] To suppose that
124
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the Burmese regard this not as impotence of the law, but as an act of forbearance
[…] is quite a mistake. They are quick to perceive that the law is inoperative, and
that, as a consequence, the worst species of gambling remains unchecked.126
Though notably irritated, Ireland admitted that correction needed to come through the
legislature. He shared the formalist assumption that the problems with the law were to do
with its writing; a writing that had been incapable, so far, to translate what was seen into
what was meant. With mild bitterness, he added:
But although this may be the result of the ruling in this case, we are nevertheless
bound to declare the law only, and not whilst acting as Judges to assume the
functions of the Legislature and extend its operations beyond the limits merely
because some good might result therefrom.127
The issues around a comprehensive definition of the term ‘place’ sprung up, not just in
Burma, but in other provinces as well. In the Bombay Presidency, the Mofusil Gambling
Act of 1866, a Police Act for controlling illegal gambling required amending in 1887 in
response to similar problems. As Mr. Melvill, member of the Governor’s Council,
presented the draft bill to the committee he informed them that ‘Parsis, Hindus,
Mohamedans and Chinamen have for their separate use erected sheds in gardens, where
they carry on this nefarious practice in an open manner.’128 He complained that ‘strings of
tongas belonging to gamblers await the arrival of trains at Kurla,’, which ‘take their
disreputable cargo of gamblers from that place with all haste to Chimore.’129 Securing
convictions was particularly difficult since the 1866 Act was inoperative in towns that were
three miles away from a railway station, unless they contained 5,000 residents or more.
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Gamblers therefore resorted to play in places like Chimore and Salsette, outside the reach
of law.
Thus, some policemen favored making arrests without a warrant, a power they believed
officers of any rank ought to have. They feared that the delay of procedure - issuing
warrants, summoning an officer of proper designation, etc. - would allow the gamblers to
pack up their operation and run. The latter were nimble, had an astute understanding of the
law and seemed to plan carefully - the police could not afford to extend them further
advantage. Though police apprehensions were well-founded, extending the right to arrest
without warrant to all officers called for prudence. Here, a clear racial division became
apparent.
In Burma, while there was some skepticism about the neutrality of Burmese magistrates,
the main concern was with the police force itself. Given the ‘propensity’ of the Burmese
to be drawn to games of chance, the British feared that corruption could not be checked
amongst some of the lower class of officers. In his response to the memorandum mentioned
earlier, G.J.S Hodgkinson recounted a case where a policeman from Bessein, lost Rs 197
to gambling, money he had been given to move from the police station to the public
treasury, ‘a distance of some 20 or 30 yards’130
Overreach was another concern; the figure of the extorting police officer loomed large. A
tension persisted between officers who wanted to expand the language of legislation to
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reflect sight on the ground and amongst those who felt that such sight was entangled with
self-interest. A notable example of such misuse of power occurred in Banaras in 1889,
when a Kotwal of the region, Yusuf Ally, arrested a group suspected of running a regular
gambling ring in the adjacent town of Kalbhairo.131 While Ally insisted that the group was
involved in illegal gaming, the lawyers of the defense had argued that the police had
misidentified them as gamblers when they were actually a group of devotees engaged in a

Sattanarayan puja - the pun was unmistakable.132 In this instance, the flawed testimony of
the approver Mahadeo, against Jung Bahadoor, the accused, seemed to create problems.
Mahadeo initially claimed that Bahadoor was not present amongst the gamblers, later
changing his statement at Ally’s insistence, to place Bahadoor in the house where the arrest
had taken place. Mahadeo had also claimed that the house that had been searched was
bolted and locked from the inside, when according to Yusuf Ally, the door was half open
when the police arrived. Mahadeo declared that the gamblers were arrested inside the
house, which contradicted the police statements placing them in the garden and the street
outside the house.133Added to this, Mahadeo was unable to describe the game that had been
played or the instruments that were used; the police’s account claimed that they had seized
a piece of chalk and an iron ledger from the premises.

The Production of ‘Place’
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For the purposes of the present discussion, let me turn to a particular detail in the
approver’s testimony described above. Mahadeo had claimed that the ‘common gaming
house’ was locked from the inside although Yusuf Ally had already given evidence to the
contrary, that he had found the door ajar. What made the former furnish this extra bit of
information; was it an oversight or was it deliberate? A close look at the gaming law
would reveal that Mahadeo’s statement was informed by legal provisions and not by

mere conjecture.
Wherever any passage, staircase, or means of access, in a place lawfully entered as
aforesaid, to any part thereof is unusually narrow or steep, or otherwise difficult to
pass, or any part of the premises is provided with unusual means of preventing or
obstructing an entry, or with unusual contrivances for enabling persons therein to
see or ascertain the approach or entry of person, or for giving the alarm, or for
facilitating escape from the premises, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is
shown, that the place is a common gaming house.134

The making inaccessible of a place gave evidence to its secretive nature. And yet, in the
eyes of the police, the nature of the space was quite apparent. Robert Reid, a retired officer
of the Calcutta Police, in a semi-autobiographical account titled, ‘Gambling in Calcutta’,
had weighed in on this question of semblance.135 In his story, Reid described the frustration
of the Calcutta police in arresting a group of gamblers who had successfully thwarted
repeated raids upon their establishment. During one particular raid, like the incident of
Kalbhairo, the meeting was staged as a religious gathering, with a ‘Hadjee reading the
Quran amongst a group of devotees’. Yet, to Reid and others, there was no doubt that this
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was a ruse; they were being made to see past the apparent. When Reid forced the door
open, it was discovered that the Hadjee had been hiding the ‘instruments of gaming’ inside
the Quran, which it was discovered, was hollow between its two covers.136
Again, the description of a locked door makes its way into the narrative. What is its
implication? I suggest that the ‘locked door’ was not just a structure but a ‘place making’
symbol. In the gaming laws of Bombay and the Strait Settlements, in Mahadeo’s account
and in Reid’s narrative, the door behaves as a symbol for delimitation and separation.
Mahadeo did not assume but expected that the door to the gaming house should be locked,
just as the Strait Settlement ordinance predicted what kind of spaces may be suspected of
being a gaming house. Similarly, for Reid, the door acted as the dividing line between the
purported and the apparent. To force it open was the actualization of state sight, to be let
in would be to go along with the farce of a religious gathering.
The door indicates more than just one possibility, especially to the hermeneutic act. As a
symbol, it ‘embodies a language of double meaning’ and ‘the act of interpretation is to
understand that double meaning.’137 A locked door was also a symbol for the ‘private’ and
as I have already mentioned, private gaming was not illegal. However, in all three cases,
the symbolic weight of interpretation was placed on obscurity rather than privacy. Clearly,
the discerning sight of the police already saw these spaces as ‘common gaming house’.
Their vision was analytic and piercing when they presented space in a preconceived form.
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The scopic knew what it desired (a gaming house) despite what was presented (a religious
circle).
In McDermot’s appeal - a place wants defining, it should be anywhere— sight was
characterized as a practice, an act of ‘place making’. The door, on the other hand, was an
objective marker that constituted place through its symbolic function. It is for this reason
that Mahadeo did not actually need to see the door as locked when he gave evidence. In
claiming that the door of the alleged gaming house was locked, Mahadeo’s testimony broke
with his experience of being in a real gaming house as he drew a picture of what a gaming
house should ideally be. As Shahid Amin argues ‘the Approver’s Testimony is neither a
confession nor a renegade’s perception of past events; it is very much a construct of a
prosecution’s view of the event and its pre-history.’138 This ‘construct’ behaved as a picture
and accordingly, the ‘locked door’ became symbolic of a space that was already in hiding.
Marking place as prohibitory was a recurring problem for the gaming laws of the
nineteenth century. Since the practice of gaming was itself not considered illegal, space
was made the object that could be criminalized. In doing so, the definition of ‘place’ would
have to be set before it was infused by action; the scene had to be set for the action to begin.
Accordingly, to mark ‘place’ a symbol was required. In ‘The Bridge and the Door’, George
Simmel indicated how both structures lent themselves to symbolic interpretation.
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first a mere bridge and afterward a symbol.140 If the symbolic function of the bridge was to
connect the banks of either side of a river, in doing so, it made ‘thinking’ of a river possible,
and ‘thinking’ of space was the primary and most intimate way of ‘dwelling.’141 The door,
on the other hand, functioned as a symbol for separation.142 Conventionally, it separated
the outer from the inner, wildness from habitation. When locked, it became a symbol of
the prohibitory—-something that literally prohibited entry. By appropriating this symbol

of prohibition, the police read the door through its function—-a symbol that produced a
prohibitory ‘place’. It became the structure that produced the ‘place’ that so desperately
required defining. Such symbols transformed descriptive spaces into sites of actual
encounter and reduced, what Paul Carter describes as ‘spatial nausea’ or the feeling of
being ‘placeless’. The feeling of ‘placelessness’ was erased when the police encountered a
‘locked door’, as the structure now became a symbolic boundary for policing.143 The
rhetorical significance of the boundary is revealed in Paul Carter’s work The Road to
Botany Bay, in the analysis of a passage written by the Gippsland pioneer W.W. Johnstone.
Johnstone relates his attempt at settling after a day spent wading through a ‘sea of logs’.
Amongst them, Johnstone identified a ‘big log’, which stood as the landmark of settlement.
For Carter, the ‘big log’ was an arbitrary symbol for marking the boundary for settlement,
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since it recorded Johnstone’s point and ‘moment of arrival.’ When the mark of having
arrived served its purpose as a rhetorical tool, it transformed space into a place.144
This is precisely what was required in gaming laws too. Marks were required to transform
abstract spaces into points of physical encounter, where a ‘place’ like the common gaming
house could be made to appear. Sometimes these markers were obscure, for example ‘the
space in front of a ‘paan-shop’.145In a remarkable case from London, Brown vs. Fenwick,
it was decided that a moveable stool and an umbrella marked the ‘place’ of a gambling
stall. A comprehensive explication of the principle was witnessed in the statements of Lord
Janes of Hereford, made to the House of Lords in 1899 in the case of Parell vs Kempton
Park Race-Course Company:
[C]ertain conditions must exist in order to bring space within the word ‘place’.
There must be a defined area so marked out that it can be found and recognized as
“the place” where the business is carried on and where in the bettor can be found.
Thus, if a person betted on the Salisbury Plain, there would be no ‘place’ within the
Act. The whole of Epsom Downs or any other racecourse where betting takes place
would not constitute a place, but directly a definite localization of business of
betting effected, be it under a tent or even movable umbrella, it may well be held
that a place exists for the purposes of conviction under the Act.146
The police, on their part, overdetermined this rhetorical quality at the cost of the generative
powers of practice. Limited to representation, such places, were ‘already always’; a thing
that was written and constituted mentally before it could be encountered physically.
Subsequently, when they were confronted, they could often disappear, a possibility that J.
Nepean, the Deputy Commissioner of Shwegyin Province apprehended before he informed
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Crosthwaite. In his response to the memorandum, Nepean recommended that the section
regarding ‘approaches and exits to’ gaming houses be removed from the draft of the new
Burmese gaming law. According to him, the Chinese had devised their own model houses
whose walls were secured by thin strips of split bamboo or kyukyubyne. Based on tip offs,
they would kick down their walls, rendering the structural and symbolic ‘doors’, ‘walls’,
‘enclosure' meaningless. Effectively, the entire house transformed back into wilderness,

robbing doors, walls and enclosures of their powers to communicate or produce a ‘site’ for
inspection or legislation. Having seen the ‘common gaming house’ vanish repeatedly,
Nepean’s confessed that:
The police can combat with these things only by surrounding the house, and as for
the most part in these towns and villages the houses are small and stand little
apart.147
More than a solution, it suggested an alternative place making strategy. By recommending

that they ‘surround the house’ Napean was suggesting that the police construct its own
boundary instead of relying on those erected by the gamblers. McDermot, who had desired
that the definition of place should be anywhere, recorded a similar perplexity regarding the
shifting structures of the Chinese. He drew attention to the fact that symbolic place making
was useless if it remained representative or fixed, like an image. Instead, he wanted it to be
an activity that mimicked those of the practicing gambler. Remarking on the definition for

‘place’ as per the Ordinance in the Straits Settlements, he wrote that:
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This ordinance defines place, but it seems to define a place when there is an
entrance to or exit from, not an open place. A place wants defining; it should be
anywhere.148

The Object of Practice
Let me draw out, here, some arguments implicit in the discussion so far. For the purposes

of this chapter, the state has been divided into three parts—the Police, the Judiciary and
the Legislature—with three corresponding functions—scopic, hermeneutic and written.
In the context of the Public Gaming Act, I have argued that the judiciary, beholden to
Jardine’s judgment and circular, maintained a formalist approach. The hermeneutic
function of the court was to consider the broad yet contradictory interests that framed the
law and choose the rule that best applied to the case at hand. To achieve favorable results
in arbitration, the legislature, needed to produce exact definitions and categories that both
described existing practices while accounting for their future deviations. To achieve this,
the legislature had to actualize through writing a desire nestled within technologies of
surveillance. A large section of colonial officials believed that such writing was
achievable, because of their underlying faith in the omnipotence of written descriptions.
Elsewhere, Hayden White captures this faith in a dogma that emerged from European
enlightenment itself; ‘the illusion that the ‘order of things’ could be accurately
represented in an ‘order of words’, if only the right order of words could be found.’149
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James Scott, in Seeing Like a State, places this statist discourse in the realm of ‘high
modernist’ thinking.150 For Scott, the major failing of centralized planning by state officials
was attributed to a reasoning which condensed a series of interconnected micro relations
of place, community or economic practice to a singular form or identity. This, according
to Scott, often came at the cost of local knowledge forms that resisted fitting into the State’s
‘scientific’ layout. This willful denial of the customary helped in producing Statist

blueprints; plans that neglected the ‘particular’ in the hope of reproducing the plan without
adjusting for details of difference. Interestingly, in Scott’s title - Seeing Like a State - state
sight is cast back as a singularized personification; the State as a subject with vision.

My archive, however, indicates unitary but not uniform sight. It also draws me to the
tapered interests of the separate branches of colonial governance, i.e., the Legislature, the
Police and the Judiciary. For the police, the problem was procedural and scopic (how to
see the crime), for the judiciary it was hermeneutic (how to read the crime). In presenting
a resolution, both departments relied on the legislature’s ability to write the crime. Scott’s
premise is correct; the state does indeed ‘see’ but in the peculiar case of illegal gaming in
Colonial India and Burma, there remains a persistent tension between what the State ‘sees’
and what the State can ‘say’. If Scott’s argument recounts the way in which the State
reduces multivocal relations of a space like that of a forest, to a singular commodity
(timber), this chapter details the process of enumeration and expansion of categories.151 Far
from the reduction of spatial types, what is witnessed is the aggrandizement of spatial
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categories. From a room or an enclosure, the discourse surrounding the features of a
common gaming house came to debate things like walls, umbrellas, jungles, trees, paddy
fields, dams, paths, boats, logs, ‘open space’ and ‘places that had access to the public’. So,
for the history of the ‘common gaming house’, my suggestion is that the problem of state
sight, planning or representation cannot be easily explained through oversight, either of
local practice or indigenous knowledge, although it is possible that they may have been

contributing factors. Instead, what I suggest is that there was a contradiction in the manner
in which a ‘common gaming house’, or ‘public place’, was produced as a legislative and
spatial category.

Since the legislature had no intention of criminalizing the practice of gaming, they decided
to move against gamblers by criminalizing space. So, a ‘common gaming house’ was

designated as an illegal space, and gaming within its premises constituted ‘illegal
gambling’. Similarly, gambling was criminal when conducted in ‘public places’. It was the
task of the legislature to produce these spatial categories through descriptive writing.
Accordingly, they described what a common gaming house could look like (room,
enclosure, dwelling), where it could be (with access to public, on shore on water, in jungles,
in gardens), what it contained (cards, dice, table cloth, money) who could be in it (an

association of five or more people, a bookie charging commission) and what were its
markers (a locked door, a place that was difficult to access). How close was representative
space to the one encountered in the world? Implicit in this series of questions is the
assumption that ‘space’ is not an empty canvas that awaits action. Rather, it is through
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ritualistic, political, or social action that space is produced. According to Henri Lefebvre,
much like a commodity, space undergoes a mode of production. It behaves like a
commodity in so far as it effaces or fetishizes this productive process and presents itself as
a universal object of knowledge (like the blueprints of an architect) and not as a product of
ideology or labour.152
In her book Rule by Numbers, U. Kalpagam extends Lefebvre’s argument to colonial forms
of state power, when she argues that:
The space of the modern state is the abstract space, and although this abstract space
is not homogenous, it has homogeneity as its goal and hence attempts to reduce all
differences within that space.153
This argument is not dissimilar to Scott’s determination of statist vision, one that resolves
differences through abstract categories. In the case of producing ‘public places’ or a
‘common gaming house’, certain geographical categories were borrowed so that a
legislative category like the ‘common gaming house’ was made to appear a real and natural
object. However, as Foucault reminds us, such natural and geographical categories are also
rooted in juridical and political discourse:
Let’s take a look at these geographical metaphors. Territory is no doubt a
geographical notion, but it is first of all a juridico-political one…Field is an
economico-juridical notion…Domain is a juridico-political notion.154
Each spatial category, when stripped of its naturalist pretension, performs a kind of
abstraction in some other social realm. Lefebvre refers to this abstract space as mental
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space, representative space and in some cases Euclidean space. In all cases, to produce
space as a pure form of knowledge, the social nature of that space is willfully erased. In
this view, space as a category is first a mental or imaginative product and only then does it
become a site for action.
In the case of Burma, the act of producing abstract space was emboldened by the police
and the judge’s belief that exact definitions could do such work. In a note to Crosthwaite,
the Deputy Commissioner of the Shwegyin Province wrote:
The first thing necessary is to define ‘unlawful gambling;’ the next thing is
to define ‘place:’ these once successfully defined, the drafting of a workable
Act should not be a matter of insuperable difficulty.155
This kind of high modernist imagination was sustained by the belief that the image or
picture conjured through language shared the same logical structure with what the picture
referred to. The history of gaming legislation towards the end of the nineteenth century in
India, pushes me to conclude that the branches of the State chose to speak of a practice
(gambling) as an object (space), because they believed that the object (space) was in fact a
product of knowledge, and anything that could be said about it could be first said in mental
or representative terms. Accordingly, the ‘truth’ of spatial types were first encountered in
the conceptual realm before it could be encountered in the world. This carried with it the
advantage of prognostication. Much like a chessboard, to see space in an abstracted and
rule governed form, also implied the ability to view all the possible moves that could be
performed on that space.
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The problem was that though a ‘common gaming house’ was conceived of as a priori
space, the State had no role in its material production. It was only when gaming took place,
by certain people, under certain conditions, according to certain rules, an actual “common
gaming house” or a ‘public place’ was produced. The rules that governed the production
of such places were structured by rules of social action and not by universals. By treating

space as representative or an abstract object the Burmese government had privileged its
own mode of production while undermining that of the practicing gambler. The truth,
however, was that the ‘common gaming house’ would have to be first produced by gambler
and only then could it be prohibited by the State. So, to produce the gaming house, the first
step was to practice (to gamble), then came sight (to witness) and finally came the written
(conception). Formalist demands for clarity stemming from definitions, functioned with
the understanding that the written was privileged over all other forms. This runs the risk of
reducing all forms of practice as resistance—-one that defies the rules of conceived spaces,
planned and ordered spaces.

The nimble-footed daing and his assistants, however, were pushing a conceptual boundary
as they challenged the limits of what prohibitory law could meaningfully say. They were

demonstrating that before action could be carried out, objectified categories like the
‘common gaming house’ or ‘public place’ remained unhelpful phantasms. Words like
‘public’, ‘enclosure’ or ‘place’ were not fixed or unaltered points of legal reference.
Instead, they were products of the very action that they appeared to disallow yet logo59

centrism was the mark of high modernist thinking. Lefebvre regretted that such thinking
was particular to ‘Western culture’, where:
The act of writing is supposed, beyond its immediate effects, to imply a discipline
that facilitates the grasping of the ‘object’ by the writing and speaking subject. In
any event, the spoken and written words are taken for social practice.156
In the field, T. C. Mitchell, the Assistant Commissioner of Kyauktan, Burma, advocated a
different approach; he pushed for the abandonment of formal definitions and commented
on their ephemeral quality:
“I believe that the difficulty of providing a definition, which could for all
cases clearly distinguish between lotteries which ought to be put down and
lotteries which do no harm, is next to insurmountable. The best way is to
have no definition at all. It is easy enough to see the distinctions between a
Chinese ti lottery […] and a lottery at the Rangoon ace meeting… But to
put the differences on paper so as to cover all cases is quite another
matter.”157
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CHAPTER 2
Bringing down the House: In Pursuit of Practice

As we saw in the last chapter, the daings who operated ti gaming houses in Burma,
skillfully evaded the provisions of the Public Gaming Act by challenging the descriptive
adequacy of statutory definitions. By constructing makeshift tents from thin slips of
bamboo that were easy to disassemble during police raids and by drawing and declaring
lotteries from separate houses, they had broken the spatial harmony conjured by the
definition of a ‘common gaming house’. Again, when Burmese farmers gambled in
abandoned orchards and cultivated rice fields, or on makeshift rafts, they were outside the
definition of a ‘public place’. They exposed to British administrators and the police in
particular, the problems of precise legal definitions when read mechanically by judges and

magistrates. Like an architect with her blueprints, the Burmese government believed that
sharp definitions and expansive terms could capture the ‘public place’ and the ‘common
gaming house’ as omnipotent legislative categories. They assumed that such ‘places’ of
gambling were objective, written and imagined forms. The gamblers, however, compelled
some to admit that both the ‘common gaming house’ and ‘public places’ were not the
abstract categories they thought they were, rather they were built through the contingency
of practice.
The problems faced in Burma soon cropped up in Bombay. This time, the contested
definition concerned the ‘instrument of gambling’. Again, it was Justice John Jardine, who
complicated matters with his inert reading of statutory law. Given Jardine’s repeated
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appearances in key moments of anti-gaming histories, this chapter attempts to unearth the
factors that informed his judicial ideology, which in turn affected his interpretation and
application of law. This method of reconstruction is then repeated in the case of Justice
K.T Telang, a prominent judge of the Bombay High Court, whose reading of anti-gaming
statutes was opposed to Jardine’s formalism and therefore marked a shift in the direction
of gaming histories in the colony. The chapter ends by narrating the rise of commodity

speculation and spot betting on prices in ‘bucket shops’ in Bombay, Calcutta and the
Punjab. The rise of the bucket shop and the incessant mutation of wagering practices
signaled a new era of control and criminalization. As we shall see in this chapter, by the
first decade of the twentieth century, provincial governments abandoned their faith in
precision writing, exact definitions and the legislature, preferring instead to regulate illegal
gambling through short term executive measures.

Gambling in the Bombay Presidency
The history of anti-gambling legislation in the Bombay presidency can be divided into two
distinct phases; it was initially viewed as a problem of ‘public nuisance’ and only later,
with the efflorescence of rain gambling, was it considered an instance of organized crime.
Before coming to the second, let me provide a short background of the first.
The earliest law for the regulation of gambling came through Act XIII of 1856, which
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operated only in the presidency town of Bombay.158 Due to the limitations placed by Act
XIII, gamblers routinely traveled to towns and districts just outside Bombay to gamble.159
Towns such as Poona, Thane, Nasik, Ahmedabad, Coorla, Bandora, Chamboor, witnessed
heavy footfall in the following years, and they increasingly came to be noted as sites for
‘nefarious activities’ that included ‘drinking, violence, robbery, theft and swindling’.160
Like in Burma, to address these problems, police commissioners and district magistrates

were requested to send in reports of their respective districts, on the basis of which the
legislature could frame a new law for the region. The report, ready by 1864, detailed the
extent and harm caused by gambling in various districts. It threw up mixed opinions; some
officers were eager that a specific law targeting gambling be enacted while many others
deemed it unnecessary. W. Hart, the Commissioner of Police of the southern division of
the Bombay presidency opposed the idea of a sweeping legal prohibition161 and called for
local legislation that would systematically control gambling in areas where it had begun to
become a source of nuisance and crime.162 The Magistrate of Satara, E. Chapman also
agreed, and described the introduction of a specific anti-gaming law as both unnecessary
and intrusive.163 Others, especially officials in Ahmedabad, firmly disagreed. Reports from
police commissioners of Cama, Rutnagharry, Ahmadnugur, Sholapur, Poona and Dharwar,
concurred with the opinion coming from Ahmedabad; they wanted the enactment a new
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law or an extension of the Police Acts of Bombay in these districts as well.164
The incidence of gambling had risen in these parts since the enactment of Act XIII of 1856,
a law that was also responsible for displacing the authority of customary laws that earlier
managed to check such practices locally. The reports described the new crop of gamblers
who migrated in large groups from the city as the “lowest and worst of the people.”165 Their
habits were disturbing to the local populations, and their presence in the districts was
associated with a spike in crimes such as counterfeiting, cheating, violence, drunkenness
and petty robberies. Just as in Burma, gamblers were portrayed in an amorphous manner
and their threat as petty criminals was amplified in official rhetoric. The trope of ‘nuisance’
animated early police reports on the issue, which decoupled the gambler from gambling.
His nebulous identity was informed by questions of morality and the gambler was often
referred to as a hooligan, thug or thief. As J Neuberger has shown in the context of pre-

Soviet Russia, hooliganism did not so much define a specific sort of crime, as much as it
suggested a perception of criminality.166 What was encoded in the word hooligan was the
possibility of a threat. Similarly, Peter Stallybrass has argued that the Victorian sensibility
regarding ‘nuisance’ and vagrancy shifted the locus of respectable fears from criminal
practices and relocated them onto the body of a subject class.167 Unsurprisingly, this was
164
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reflected in police reports on gambling in India, which relied heavily on the feedback of
respectable members of the community - town administrators, schoolteachers, principals
and ‘village elders. Policing acts in the colony like Act XIII were modeled, after all, on the
Vagrancy Act enacted in England in 1824.168 What was missing in all this feedback were
instantiations that were able to translate ‘respectable fears’ into real police cases. Perhaps
such cases were too mundane to be documented and were therefore absent in official

reports.
The hurdle of scanty evidence was overcome by the body of forceful opinions in the end,
and the Legislative department of Bombay presidency, under the initiative of Mr.
Juggonath Sunkersett, passed a bill to criminalize the ‘common gaming house’ in towns
and urban areas. The bill laid down the specifications of instruments of gaming; secured
licenses for those hotels, resorts, or clubs that could allow gaming; assigned power and

position to those who could prosecute gamblers, allotting certain officials in the police
force the power to convict, and defined the circumstances under which one could either be
considered a gambler or guilty of having illegally gambled. Additionally, the bill debated
and delimited ‘public places’ with the intention of curbing games that were practiced in
public streets or other places that were open to public gathering. The Act was passed as the
Bombay Act III of 1866169 and was the precursor to Act III of 1867.
Though decisive in scope, the Act harbored was ambivalent about the trustworthiness of
the native daroga. It was decided that it would not be prudent to grant the police arrest and
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warrant powers in mofussil areas. Accordingly, the Act was limited to the suppression of
gambling only in large towns and their suburbs and not the entire presidency. However,
just like in Burma, it was soon discovered that more than the local police, it was the
gamblers who circumvented the jurisdictional limits of the law, setting up shop in liminal
spaces like railway stations which went undefined in the Act of 1866. To prevent this, the
government extended the powers of the act beyond cities and towns. In 1887, therefore,

the regional gaming law of 1866 was amended and the Bombay Prevention of Gaming Act
(Act IV of 1887) enacted. The latter extended powers of the police beyond cities and towns
in the Presidency, also equipping the police with jurisdiction over the island of Salsette,
which was considered the new hotbed for gambling. The Superintendent of Police was
given the power to take cognizance of any crime related to illegal gaming in the Presidency
and issue a warrant for search and seizure.170 Parts of the city of Bombay, however,
remained untouched by the new law and continued to be governed by Act XIII of 1856
(Sections 56 and 66).

Instrumental Logic
Act IV of 1887 was initially successful in tackling the problems of illegal gaming in
Bombay. However, novel impediments were faced when rain gambling proliferated in the
presidency. In 1889, a case was presented before the Bombay High Court in which
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Narotamdas Motiram and Hemraj Khemjee were accused of renting a shed near
Mowbadevi, where they had set a stall for the purpose of rain gambling, a game that was
soon to gain notoriety as a popular pastime amongst Marwaris in Delhi, Bombay and most
notably, Calcutta.171 Rain gambling involved guessing the probability of rain on a
particular day. Bets were arranged on the incidence of actual rainfall, on the quantity of
rain, and on whether rainfall would be enough to cause a measuring tank, the moree or

mohri, to overflow. In the Narotamdas case a third bet was also in play. The water that
overflowed from the moree had to strike a wooden cone called ‘lakri ki moree’. The game
was arranged around wagers made collectively by the participants and registered by a
bookie - in this case, Motiram and Khemjee both - who charged a commission on each
individual bet.172 The police inspector of Mowbadevi attested to the popularity of the game.
He himself had witnessed, at a time, nearly five to seven hundred people in the shed,
absorbed in play. He seemed certain that the stall run by Motiram and Khemjee was nothing
more than a public betting house - a contested description, given that betting and wagering
were not illegal in India, but were described as informal contracts that the courts did not
recognize or enforce. I will forego a detailed narrative of the case since it has already been
covered quite comprehensively by Ritu Birla in Stages of Capital.173 Instead, through a
quick summary, let me highlight the relevant details that inform the ongoing discussion.

The fact that wagering was not mentioned explicitly as an illegal act meant that the
prosecution had to prove that rain betting constituted a game. As was the case in Burma,
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section 294 A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) could not be implemented since the bet could
not be considered a lottery. Besides, unauthorized lotteries could only be shut down under
‘complaint made by order or authority of government’ - another criterion that was not
satisfied.174 While the defense insisted that rain betting did not constitute a game, Mr. Frere,
the lead prosecutor, argued for their similarity. According to him, betting was gaming, and
a public betting house was no different in intention than a ‘common gaming house’. After

all, the law was not designed to categorize variation but to prohibit people with no prior
relationship from gathering and playing for money. Frere contended that rain betting could
be viewed as a game of chance if one considered its required paraphernalia, such as the
aforementioned moree or a rain gauge, which in his opinion were ‘instruments of gaming’.
However, the argument moved from the conclusion to the premise. If betting was not the
same thing as gaming, then the instruments that facilitated the former could not be used to
demonstrate its links to gaming. The premise was fragile and for Jardine, the circumvention
was obvious:
The proper meaning of the term “instrument of gaming” of course depends on the
proper construction of the term gaming; and if this term does not include betting, it
will, I think, necessarily follow that Mr. Frere’s contention is unsustainable.175
Again, Jardine felt that Frere had confused his categories. The rain gauge, he explained:
[…] registers quantity just as the watch in the hand of a Judge registers time, or as
a thermometer is used to register heat or a barometer the pressure of the atmosphere.
Its use resembles further the use of these instruments in that it does not introduce
any element of chance into betting.176
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Like in Burma, Jardine drew attention to Tollet vs. Thomas, the London case discussed in
the previous chapter, clarifying that only instruments like the pari-mutuel that had been
designed explicitly for use in gaming could qualify as ‘instruments of gambling’. To extend
the definition to objects that were in only in incidental use would set a dangerous precedent.
The Chief Presidency Magistrate agreed:
For all I know to the contrary bets may have been laid whether the accused in the
present case will be convicted or discharged by the Chief Presidency Magistrate,
but I trust that my present judgment may not be deemed an ‘instrument of gaming’
merely because some bets may be dependent on it.177
I shall return to the astuteness of this comment later. For the moment, let us move to the
fallout of the judgment. Though Narotamdas and Khimjee were acquitted, their case
sparked a debate in the Legislative Assembly about the need to amend the recently drafted
law. In 1890, an amendment was made to section 3 of Act IV of 1887, where the term
‘wagering’ was included within the definition of gaming.178 During the Proceedings of the
Council of the Governor of Bombay, Sir Raymond West made a remarkable statement:
It might be thought that by interfering with this form of gambling, betting on horse
racing would by a logical consequence have to be put a stop to; there is something
to be said for that, but if you carried out the idea to the logical end then even
insurance offices would be doomed; although the ground principles are extremely
hard to determine, the general applications are easy, and Government, who have to
look to the good of society in general, have been obliged to take the matter up in a
practical rather than a systematic way.179
In elaborating the principles propping the Act, West drew attention to the problems of
taking the ‘idea to the logical end’, which would have threatened legitimate businesses like
177
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insurance and leisure activities like as horse racing. Ritu Birla has observed that the Chief
magistrate’s argument in the case, that ‘speculation on commodities and shares was like
rain betting’ indicated that ‘even before wagering was criminalized in Bombay in 1890,
market speculation had been interpreted as an engagement with chance, rather than an
exercise of skill.’180 However, when West grouped insurance within the ambit of
resemblant practice, the principle extended beyond just taking risk to make money and now

included hedging to avoid loss. Importantly, as West urged his fellow law members to
abandon the systematic in favor of the pragmatic to achieve purposive ends, he also
privileged the substantive over the formal features of anti-gaming laws.
The benefits of administrative pragmatism did not persuade Jardine, who knew that such
laws held repercussions over other fields of activity too. More importantly, it undermined
the authority and purpose of statutory law, which James Fitzjames Stephen had once

represented as the tool of ‘moral conquest’ in the colony.’181 Judging from his reading of
statutes, we have seen that Jardine also held similar regard for legislative lawmaking and
abhorred judicial legislation. What informed this particular prejudice?
The question regarding judicial practice and ideology has drawn the attention of legal and
post-colonial scholars of South Asia. The ideology or motivations of judges, however,
more readily reveals themselves when judicial practice ‘deviates’ from the explicit
directives of the legislature. In a rich and persuasive article regarding ‘semi-autonomous’
judges in South Asia, Mitra Sharafi has questioned whether colonial judges actually
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‘functioned consistently as the state’s emissary.’182 Instead, what interests her are the real
practices of judges who made ‘quiet departures from colonial legislation and treatises’ and
let personal notions of equity and ideology permeate their rulings and interpretations.183
Sharafi’s method is similar to Partha Chatterjee’s cryptographic reading of the ‘secret
histories of nationalism’, through a reading of the silent cultural and political consciousness
amongst native judicial agents towards the end days of colonialism.184
But how do we rescue the ideology and principles of a judge who did not ‘deviate’ from
written rules and treatises – of someone who, in fact, followed the code? How do we
account for his substantive thought process, silent motivations and desires to bridge the
worlds of procedural law with the transcendent idea of justice? Quite obviously, even while
following the law to the letter, Jardine could hardly be described as the ‘state’s emissary’.
Both in Burma and later in Bombay, his judgments caused a fair bit of controversy. His

ruling in Burma triggered the need for a new law, which came through Act XVI of 1884.
But when amending this law in 1898, the reviewers admitted that the need for it had only
arisen because of ‘the then Judicial Commissioner differing from the Recorder, for some
reason which did not commend itself to anyone else.’185 Jardine himself recognized his
unpopularity amongst the executive branch and even acknowledged it in an essay written
in 1893, where he weighed in on the suitability of the jury system in India:
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When I was Judicial Commissioner of Burma, I remember hearing a story which is
quite consonant with judicial nature. A general inquiry being made about the
increase of crime, one Magistrate reported that the Judicial Commissioner was the
cause, meaning that the superior tribunal was too prone to acquit on appeal men
rightly convicted by himself.186
But such criticism did not deter Jardine. To understand why requires a bit of historical
reconstruction. As critical legal histories have convincingly argued, even when analyzing
formalist legal practices, the analyst must abandon approaching the law and its various

applications as a closed epistemic system and pay closer attention to the social milieu
through which it emerges.187 In that spirit, through a hermeneutic reading of fragments,
what follows is an attempt to recreate the motivations informing Jardine’s judicial practice.

Constituting Justice Jardine

John Jardine joined the Bombay Civil Service in 1864. There is no record of when he
moved to lower Burma; it would have been after 1872, when the judicial and executive
powers of the Chief Commissioner were dissolved and a separate post of Judicial
Commissioner was instituted.188 Jardine was the Judicial Commissioner of Burma in 1883
and would remain so till he became the Chief Secretary to the Bombay Government in
1885, the same year as his investiture as judge of the Bombay High Court. He retired from
his post in 1897 and returned to England. In England, he entered politics and was elected
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in 1906 as the Member of Parliament for Roxburghshire, which he represented till his death
in 1919. In the archive, Jardine is not present in the auto/biographical mode – there is not
much by way of self-publication or biographies. The historical traces are in his judgments,
questions he asked, and observations he made as a member of parliament, an article he
wrote on the suitability of the jury system in India and from a preface written to a book by
Maung Tet Pyo titled Customary law of the Chin Tribe. These limited sources inform the

following analysis.
Jardine took institutions seriously and performed his duties both as judge and as member
of parliament accordingly. A firm believer in the separation of the functions of government,
he asked a fair number of questions during his time in parliament, which he believed was
the duty of every elected representative. In spite of his praise for James Fitzjames Stephen,
he did not appear beholden to Stephen’s views regarding the despotic power of political

conquest and as legislator, he often criticized excessive and unauthorized use of power in
the colonies. In fact, he expressed no ‘sympathy with that class of writers who wish or
expect that no questions will be put in Parliament about the official action taken in India.’189
Though a majority of his interventions concerned the county he represented in Scotland,
he kept a keen eye on both India and Burma. In 1914, he questioned Parliament on the need
and fallout of the imposition of martial law in Punjab. He inquired whether the provisions
of the order had been reversed by the enactment of a new law, since the previous law had

189

Jardine, Jury 299.

73

allowed for significant military excess and brutality.190 The concerns regarding the use of
exceptional or emergency military law in the British Empire were also concerns within the
metropole, especially in the wake of the increased militancy of Irish Home Rule
movements – this was another one of Jardine’s worries. His opinions regarding the balance
between the questions of law and sovereignty surfaced once more during the discussion of
the Indian High Courts Act in 1911, where he praised the colonial judicial system for being

‘independent’ of the political compulsions of the state. At the time, his position was
endorsed by the future Prime Minister of England, Ramsay Macdonald, who agreed that
the High Courts represented ‘the very best sentiments and traditions of British justice.’191
From Jardine’s praise of the High Courts and repeated follow-ups regarding the autocratic
use of power, we get a sense of his anxieties regarding executive overreach. The question
of executive overreach was one that was already entangled with the operation of various

anti-gaming laws, which several administrators felt were constantly misused by native
police officers.192 This impression is reinforced by the case of Jung Bahadoor discussed
earlier. But the apprehension was also baked into early police laws, ones that treated
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gambling as a nuisance. Accordingly, through various clauses, curbs were placed on the
police in Act III of 1867.193 The Secretary to the Government of India, E.C. Bayly, had
advocated similar caution when operationalizing the Police Act of Bombay:
The exercise of the power given by Act XIII of 1856 I am directed to observe
is reserved to the commissioner of police personally. If any less responsible
and less experienced agency were used the Governor General in Council
fears that the very large powers given by section 58 would be often seriously
abused.194
Jardine’s fears of political excess made him a natural ally of paternalist administrators like
Mountstuart Elphinstone and John Malcolm, for whom he reserved generous praise. In his
preface to Customary law of the Chin Tribe, he described Elphinstone as a ‘profound and
far-seeing’ administrator and in a question regarding the ‘Unrest in India and Partition in
Bengal’, he described Malcolm as a ‘distinguished governor’, who had said:
[T]hose responsible for pointing indiscriminate abuse at the people of India were
usually deficient in a full knowledge of their language…He himself had been
associated for years with native Indian judges in the High Courts, men of high
reputation, great learning, and versatile capacity.195
Jardine’s endorsement offers some insight into how he viewed native judicial acumen, his
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reference to their ‘great learning and versatile capacity’ indicates his views on the
population he administered, or more accurately, judged. These opinions are elaborated in
his essay on the jury system in India. The essay responded to the question regarding the
suitability and effectiveness of the jury system in India. As an answer, he composed
somewhat of a field review. Though contestable, I detect in it a notable slant towards the
usefulness of the system and his trust in native jurors.
Complaints against the native jury came from a section of critics who claimed that natives
were prone to acquit their fellow men, a practice that the former suspected stemmed from
racial hostility towards the British, a suspicion reinforced by the unwillingness of native
jurors to sentence their countrymen to death. But Jardine took this to be the sentiment of
an ‘advanced civilization’, like that of the Hindus and the Jains, who abhorred violence
and were also forgiving. More importantly, unlike in the case of Ireland, ‘where, it is

alleged, crime becomes rampant because local juries, misled by political feeling, agrarian
grievances or outside intimidation, refuse to convict on clear un-contradictory testimony,’
Jardine failed to detect a similar sentiment in India, where native ‘desire for pure justice’
was, ‘invariably shown’.196 His belief thus ran contrary to many of his compatriots,
especially in the wake of the controversies surrounding the Ilbert Bill. He continued to
champion the inclusion of Indians in the colonial justice system, as he reiterated in the

context of the Indian Councils Act in the House of Lords in 1909:
It was well known to those serving in India that the administration gained
immensely in every way and at every point, and especially in times of peril, when
it had competent native advisors on whom it could depend and I welcome the belief
196
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that this Bill was intended to assist the Secretary of State for India to bring into his
Council some of the natives of this country, who were familiar with the opinions
and the feelings of the people on many questions, familiar to a degree that no British
official - however well-qualified in other respects - could possibly be.197
Jardine remained optimistic on two counts - that Indians were appreciative of British law,
and that British law would only succeed when it operated dialogically, by utilizing
indigenous knowledge through institutional support. The jury was the embodiment of this
medley; a neoteric ‘panchayat’ of sorts. Perhaps it was this belief, coupled with his general
regard for James Fitzjames Stephen that pushed him to endorse the latter’s views on the
jury, even if the statement contradicted his own formalist methods of decision making.
The use of juries, when fairly good juries can be had, possesses some undoubted
advantages. It prevents the main principles of justice and legal reasonings from
being hidden away in technicalities. Everything laid before a jury has to receive a
popular exposition and be submitted to common sense tests. The jurymen
themselves receive and carry away a true idea of legal principles.198
By including this quote by Stephen in his essay Jardine apparently agreed that British or
‘foreign’ law was legible only when it was inclusive and transparent. Against pedantic
practices, one detects the privileging of West’s appeal for the practical over the systematic,
the effective over the technical. But when brought together with Jardine’s general suspicion
regarding executive overreach in the colony, the implications are no longer straightforward.
For Jardine, the law was a shield, not a sword. So, the simplification of technicalities could
only be understood as ‘justice’ when it empowered the governed, not the State.
Perhaps the best indication of Jardine’s views on codified and statutory law come from his
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preface to Maung Tet Pyo’s book on the customary practices of the Chin tribes of Burma.199
In his foreword Jardine acknowledged that the ‘Burmanizing and civilizing process’ were
advanced amongst certain tribes as compared to others.200 However, even amongst the
more ‘civilized’:
The question remains, what happens to a Chin if he disobeys a rule? In British
Burma a Chin seeking legal redress would have to go to the ordinary courts, which
apply the Procedure Codes, the Penal Code, the Contract Act, and the Special Relief
Act. There is no statute that perpetuates Chin customs or gives the Chins a right to
Chin laws. If any rule contained in the book I am editing is alleged as a custom, it
would have to be proved if not admitted by the other party. 201
In claiming that no rule recognized the ability of the Chin to determine their own rules,
Jardine invoked what legal scholar H.L.A Hart would later term the ‘rule of recognition’a higher order or system of rules that legitimize the operation of everyday laws. For modern
legal systems, the ‘rule of recognition’ also maps onto the legislative process - the rules
that emanate from this process are recognized as ‘law’ and are binding on the officials
tasked with their implementation. The customary rules of the Chins could not be given the
stature of law since colonial conquest had established a new order of legitimacy. At the
same time, the violence of this conquest itself remained outside the categories of legitimate
or illegitimate. The willful disavowal of conquest continued into Jardine’s next set of
observations. He believed that customary rules could be admitted into legal canon if ‘it was
in its nature so reasonable as to be entitled to recognition of a Court of Equity.’202 Jardine
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thus absorbed the original violence of conquest and displaced it onto higher standards of
‘reason’. For Chin or British, it was reason and not political sovereignty that determined
whether custom could become law. Unlike the paternalists he admired, he refrained from
eulogizing the customary simply because it was autochthonous. Attentive to the warnings
of Henry Maine, he declared:
The tendency of making a formal record of customs is to give the customs a fixity
and uniformity which they never acquire in native society, where they would
fluctuate, change or disappear under the influence of new sentiments, new laws,
and other changing conditions of life and government…I take the decision of the
High Court of Bombay in Mathura Naikin’s case to be in point of fact a judicial
declaration against giving any such weight to customs the people have discarded as
unsuited for present times.203
Jardine thus warned the author of a purely mimetic practice of codification. Customs could
be made formulaic, standardized and codified, yet their status as law was ultimately
dependent on their reasonableness, not on their outward appearance. Nasser Hussain has

compellingly posited that the contradiction between the political and moral imperatives of
colonialism were resolved by the incessant refinement of legal procedure—its most elastic
and closely guarded realm.204 However, Jardine’s refusal to separate form from content
was a declaration against the cosmetic transformation of custom. Eventually it was the
Courts that were left with the task of ‘recognizing a new and good usage rather than an old
and bad one, and for their leaning toward the opinion of the more enlightened part of the

community.’205 Jardine directly invoked Maine when he claimed “that the change from
status to contractual relation is always going on”, and it was the task of the Court to enable
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this transition.206 Broadly then, he argued that political sovereignty was determined by
reason and the latter was functionally responsible for the historical evolution from status
to contract. Laws in operation such as the Contract Act or the Penal code, were not enforced
because of conquest but was the historical culmination of reason itself. As a result,
codification was not a process applied over just any content, rather it was the
reasonableness of the content that determined its potential to be codified.
These snippets paint an impressionist image of Jardine’s judicial philosophy. From the
foreword written for Maung Tet Pyo, his opinions resemble those of the early Utilitarians
like Macaulay, who believed in both the superiority and transformative capacity of English
law when introduced to the colony in the form of codes. His repeated and adulatory
references to Stephen reveals the importance he gave to both the legislative process and to
its final product. However, he was also sympathetic towards the native population onto

whom these laws applied. Like the paternalists, he was attentive to and valued
autochthonous knowledge and believed in meaningful collaboration with the governed. He
also believed that ‘educated’ natives both appreciated the sophistication of British law and
understood its potential to transform and modernize the country. His faith in such laws,
emerged from a deep belief in their underlying principles of equity and justice. In order for
this to be actualized, such laws needed to function in accordance with their original intent

and be saved from the corrupting influence of executive overreach, a routine affair in the
colony.
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Is this what pushed Jardine to read statutory laws formally? In a dense and perceptive
article, Faisal Chaudhry attempts to bring Weber’s four categories of meaningful action as
well as his categories of legal thought into harmonic conversation. According to Chaudhry,
‘Weber’s choice of conceptually segregating the categories of legal thought from his
general sociology of meaningful action is revealed in his precocious but unsuccessful tactic
for solving the problem of judicial legislation.’207 Quite astutely, Chaudhry sees Weber’s

efforts to separate the functions of ‘law making’ and ‘law finding’ as emblematic of a
consuming debate in the Anglo-continental legal tradition, which ‘desired to uphold the
ultimate coherence of the formalist construction of the liberal state.’208 Chaudhry agrees
with Duncan Kennedy when he concludes that if judicial decision-making were to be
placed within Weber’s broader categories of ‘meaningful action’ then, counterintuitively,
only when a judge acts formally and not substantively, can his/her action be described as
value rational - in accordance to an ethical or higher order value.209 From Jardine’s
comments in Customary Law of the Chin Tribe, it is possible to read his faith in the ‘the
equity’ of codified (British) law as an incitement to formalism. If well-deliberated British
legal systems were a guide for society to move from status to contract, then its principles
needed defending. As a result, as we shall see in the following section, when the
opportunity presented itself in a year’s time during the proceedings of Queen Empress vs
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Govind and Others210, Jardine would once again ignore West’s plea for privileging the
‘practical’ over the ‘systematic’.

A Man Must have a Code
In Queen Empress vs Govind and Others (1891), the accused were arrested without a
warrant and charged under section 12 of Bombay Act IV on the grounds that they were
playing for money with ‘instruments of gaming’ on a public footpath. The game was ‘pitch
and toss’; coins were thrown in the air and those that landed with ‘the named side’ on top
were won by the thrower. The accused were acquitted by the district magistrate on the
grounds that coins were not ‘instruments of gaming’. The decision was appealed in the
Bombay High Court, which brought the case to Jardine’s attention. Jardine reiterated his

conclusions from the Nga Po Thit and Narotamdas cases and clarified that only such
instruments that were designed for the explicit purposes of gaming could be considered
‘instruments of gaming’. In an elaborate analysis of the words ‘instrument’ ‘subject’ and
‘means’, Jardine settled on the principle that for him ended the debate definitively:
[The] Act of 1890 departs from the phraseology of the English Acts and includes
‘any article used as a subject or means of gaming’ while ‘gaming’ shall include
wagering, I think we ought to see whether the real meaning was, as I think, to make
it more easy to obtain convictions in cases of wagering at common betting houses
and such place. It is difficult to suppose that the words ‘subject’ and ‘means’ apply
commonly to games…But we do speak of the subject of a bet or a wager, and we
find in the decisions that in wagering cases the Courts have had very carefully to
consider the legality or illegality of ‘means’ used to stimulate betting or decide on
bets…Whatever the word ‘subject’ as distinct from ‘means’ may intend in the
210
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Bombay Act of 1890, I think there would be no difficulty in holding that the
contrivances used are instruments or means of wagering, it being proved that they
have no other use.211
The words ‘instruments’, ‘means’ and ‘subject’ though used interchangeably, held
particular meanings in Jardine’s reading. Most notably, he decided that the word
‘instrument’ needed to be read in its objective sense and not as the adjective - instrumental.
Accordingly, an instrument was an object designed for the sole purpose of gaming (like a

pari-mutuel) and could have ‘no other use’, a construction that was particularly problematic
for certain forms of evidence regarding gambling.
When gamblers were arrested through a sudden raid, the police seized what they could as
evidence to prove the place to be a ‘common gaming house’. This task proved particularly
difficult for certain games like flyloo, a betting game played in Burma during the closing
decades of the nineteenth century. The game involved people betting on which cube of

sugar, between two cubes, would attract a fly. Those who had bet on the cube on which the
fly landed would win the collective pot. In such a game, how would the police determine
an ‘instrument’, if all they had to go by were two pieces of sugar on a table? Faced with
nothing else, the police often seized money and presented it as evidence of gaming. Money
was, of course, an unstable ‘instrument’, difficult to hold to the formal and descriptive
reading proposed by Jardine. Even after confiscation, it spoke of its double nature.
In the Jung Bahadoor case, narrated in the previous chapter, of all the objects recovered in
the raid and later presented as ‘instruments of gambling’, the most interesting ones were
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the cowrie shells that lay on a table. The accused claimed that the shells were ritual objects
for the Sattanarayan Puja, while the police felt that it was the money staked in the game.
The fact that cowrie shells were instruments of gaming was not a far-fetched suspicion. A
successful raid would in all probability recover money in some form or the other. However,
after being confiscated, what became of the nature of this money? Was it devalued as a
piece of evidence? The question had been raised in the Bombay Province previously in

1878 in Crown vs Rambhat Paremeshware Bhat and 5 others.212 The accused contended
that if the confiscated money was not returned to them after the case was concluded, then
a fine was additionally punitive. Seeking clarity on this question, the District Magistrate of
Kanara wrote to the Remembrancer of Legal Affairs. The latter informed him that there
was nothing in Bombay Act III of 1866 which authorized the confiscation of money.
Section 5 did authorize the police to ‘seize all money reasonably suspected to have been
used or intended to be used for the purpose of gaming’, but it was left to the magistrate
trying the case to decide what to do with the money after the sentence had been passed.213
The Magistrate therefore concluded that:
[…] there is a distinct provision made concerning the instruments of gaming of
whatever kind and no provision whatever made for the confiscation of moneys
found…Where they [instruments] are alluded to as “cards, dice, counters, cloth
board or other instruments of gaming used in playing any game” the section
excludes money which is mentioned particularly in the provisions of section 5 but
as distinct from instruments of gaming. Section 5 provides for the “seizure of all
instruments of gaming and all moneys.214
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Money could not be presented as an instrument of gaming as, even after confiscation, it
continued to exert its value monetarily. Jardine partly noted this when he mentioned that
section 12 of Act IV of 1887 required the magistrate to confiscate or destroy the evidence
of ‘instruments’, which in the case of money was impossible, as confiscating money and
then fining gamblers could be regarded as double sentencing.215 Since money could not be
just the one thing, it could not be evidence of an ‘instrument of gambling’. By drawing

attention to its universal nature, it successfully defied any pure descriptive or tautological
understanding - an instrument of gaming is an instrument of gaming. Importantly, it pointed
to the logical difficulty of descriptively defining ‘instruments of gaming’ since objects like
a cube of sugar or money generated meaning only relationally.
The problem was compounded by the provisions of Section 7 of Act IV of 1887 that defined
what constituted the ‘proof of keeping or gaming in a common gaming house.’
When any cards, dice, gaming table, counters, cloth, board or other instruments of
gaming used in playing any game not being a game of mere skill, are found […] it
shall be evidence until the contrary is made to appear that such house, room or place
is used as a common gaming house…although no play was actually seen by the
magistrate or police officer or by any person acting under the authority of either of
them.216
Given that the arrests secured in a ‘common gaming house’ could take place ‘although no
play was actually seen by the magistrate or police officer’, ‘instruments of gaming’ needed
to be self-evident, like pari-mutuels, cards, or dice. In Robert Reid’s short narrative on
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‘Gambling in Calcutta’, the final raid on the gaming den had confirmed the police’s
suspicions through precisely this definition:
The Hadjee's Koran was bound with the cover of an old musical album, and in the
space which once contained the musical instrument, were found two packs of cards,
six sets of dice, and a square piece of cloth on which was printed birds and animals,
a game in which Chinamen only, as a rule, indulge. The Hadjee's Koran and its
contents were produced in Court and caused immense laughter.217
Once found, the instruments criminalized the entire space. What was presented as religious
gathering now became a gaming house. However, some degree of legal over-determination
was still at play when it came to viewing these objects as ‘instruments of gaming’. Could
these objects not be found in spaces that were not common gaming houses? This precise
question was asked by the Amrita Bazar Patrika in the context of the rain gambling bill of
Bengal in 1897:
For what ‘house’ in the land, from the Viceregal palace downwards can be found,
what ‘tent’ civil or military, what ‘space’, where a Church or bazar is being laid,
in which there are not ‘cards’, ‘dice’, table-cloth, boards or other instruments of
gaming? And by section 6 of this Act, “when any cards found in any house,’ it shall
be evidence that such house, tent etc., is used as a common gaming house.218
Then came the attack regarding partisan vision:
It is, however, a very hard matter to prove a negative like that; for, how can one
prove satisfactorily that the cards found in his house were not meant for gaming
purposes […] but as the Viceroy or any civil and military officer or any non-official
European has no fear from such raids in their houses, the Gambling Act does not
affect them at all. It is thus the poor natives who suffer and suffer terribly.219
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The charge of seeing similar spaces differently was aided by the work of petitioners like
Vinayak Sitaram who, in a letter sent to the government of Bombay, declared that his only
intention was to ‘prevent Hindus from molestation’. However, he apprehended this exact
possibility from the descriptions of ‘instruments of gambling’ in the gaming act of
Bombay.220 He claimed that most Hindu households customarily presented the groom,
(who, he clarified, was ‘always a boy’) with Dashavataari cards and Sonytis (16 wooden

or ivory figures). Could these innocent gifts criminalize all households? Even though these
gifts were intended for play, play was limited to Diwali.221 Continuing in the same vein, he
naively asked whether ‘respectable’ people walking past a cock fight could also be arrested
for ‘aiding and abetment’ gaming— terms that required ‘proper definitions’ in his opinion.
Clearly, the demand for legible definitions were not made by administrators and the police
alone.

What appeared as wide-eyed inquiries in Sitaram’s letter had turned to full scale outrage
in the columns of the Amrita Bazar Patrika by 1897. Alongside expressing indignation
regarding the double standards of gaming laws, the writer of the article in the Patrika also
exposed the problem with Jardine’s definition of ‘instruments of gaming’. For Jardine, to
substitute the words ‘instruments of gambling’ with ‘subject of gambling’, made the actual
object of evidence disappear. According to him, reading ‘instruments’ interchangeably

with ‘subject’ or ‘means’ of gambling was to overextend the discretionary powers of the
judge.
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The word “subject” as used in the Act of 1890 refers to something tangible, some
article, and is not equivalent to the phrase “subject matter of the wager” […] I think
“subject” is not intended to include stakes or the money risked; if the legislature
had so intended it would have said so. Combes v. Dibble illustrates the difficulty of
extending the meaning, and when dealing with stakes, the legislature used definite
words…and to include the money or stake would give a dangerous extension to the
rule of evidence enacted in section 7.222
Proper judicial practice was to clarify and not elaborate on legislative intention. In fact, he
repeated the exact phrase he had used in de-criminalizing ti in Burma - ‘if the legislature

had so intended, it would have said so’. The observation clearly reinforced his distaste for
judge-made law. His ruling, on the other hand, demonstrated restraint and sobriety. His
mechanical reading, so he thought, would limit ‘the dangerous extension to the rule of
evidence’, and avoid unnecessary harassment. At the same time, it also prevented
legislative intent from passing to a point of absurdity as anticipated by the comment made
by the Chief Presidency Magistrate, during the Narotamdas case – ‘I trust that my present
judgment may not be deemed an ‘instrument of gaming’ merely because some bets may be
dependent on it.’
However, as the Amrita Bazar Patrika article unintentionally exposed, Jardine’s reading
of the word ‘instrument’ betrayed a constitutive confusion regarding the true nature of the
‘common gaming house’; the sort of confusion that would be exposed by Ludwig
Wittgenstein twenty-three years later in a devastating review of Science and Logic by P.

Coffee:
He [Coffee] confounds classes and complexes. (Mankind is a class whose elements
are men: but a library is not a class whose elements are books, because books
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become parts of a library only by standing in certain spatial relations to one
another—while classes are independent of the relations between their members).223
Similarly, gaming houses were not a class constituted by elements like ‘instruments of
gaming’ and accordingly, ‘instruments of gaming’ did not have to be self-evident. As a
complex, the structure received property from the way its elements related to one another,
in the act of gambling itself. For this reason, it was possible to make a spatial distinction
between the Viceregal House and a ‘common gaming house’, even if the same
‘instruments’ were discovered in both places. Neither the term ‘place’ (as in Burma), nor
the term ‘instruments’ gave certainty to the features of the ‘common gaming house’. Its
only true feature was gambling—a practice that was not illegal and remained legally
fungible.
To maintain a legal premise, the term ‘common gaming house’ could not exist prior to
‘instruments of gaming’; the ‘common gaming house’ was a place that contained
‘instruments of gaming’, objects could not become ‘instruments of gaming’ because they
were found in a ‘common gaming house’. If strict definitions did not govern the category
of what was and what was not an ‘instrument of gaming’, then the only thing that prevented
the Chief magistrate’s ruling in the Narotamdas case from being included in the category
would be arbitrary will. Jardine felt that his reading had prevented this exact possibility.
He even congratulated himself on correcting a mistake that others were liable to make:
While I think my interpretation of the language will carry out the real meaning of the
Legislature and avoid absurdities and undue interference, I am not sanguine that this
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construction will prevent the occurrence of mistakes in applying this Gambling Act to a
large and new class of cases. Where so perplexing a word as ‘subject’ is used without
explanation, misconstructions are likely to occur.224
It is worth considering Jardine’s admission regarding the uncovering the ‘real meaning of
the Legislature’ coupled with his uncertainty regarding the ‘occurrence of mistakes’ in
future applications. The admission acknowledged the aporia at the heart of formalist
readings. Fred Dallmayr explains that the problem is that:
[…] rule governance or the ‘rule of law’ can be known independently of
circumstances as a purely rational proposition and furthermore the rule is the same
for all or applied in the same manner to all individuals […] however how can the
law or its content be fully known apart from any contextual concretization—given
that the law can never exhaustively stipulate its range of application.225
The formality of law is shaken in every case of application, which for Hans George
Gadamer is the ‘essential tension’ at the heart of all hermeneutics.226 Thus, even when
staying true to the code, Jardine was not so much rescuing a pre-existent meaning as he
was producing that meaning formally. According to Frederick Schaur, the caricature of
formalism – ‘to be enslaved by mere marks on a printed page’- does a certain disservice to
its ideological premise.227 As he puts it, ‘it is exactly a rule’s rigidity, even in the face of
applications that would ill serve its purpose, that renders it a rule.’228 However, when
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literality impedes the very purpose of law, is there a point in continuing to be tied to it? A
formalist answer would be ‘yes’, because the purpose of law is itself contestable, since any
immediate ‘purpose’ could always be challenged by a ‘deeper purpose’.229
Queen Empress vs Govind and Others is just a footnote in the legal archives on the subject.
The game of ‘pitch and toss’ was a minor game that did not sustain a historical life in the
same manner as rain gambling or commodity speculation. What then prompted Jardine to
tease out pedantic differences between language, law, and meaning, instead of handing the
gamblers a small fine? His careful attention to the differences between the words
‘instrument’, ‘means’ and ‘subject’ gave evidence of his larger understanding on how to
follow a rule, a theme that was debated in both the field of law and linguistics in nineteenth
century Britain. The kind of activity that Jardine imagined to be proper to a judge was
similar to what Wittgenstein imagined was the work of a philosopher—to clear the

confusions caused by ordinary language and reduce propositions to their simplest atomistic
forms.230 In fact, both Jardine’s judicial method and legal philosophy closely mirrored the
doctrines of analytical philosophy and jurisprudence that had gripped England towards the
end of the nineteenth century.
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Before Whitehead and Russel were to publish the Principia Mathematica in 1912, J.L
Austin had translated Gottlob Frege’s The Foundations of Arithmetics in 1884. Through
the last decade of the nineteenth century, Frege published widely on the nature of language,
teasing out the relations and differences between meaning, sense and function. Caught in
the tailwinds of natural order, Frege revised and replaced Aristotle’s analysis of subject
and predicate forms with function and argument, progressively shepherding him towards

the discovery of the order shared by both language and arithmetic. Accordingly, the truth
value of propositions was captured in logical as opposed to their grammatical forms. Just
like in arithmetic, Frege had imagined that the logical form of language could be discovered
through proper philosophical work, inspiring a generation of pupils in England, none more
notable than Bertrand Russell. Russell demonstrated in his theory of ‘definite descriptions’
that the logical form of the proposition was not its real form and that most philosophical
confusions regarding meaning and sense were caused by philosophers who focused on the
‘real forms’ of an expression and not the logical form of language.231 However, it was
Russel himself who would discover a paradox that impeded the advancement of a singular
logical form in the field of linguistics, as it revealed to him that the rules of language did
not correspond to the logical order of mathematics.232
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There is no immediate historical link discoverable between Jardine and analytical
philosophy. Yet, his formal and consistent reading of law reflected his juridical attitude
regarding statutory language. It also pointed to the close relation between analytical
philosophy and analytical jurisprudence of the nineteenth century. As observed by Nathan
Isaac, analytical jurisprudence was different from the constructivist approach of Utilitarian
law making, since it only “makes its appearance when there is a body of law on which to

work…[and] is worth analyzing because it is consistent with itself.”233 However, in Queen
Empress vs Govind and Others— Jardine himself was struck by the ambivalence of ‘rules’,
even in the closely guarded field of law. He understood that what made law a normative
system was its rule governed nature. Yet, the very system of rules that governed the
production of law did not self-evidently instantiate how the rule was to be followed. One
of Jardine’s icons, Fitzjames Stephen, believed that British codes were a ‘compulsory
gospel which admits of no dissent and no disobedience’. What Jardine had come to realize
was that even in explaining the ‘real meaning’ of the legislature he was still interpreting
its language and not obeying it.
What did it really mean to obey a rule? Wittgenstein once asked whether ‘obeying a rule’
is something that only one person could do just once in their life.234 It was possible, he
thought, although it violated the phrase’s grammatical meaning.235 What he meant was that
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importantly, what they believed was acting in accordance to a rule could be just one of the
many applications of the rule itself. Since the application of rules was in itself not ‘rule
governed’, Wittgenstein suggested that the act of obeying or following a rule was a
communal practice founded in choice, even custom.236 This led him to believe that ‘it is
not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be
the same thing as obeying it’.237 No individual could be the sole authority of a rule, as its

very condition was that it should be fallibly readable.238 Therefore, in extending his
analysis Wittgenstein concluded that a ‘private language’ based on a set of personal rules
that was invented and legible to just a single person, was an incoherent concept. As he
demonstrated through the beetle in a box thought experiment, the rules of language were
grounded in its communal usage, where the act of following or violating a rule was
‘understood’ and verified through social sanction, not through transcendental logic.239
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Similarly, Jardine realized that even when his judgment was faithful to the rules of ordinary
language it did not guarantee a perfect iteration. He had stumbled onto Wittgenstein’s
paradox —- ‘no course of action could be determined by a rule because every course of
action can be made out to accord with the rule’.240 This meant that coded law, even when
read formally, remained disturbingly arbitrary, and definitely customary. The code itself
suggested its multiple yet ideologically consistent applications. So, in 1892, when Justice

K.T. Telang provided a contrasting meaning of ‘legislative intent’ in the same set of
gambling laws, his interpretation remained consistent with the provisions of the code itself.
His judicial ideology and political sentiments, however, were very different from that of
Jardine’s.

The Problem of the Penumbra
Jardine’s reading and application of anti-gaming maintained somewhat fetishized his
fidelity towards statutory codes. Yet, a rigid code that relied on the self-evidence of terms
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and phrases was constantly up for creative challenge. As seen in Vinayak Sitaram’s letter,
clarity regarding definitions of terms like ‘instruments’ were demanded by the population
over whom the law applied. It may be that Sitaram was one of many law-abiding citizens
who was asking the government what it meant to ‘follow the law’. However, given the
extraordinary number of transgressions in the context of gambling, it was equally possible
that he was asking - ‘how to get away after breaking the law’. Just two short years after the

Amendment of 1890, under the weight of a growing list of challenges, a formalist
application of the Public Gaming Act had been stretched to its limit.
In 1892, in the town of Bhooleshwar in the Bombay Presidency, Khanjee Bhimjee and
Dosabhoy Eduljee were found running a rain gambling stall on Cathedral Road.241 The
accused claimed that they had ‘kept’ the stall for Puroshatamdass Hurkidordas, the owner
of the property. Curiously, they ran it quite openly and made little attempt to disguise its

nature. As the police were to discover, the problem of prosecuting this set of rain gamblers
was that they kept no instruments in the stall itself. Instead of having a mohri or cistern that
measured the quantity of rainfall, they ingeniously used the gutter lines and rooftops of
adjoining houses to measure rainfall. Oblivious to how it appeared, they were convinced
that legally speaking, they were not running a gambling stall. When brought to the Bombay
High Court, the matter was presided by Justice Parsons and Telang. Clear on the intent and

nature of the stall, the Judges had to admit that the limited definitions of ‘instruments of
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gambling’ and that of ‘keeping and owning’ made it difficult for them to prosecute the
accused.
The books that recorded bets, recovered in the police raid, were disbarred as evidence by
Justice Telang, who contended that they were ‘too remotely connected with wagering to
be described either as instruments or means or subject of wagering’.242 That left the
rooftops and the gutter lines of the houses neighboring the stall that had been used to
measure the rainfall. Mr. Invravity, who had previously represented Narottamdas
Motiram’s in 1889, contended that if these structures were included in the definition of
‘instruments’ then they would have to be seized and destroyed as was customary under the
provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act (Amended in 1890). The argument
was rejected, as Telang informed Inveravity that the law stated that the fate of such
‘instruments’ was to be decided at the discretion of the District Magistrate, Mr. Cooper,

who could decide to leave them where they were. Still, there was no getting around the fact
that the ‘instruments’ had not been ‘kept’ in the house itself, as Justice Parson observed.
The roofs of the adjoining houses clearly are not kept in the place in question. But
the advocate general contends that they are used therein since they are made use of
for the purpose of wagering therein. If this argument is sound, then it would have
been far simpler to have proceeded against the accused for the use of the rain itself
since that admittedly was used as the subject of wagering within the place. The bets
were laid on or against the fall of rain. I am unable, however, in any way to accept
the argument.243
Previously in Burma, Chinese daings had drawn lots in one house and announced winners
in another, thus allowing neither to be constituted as a ‘common gaming house’; in this
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instance, Eduljee and Bhimjee had broken its spatial harmony once again. Due to Jardine’s
formal interpretations, the Act had encouraged what the legal scholar H.L.A. Hart referred
to as ‘problems of the penumbra’. As a problem related to the reading of statutory law, the
challenge of the penumbra was first highlighted in the nineteenth century by legal scholars
the Realist school of jurisprudence.244 Hart critiqued the Realists for overdetermining the
endemic nature of the penumbra and concluded that they had overdetermined the influence

of the natural sciences on positivist theories of law. However, he did admit that:
They opened men’s eyes to what actually goes on when courts decide cases, and
the contrast they drew between the actual facts of judicial decision and the
traditional terminology for describing it as if it were a wholly logical operation was
usually illuminating; for in spite of some exaggeration, the Realists made us acutely
conscious of one cardinal feature of human language and human thought, emphasis
on which is vital not only for the understanding of law but in areas of philosophy
far beyond the confines of jurisprudence.245
Paraphrasing the Realists, Hart invited us to think of a park that bans vehicles from its

premises. At this point, objects like cars were close to the general meaning of the term
‘vehicle’ and would be naturally included within the prohibition. But what about a toy car,
roller-skates, or an airplane for that matter? Were these objects obviously denoted by the
term ‘vehicle’ and if not, what exactly was the legal rule that made the car a ‘vehicle’ as
opposed to a pogo stick? Since the objects did not declare themselves as ‘vehicles’,
judgement in such cases were not dependent on any logical deduction, since ‘deductive

reasoning cannot serve as model for what judges should do to bring particular cases into a
general rule’.246 This was the problem of the penumbra, a problem that early Utilitarians
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like Bentham and Austin had not given much thought to, though Hart felt that in such cases
even they might have given their approval for judges to legislate. For Hart, it was
Blackstone’s ‘childish fiction – ‘judges find never make law’, that birthed formalism in the
first place, while in Hart’s consideration, a particular judicial interpretation resulted in a
particular conclusion, but logic still remained ‘silent on how to classify particulars’ which
‘is the heart of the judicial decision’.247 He seems, however, to have underestimated the

fidelity that the practice would inspire in colonial judges like Jardine.
A similar aporia haunted Jardine; even statutes fell short of standardization since following
the code was an act of interpretation and not obedience. To eliminate variation, he tied his
interpretation to the rules of language, which he believed held logical coherence.
Accordingly, when he read ‘instruments of gaming’ as instruments designed for the
purpose of gaming, he thought he was providing stability to the code itself. However,

Marwari and Burmese gamblers had understood that terms like ‘common gaming house’,
‘place’ and ‘instruments of gambling’ did not describe the world as it really was; such
terms were only legal fictions dressed in semantic formality.
Let us return to the trial. As was common in these cases, the prosecution struggled to
establish the ‘common gaming house’ as per the vocabulary of law. They presented the
money seized in the raid as evidence of having found an ‘instrument of gaming’.
Predictably, the court dismissed the argument. Justice Telang even remarked with
amusement that ‘if halfpence are instruments of gaming, then we all carry these dangerous

247

Ibid.

99

instruments.’248 Even as their arguments crumbled rapidly, the prosecution boldly claimed
that they had recovered a clock from the house which according to them was instrumental
in deciding the time within which a bet could be placed. Would the judges be persuaded?
Mr. Invaravity invoked Jardine’s spirit when he argued that the meaning of the words
‘instrument of gaming’, as per the law, ‘must be confined to things that are specially
devised for and intended to be used for the purposes of gaming.’249 The Advocate General

raised objections to this definition and claimed that any object used for the purpose of
gaming should be an ‘instrument of gaming’; Justice Parsons remained unmoved. He failed
to see the ‘instrumentality’ of the clock:
All he says is that the clock kept accurate time, and was watched by gamers, and
that bets were decided by persons seeing the time by the clock, if necessary, but in
cases of no doubt, without reference to the clock. I cannot infer from this that bets
were made and decided by the time kept by this clock, which is necessary, in order
to make it an instrument of wagering.250

The prosecution was given a more sympathetic hearing by Parson’s Indian counterpart,
Justice Telang. Before coming to Telang’s verdict, let us consider the factors responsible
for his reasonings.

Reconstructing Telang
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Born in 1850, K.T. Telang matriculated from Elphinstone College, Bombay in 1864 and
obtained his his LL.B. in 1869, following which he became a ‘senior fellow’ at Elphinstone
and lectured in Sanskrit philology and literature. More than a passing interest, Telang’s
extensive knowledge of Sanskrit literature is evidenced in a detailed rebuttal of an article
by Albrecht Weber, who had claimed that the Ramayana was a copy of the Homeric
epics.251 He also wrote an essay on the life of Shakaracharya and his translation of the

Bhagvad Gita into English was included in Max Mueller’s compilation titled Sacred Books
of the East. A proud Maratha, both Shivaji and the Peshwa state found heavy praise in
many of Telang’s essays and speeches.252 Telang’s scholarship was not limited to the
classics, as he showed equal dexterity in political economy, natural philosophy and
European history. Ironically, he held respect for both Edmund Burke and Herbert Spencer,
the latter being the chief proponent of ‘social Darwinism’, a concept that heavily influenced
theories of eugenics and scientific racism in the colony.
Telang joined the Bombay High Court as a barrister in 1872. Here began his long
association with notable Indian lawyers, some being the founders of the Indian National
Congress in 1885. Inevitably, his political outlook was deeply influenced by the first blush
of nationalist thought forwarded by figures like Mahadev Govind Ranade, Sir Pheroz Shah
Mehta, Badruddin Tyabji and Dinshaw Edulji Wacha. In 1877, in a speech delivered at the

Sassoon Mechanics Institute in Bombay, he spoke in favor of preserving the seven and half
percent tariff charged on Lancashire and Manchester coarse cotton, arguing that the tax did
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not violate the tenants of free trade and was vital for the development of indigenous
industries like the Bombay cotton mills. He even spoke on the floor of the Congress in
1888, but removed himself formally from the organization when he was elevated to the
position of judge in the Bombay High Court in 1889.253 According to D.E Wacha, the
nationalist circles of Bombay were struck with profound regret by Telang’s elevation, as it
cut short his promising political career.254 Others were of the opinion that the new position

lent further gravitas to his politics.255 What was this politics and what was the nature of its
influence, if any, on his judicial decisions?
As mentioned previously, Fitzjames Stephen had written an article in the Times in 1883,
where he characterized British colonialism as “an absolute government, founded not on
consent but on conquest”. Writing in the wake of the Ilbert Bill, Stephen accused the
Viceroy of India, Lord Ripon, of shifting the foundation of colonialism in India. In a public

meeting held in Bombay in 1883, Telang repudiated Stephen’s arguments by putting
forward his understanding of colonial liberalism. Playing on the British imperial desire to
be traced back to Rome, Telang reminded them that the Romans had shared political
privileges with conquered populations in order to impart instruction.256 In reiterating his
loyalty to the British government he held them to the universalist assurances avowed in
liberal discourse. It was obvious that this generation of nationalists remained invested in

the transformative promises of Empire. Meanwhile, Auckland Colvin, a member to the
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Viceroy’s Council responded to the stirring around the Bill by asking educated Indians to
focus on internal social reform rather than political concessions; ‘indirect rule’ allowed
imperial discourse to place the task of transformation back onto Indians. Colvin claimed
that the political freedoms being demanded by Indians were harmful in the long run and
the gains of colonial modernity would be wasted by a non-progressive native society. How
did nationalists respond? We get an idea through Telang’s articulations.
In a letter to B.M. Malabari, a social reformer who campaigned against infant marriage and
enforced widowhood in the Bombay presidency, Telang shared his opinion regarding the
efficacy of eradicating such social practices through legislative action:
My faith in “the education of public opinion” as a great force is almost unlimited,
I believe that in the long run the results of that education are not only more enduring
but (what might seem paradoxical), more rapid than the results of artificial
remedies.257

At this time, Telang’s proposal was thus in direct opposition to the strategies adopted by
early social reformers like Vidyasagar, who utilized the State’s political might to effect
social changes onto an unwilling, orthodox Hindu majority.258 In just a couple of years’
time, however, Telang revised his views dramatically. Speaking to a public gathering in
1886, he confronted Colvin’s charge head on:

K. T. Telang, “Response to Malabari’s note on Infant Marriage and Enforced Widowhood in India”, in
Selected Writings and Speeches, p. 251.
257

As Tanika Sarkar has shown, Vidyasagar's crusade had succeeded largely due to his ability to gather
signatures from a minority of like-minded native subjects before the orthodox majority had the chance to
mobilize. He used the signatures to lobby the government of the time and convinced them that the majority of
the native population were ready to accept a bill that would allow widow remarriage. By the 1880’s, when
Malabari was active, the colonial state was unwilling to let universal moral laws permeate the native domestic
sphere. Tanika Sarkar, Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation: Community, Religion and Cultural Nationalism,
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010. p 232.
258

103

It is said that a nation socially low cannot be politically great, that history shows no
instance of such a condition. Now if this means that political and social progress go
on together, that the spirit of progress working in the political sphere always
manifests itself in greater or less vigor in the social sphere, I at once admit it.259
To emphasize his point, he provided a pre-colonial example:
In the days of the Peshava regime again, there was a liberalizing process going
on…I am inclined to strongly draw the inference, which I have held for a long time,
the if Peshva rule had continued a little longer, several of the social reforms which
are now giving us and the British Government so much trouble would have been
secured with immensely greater ease.260
Telang therefore coupled political action with social transformation. In doing so, he
privileged the moral and political importance of law as an agent of social change. But his
statement was fraught with internal contradiction, as reported by his fellow jurist Raymond
West. Following his untimely death in 1893, West penned a heartfelt tribute to his
colleague, documenting Telang’s many achievements and a few of his failings.261 West’s
fondness did not impede him from expressing disagreements. So, he saw Telang as a
Hindu, an erudite Sanskrit scholar, a progressive rationalist fostering a scientific temper
but also a father who married his daughter off at the tender age of eight, even though ‘the
act was opposed to his principles.’262 Sensitively, West registered this last detail as the
contradiction ubiquitously wrestled with by enlightened natives - looking to the future
while being tethered to tradition. Accordingly, when the stakes were not as personal, ‘he
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hailed with warm welcome the principle that custom must ameliorate, even the Hindu law,
and it was refreshing sometimes to hear him argue for ‘modernization’.263
In this, Telang bore resemblance to Jardine, who placed equity over custom, enfolded
within ‘modern’ British standards. But this is where the similarity ended. Unlike Jardine,
Telang valued the political and substantive objectives of law, which often went against
autochthonous sentiments. So, as opposed to Jardine, Telang did not hold a high opinion
of the native jury system and even opposed their involvement when ‘juries were found
unequal to the duties cast upon them.’264 Such substantive concerns marked a decisive
break between the two judges and while Jardine’s formal approach regarded the procedure
of law as an end in itself, for Telang, it was more of a means to an end. As a result, his
reading of law was informed by their intended effect, not their precise wording.

Redefining the Instrument
When the Bombay Public Gaming Act was first drafted in 1887, Telang expressed both his
awareness of and displeasure with its creative circumvention:
I am informed that people of the same class as those who were described by mover of Bill
have been exercising their wits to find out how to frustrate the working of the Act when
passed and one of the ways which seems to have suggested itself to their ingenuity is that
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they might go into Bombay harbor and play in boats… Council should expressly legislate
for these acts.265
He knew that many gamblers were one step ahead of the law, a problem which could not
be corrected by fixing its wording. This realization propelled him to take matters into his
own hands, and in the case from 1892, he declared the ‘clock’ to be an ‘instrument of
gambling’. In contradicting Justice Parson, he breathed intent into the words of the
legislature.
It is true that if Mr. Inverarity’s argument is correct to its full extent, these points
will be all immaterial. He contends that the interpretation of the material of the
phrase instrument of gaming in Watson Martin, and other authorities, adopted by
this court in more than one ruling is still good in spite of Bombay Act I of 1890.
This certainly appears to have been the opinion of Jardine J. But I find it difficult
to concur in that opinion. Prima facie, I should say that the very fact that the
legislature having all these authorities before it, lay down a fresh interpretation of
the phrase “instruments of gaming” affords by itself an indication, that some
enlargement of the scope of the words was intended. And secondly, I think that the
word “means” is a word with a wider signification than was given to the word
“instrument”, by the judicial decisions that have been alluded to. Taking the phrase
means of wagering in its ordinary idiomatic sense, I should say that it might fairly
be regarded as somewhat wider than the phrase: instruments of wagering. And
when the former phrase is added to by the latter, it seems to me difficult to avoid
the inference that some widening of the scope of the old law must have been
intended.’266
Telang took the language of amendment as a sign of legislative endorsement and decided
that the judiciary should take the lead in laying out a fresh definition for ‘instruments’. As
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opposed to Jardine, his reading of legislative ‘intent’ reinforced the substantive rationality
and moral prerogatives of law. Should we take this as a reflection of his politics?
In A Princely Imposter? Partha Chatterjee argues that “there was no mistaking the
nationalist location of the legal-political thinking of Pannalal Basu and Charu Chandra
Biswas”, judges who gave favorable verdicts for the petitioner claiming to be Ramendra
Narayan Roy, the middle child and a kumar (prince) of the Bhawal Estate in Bengal.267
Basu and Biswas were emblematic of a colonial judicial system that had silently turned
nationalist and was lying in wait for the transfer of power. Such judges were versed in the
universal principles of law, but they also understood the cultural peculiarities of the country
in which they were to be applied. For Chatterjee, they represented the secret history of
decolonization, “carried out not so much in street demonstrations, prisons, and conference
tables but within the interstices of the governmental apparatus itself.”268 Though the

Bhawal case was tried in the 1930s, by which time the national movement had matured
significantly, is it nonetheless possible to read back his observations as early as 1892? Were
there political and cultural imperatives animating Telang’s decision?
Gambling was low-hanging fruit, and Telang’s reading of legal intent repurposed law as a
political agent to effect social change. On the question of native gambling, his initiative
was not an anomaly either. Five years later, Surendranath Bannerjee, a senior leader of the
Indian National Congress in Bengal, would lead a crusade against the ‘vice’ of rain
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gambling in Calcutta. A persistent question for nationalist thought, native gambling was
treated as moral problem that was to be eliminated for the sake of social progress; as late
as 1935, Gandhi would describe gambling as a ‘moral evil’ that ‘destroyed the soul within’.
Telang’s verdict in 1892 quietly addressed these future concerns. It also marked a reversal,
where social transformation was absorbed within the political objectives of a liberal rule
of law. This did not go unnoticed by British commentators. When the bill to ban rain

gambling was framed in Bengal in 1897, The Englishman gleefully reported the irony that
‘Saturday’s Bill has been initiated, not by the restless and interfering European, but by the
ease loving and innovation-hating native of the country.’269
But let us not ahead of the story. The details of the Bengal rain gambling Act will be
addressed in the following chapter and, for now, let us conclude the case from 1892. Once
Telang had given his opinion, the final ruling was handed to the District Magistrate, Mr.

Cooper. The case had generated significant local interest and the Times of India ran weekly
periodicals reporting a blow-by-blow account of the events to its readers. On 23rd of
November 1892, Cooper’s final decision was disclosed:
It seems to me that looking as we are bound to do, at the history and course of
legislation on the subject we ought to hold that any article which is in fact used as
a means of wagering must be held to be within the definitions of wagering even
The Englishman, ‘Will it Cut Both Ways’, Monday, March 22nd, 1897, The paper continued, ‘There is at
first a suggestion of topsy turveybdom when we are confronted with the fiery reforming zeal of Mr. Surendra
Nath Bannerji, Mr Das, Rai Eshan Chander Mitter, and Rai Durgagati Banerjea, and when on the other side
we find the Hon’ble Mr. Wallis, the apologist of an abuse which is hallowed by the associations of three quarters
century…And Mr. Surendra Nath Bannerji asked why Mr. Wallis or the Chamber of Commerce, or the Trades
Association, should be supposed to take any interest in the matter. The curse did not affect the Europeans. It
was on the poor natives that the baneful spell rested, those natives who have cause to bless themselves that they
have a champion like the Hon’ble Surenda Nath, when a matter of life and death to them is being discussed.
This was all very pretty, and if Lord Ripon had been present, he would doubtless have felt that he had not lived
in vain.’
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though it may serve some other purpose or purposes. From the evidence it is proved
that this clock, though an ordinary clock, was placed in a prominent position at this
place and kept there and used there for the purpose of fixing the time of the rainfall,
or the time when the chance expired… that being so, I must hold, that it was an
instrument kept and used at the place as a subject or means of gaming.270
Cooper’s exegetical reading captured a sense of both success and failure. The fulfillment
of apparent justice was premised on judicial overreach, replacing the legislature as the
source of legal authority. Three short years ago, Jardine disqualified the rain gauge as an

‘instrument of gambling’, because it ‘registers quantity just as the watch in the hand of a
Judge registers time’. It is ironic that it was a ‘clock’ that finally broke his reasoning.
Telang’s judgment and Cooper’s decision instituted a new regime for colonial gaming
laws, where their constitutive powers were privileged over their regulative function.
Jardine had contended that since the police did not need to see gambling take place, the
evidence recovered from a ‘common gaming house’ needed to authoritatively suggest that

they were ‘instruments of gambling’. Accordingly, ‘instruments of gambling’, recovered
as evidence could only be those objects that were designed for the purposes of gaming.
Thus understood, the law was regulative— it regulated ‘an activity whose existence was
logically independent of the rules’, made by the legislature.271 By including the clock
within the ambit of ‘instruments of gaming’, gaming laws became ‘constitutive’— the
features of the ‘common gaming house’ was constituted by the law itself. John R Searle
argued that propositions that bear the structure: “X counts as Y in context C”, where ‘Y’
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carries positive or prohibitory consequences, are examples of constitutive rules.272 As
Searle explains:
Constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they create or define new forms of
behavior. The rules of football or chess, for example, do not merely regulate playing
football or chess, but constitute the game itself.273
As per Jardine’s definition, ‘instruments of gaming’ were self-`evident objects, which
existed apriori to becoming a legal category. Telang’s ruling reversed this as ‘instruments
of gaming’ were now constituted by the needs of various gaming laws. By severing the
formal distinctions placed on law by ordinary language, the Act came to exclusively define
what was to be seen as gambling and what was to be considered legal. Having embraced
its constitutive function, gaming laws returned to an original despotism that formal codes
hoped to overcome. In opposition to the words of Blackstone, gaming laws were no longer
required to find a ‘common gaming house’ as much as they could just make one.
What of the gamblers themselves? Derrida remarks that ‘the ‘sufferance’ of
deconstruction…is perhaps the absence of rules, of norms and definitive criteria that would
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allow one to distinguish unequivocally between droit [Law] and justice.”274 In the absence
of a centre or strict rule, gamblers who had previously constructed and deconstructed the
structure of the ‘common gaming house’, were to now undergo a period of sufferance.
Jardine’s ideological expulsion meant that gaming laws would now unfurl arbitrarily. By
1898, an Amendment to the Public Gaming Act (Burma), even included coins within the
definition of ‘instruments of gambling’. As if to erase Jardine’s legacy comprehensively,

the inclusion was made to regulate the ‘public nuisance’ of ‘pitch and toss’.275 Again, when
the case against rain gambling rose in Bengal in 1897, the Bengal Legislature no longer
felt the need to explain the formal differences between horse racing and rain betting and
opium betting. As anti-gambling laws overcame their need to explicate a ‘general rule’, the
Bengal Rain Gambling Act of 1897 simply banned the practice of ‘rain gambling’.
Regarding ‘instruments of gambling’, The Indian Daily News reported:

The report of the Select Committee on the Bill was presented, which defines “rain
gambling” as “wagering on the occurrence or non-occurrence of rain” while
“instruments of gaming” are defined as anything used as a means of rain gambling”
making it clear that clocks and waterspouts are included in the definition.276
‘Anything used as a means of rain gambling’ meant that the category was open for future
inclusions. Stirred by the indignation of the rain gamblers of Bengal, the article asked
fiercely:
Rain gamblers might take it into their heads to use the new Post Office clock as “an
instrument of gaming […] Then again, rain gamblers may not care to continue their
speculation in Burra Bazaar, or even in private, and might decide to assemble in
Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundations of Authority”, in Deconstruction and the
Possibility of Justice, ed. Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, David Gray Carlson, New York: Routledge, 1992.
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Dalhousie square, and register their bets by the waterspouts on any building in the
vicinity, say the Writers’ Building. Would those waterspouts be destroyed or
removed?”277
Having lost their authority in producing the features of a ‘common gaming house’, rain
gamblers might as well have played out in the open, in Dalhousie square. It might be less
objectionable to do than playing in a room or a house, behind closed doors.

Bucket Shops
While Telang’s judgment and the Amendment of 1890 effectively criminalized rain
gambling in the Bombay province, Bengal went in a different direction. In 1897 the
government passed the Bengal Rain Gambling Act, a specifically targeted law to prohibit
rain betting in the province. The events leading to its passage will therefore be covered in

the following chapter. It should be noted, however, that the efflorescence of rain gambling
had signaled a decisive break in colonial gaming histories. The organization of rain
gambling houses in both Bengal and Bombay had shifted the target of colonial law. The
concerns regarding gambling were no longer limited to petty crime or ‘nuisance’, nor did
the gambler map onto a class that could be coded as the ‘lumpen-proletariat’.278 Gambling
now came to be understood as a form of betting or wagering and involved a class of
participants who were men of commerce. To that end, other forms of wagering that
involved predicting the future prices of commodities like opium, cotton, grain, and silver
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developed coterminously with rain gambling. In many cases, like in the Punjab, rain and
commodity betting were carried on in common premises.
At the close of the nineteenth century, for instance, Egerton Road in Delhi played host to
a set of forty-four shops where speculators tried their hand at guessing the weekly price of
a chest of opium.279 Satta (betting), as it was popularly known, involved shopkeepers
offering individuals one to ten odds to guess the last two figures on monthly opium rates.
Opium was processed and packaged in Kanpur, following which it was shipped to Calcutta
where its price was declared through auction. Soon after, brokers would telegram shop
owners in other cities, informing them of both current prices and other relevant details
which might induce future fluctuations. So, if the chests were priced at Rs. 996, those who
put their bets down as 96, would be declared winners.
Limited by the definition of gambling and gaming as provided in Act III of 1867, the
authorities in Delhi and the Punjab encountered familiar problems when it came to
prosecuting these practices. Meanwhile, the alarming growth of wagering in the United
Provinces had begun to make local administrators apprehensive. Hatim Mirza, the Deputy
Inspector of Police in Rewari, was particularly disturbed by the prevalence of opium
gambling in his circle, and expressed amazement at the frequency with which his attempts
to regulate these practices were thwarted by his seniors, who repeatedly dropped charges
made against these shopkeepers.280 Frustrated, he wrote to the District Inspector of Delhi
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in 1898, alerting him to the duplicitous nature of legislation when it came to rain and opium.
He conveyed his suspicions that administrative apathy when it came to the latter was fueled
by the profits the government realized from the high volume of activity on the telegraph
lines the shopkeepers used to keep track of commodity prices in real time. Additionally, he
suspected that the government considered such wagering useful, since it maintained a
buoyancy in the market price of opium.281
A year after Mirza aired his concerns, Mr. Madan Gopal, barrister and member of the
Punjab Legislative Council, acted concretely on his misgivings by drafting a bill which he
and other likeminded members, proposed to the Legislative Council and the General
Secretary to the Government of Punjab, H.J. Maynard.282 The Bill was framed on the lines
of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act and recommended the inclusion of the word
‘wager’ in the ‘Punjab Prevention of Gambling Act, 1899’. This suggestion was, however,

turned down as the Secretary to the Government of India, J. P. Hewett, informed him that
what went on in the premises of these shops was not gambling, ‘but a form of betting on
the average price of the monthly opium sales in Calcutta.’283 Since ‘no appliances are
required and it is possible to bet at any place or any time… the Governor General in Council
considers that a sufficient case has not been made out for the amendment of Act III of
1867.’284 As the following chapter demonstrates, this statement contravened the reasonings
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that had spurred the Bengal government to pass the Bengal Rain Gambling Act just a
couple of years ago.
The government’s dismissal of Madan Gopal’s bill was taken as silent endorsement of the
practice and in the following years the shops rapidly multiplied. As per the report filed in
1908 by Mr. Missick, Superintendent of Police in the Punjab, sixty-six shops on Egerton
Road promoted daily gambling while the remaining facilitated opium satta on a particular
day of the month. Missick submitted his findings on Ank and Dara, variations of the
original satta.

285

So, if the price of opium was Rs 995, those who bet on the number 5

would receive ten times their deposit and those who bet on 95 would receive eighty times
their deposit. The former was referred to as Ank (the Marwari word for ‘one’) and the latter
as Dara (the Marwari word for ‘two’).286 In the same year, Mr. Humphry, the Deputy
Commissioner of Police, wrote to the Commissioner of Delhi to inform him of the growing

concern over the ascendance of crimes which large sections of the respectable community
associated with the thriving practice of Ank and Dara. He suggested the introduction of
some kind of law that would at least control and survey big gaming institutions, even if the
smaller shops slipped through the gaps in surveillance.287 After making a trip to Delhi’s
Egerton Road personally, Humphrey noted the excitement amongst the large crowds that
gathered on the street when the monthly betting shops released their results in the first week

of every month.288 He reported that tickets were issued from printed books which contained
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foil and counterfoil. The amount of the bet was left to the discretion of the bettor. According
to him, a system it seemed to offer the lure of a ‘get rich quick’ scheme. However, even if
a cluster of bettors chose the winning number, the shop owners would always be left with
a profit due to the very high possibility that on most days, most people, bet on the wrong
number. Crucially, Humphrey questioned the reliability of the information at the disposal
of the common man who placed the bet. Not only was the latter unaware of both market

dynamics and price fluctuations, Humphrey suspected that the proprietors spread false
rumors on the quoted prices, or favored odds which they secretly knew were bound to
fail.289
In a recent article, Christina Lubinski and Julia Rischbieter describe such practices of spot
betting on opium, and more importantly on cotton, as the development of early ‘futures
markets’ in colonial India.290 However, from appearances at least, it is more likely that

these shops had nothing to do with futures and were more akin to the ‘bucket shops’ that
cropped up in America during the closing decade of the nineteenth century. The term
bucket shop was used sparingly in India and was only invoked by the stewards of the Turf
clubs of Bombay and Calcutta when reporting illegal off site betting carried on race days
by unlicensed bookies. But the shops on Egerton road were similar to the bucket shops that
Stuart Banner has described as ‘a simulated brokerage where customers could ‘buy’ or

‘sell’ stocks or commodities.’291 Banner makes the claim that the number and popularity
289
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of bucket shops grew significantly following the invention of the stock ticker in 1867,
which allowed ‘anyone with a telegraph connection to receive price information nearly in
real time.’292 He also draws a difference between ‘honest’ and ‘dishonest’ bucket shops,
the former representing a more existential threat to the trades conducted on legitimate
commodity exchanges.293 Fraudulent bucket shops, like those that cropped up in the United
Provinces at the close of the twentieth century, were easier to distinguish. In spite of their

claims, in many cases, such shops had rigged odds from the very beginning. They attracted
an ignorant and unsuspecting clientele who approached commodity speculation as a form
of number betting, in which luck proved to be the prime motivator for play. Added to this
were more serious charges of fraud which involved a series of innovative strategies to dupe
customers. The easiest and most common method was the release of a false price, usually
a number that had the least bets placed on it. But other more cunning options were also at
the disposal of the proprietors:
[a] bucket shop owner could ‘hold the market’, that is, post prices only after a delay,
so the bucket shop operator would know the market’s directions before his clients
did. A bucket shop could even fleece its customers with real prices. Customers
typically purchased on very small margins, putting down as littles as 1 % of the
value of the stock or commodity nominally being purchased, so a price movement
of 1 % in the wrong direction was enough to wipe out a customer’s account. A
bucket shop operator seeking to make price move by 1 % could buy from a
confederate on the real exchange at the desired price, which would be duly reported
by telegraph. Once the customer’s accounts had been emptied, the confederate
would buy back at the same rice from the buck shop operator.294
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The last tactic indicates that bucket shop owners were probably speculators themselves,
who, by acting in consortium, could influence the daily price movements of commodities
by slight percentages for their own ends. While their own speculative activities remained
legitimate, the same could not be said for what went on in their shops, which was simply
price betting and bore little resemblance to futures or options contracts drawn between
merchants and buyers or amongst traders themselves.
Humphrey’s detailed report regarding such bucket shops served as warning to the Punjab
government. Rehearsing Mirza’s suspicions, he accused the government of maintaining a
purposive silence because of the profits realized from the telegrams sent by the shopkeepers
to Rewar, Bombay and Calcutta, which Humphrey calculated as amounting to ‘thousands
of rupees on a yearly scale.’295 Like his predecessors, Humphrey’s request for legislative
interference, too, fell on deaf years. The decision emboldened shopkeepers once more. By

1909, ‘some of those interested in satta gambling’, approached the Punjab Government
and requested them for a license for select shops.296 They suggested that they be charged
Rs 1000 for each license, which should remain valid for a period of three years. While this
particular appeal was rejected, the government’s apathy towards active interference in the
day to day operations of these shops encouraged them nonetheless. By 1910, the Deputy
Commissioner of Delhi, Mr. Barron, reported that 36 monthly betting shops, 38 daily

betting shops and 73 agencies (for the purchase of wager tickets) were to be found in Delhi.
Agencies were no less nefarious, as they drew the ‘respectable classes’ to such games

295

Home Department, Police-A, Proceedings, 96-96, June, 1916, NAI.

296

Ibid.

118

through the aid of domestic servants, who visited these shops to procure tickets on behalf
of their employers.297 In a couple of years, this phenomenon of number betting took roots
in Bengal as well, only this time with cotton.

Cotton Gambling in Bengal
‘A pernicious form of gambling has recently made its appearance in Calcutta, known as
“cotton gambling”’ reported H. Wheeler, the Private Secretary to the Viceroy Lord
Chelmsford in 1911. Mostly conducted near Burrabazar in north Calcutta, the gambling
activities were similar to the occurrences in Egerton Road. Boards were hung at the
awnings of the shops which displayed numbers between 0 and 9, inviting players to bet on
any number in between. The winning number was obtained by posting on a board the five

items of cotton future and the demand sale quotations from America and England, which
were then added together and divided by five. The result was rounded off and declared the
winning number.298 The betting was an elaboration on ank and dara, only, this time, the
government of Bengal took the problem more seriously. Its resolve to action was spurred
by misgivings of fraud - apprehensions that had remained mere insinuations in Punjab but
were disclosed in full detail by the English periodical Empire in Bengal. The paper reported
that the shops indulged in ‘wholesale cheating’ where ‘the winning number [was]
surreptitiously changed if too much money [had] been laid on it.’299 A member of the
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Lieutenant Governor’s Council, Vernon Dawson, inspected the matter more thoroughly.
Late at night, after business hours, he drove down Lower Chitpur Road and counted ‘within
the space of about 300 yards, 35 “shops” displaying boards with the quotation of odds
against the figures 1 to 10, headed in some cases in English “American Cotton Figure” and
in others in vernacular “Cotton game”’.300 Alarmed by this brashness as well as the heavy
footfall in these establishments, Dawson called for immediate action. Some arrests were

made soon after. However, when the case came up for review in the Calcutta High Court,
both Justice Holmwood and Justice Syed Ali Imam decided in favor of the accused Hari
Prosad Bhoowalka. Like Jardine previously, the judges reasoned that the activities
conducted in these shops ‘appeared to be pure betting’ and could not, from the face of it,
be called gaming. The onus was on the prosecution to prove these spaces were ‘common
gaming houses’ which they did by presenting the items seized in the police raid as
‘instruments of gambling’. These items included a tin board containing the day’s cotton
figures, a wooden board hung outside the premise, a canvas board showing the odds on a
series of figures, a small board for writing the figure of the day, a small tin ticket with 9
the winning digit on it, a board giving the odds on place betting, a board giving the odds
on ‘mixed double and triple’ betting figures and a cash box containing Rs. 410.301 However,
the judges concluded that:

Every one of these things is exactly what may be found in any stall of any book
maker at the races, and though such boards may have been declared illegal in
England, they have certainly not been made penal by any Statute in force in Calcutta
[…] In the case of rain gambling these have been specially made instruments of
gaming by the Legislature in Act III of 1897, and it is therefore clear that they are
300
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excluded from the operation of the Police Act in the case of cotton gambling. To
sum up therefore we find that this cotton gambling is not a lottery; it is not a game
or a contest; and it is not a form of gambling in which instruments of gaming are
kept or used for the profit or gain of the person owning or using the place.302
Once more, the impetus to action was placed at the doors of the legislature. Fatigued by
the newfangled innovations they repeatedly encountered on the ground, the local
government dismissed the possibility of a legislative solution. ‘We cannot cover everything
by definition’ confessed the Lt. Governor of Bengal, F.W Dukes in 1912, adding that,
‘whatever we do, some sportsman will get behind it and invent a new method not covered
by definition.’303 The certainty of legal representation was all but breached.
F.W. Dukes therefore proposed a different solution, one where gaming would include ‘any
kind of betting, gaming or wagering, which the local government may, by notification in
the Calcutta Gazette, specify on this behalf.’304 The proposal, however, was struck down
by the office of the Viceroy of India, who while sympathetic to the motivations of the local
government, deemed the strategy to be ‘legislation by notification’. This left too ‘wide a
discretion to the executive authorities’ and therefore could not be accepted.305 Instead, they
advised Bengal to walk the path of Bombay and include wagering within the meaning of
gaming through an amendment to the local gaming act. In turn, the government of Bengal
found this solution to be unacceptable. Their objection to a blanket ban concerned the
criminalization of horse racing, which they had no intention of prohibiting. A way of
getting around the problem would have been to declare horse racing a ‘game of skill’ ,
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providing it exemption from the amended law. But this would have drawn the unwanted
attention of vocal moralists, apart from inciting accusations from native periodicals who
had previously attacked it over partisan action during the passage of the Bengal Rain
Gambling Act in 1897. Syed Ali Imam, one of the judges who ruled in favor of acquittal
of the cotton gamblers in 1911, offered a more practical alternative. He understood that a
ban on all wagering would ‘be resented by an influential class of Calcutta society’, and

suggested instead that:
The answer to this is that since 1890 the amended law has been administered in
Bombay and for a period of 22 years it has not been applied to horses racing there,
and that there is no reason why the executive in Bengal should not wink at betting
on horse racing as it has been doing in Bombay.306
The reasoning puzzled Dawson. To him, the substantive differences between ‘legislation
by notification’ and exercise of executive discrimination were negligible; in principle, both
appeared arbitrary. At least ‘legislation by notification’ carried a hint of procedure, while
banning all wagering and then turning a blind eye towards the turf skirted the definition of
despotic enforcement. The more pressing concern, however, came from stewards of
Calcutta Turf Club themselves, who demanded legislative protection for their practice and
refused to accept executive guarantees. So, they asked that any amendment to the law
explicitly exempt wagering on horse races from its jurisdiction. Otherwise ‘any private
opponent of horse racing could lodge a complaint under the Gambling Act’, and a
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magistrate would find it difficult to ‘decline to take cognizance of it on the ground that
executive authorities were averse from enforcing the law.307
Beyond British sentimentalism, the Calcutta Derby Sweep was the largest in the world and
horse racing attracted a fair bit of revenue for the local government during the winter. The
government of Bengal therefore resented the possibility of framing a law that would allow
‘any crank’ who took offense at the practice to move court.308 As a result, Bengal and Delhi
reached a temporary impasse. As a stop-gap solution, the local government passed the
Bengal Cotton Gambling Ordinance in December 1912, making the practice illegal for a
period of 6 months. This, however, was not a durable strategy and during the proceedings
of the Bengal Legislative Council, Dukes reiterated the ‘ingenuity of the persons who
organize public gambling in Calcutta’, who at a moment’s notice could shift their game to
the prediction of the ‘price of jute at Hatkhola or to the meteorological reporter’s figures

of daily temperatures.’309
All was not going smoothly in Bombay either and by the end of the first decade of the
twentieth century, rule by executive discrimination faced stiff resistance. The
government’s protection to the Western India Turf club had been jeopardized by the
mushrooming of ‘bucket shops’, which through wire transfers enabled players to conduct
offsite betting. Hostile opinions brewed in the local press and intensified after a second
course was inaugurated in Poona in 1910. While money came in from all quarters, critics
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drew the government’s attention to a large class of mill workers who were drawn to betting
establishments. Pressured by public reproach, the government of Bombay was forced to
pass the Racecourse Licensing Act in 1912. The Act secured monopoly over betting and
racing in favour of the Royal Calcutta Turf Club and the Western India Turf Club.310 It laid
down that racecourses would have to obtain licenses issued by the provincial government
in order for the venue to be considered legitimate. In the absence of a license the course

would be shut down and the owner fined a sum of Rs. 200.311 Only a select number of
bookies were issued licenses to register bets on the races organized in or by these clubs.
These bookies were managed by the Stewards of the respective clubs, thereby centralizing
the governing authority over racecourse betting. On paper, at least, the law effectively
criminalized ‘bucket shops’, although informal betting stalls remained scattered in both
Poona and Bombay. The new betting system was thus a collaborative arrangement between
licensed book makers and the totalizators312, which dispensed betting tickets and displayed
betting lists along with odds for each horse.
The Stewards of the Western India Turf Club were dissatisfied with the outcome. Their
complaint was directed at the practices prevalent in Bengal, where a comparable law had
yet to be passed or even discussed. So on the day of the ‘Trials’, the ‘Viceroy’s Cup’, the
'King Emperor’s Cup’, the ‘Civil Service Cup’ and the ‘Army Cup’, bookmakers in Bengal
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continued to advertise and take bets through wire transfers, a practice that affected business
in Bombay. In a strongly worded letter, the Acting Secretary of the Western Union Turf
Club, J.E. Hughes, laid serious charges against his Calcutta counterparts.
It will not have escaped the notice of Government that the Bombay and other
daily papers publish almost in every issue long advertisements from book
makers having their places of business in Calcutta and elsewhere outside the
Bombay Presidency, and that these, of set purpose, offer to do business with
owners and backers on terms calculated upon published Totalizator results.
Some of these firms, e.g. Lee and Bettie, are believed not even licensed and
recognized by the Calcutta Turf Club, though other advertisers are so
recognized […] If such betting is permitted to proceed without check, racing
on this side of India must be so seriously handicapped that it is possible, at
no distant date that it may be necessary to abandon it. The stewards gladly
acknowledge that the Bombay Government have done their utmost to
control and prevent “Bucketshop” betting within the Bombay and Poona.
They are, however, compelled now, in the light of the experience gained
during the Poona racing season to point out that a “Bucketshop” is just as
effective in Calcutta or any other part of India, to prejudice the Totalizator
business of the Western India Turf Club.313
In response, the Chief Secretary of the Calcutta Turf Club, James Hutchison, admitted that
indeed “Bucketshop” betting was ‘most detrimental to the best interests of racing’.314 The
acknowledgment went towards correcting the Club’s questionable commitment to
standardized betting and signaled a willingness on part of the Bengal racing community to
act against bucket shops in general.315 Pincered by the concerns of Bombay and the
growing concerns regarding cotton gambling at home, the Bengal Government, long wary
of committing to a stand on wagering explicitly, finally included wagering within the
definition of gaming. Instead of passing a licensing act for racecourses, the government
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amended the Bengal Public Gaming Act (1867) and the Howrah Police Act (1866) so that
‘gaming’ would now include ‘wagering’, except when wagers were made on horse races.
The law was thus modeled on the provisions of section 2 of the English Street Betting Act
of 1906.
Following Bengal’s lead, discussions regarding the opium betting in Punjab were also
reopened in 1916, when W.M. Hailey, the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, wrote to the
Secretary to the Government of India, requesting action on similar lines.316 Since the
considerations shown to turf betting in Bombay and Calcutta were absent in the Punjab,
Hailey recommended that all wagers be included within the definition of gaming by
extending the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act (1890) to Delhi through the ‘machinery
provided by section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, XIII of 1912 and VII of 1915’.317 His solution
was ultimately accepted by Lord Chelmsford and after having circled the issue for nearly

twenty years, wagering was added to the definition of illegal gaming in the Punjab in 1916
as well.

Bringing Down the House
Radhika Singha notes with irony that following the revolt of 1857, when a chorus of British
voices advocated for firm ‘paternalist executive’ rule in India, the Crown chose to embark

316

Home Department, Police-A, Proceedings, 96-96, June, 1916, NAI.

317

Ibid.

126

on a manic spree of legislative codification.318 This was the fate of gaming laws as well.
Gambling as a practice was not subject to blanket criminalization, instead, the practice
underwent a series of statutory divisions. Gambling included lotteries, ‘games of skill’ and
‘games of chance’. As opposed to private raffles or sweepstakes conducted by members of
a club or an association, lotteries were illegal when they were unauthorized and when
openly advertised, advertisers were booked for ‘aiding and abetment’. Similarly, ‘games

of skill’ like whist, rummy and bridge were considered legal and ‘games of chance’ were
made illegal only when played for profit in a ‘public place’ or a ‘common gaming house’.
Anti-gambling laws of the nineteenth century like the Public Gaming Act (1867) or various
provincial Police Acts, felt confident in their ability to define such spaces and the
‘instruments of gaming’ that populated them. Provincial legislatures held unquestioned
faith in their expressive abilities, convinced that any slippage in conviction was due to
poorly constructed or faulty definitions in the law themselves. So, when encountered with
new practices, devices and tactics, their solution was to reword, re-define and expand the
categories covered by law, such that ‘the order of words would come to fully express the
order of things’.
This belief in linguistic and legal representability began losing ground by the twentieth
century. Confronted with ever mutating innovations and purposive cunning, anti-gaming

laws had passed from a history of legislative control to that of the executive. Having
relinquished belief in their own omnipotence, such laws no longer needed to anticipate the
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gambler’s practice before it was practiced. Instead, executive control allowed the state to
act after and define post-facto. Anti-gambling laws had therefore acknowledged the
impermanence of their field and their own fraught histories. Simply consider the figure of
the ‘professional gambler’ as reported from 1898:
Considerable harm is done by the professional gambler, generally town bred men,
who wander about the rural districts cheating cultivators out of their hard-earned
wages by means of marked cards and loaded dice.319
This figure was soon rendered unrecognizable. Contrast him to what the President of the
Calcutta Stock Exchange, B.N Chaturvedi, described as the players in the Katni Bazar in
Bengal, 1943.
This is an assemblage of people on the roads around the Stock Exchange Building,
who have a system of dealing in differences only at the end of the day adjusting
their transactions of the day on the basis of a fixed closing price.320
According to Chaturvedi these ‘gamblers’ had previously been brokers at the Bengal Share
and Stock Exchange Association Ltd. and now operated adjacent to the Royal Exchange
Place, once the Association was liquidated in 1938. Legally, gambling had turned too
ambiguous to be contained within familiar and set vocabularies. The gambler now mapped
onto a market actor, a commercial agent and a speculator; ‘instruments of gaming’ now
included account books, ledgers, receipts and household objects like clocks; the ‘common
gaming house’ overlapped with commercial shops, association buildings or even the
footpaths outside these buildings. The apriori assumptions of nineteenth century antigambling laws were so thoroughly destabilized that the careful distinctions between
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wagering, gaming and betting, erected by figures like Jardine, were almost completely
erased. With it, the walls of the ‘common gaming house’ had also finally crumbled.
Importantly, when administrators like Dukes acknowledged that banning one form of
gaming and wagering only lead to the invention of other games or more creative forms of
wagering as replacement, the government also realized that the prohibitory functions of
anti-gaming laws were simply an ‘incitement to capital’.321
The shift in defining and prosecuting gambling through executive action, however, came
at a certain cost. It left a void in the heart of law. As gaming, betting, and wagering were
enfolded into an indistinct category, anti-gaming laws began operating without much
certainty regarding the nature of the practices they claimed to regulate. The situation soon
grew complicated, when exchanges in commodities like grain, cotton and jute began
trading futures and options contracts. Controversy broke out regarding the legitimacy of

certain kinds of trading, especially in futures—were these ‘useful’ and legitimate
commercial contracts or was it gambling dressed as commerce? As the government
abdicated its responsibilities of defining that which it prohibited, the task was taken up by
speculators, brokers, traders, arhatiyas, and commercial associations. As a result, antigaming laws soon became tools in the hands of the native business groups for targeting

I am paraphrasing Foucault’s observations regarding the prohibitory injunctions placed sexual discourse
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possibilities and fields discourse. Foucault demonstrates this through the Victorian prudishness regarding the
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as an object of knowledge. Foucault notes that ‘Rather than the uniform concern to hide sex, rather than a
general prudishness of language, what distinguishes these last three centuries is the variety, the wide dispersion
of devices that were invented for speaking about it…Rather than a massive censorship, beginning with the verbal
proprieties imposed by the Age of Reason, what was involved was a regulated and polymorphous incitement to
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their professional rivals. Crucially, in the absence of a settled legal definition regarding
gambling other normative discourses began filling this vacuum. As the following chapters
will show, it was the moral associations, the financial outcomes and the social standing of
the ‘gambler’ that served as the putative definition of what the practice implied. As the law
itself grew more nebulous, such impressionist representations of gambling were reified.
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CHAPTER 3
Gaming contracts: Normative Strategies and the Making of a Discourse

In July 1895, Surendra Nath Banerjee, a senior member of the Indian National Congress,
directed the attention of the Bengal Legislative Council to the proliferation of rain
gambling in Burrabazar.322 Unlike in Bombay, the gaming houses of Calcutta were more
organized and drew a diverse crowd. Marwari proprietors claimed that rain gambling took
place for only a month and that bets were taken three times in the day; from 9:00 a.m. to
12:00 p.m., 12:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m., and occasionally from 6:00 p.m. till almost
midnight.323 The locality of Burrabazar played host to three gaming owned by Babu Shew
Nandan Tewary (Shiv Nandan Tewari), who had appointed bookies/brokers entrusted with
maintaining the betting ledgers recording the player’s debts and winnings. They would give

players the odds of the day and charged them one anna on each rupee as commission. The
betting system, which found little mention in government and police reports, is recovered
from an ethnographic piece published in The Statesman in, October, 1896. The report
claimed that the odds lay against those betting in favor of rain, who also stood the chance
of winning a highest sum. In case rain was imminent, those who bet against its probability,
could hedge their bets by speculating on the quantity of rain. A measuring container called
the mohri (also referred to as the Calcutta mohri or lakdi ki mohri) was placed on the roof
of these betting houses. If the quantity of rain was significant enough to cause its overflow
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then the secondary wagers could trump the initial bet. If the cistern did not overflow, the
players still recovered some of their money, as the odds were lowered during the second
call. Bookies would rely on the information of the rangbaz (callers), who would position
themselves on rooftops and called out when they spotted a change in the weather.
According to their calls, the bookies would place revised odds in front of players. The
report stated that Marwari players were allowed to bet on credit at these rain gambling

houses, which allowed them the advantage of changing bets at the last minute or betting
big when they sensed the opportunity to win.

The Marwaris who defended the practice claimed that rain gambling was a tradition they
carried for nearly eighty years, when they first migrated to Calcutta.324 Indifferent to these
sentiments, S.N Bannerjee raised an alarm over the game’s increasing popularity. In fact,
he claimed the support of the ‘respectable’ classes of Burrabazar when he made his case.
Bannerji’s caution was bolstered by the report filed by Sir John Lambert, the Police
Commissioner of Calcutta, in August 1894. Opposing the Marwari claim, Lambert dated
the game to the last twenty years. During this period, the number of gaming houses had
grown from one to three, all on Cotton Street in Burabazar.325 This locality, which also
witnessed the most intense play, was plagued with nuisance and overcrowding during
crucial market hours. He reported that rain gambling was no longer limited to the Marwaris
and players from Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, Arab and Eurasian communities were all
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involved. Bolton’s report failed to translate as law since Sir Charles Elliot, the Lieutenant
Governor of Bengal in 1895, advised against it. He argued that a legal ban would push the
game into secrecy, or more problematically, spur other more nefarious games. The more
pressing issue, however, was that:
[Elliot] does not think it possible to devise a law which would stop the form of
betting known as rain gambling without also bringing such practices as betting on
races, or on events of chance, within the same prohibition.326
Elliot’s therefore cautioned against a punitive ban on a particular practice in the absence of
a general principle. But he was soon replaced as the Lt Governor of Bengal by Alexander
Mackenzie in December 1895, who held a different view. Following Elliot’s transfer, in
April 1896, Tulsi Das Dey sent a petition signed by 200 residents of Burabazar requesting
the government to check the ‘evils’ of rain gambling once more. Unsurprisingly, this
request was met by a more agreeable audience. Sympathetic to the grievances of the
petitioners, Mackenzie still needed to secure a wider opinion before proposing legislative
action. Accordingly, he asked the Calcutta Corporation, the British Indian Association, the
Indian Association, the Central National Muhammadan Association and the Muhammadan
Literary Society on their views regarding the subject. The British Indian Association
seconded the opinions held by Charles Elliot but the rest informed Mackenzie that the
practice had mushroomed alarmingly and required intervention. The Muhammadan

Literary Society further alleged that rain gamblers had preyed on the pardah-nashin
women of the Moghul, Memon and Surti communities through a class of female brokers.
The majority eagerly anticipated a law to check the menace.
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The endorsement of these various associations provided Mackenzie the succor needed to
initiate the process of law. His decision, however, was met by uncharacteristic protest from
the ‘Marwaris'327 who regarded themselves as traditional absentees from the political
sphere in Bengal. Their enduring protest through petitions and newspaper editorials, and
the staging of mass demonstrations in Dalhousie Square and Cotton Street (Burabazar)

attested to the significance of the practice. From September 1896 to April 1897, a slew of
newspaper articles discussed the Bengal Government’s decision. British newspapers and
periodicals like The Pioneer, The Statesman, Capital and The Englishman, were
disheartened by the moral specter animating the Government’s steadfastness; Capital
dubbed the attitude ‘grandmotherly’.328 Native newspapers presented a restrained outrage;
they admitted that gambling was indeed a vice but were struck by the partisan
criminalization of rain gambling as opposed to horse racing. Most regarded legislation on
the matter excessive, since customary arrangements and police control were more than
adequate in controlling its spread. The Bengalee, an English periodical run by S.N
Bannerjee, maintained studied silence on the matter between September 1896 and April
1897, limiting themselves to reporting the proceedings of the Legislative Council. This was
in stark contrast to the number of opinion pieces they published during the term of Charles
Elliot, when they were looking to influence public opinion.

I have put the term Marwari in quotes to indicate that those who protested against the ban on rain gambling
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There was some resistance to the Bill in the Bengal Legislative Council when N.N. Ghosh
and Bhupendranath Bose questioned the need of a separate law to regulate the problems in
one particular street in Calcutta. ‘Nuisance’ could be better regulated through police action
than a new law, they argued. Bannerji, Mackenzie, and Sir Charles Paul (the Advocate
General of Bengal) felt otherwise, even as their case rested on vague anxieties and potential
harms.329 Concrete examples that would substantiate their anxieties into actual incidents

were sparse to the point of puzzlement. Even charges related to foul play and cheating were
left unconfirmed. Rumors circulated that the proprietors of rain gambling houses had
tampered with the water tanks or mohris and that they cheated the poorer and more
vulnerable players off their winnings. However, in spite of a raid on one such
establishment, the police failed to discover evidence substantiating these claims.330
Marwari lobbyists admitted that the game had grown unruly in Bombay, but similar
charges could not be leveled in Calcutta where it functioned as a well-regulated outlet for
popular entertainment.331. They used newspaper reports to show that the practice had not
escalated significantly from 1895 to 1897. If nothing had changed, why was the
government introducing a Bill that had been considered unsuitable both in its aims and
enforceability just two years earlier? English newspapers like Capital and the Englishman
also voiced the apprehensions of the British subjects of Bengal, who feared that in its
puritanical zeal, the government may soon prohibit betting on British indulgences. Horse
races were their primary concern but some expressed apprehension that perhaps even ‘the
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modest rupee bet on whist at the Bengal Club’ may soon be outlawed.332 In rehearsing the
importance of non-interference, they reminded Mackenzie that puritan doctrines were
impossible to implement through legislative authority alone. Cracks within the government
further widened when the opacity of legislative procedure was exposed to the public. The
day the Bill was to be voted upon in the Bengal Legislative Council, a squabble erupted
between Babu Bhupendranath Bose and S.N Banerji.

Bose apparently arrived late,

assuming that the issue of rain gambling, would be discussed only after the Council had
concluded other ordinary matters. However, at the behest of Surendra Nath Bannerji, the
matter was put to an early vote, and the Bill was passed in Bose’s absence. When Bose
arrived, he demanded the bill be reintroduced for discussion and was, on the behest of an
agitated Bannerjee, ruled out of order by the Chairman of the Council.333 The standoff
projected an image of divide, and the Madras Standard expressed concern that the incident
was emblematic of the manner in which ‘the breach in the Congress party is widening
daily.’334 The incident also weakened public trust, as many were left speculating the
designs of a deeper plot. Was the government was trying to redirect the Marwari’s
speculative instincts onto government opium, or did the government just want to escape
the heat of the plains and pack off to Shimla early?335
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When the Bill passed the first reading and was referred to a Select Committee, Marwari’s
led by Hukmi Chand Chaudhury and Babu Premsook Das, organized a town hall, which
the Indian Daily News referred to as a ‘Monster Meeting’.336 The meeting was held in 68
Cotton Street, Burabazar, a house away from the gaming house in question. The group that
met that day claimed to speak on behalf of all the Marwari’s of Calcutta. They argued that
rain gambling was harmless compared to horse betting or stock and share speculation and

by banning it, the government would be enacting a law that was both intrusive and
unwarranted. They invited a few members of the Bengal government and a section of the
press to their meeting where they moved resolutions and voted over the next course of
action. It was all very parliamentary. Many like Babu Saligram Lokhani and Janki Dass
suggested that the Marwaris in attendance should stay away from teji mundi (options)
transactions on the government sale on opium. Indian dailies were quick to report on the
competency of the threat, which they held to be responsible for the drop in price of that
week’s opium. They even pointed to the pinch in government revenue that resulted from
the lack of activity on telegrams sent from Bombay and Calcutta relaying information on
the current rate of opium.337 Some spoke of the racial partisanship of the bill and others
refuted the many allegations raised against the game and its proprietors. In spite of their
many apprehensions, the Bengal government passed the Bengal Rain Gambling Act in
April, 1897. Some members of the Council, otherwise in support of the Bill, recommended
a broader wording that would give the Act the power to prohibit other games of chance
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apart from rain gambling.338 These recommendations were sidelined and unlike Bombay,
where the Act of 1890 banned all wagering (except in horse racing), the Bengal Raingambling Act (1897) tweaked specific sections of the Bengal Gaming Act (1867) and the
Calcutta Police Act (1866) to act against the practice in particular. To the definition of the
‘common gaming house’ the following words were added, “or in which rain gambling, that
is to say wagering on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of rain, is carried on for the profit

or gain of any such person as aforesaid”.339 Similarly, the definition of ‘instruments of
gaming’ now included ‘water spouts, clocks and betting ledgers’. which when found in a
room, house, enclosure, or office, could be used as evidence to establish the space as a
gambling house. The ambitions of framing a general law were shelved temporarily.
Even with the benefit of hindsight, the events and the manner of the proceedings remain
puzzling. Judging from the public sphere, the Act was forced upon an unconvinced

population, British and Indian alike. Despite their repeated efforts, the chief architects of
the Bill could neither prove the extent of harm, nor could they authoritatively explain why
rain gambling was singled out at the expense of other kinds of gambling, especially horse
racing. The way in which the Bill was bulldozed through the legislature was surprising.
The tentative speculations of native dailies like the Amrita Bazar Patrika also fail to
explain the events satisfactorily. The ban on rain gambling did not inaugurate a slew of

legislation against other native games of chance, neither did it effect the volume of activity

Some like A.M Bose rehearsed anxieties regarding police harassment, similar to the concerns expressed by
administrative and legal officials in Burma and Bombay in the past. Some members felt that the Bengal Raingambling Act presented the perfect opportunity to fix the flaws in the Public Gaming Act of 1867 itself; doing
so, they argued, would prevent the occurrence of such specific legislation in the future.
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on commodity speculation, as the Marwaris did not come good on their threats of boycott.
In fact, despite the ban, rain gambling continues in Calcutta to this very day, albeit
discreetly.340

What then was the significance of the event and its outcome? According to Anne
Hardgrove, the incidents of 1896-7 reified the communal boundaries of the Calcutta

Marwaris.341 She argues that the protests actively unified the Calcutta ‘Marwaris’, who
were previously scattered amongst caste identities like the Oswals, Maheshwaris,
Agarwals, Jains, Serogis etc.342 The protests were therefore emblematic of a public
‘performance’ of political identity, which in turn produced communal homogeneity along
cultural lines. Hardgrove insists that we see the defense of rain gambling as the
performance of culture, where the functional significance of rain gambling is unaffected
by whether the practice was a custom or an ‘invented tradition’.343 Ritu Birla on the other
hand reads the events as part of the continual bifurcation of the field of economic and
cultural binaries effected by the work of colonial governmentality on native commercial
practices.344 In fact, the cultural claims put forward by the Calcutta Marwaris regarding
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rain gambling was the effect of a colonial politico-legal process that sequestered native
capitalist practices into domains of public and private. Birla situates Foucault in the colony
to demonstrate how ‘the relation between the concept of economy as a model for governing
and the economy as an object of governance’ emerged during the latter half of the
nineteenth century.345 As the objectified reality of the ‘colonial economy’ emerged,
indigenous commercial practices that drew on ‘symbolic capital’, structured by caste and

kin networks, were progressively demarcated and marked as ‘private’ or cultural matters.
Rain gambling and other forms of native gaming were slotted accordingly. Birla's analysis
resists the interpretation that the ‘Marwari’ protest was a pre-existent and self-evident
moment of cultural resistance, one where the logic of culture and community are pitted
against the colonial state. Instead, her framework allows her to see the logic of culture to
be the product of the bifurcations effected by colonial power itself.

These arguments illuminate the historical process and clear ground by way of explanation.
They are however, largely determined by the arrangement of the archive itself, which
requires a secondary revision. The explanation of the events of 1896-7 in Calcutta are
mostly reliant on one substantial file, whose copy is distributed between the National
Archives of India, the West Bengal State Archives and the ‘Archives and Manuscripts’
section of the British Library. In it are the original report filed by Lambert in 1894 and
Charles Elliot’s response in 1895. It also contains the petitions attacking and defending of
rain gambling, some newspaper reports, the proceedings of the Legislative Council of

345

Ibid., p. 21.

140

Bengal and the remarks of the Select Committee that reviewed the Bill. The file ends with
the passage of the Act. The information is bound serially which generates its own temporal
sequence—a petition calls for banning rain gambling, the government acts on behalf of the
petitioners, the practitioners protest, the law is passed. The narrative generates a rhetoric
and produces a truth effect where the categories deployed in the telling appear selfevident.346 For example, in the contest of opinions regarding rain gambling, terms like

scandal, debt, fraud, culture, human nature and moral legislation are used frequently. These
terms produced an image of both gambling as well as the gambler. Crucially, the discursive
reification of such categories filled an obvious void in the law itself, which still stopped
short of providing a comprehensive definition of gambling. In the absence of a legal
definition, the public sphere acted as a site where terms, representations and impressions
of gambling ossified. As a result, these categories require deeper interrogation and cannot
be accepted passively. While appreciative of the value and sophistication in Birla and
Hardgrove’s arguments, the impetus of this chapter is to understand culture and the
operations of colonial law differently. First, it does not overdetermine the significance of
rain gambling as understood through the framework of custom and culture. Second, it does
not pit the community and the government in oppositional terms and does not treat the
colonial legal machinery as something that acted on practices of native commerce. Third,
it pays attention to the discursive strategies that worked alongside colonial law to ‘dis-

The truth effect produced through rhetoric of narrative is widely accepted by most historians. This, however,
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embedd’ the practices of the bazaar and render it the ‘market’.347 The bazaar, according
to Rajat Ray, was the indigenous money market that was dominated by native banking and
mercantile communities and which sustained the trade in grains, cotton, piece goods and
precious metals.348 Accordingly, it is my intention is to re-situate the relevance of rain
gambling within practices that may be deemed bazaari. Importantly, it is by paying close
attention to the operation of the terms in the transcript – ‘debt’, ‘scandal’, ‘suicide’, ‘weaker

and vulnerable sections’— that we understand how the term ‘gambling’ was naturalized in
discourse and thereby established as a social problem and as a means for targeting
individuals. To paraphrase Neeladri Bhattacharya, the examination here is one of ‘deep
conquest’, one that ascertains the range of normative technologies that acted alongside law
upon bazaari practices.349 Correspondingly, it verifies the extent to which the bazaar was
truly ‘disembedded' and the extent to which it remained an incomplete colonial phantasm.
So, alongside mapping the strategies through which colonial law constituted and deployed
its categories, the chapter also aims to recover the hidden transcript through which the
bazaar communicated.350
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Decoding the Public Sphere
Jurgen Habermas argues that the liberal public sphere emerged alongside the rise in wealth
and power of a new mercantile class in Europe during the eighteenth century, a class that
re-situated private interests of wealth management from the domain of the ‘family’ onto
the emergent sphere of civil society. Civil society, thus conceived, constituted a space for
‘public opinion’ based on reasonable and rational debate. For Habermas, the emergence of

civil society was integrally linked to the rise of mercantile class and capitalism, where news
regarding exchange and the price of commodities grew in importance. Accordingly, he
characterized civil society as an institution that ‘established itself as a realm of commodity
exchange and social labour governed by its own laws’.351 Its rise during the period of
‘enlightened despotism’ in eighteenth century Europe meant that as an institution, it
remained antagonistic to the political rationality of the State and served as a check to its
power.352 Seyla Benhabib describes this early bourgeois public sphere as ‘a sphere which
mediates between society and the State, in which the public organizes itself as the bearer
of public opinion.’353 So, within the liberal view, the public sphere developed as a space
where state power and public discourse co-constituted the realm of political rationality,
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where both categories remained distinct, but operated through a juridical relation.354
Scholars of South Asia argue, however, that Habermas’ liberal ‘bourgeois public sphere’,
was in remission before it had the chance to mature in the colony. Many question the
suitability of this term in explaining the constitution, assertions and actions of
autochthonous non-statist or anti-statist actors. Instead, they find analytic potential in
categories like ‘public culture’, ‘public arena’ and ‘theatre politics’. These categories better

explain how the modern European ‘public sphere’ adapted to colonial conditions and gave
shape to political discourse. They also demonstrate the importance of ‘public space’ as a
site for both political action and cultural consolidation. Scholars like Sandria Freitag and
Douglas Haynes see public space as crucial for contesting, performing and constituting
public opinion and ‘community politics’; the latter drew on meanings generated by ‘ritual,
symbol and theatre’ rather than reason as it is putatively understood within the ambit of
European enlightenment.355 Given this alternate history, how relevant is the analytical
potential of the bourgeois public sphere in colonial India? In uncovering the genealogy of
civil protest and mass strikes in India, Lisa Mitchell persuades us to take autochthonous
modes of resistance characteristic of civil society seriously, and thereby avoid the language
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of a colonial archive that suppresses elements that speak outside its categories.356
Mitchell’s caution applies to the case of rain gambling, which has been characterized as an
instance of ‘community’ defending its cultural practice against intrusive legislation. If,
however, we read the protests against rain gambling through the mode of the ‘liberal public
sphere’ and its quintessential form of reasoning, we may be able to bypass the language of
colonial exceptionalism, which often results in ‘making India look peculiar’.357

Hardgrove contends that the protests agains the Bengal Rain Gambling Act was an instance
of ‘community as political actor’, in which the Marwari community asserted and therefore
constituted, its communal and cultural claims in the public sphere.358 Latent in Hardgrove’s
analysis is a limitation, one that invalidates the colonial public sphere as a site for the
articulation of universal interest. This would be inappropriate in the case of the Bengal
Rain-gambling Act of 1897. After all, while rain gambling was presented as a native
custom, its public defense also engaged a mercantilist logic that stood against a reigning
political order. It is important to recover this dormant commercial logic that was expressed
through customary and cultural idioms. Importantly, as Tanika Sarkar reminds us, while
the colonial public sphere of nineteenth century Bengal operated through the ‘politics of
recognition’, in which practices of community were exempt from legal scrutiny,
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community practices themselves had turned ‘post conventional’.359 As a result, cultural
practices were no longer justified by appealing to the unconditional authority of custom,
rather they were debated and defended through universal standards of ‘reason’.360 A closer
look at the arguments presented by the Marwaris would confirm Sarkar’s contention. In
fact, while discussing the ‘monster meeting’ held in protest by members of the Marwari
community in 67 Cotton Street on the 27th of March, 1897, Hardgrove herself notes that

‘the structure of the meeting was quite remarkable’ given ‘the choice of language, the
format of speeches the use of parliamentary procedure.’361 The choice to conduct the
meeting in English was so ‘unusual’, that even The Bengalee could not resist a comment.
So the friends of the rain gamblers met at the Dalhousie Institute on Thursday last
to protest against the action of the government. They made speeches; they recorded
resolutions. But it so happened that neither the resolutions nor the speeches were
read out by the speakers themselves.362
The jibe disguised a furtive anxiety. Indeed, the hubris of some members of Calcutta’s civil
society generated an impression that the methods, etiquettes and language of liberal
parliamentary agitation was strictly an upper class Bengali phenomena. This belief found
space in the speech of Babu Hukmi Chaudhury, who at the meeting at 67 Cotton Street
declared to the attendees that ‘We are not agitators, gentlemen, as our Bengali friends are
said to be’.363 Even so, these political debutants had caught many off guard.364 Conducting
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meetings in English, writing petitions to the government, expressing opinions through
newspaper editorials and adopting a parliamentary style of politics, speaks strictly to the
form of agitation. What of the content? Was it about safeguarding custom or were
commercial interests at stake too? A closer look at the language and motifs of the defense
provides some indications.

Newspapers and periodicals highlighted the government’s hypocrisy regarding native
gambling. The Hindoo Patriot, Amrita Bazar Patrika and the Indian Daily News openly
accused the government of racial partisanship when they banned rain gambling while
‘winking at the worst form of gambling on the turf’.365 Capital naively explained this as an
instance of making ‘one law for the rich and another for the poor’.366 What peeved Marwari
petitioners was their belief that rain gambling was more honest and transparent than betting
on horses. They argued that the chances of fraud were limited, even non-existent in rain
gambling, while in horse racing everything from the horse to the jockey could be
influenced, thus fixing the outcome of the race. Cases of conspiracy and fraud from both
India and England were raised to support the claim that horse racing was a plagued and
manipulated sport.367 But “no one can manipulate the clouds”, declared a letter written to
the Editor of the Indian Daily News, who added that “the whole transaction is
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aboveboard.”368 The accusation of racial partisanship grew so loud that S.N Banerjee was
forced to respond to it on the floor of the Legislative Council:

It has been urged that because we cannot suppress betting on the turf, therefore we must
not interfere with rain gambling…does it stand to reason and common sense that because
we cannot suppress both these evils we must not suppress one of them when it is in our

power to do so?369

More than turf betting, however, the defense gainfully exploited the similarities between
rain gambling and the resemblant practices of spot betting, futures and options trading.
These arguments transcended questions of race and community. Instead they asked a more
fundamental question—-what exactly was gambling and how could a law prohibiting its
practice do so without first settling on its definition?370 In a letter written to Alexander
Mackenzie on the 3rd of February, 1897 by the ‘Marwari citizens of Calcutta’, the
petitioners noted
Your Honour’s Memorialists will not refer to transactions recognized as legitimate
by law and society, specially such as [those] relate stocks and shares, to opium, and
even on commodities of commerce and trade although these fully partake of the
nature of gambling.371
In the opinion of the The Hindoo Patriot:

If rain gambling is to be stopped because number of men have been ruined by it,
then we submit that “forward” transactions of every kind, whether in government
368
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papers, gold and other shares, or jute or opium or indeed any other kind of produce,
ought to be suppressed also.372

The following year, at the meeting held at 68 Cotton Street, Babu Hukmi Chand
Chaudhury, responded to the government’s accusation that crowds of rain gamblers had
paralyzed the ordinary operations of Burabazar. Instead of drawing attention to crowding
at the Turf club on race days, Chaudhury asked the government to direct their attention to

the more sizable crowds that regularly gathered at the opium chowrasta.373 At the same
meeting, Babu Bungsidhur from the firm of Juggernath Goverdhone Das asked the
attendees:
We all know that thousands of people are ruined every year and are forced to seek
relief in the insolvent court on account of their indulgence in stocks and shares
speculation. But whoever heard that a person was ruined by rain gambling?374

The implicit accusation was that the government had maintained purposive ambiguity
regarding the legal definition of gambling, thus allowing them to legislate arbitrarily. So,
as part of their defense, the defendants put all kinds of commercial speculation, especially
on government opium, on trial. The trade in government opium was unanimously referred
to as “tejimundi speculation”. Teji mundi is faithfully translated as an options contract,
where teji meant rise (bull option) and mandi meant fall (bear option).375 Teji and mandi
were single options and teji-mandi was the double option. In teji-mandi, a buyer could pay

a nominal premium to purchase the ‘option’ to buy a commodity in the future; unlike
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forward contracts, the buyer of teji-mandi did not commit to purchase, rather, he just
bought its ‘option’. I am arresting further descriptions related to the practice, as I will have
occasion to return to its discussion in the epilogue. For now, I am more interested in the
manner in which teji mandi was both presented in the public sphere and compared to
gambling. Again, I draw attention to the language of papers like the Amrita Bazar Patrika,
who declared:

Ask a child in Burra Bazaar and he will tell you that this teji-mundi unlike rain
gambling, involves the betting of thousands of rupees…Government, however,
does not venture to interfere with it; for if it does, the opium gamblers will strike
and not purchase opium, and that means great financial loss to Government.376
The switch between ‘opium speculation’ and ‘opium gambling’, should not be dismissed
as oversight; the cues came from the defendants themselves. In a letter to the Editor of the
Indian Daily News, a gentleman who signed off as ‘Marwari’, asked:
Why should A or Z be at liberty to gamble in Government Paper with impunity (for
it is gambling after all) while I am to be restrained by special legislative enactment
from placing my money on the behavior of the clouds.377

In his letter to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Babu Premsook Das,
member of the “Rain Gambling Managing Committee” blended the distinctions more
skillfully:
The petitioners desire to point out that rain gambling is distinguished from all other
forms of gambling, such as betting on the turf, wagers on the rise and fall of the
value of Government and other securities and of shares of commercial concerns, as
also those speculations in the mercantile world which are known by the name of
forward transactions.378
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Das included rain gambling within a list of, what he felt to be, analogous activities. Far
from naiveté, he took full advantage of the gambling’s grey legal status, with the
understanding that the ‘nature’ of gambling—risk, hedging, prognostication—impregnated
every commercial venture. By describing conventional commercial activities as gambling
his position spelt out the strategies of argumentation indirectly. This silently worked its

way into the public sphere as well. Apart from the Amrita Bazaar Patrika, other
newspapers like The Hindoo Patriot aggressively asserted that “the Government itself is
indirectly the patron of opium gambling”.379 Clearly, the public sphere was not just medium
for registering complaint or deploying a defense, it was also the active site for constituting
the meanings and connotations of the term gambling. Accordingly, it could be many
things— a cultural practice, an economic activity, a moral and social problem, a universal
condition— all at the same time. In a letter to the Editor of the Indian Daily News, a writer
calling himself “Marwari” insisted:
It has been admitted from time immemorial that gambling or gaming is a vice; but
it is a vice so thoroughly human and permeates human thought and acts so
universally that any attempt to stop what is known as rain-gambling by law will
probably rouse much feeling that had much better be left alone.380

Gambling exceeded the confines of any specific cultural or customary claim as its universal
nature manifested itself through an instinct. The ban on rain gambling then was not an
attack on a particular custom, limited to a specific community. The “Members of the
Marwari Community” dispelled cultural confinement in a second petition to Alexander
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Mackenzie, where they asserted that “human nature is human nature.”381 This is precisely
why petitioners like Babu Premsook Das and periodicals like the Hindoo Patriot argued
that if rain gambling were banned in Calcutta, then Jota Sowda, a ‘game’ based on the sale
of cotton bales in the London market, would come in to vogue as it did in Bombay. In their
petition to Alexander Mackenzie, the “Members of the Marwari Community” described
Jota Sowda as “a new form gambling…not unlike, in some of its aspects, to the betting

called Teji-mundi in connection with the government sales of opium”.382 While Teji-mundi
was otherwise referred to as speculation, Jota Sowda was called gambling. Importantly,
both of them were the natural outcome of the human nature. The argument suggests that
more than a sectarian custom, gambling, betting and wagering were expressions of a
universal instinct of commerce. The existence of such proclivities was rational and their
suppression would be irrational.

The British press held consensus with their Indian counterparts in describing the actions of
the government as being morally inspired and therefore intrusive. As mentioned earlier,
Capital described the Act as ‘grandmotherly’ and even released an editorial that targeted
Alexander Mackenzie specifically, who they named ‘the moral man’. The Pioneer, The
Statesman, The Englishman and Capital feared that after rain gambling the government
would target horse racing. The Englishman concluded that the governing ideology had
replaced “utilitarianism with morality”, an approach last encountered before 1857, when
Evangelical dogma permeated the corridors of power. While the British press dreaded the
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possibility, the champions of the Bill celebrated its arrival. Having been thwarted by the
former Lt. Governor, Charles Elliot, The Bengalee, anticipated the arrival of the ‘Christian
Ruler’, Alexander Mackenzie.383 The implications of this were seen in the case of rain
gambling too:
We have now a wise and Christian ruler over us and we trust that he will take a
different view of the matter, and put down with a firm hand what is little short of a
scandal and which has brought ruin and misery upon many a home at Bars Bazar
and elsewhere.384
Ironically, the impending ambitions of Christian rule negatively stirred the passions of the
British press. Their fears were possibly stoked by the actions of moral puritans in both
Britain and America, who had steadily mobilized against gambling towards the end of the
nineteenth century. Debates surrounding legality and enforceability of gaming contracts,
which enjoyed a checkered history in America, gained increasing attention in the public
sphere from the 1870’s onwards. In response to the sharp drop in agricultural commodity
prices in the 1890’s, the ‘People’s Party’ of America was constituted to safeguard farmers
interests. The virulence of their attack was directed at the moral and financial irregularities
of commodity speculation, which was commonly dubbed as gambling.385 The political
challenge to gambling was even sharper in England. In the early nineteenth century, wagers
were legal in England, except those that breached the peace, hurt the character of a third
person, against the rules of sound policy or morality and those that were contrary to the

positive enactment of law.386 England enacted The Gambling Act in 1845, which made
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recovery of money in gaming contracts legally unenforceable.387 However, it was the
Betting Act of 1853 that marked the British government’s resolve to crackdown on popular
gaming. The Act was intended to target the problem of working class gambling which had
been on a rise ever since betting on horse races had become a popular pastime in England.
This had its roots in the rapid democratization of big races such as the Royal Ascot, which
became productive leisure to both industrial workers and to the emergent entertainment

industry.388 The 10 Hours Work Act, foundational in overhauling older patterns of labour
and restructuring ‘work time’ in factories, had also produced ‘leisure time’ as its
unintended corollary.389 To facilitate this burgeoning industry, new forms of leisure were
devised and managed by proprietors, who benefitted greatly from the patronage of the
working class. Gambling and drinking were some of the most popular ways of industries
in this regard. Horse racing in particular replaced some of the more violent games like
boxing that had dominated popular interest in the past.390 By the 1880s the betting industry
had grown considerably, owing to innovation in the communications industry. The
telegraph and the development of the railway were crucial in developing a national sporting
market that offered off course bets to racing enthusiasts. The betting laws of England had
made wagers unenforceable by law and as a result, a number of cash betting offices began
pullulating the country, replacing the credit networks of the past.391 By the close of the

David M. Dixon, From Prohibition to Regulation: Bookmaking, Anti-gambling, and the Law. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1991, p-39.
388
David M. Downes et al. eds. Gambling, Work and Leisure: A Study Across Three Areas. London:
Routledge & K. Paul, 1976, p. 37.
389
E.P Thompson, “Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism, Past and Present, no.38 (1967), pp. 5697.
390
Dixon, From Prohibition to Regulation.
387

391

Ibid.

154

nineteenth century, the increased commercialization of gambling, an activity that cut across
both work and leisure had become a serious concern for British Parliament. The increase
in real wages meant that instead of saving, most of the excess money of workers was being
spent on what many considered puerile ends. As David Dixon notes, the issue, a major
concern, became a matter of routine discussion in churches and social organizations. By
1890, the NAGL (National Anti-Gambling League) had been established. Their aim was

to curb off course cash street betting, an institution which they believed was largely
responsible for corrupting work ethic, fostering immoral temptations and profiting off the
unawareness and naiveté of the working class.392 On hindsight, Marxist examiners of
gaming histories in England considered the project of the NAGL as an inauthentic exercise
of moral legislation. Arguments of the art critic and psychoanalyst Peter Fuller, highlight
this opinion which regarded the NAGL’s effort as an eyewash for appeasing popular
anxiety without acting against aristocratic or high end gaming in England.393 Dixon,
however, stops short of labelling the efforts of the NAGL as superfluous and deceptive. He
contends that the NAGL’s intention was to go after not the gamblers themselves but the
bookies and off course cash betting networks. Dixon makes a fair argument in this regard.
It is not necessary for all movements, especially those inspired by moral infuriation, to
consider the implications of the wider structures in place. The actions of activists can
remain honest but ill-fated as history has made obvious repeatedly. However, Dixon does
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concede that lobbies, political interests, long term gains etc. were as important as
impassioned puritanism, both acting in each other’s interests. Eventually, the efforts of the
NAGL ended with the enactment of the Street Betting Act of 1906 that prohibited all offcourse cash betting. As Dixon remarked, this meant “the virtual completion of the
criminalization of public working-class gambling”, without affecting a corresponding blow
to high end gamers.394 It is possible that the NAGL’s growth in Britain accentuated the

anxieties of sections of the British press in India. India, after all, was a haven for British
amusements, which remained shielded from moral reproach. Already, the Calcutta Derby
was a celebrated racing event and by the first decade of the twentieth century the ‘Derby
Sweeps’ attracted action from all corners of the globe. Published in 1930, in his book titled
The Romance of the Calcutta Sweeps, Major Henry Hobbs recounted how British citizens
from as far as South Africa and Australia would purchase derby tickets through agents or
friends in Calcutta.395 Racing also provided pecuniary benefits to to the Provincial
governments of Calcutta and Bombay. In fact, when spot betting on cotton prices grew
wildly popular in Calcutta in 1913, the Bengal government finally contemplated a ban on
all forms of wagering (not just on rain). However, the Chief Secretary of the Bengal
government advised caution against a blanket ban, since “it [horse racing], also attracts
large number of the wealthier classes to Calcutta during the cold weather season and thus
contributes to the general prosperity of the city.”396
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It is likely that British newspapers were apprehensive regarding the status of the Turf and
therefore stood in defense of rain gambling in 1897. They admitted that gambling was
morally wrong and financially illogical, however, it was equally foolish to ban it through
legislation. When it came to characterizing rain gambling, however, it was British rather
than Indian periodicals, who appeared eager to describe the practice as a sectarian and
cultural activity of a community. They either failed to comprehend or willfully suppressed

the potential of a universalist or commercial argument in the Marwari position. They were
also apathetic to the manner of protests. The medium of English and the parliamentary
proceedings left The Englishman unimpressed—‘ We confess we are not greatly struck by
the literary style or the logical reasoning of the memorials which have been forwarded to
the Lt. Governor on the subject.’397 They mocked those who drew attention to the benefits
that rain gambling provided for the emergent science of meteorology and weather
prediction, a claim that Marwari defendants pushed with all earnestness. In doing so, they
highlighted how rain gambling exceeded the specific cultural boundaries of a community,
and that its underlying knowledge could be productive for universal ‘science’.

It would be unfair to claim that it was only British commentators who coupled rain
gambling with custom, as certain Indian periodicals also made efforts to bracket the
practice similarly. In a letter to the Editor of the Indian Daily News, a contributor who
inexplicably signed off as “Abandoned Cows, Hacks, and Poor Doggies”, warned that
“Meddling and puddling with the ways of the Asiatic…is a great mistake throughout the
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country”.398 Others found gambling to be a practice that had roots in the ‘Indian’ tradition
‘from the time of the Mahabharata’. Having previously gained a wider readership in 1891
when targeting the government over the “Age of Consent Bill”, it was the Amrita Bazar
Patrika that pushed for a cultural defense forcefully. Its protectionist position from 1891
had secured financial success for the paper, so much so that from being a weekly paper it
began to be published daily.399 Regarding the “Age of Consent Bill”, Mrinalini Sinha notes

that while the Amrita Bazar Patrika had chosen its line of argument clearly, Surendra Nath
Banerjee and The Bengalee had faltered and remained indecisive.400 At the time, he
attracted British scorn, the latter concluding that ‘Indian rationalists’ were still unprepared
for the benefits of modernity. Perhaps in order to correct this image, Banerjee doggedly
pursued the moral evil of rain gambling in 1897.

It is not that Marwari practitioners did not employ a cultural defense while making their
case. After all, it was a tested legal strategy and a certified method of gaining public
sympathy. However, the nature and manner of their argument exceeded the limits of a
specific cultural defense and extended to questions regarding the freedoms and guarantees
built into the foundations of any capitalist venture. This, the British press were unwilling
to admit. By labeling the stir against the law as a Marwari agitation, the native agent was
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rendered pre-capitalist, to be distinguished through ties of community and kinship.401
Accordingly, Capital carried the following warning for the Bengal government—‘ it is
difficult for people who know nothing of natives to understand and appreciate the value
they set on cherished customs, peculiar idiosyncrasies and fixed prejudices.”402 Similarly,
The Englishman characterized rain gambling as both ‘a foolish form of wasting money’
and ‘a long established custom’.403 As a result, the inner/outer, cultural/material dyad was

pushed more sharply by the English press than it was by the Marwaris themselves.
Alongside a nativist defense, the Marwaris had argued that the practice was universal in
the sense that it was commercial. They believed the practice to be fair and questioned what
kinds of economic activity were deemed legitimate for colonial subjects. On the other hand,
the Englishman wondered about the ultimate object of introduction of the Bill - ‘is it to
improve the morals of the Marwaris who have such an inveterate propensity for
gambling?’404

Amongst other implications, the description reproduced a distinction between the
commerce driven Englishman and the native Marwari, whose propensity for gambling
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stemmed from practices of culture and community. The argument erected an undeclared
boundary, which established gambling as a non-commercial, cultural practice.

A Genealogy of Rain Gambling
However, if the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to
history, he finds that there is “something altogether different” behind things: not a timeless

and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was
fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.405

In spite of the spirited defense presented by the pro-rain gambling lobby, the issue struggled
to escape its cultural trappings. However, nested within the din of arguments was an
unsettling detail. When Tulsi Das Dey sent Alexander Mackenzie the petition, thus
reigniting the government’s interest in rain gambling in 1896, he did so under the influence
of a Marwari gentleman. S.N Banerjee, amongst others, had taken this to be evidence of a
division within the community and had welcomed the petition as the effort of a small but
determined group of social reformers. Indeed, Banerjee and Bolton had claimed to have
consulted the ‘respectable’ members of the Marwari community on the issue and later
assured the Legislative Council that almost all were opposed to rain gambling, and it was
only ‘caste obligations’ that prevented them from going public with their disapproval. But
the story was not as simple as it was made to appear. Those opposed to the ban claimed
that a personal rivalry had penned Dey’s petition. They claimed that ‘a man from

Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in In John Richardson & Brian Leiter (eds.), Nietzsche.
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Allahabad’ had recently approached Babu Shew Nandan Tiwari (Shivnandan Tiwari) and
had asked for a stake in one of the rain gambling houses in Burabazar. When asked to
deposit Rs. 10,000 for the privilege, he refused, since he did not have the money.
Subsequently, he acted with notable alacrity to malign the game and with it, Tewary’s
reputation. This accusation circulated as rumor and in all its length, the file does not assign
a name for this individual. He was referred to ‘the man from Allahabad’ and in some of the

more passionate indictments, as ‘the cook from Allahabad’. The defense therefore argued
that the ill will towards the game stemmed from cynical motives of rivalry and payback
and the concern regarding the immorality or criminality of the practice were feigned and
untrue. Was there truth to this accusation? Pursuing the details of this story also entails the
investigation of a term recurrently deployed in the record - ‘Marwari’. Since this reading
refuses to take the categorical descriptions of culture and community as self-evident, this
too demands further scrutiny.

Who were the Marwaris and who fell within this category? Each side claimed that they
were its true representatives. The Bengalee, a paper run by S.N Banerjee, claimed to have
‘talked the matter over with many influential men of Burrabazar, whose names for obvious
reasons we do not disclose, and they are unanimousness in their testimony as to the ruin
and misery which this gambling house is working at Burrabazar.’406 Speaking in defense
of the practice, at the meeting at 68 Cotton Street, Babu Rung Lall Poddar made a similar
assertion:
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Gentlemen, give me permission to emphatically declare that the Marwari
community has nothing to do with this memorial [against rain gambling] and that
the same does not represent their views in this respect. You are aware, that a
counter-memorial, largely signed by Marwaris, including the heads and managers
of all the respectable firms of this city, has been submitted, showing that rain
gambling is far less injurious than several other recognized forms of gambling407
C.W Bolton later claimed that the meeting where this memorial was adopted was ‘not a
public but a private one, attended by only 100 to 125 persons, mostly interested in rain

gambling, nearly one-third of whom belonged to the same house.’ He said that ‘none of
the members of the influential members of the Marwari community were present’ and
concluded that ‘the meeting was thus of no importance’.408

Who is to be believed? Poddar and the “Members of the Marwari Community” followed
by providing the government with a memorial carrying 1,290 signatures, almost ten times
the number Bolton claimed were at the meeting.409 On the other hand, the census report of
1901 placed the Marwari population of Calcutta at nearly 14,000, making the signatories
to this memorial only a tenth of the total population.410 So, who were the authentic
representatives the Marwaris of Calcutta? The question is particularly relevant if rain
gambling is regarded as a cultural practice or as a Marwari custom. Hardgrove believes it
was and takes the Marwari defense of rain gambling as an instance of a ‘community as
political actor’. Accordingly, she argues that the ‘Marwari’s defense of gambling as
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essential to their character was a performance to establish an interiority that could then be
mobilized in the demand for political rights.”411 However, the narrative of cultural
homogeneity is somewhat punctured by the fact that the petition calling for its ban
emanated from within the community itself. But Hardgrove explains this complaint as ‘an
act of betrayal’, which somewhat damaged the perception of ‘a presumed cohesion’ within
the community.412 She argues that the putative belief amongst public commentators at the

time was that the Marwaris ‘were entitled to a form of gambling so culturally specific to
them’ and the fact that the petition was initiated by an insider raised suspicions that the
instigator had been blackmailed. Interestingly, similar charges of foul play were also raised
by the opponents of the practice. When S.N Banerjee first raised the issue in 1895, The
Bengalee had published the following piece:
In Bura Bazar the conduct of the Police has been open to serious misconstruction.
It may be wholly undeserved, and probably it is; but people put two and two
together, and say it makes four. The police have no excuse in the matter. The
gambling house flourishes in the full blaze of publicity.413

Again, a month before the Dey sent his petition to the government, The Bengalee made a
startling allegation.
Bye the bye, can anybody tell us why a particular Superintendent of Police, whose
name, we are prepared to give, if necessary, has been actively interesting himself
with a view to persuade one of the organizers of this movement not to send the
petition?414
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A few months later, on November 14th, 1896, in a piece titled “An Extraordinary Case”,
the paper narrated the story of a ‘Marwari (kerosene) merchant of Bura Bazar’, entangled
in a dispute with a rival businessman. The report claimed that the local magistrate had
dismissed the charges made against him by his ‘jealous rivals’, but the matter was far from
settled. Apparently, following a threat to his life, the merchant was ‘chased all the way to
the North Western Provinces by budmashes armed with sticks and knives.’415 The piece

reported that the merchant’s pleas for protection had gone unheard by the Superintendent
of Police at Bura Bazar and it was only when he was reassured of security by the
Superintendent at Howrah did he return to Calcutta. The paper asked provocatively:
What could be the meaning of all this? It is believed rightly or wrongly it is not for
us to say, that the Bara Bazar Police, the supporters of rain gaming, are thick in the
plot, and are in the hands of his enemies.416

These subterranean plots ran parallel to the weightier discussions of the public sphere that
debated morality, the right to custom, racial partisanship and the limits of governmental
interference. Yet these details remain compelling for those in search of a genealogical
history, for often it is these ‘personal conflicts that slowly forged the weapons of reason.’417
While scribbled at the margins, these stories of internal strife, personal rivalry, jealousy
and commercial competition failed to emerge as fully disclosed arguments in the public
sphere. Instead, they marked the transcript as an ‘open secret’, written in the language of

insinuation that never resolved as to who was the kerosene merchant, who was his rival,
who were the extorting police officers of Burrabazar and most importantly, who was the
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‘man from Allahabad’? While these answers may be irrecoverable, the inquiry is not
pointless. The effort is to understand the process through which rain gambling was
rendered customary and gambling was consigned as a social/cultural rather than
commercial practice. The stakes are therefore weighty, since ‘community’, as Partha
Chatterji reminds us, remains a loaded term in the colony. Revisiting the Hegelian divisions
between civil society, the state and the family, Chatterjee argues that civil society was

conceived as the individuated sphere of the subject, where he/she was free to pursue
personal interest as per the norms of reason. The mode of civil society was opposed to that
of the family, which functioned on the ascriptive bonds of love and sacrifice, compelling
the individual to freely surrender personal interest for the good of the collective. Chatterji
argues that this ascriptive logic was mapped onto community, and accordingly, ‘in the
narrative of capital, community becomes relegated to capital’s pre-history’.418 Indeed, if
rain gambling were to be the practice of community, then Hardgrove's reading of the
motive regarding an intra-community instigator necessarily conveys a sense of ‘betrayal’.
But what if we flip the narrative and pay closer attention to the hidden transcript? What if
we relocate the ‘man from Allahabad’ outside the community (and therefore ‘betrayal’)
and into the sphere of a contracting civil society?

Customary, or Bazaari Practices?

Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, p. 232. Chatterjee argues that ‘“Ethical Life” as a narrative of community where subjective
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While it appears that the gambling houses in Calcutta were devoted exclusively to rain
gambling, this was generally not the case. When in 1901, Madan Mohan Gopal introduced
a private bill for amending the Public Gaming Act in Punjab, he isolated both rain and
opium gambling as the target of legislation. But the feedback of local officials alerted the
government to the fact that rain gambling was only a fraction of the total dealings of these
‘gaming houses’. The Deputy Commissioner of Delhi, Major Davies informed the

government that
Rain gambling is only carried on in Delhi to a very small extent, only during the
rains. There are 44 shops in which rain gambling is carried on to a greater or less
extent—- but the shops are used throughout the year for gambling in opium which
goes on all year round. This opium and is far more popular than rain gambling, and
as it takes place every month, its evils are far more extensive.419

While Davies referred to both rain betting and the betting on the price of government opium
as ‘gambling’, he did not refer to these spaces as ‘common gaming houses’. Rather, he
describes them as ‘shops’, for that is what they were. Not only were these spaces of
legitimate commerce, but the owners of these ‘shops’ were men of commerce as well. The
Deputy Commissioner of Jullunder, Lt. Col. Rennick, informed the government that ‘my
experience has shown me that it [rain gambling] is principally carried on in large centers
amongst grain brokers and dealers’. The Deputy Commissioner of Gujarat, J.R.
Drummond, supplemented this view, stating that alongside rain gambling, betting on

opium prices was conducted mostly by ‘several rather well to do and to all appearance
reputable traders of the Aggarwal and Dhussar communities.’420 In a note sent in 1898, The
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Deputy Superintendent of Police in Rewari, Hatim Mirza, appeared particularly outraged
by the efflorescence of these shops and the nefarious practice of opium speculation in
Delhi. But what really disturbed him was that some of these shopkeepers had begun ‘to
pay income tax on the income realized from this bargain,’ which ‘made them bolder’ and
convinced them that ‘they are doing nothing against the law.’421

As stated in a previous chapter, when the government realized that Gopal’s bill, intended
to target rain gambling, would impact opium speculation more severely, they declined to
table it in the Legislative Council of Punjab. They argued that ‘this particular form of
betting is well known in Calcutta and elsewhere and could not be effectually stopped any
more than any other form of betting could be.’ The reasoning was in exact contradiction to
the logic that outlawed rain gambling in Calcutta a couple of years previously. Crucially,
it gave weight to the claims of the Calcutta Marwaris who had argued that rain gambling
and speculation on the price of opium, conducted through forwards (badni) or options (tejimandi), were part of a conjunct field of commercial activity. Emplotting the value of rain
gambling within the commercial operations of the bazaar therefore requires a clearer
understanding of characters like Babu Shew Nandan Tewary, the owner of the gaming
house in Calcutta.

Reports of Davies and Drummond, amongst others, suggest that the ‘grain merchants’ who
ran and participated in the betting establishments in Delhi, Punjab and Gujarat were
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probably arhatiyas, a crucial member of the bazaar economy. These arhatiyas or
commission agents would procure produce either directly from the peasants or from
smaller itinerant traders like the faria or bepari (as in the case of jute) on behalf of
European managing houses, wholesale exporters or for mills and native merchants.
Arhatiyas were either pucca or kutcha. While the kutcha arhatiya was a commission agent
in the pure sense, according to Justice Beaman of the Bombay High Court, the pucca

arhatiya ‘was something more’.422 Previously a ‘creature of custom’, the legal identity of
the pucca arhatiya was first established by Justice Chandravarkar in December 1904 in the
case Kanji Deoji v. Bhagwandas. Unlike the kutcha arhatiya, who was an in-between agent
for urban (mercantile) buyers and up-country suppliers, the pucca arhatiya:
[…]receives orders from his constituents and places them in the open market. His
obligations are briefly to find money for goods or goods for money or settle
differences on due date. His peculiar feature, and on which is, as far as I know, not
shared by any other agent known to the law is that he can allocate his principal’s
contracts to himself when it suits him to do so.423

So, while the kutcha arhatiya was an intermediary who received commission and dropped
out of the transaction once he had established contractual privity amongst his constituents,
the pucca arhatiya could assign the contract to himself.424 Tewary was never directly
referred to as an arhatiya but most clues point to that direction. The most obvious indication
comes from the fact that rain gambling, even in Calcutta, skirted the opium chowrasta.
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Added to this was the repeated invocation of teji mandi by the defendants to prove that rain
gambling was nestled within a host of ambient speculative activities. Second, the
ethnographic piece carried by The Statesman in 1896 had stated that bookies would ask
players, ‘khayega’ (will you eat), when approaching them with the odds of the day. The
players in turn would respond by saying khaya (I have eaten) if they wished to register a
bet. Interestingly, Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas, the chairman of the East India Cotton

Association would inform the Wiles Committee in 1930 that these were the same terms
used by speculators and spot brokers in the cotton markets of Bombay.425 At least
idiomatically, the ‘extensive negotiability’, as Ritu Birla terms it, between symbolic capital
and the ‘unmarked space of universal capital’ remained intact in spite of the efforts made
by the colonial legal apparatus to sequester its operations.426 Finally, there is the question
of charity. While defending the reputation of the Tewary, the pro-rain gambling lobby
argued that the proceedings earned from rain gambling went towards the upkeep of “two
infirmaries for aged and useless animals”.427 While the ostensible aim was to bolster
Tewary’s moral reputation, it is equally important to read such charity within the enframed
code of native commercial practice. Rajat Ray argues that such ‘charity charges’ were part
of standard business and these rates were fixed by arhatiyas’ market panchayats.428 It
should be noted that even in the bylaws of the Cotton Dealers’ Managing Committee, one

Madhoo Pavaskar, “Options Trading in Commodities’, Economic and Political Weekly, July 22-28, Vol.
41, No. 29, July 2006, pp. 3150-3154, p. 3150.
426
Birla, Stages of Capital, p. 21. Birla uses the term ‘extensive negotiability’ to refer to the intermingling of two
separated fields of commercial activity; the sphere structured by the logic of symbolic capital—kinship, caste,
lineage—and the unmarked universal space of capital circulation.
427
Legislative Department, Proceeding No. 26-54, May 1897, NAI.
428
Rajat Ray, “The Bazaar: Changing Structural characteristics of the indigenous section of the Indian economy
before and after the Great Depression” IESHR, 25, 3, New Delhi: Sage, 1988.
425

169

of the earliest organizations founded by 200 cotton traders in Bombay in 1855, clause 8
specified that ‘pigeons and other birds should be fed daily and rupee one be spent for that
purpose.’429 The similarities in idioms and practices indicate that at the very least, Shew
Nandan Tewary was more than just a proprietor of a ‘gambling den’ in Burabazar.

It is notable that the legal recognition and the economic importance of pucca arhatiyas

grew alongside the increase in the volume of forward trading430 in opium, cotton, linseed,
sugar, and most importantly, grains. To that end, the pucca arhatiya, often complemented
his function of procurement with goladari— the storage of grain—a service that richer
peasants availed off in lieu of short-term advances.431 They even made advances on the
basis of their holdings which were stored in grain pits or khattis. In fact, these practices of
storage, hoarding and speculation were held responsible for the artificial inflation of the
price of rice in Bengal in 1918, when Marwari speculators gained notoriety for cornering
its market. Amongst calls for greater scrutiny members of native civil society demanded
that the government make clear the legal status of speculation in food grains and the laws
that regulated its practice. The Maharaja of Cassimbazar, Manindra Chandra Nandi, wrote
to the Revenue and Agricultural Department in 1920 to ask ‘whether any special steps can
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be taken to prevent speculation in food grains’, but received an answer in the negative.432
The Government courted further reproach when the price of wheat rose unnaturally in 1921
and Marwari ‘wheat gamblers’ of Burrabazar were accused of storing almost 10,000 tonnes
of wheat illicitly.433 At the time, the speculative trade in wheat was seven times more than
its actual availability in the market.434 These incidents typecast certain commercial
communities, particularly the Marwaris, as being self-interested profiteers who acted

against nationalist interests. While the image was partly negated by their endorsement of
Gandhian mass politics in the 1930’s, the suspicion was never fully abandoned. As shown
by Rohit De, the impression was imported into the post-independence years and was
reinforced by depictions of the baniya as one who prioritized business over the nation.435

These practices, however, were not indisputably labeled as wagering, betting or gambling.
Indeed, in Bhagwandas Parasram v. Burjori Rattonji, Justice Beaman firmly stated that to
say that
[…] the Pakka Adatia is and always has been nothing more than a book-maker
accepting bets on commodities instead of race horses, is to say the least an
exaggerated assertion tinged with unnecessary prejudice…People who act as Pakka
Adatias are generally respectable and financially substantial businessmen who
actually give and take delivery of goods which they contract to sell or purchase.436
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The commercial agency of the arhatiya was marked by a certain fluidity, where according
to context, they were either gamblers or ‘businessmen’. While these monikers were
contestable in the commodity trade, in the case of rain betting the doubts grew thinner.
However, the question still remains, what was gambling—was it the social and cultural
practice of businessmen, or was it business itself?

Reflecting on the paradox between a solvent native money market and the sluggish
environment in industrial investment, Tirthankar Roy argues that most native bankers and
merchants, with the exception of the Parsis, kept their money idle for most of the year so
that they had liquid capital for seasonal lending. The most lucrative market, which fetched
the highest return, was the market for rural usury. Rajat Ray argues that native money
markets that moved capital through negotiable instruments like hundis, were the most
active from January to June, when the rabi harvest was procured from the hinterlands.437
However, this market did not advance to peasants directly since the market for rural usury
was cash dominant and hundis were limited to metropolitan exchanges, mostly amongst
bankers themselves.438 The absence of negotiable instruments in rural usury was due to the
high volume of unsecured lending which urban bankers found too risky to handle. So,
instead of partaking in it directly, they preferred to have their capital trickle down through
the hands of arhatiyas (both katcha and pucca) who then lent to big peasants and local
usurers; the latter being familiar with the social structures of the village were better placed
to recover the advance. Roy claims that the money market in rural usury was most active
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from end October, just after the monsoons, when the rabi crop was sown. It is also true that
the arhatiyas themselves held a wide range of portfolios, of which usury was an important
one. For example, when in a tax assessment from 1923, Misra Lal, the proprietor of the
firm Jhandu Lal Shiam Lal of Johri Bazaar Agra, requested the income tax department to
count a loss of Rs 29000 in ‘forward contract business of cotton yarn’, the tax officer
reviewing the balance sheet found that apart from profits on gold and silver jewelry, ‘the

assesses’ return an income of Rs 1000 from sarrafi business and Rs 7065 from money
lending.’439

Is it tentatively possible to refigure our understanding of rain gambling in light of the
lucrative demands of seasonal lending? Both the pro and anti-rain gambling lobbies had
forcefully declared that the game held an attraction that extended beyond the Marwaris, as
it did not require a specialist knowledge like commodity speculation. Given that the
practice generated a wider base, its cash profits were also substantial. In fact, it was the
rapid efflorescence of rain gambling establishments that first attracted legislative attention
towards these houses. While in Bengal the number had escalated gradually, from one in
1867 to three by 1896 (the last two cropping up in a span of two years), the Deputy
Inspector at Rewari, Hatim Mirza reported that the growth was alarming in Delhi, where
‘about four or five years ago there were only a few shops which transacted business of this
sort, but since that time forty five shops have been opened.’440 Later, in 1916, the Chief
Commissioner of Delhi, W.M Hailey reported the number to have risen to one hundred and
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fourteen. So, it is worth enquiring whether for the arhatiyas straddling the worlds of urban
banking and rural usury, these gaming houses were gainful avenues for generating liquid
capital that were then redirected into moneylending. Though I hold the discussion on rural
usury for the following chapter, I will emphasize that such lending was crucial in sustaining
commercial agriculture and in securing networks of agricultural procurement. While it is
impossible to ascertain whether Babu Shew Nandan Tewary's rain gambling houses were

a means for such ends, the conjecture is not entirely implausible.

What can be asserted with more certainty, however, is that the plot scripted against Tewary
by the ‘man from Allahabad’ was by no means exceptional. Nor was it a subplot in an
otherwise serious discussion. From the early 20th century, more than the government, it
was commercial actors who actively adopted the discourse on ‘gambling’ to target their
rivals. Unlike in the case of rain gambling in Bengal, where the government took an active
interest in banning the practice, the situation had notably changed within a decade. By the
time of the First World War, most provincial governments had relinquished their role in
determining the legitimacy and illegitimacy of commodity speculation. Instead, they
abdicated these responsibilities to newly formed commercial bodies like the East India Jute
Association and the East India Cotton Association. Using cotton, let me illustrate how
factional interests made use of the colonial legal apparatus to further sectarian agendas,
and in doing so, shaped the structure and practices of the industry as a whole.

Subjects of Interest within Community
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Efforts to organize the native cotton trade had its beginnings in the mid nineteenth century.
As mentioned previously, the first consorted effort came in 1855, when 200 merchants
came together to form the Cotton Dealers’ Managing Committee. This was followed by
the the Bombay Native Merchants Association in 1884, which through restricted
membership, attempted procedural standardization.441 The European end of the cotton
trade had the Bombay Cotton Trade Association, a joint Stock company established in

1875, floated with a share capital of Rs. 50,000, split amongst 50 members. The racial
partisanship of the Association peeved native merchants, and notable figures like Sir
Dinshah Petit, Cursondas Vallabhdas and Narandas Purshottamdas responded by setting
up their own joint stock company and named it the Bombay Cotton Trade Association.
Through charters, these organization regulated the practices of its members and settled
their disputes, most of which arose from trading hedge and forward contracts. Despite such
efforts, the trade showed no notable homogeneity by the beginning of the First World War.
According to M.L Dantewala, hedge and forward contracts were not well-defined
regarding volume, the standard of delivery and the period of settlement and so, ‘the market
was entirely dominated by speculative interests.’442 Significantly, the Indian textile
industry began expanding rapidly during this period. From being largely an article of
export, Indian cotton was now directed towards the demands of the Bombay mills, who
met nearly 42 % of the domestic demand for cloth. Given that the mills were now
consuming almost half of the total cotton grown in India, it was in the interest of most
sectors to organize the haphazard and informally structured trade and bring it under some
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central authority. The first concrete steps towards this were taken in June 1918, when the
Cotton Contracts Committee was set up under the Defense of India Act. The Committee’s
most immediate task was to streamline and standardize hedge and forward contracts, as it
was this contract that regulated the ‘futures market’, which in turn, set the rates for other
sectors like farming, spinning and the mills.443 To do so, the Committee authorized the
establishment of clearing houses for settling contracts through price differences and for

passing delivery orders. For clearing houses to function smoothly, an agreement regarding
the range of the forward or ‘basis contract’ (were they to be ‘wide’ or ‘narrow’444) and the
intervals for clearing such contracts (weekly or fortnightly) was required.445 The Bombay
Cotton Contracts Control Act was passed in 1919, which established a Board entrusted to
set up clearing houses and organize the trade. This process was more arduous than it
appeared. A consensus needed to be generated within each sector of a trade that included
growers, exporters, importers, commission agents, jaithawalas, muccadums, brokers, and
mill owners. The apprehensions of the Mill Owner’s Association were difficult to assuage;
they feared that the terms of the trade were being settled in the sellers interests rather than
the buyers. The tireless negotiations of Neville Ness Wadia convinced a section of the mill
owners to come under the direction of the Board. Concurrently, Sir Purshottamdas
Thakurdas was busy putting together a representative Association, which could centralize
the operations of the cotton market. The association was named the East India Cotton

The futures market was the centralized market for forward and hedge contracts, that report ‘the consensus
of trade opinions since the composite judgement of all the operators is being constantly recorded in the current
or ruling price of the commodity.’ Futures Trading and Futures Marketing in Cotton, p. 7.
444
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Association (EICA) and was registered under the Company Act in October 1921.
Subsequently, in June 1922, it requested the Government of Bombay for statutory powers
through which it could regulate the cotton trade through the issuance of bye-laws.

The unification of the native trade under the EICA was unable, however, to rid the terrain
of its agonistic edges. This fragile consensus was plagued by lingering disagreements,

especially on three issues; restriction regarding membership to the Association on the
volume of cotton that was traded, the mandatory security deposit of Rs 10,000 to become
a member and the exclusion of brokers from the representative body.446 More plainly, many
resented that in the name of the Association, the Government had handed putative
monopoly to the big players at the cost of minor traders with limited capital. The fact is
that many continued to circumvent the EICA’s regulatory authority and conducted business
where speculative contracts dealing in a lesser volume of cotton were enforced informally.
Evidence for this is gleaned from the number of private member bills that were sent to the
governments of Bengal and Bombay, which under various headings, sought a ban or the
criminalization of those associations that functioned outside the EICA’s purview. The first
came in 1925 when Babu Debi Prasad Khaitan drafted the ‘Wagering Associations Bill’.
This was followed by the ‘Futures Market Bill’ tabled by P.D Himatsingka in 1927 and the
‘Calcutta Suppression of Wagering Baras Bill’, drafted by K.C Roy Choudhuri in 1930.
These bills echoed a common objective - to characterize certain kinds of speculation as
legitimate business and define others as pure wagering or more specifically, gambling. In

446

Ibid.

177

the opinions of these drafters, several firms or baras were conducting trading operations
with no intention of taking delivery of the product being traded; profits were made on the
difference between the market price and forward price of the contract. This is how money
was made. ‘A’ agrees to a contract with ‘B’ in August, promising him delivery of 50 bales
of cotton at Rs 500 a bale in January. In January when the contract expires, if the price of
cotton is Rs.490 a bale, then A makes a profit of Rs. 10 a bale, i.e Rs 500 in total. If the

market price of cotton in January is Rs. 510, then B makes a profit of Rs 500. However,
instead of actually giving or taking delivery of the 500 bales, A and B settle the contract
by paying each other the difference between the market price of the commodity and the
forward price agreed to in the contract. Usually, such contracts were passed off in a chain,
which was also referred to as ‘cross contracting’. So, before January, B could find a new
buyer C, who could buy the contract for Rs. 510 a bale. C in turn could sell the contract to
D and so on. Each of the intermediaries in this chain would only collect the difference
between the forward price and the market price. Theoretically, the last member holding the
contract would take actual delivery, although in many cases, even he would settle through
price differences.

It should be noted that this kind of trading was not limited to baras alone, as many
established exchanges including the EICA conducted business similarly. More
importantly, such contracts, where profits accrued through price differences, were not
considered ‘wagering contracts’ as per section 30 of the Contract Act. Indeed, it was argued
that even if the contract passed through the hands of several intermediaries who settled
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only through differences, if delivery was made at the final end of the chain, then the
intermediary contracts were not wagers and thus were not voidable. This for example was
the verdict of Babu Baijnath Das of the Lower Appellate Court of Cawnpore in Hazari Lal
Chang Mal vs Keshodas Rangopal:
The Plaintiff’s books disclose all adjustment in differences. Possibly it is so. But
then what will you say about the 1375 bags covered by 18 sold notes. Will you say
that even in those cases with the actual goods behind each of those 18 sold notes
the transactions were me merely gambling because the plaintiff by counter contracts
simply passed on the goods and received as profits only the differences?447

The judge concluded that such contracts were not wagers and ruled that these transactions
could not be termed gambling. Given the ubiquity of settling contracts through differences,
the target of the bills was less to prohibit a form of practice as much as to have such
transactions conducted under the umbrella of bona fide Associations like the EICA and
their exchanges.448 Accordingly, a recurrent demand was that all baras should all be
registered under the Companies Act, failing which, they should be declared as ventures for
illegitimate gambling. Take for example, the Statements and Objectives of the Futures
Market Bill, where P.D Himatsingka listed the problems of unrecognized baras.
While it is necessary to control and regulate the dealings in properly controlled
Futures Markets so as to, in the words of the London Jute Association, “employ
controlled speculation to assist sound trading’, it is essential to put a stop to Baras
which are of a purely gambling nature.449

Central Board of Revenue, 1924, File No. 90.
In the ’Futures Market Bill’ the EICA was given the same status as the New York Mercantile Exchange and
the Liverpool Cotton Exchange, Legislative, 1930, File No. 29, NAI.
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While appreciative of the intention, the government remained wary of enacting these bills
into law. The primary objection, as stated in a note by the Secretary of the Department of
Commerce, was that ‘it involves excessive governmental interference in private
concerns.’450 Clearly, by the second decade of the twentieth century, the Government
considered the details of trading as a ‘private’ matter and were therefore weary of directly
interfering or actively shaping these practices. Instead, they preferred that the regulation

come from within the trade itself, mostly because they were still unable to decide or
definitively legislate as to what was and was not gambling. Even in Hazari Lal Chang Mal
vs Keshodas Rangopal, the Judge Babu Baijnath Das observed:
The line between what may be called speculation—a term which I interpret largely
in the sense of making forward contracts—and gambling is a very fine one and each
case has to be decided on its merits.451
Das’ ruling overturned a previous decision taken by Justice Aghore Nath Mukherjee, thus
indicating just how nebulous this field of law was. This confusion was not exclusive to the
colony. Even the commodity markets of early twentieth century America were marked by
such uncertainty. As Stuart Banner notes, in many cases it was the moral position of the
judge that finally determined what they they saw as commerce and what they decreed as
gambling.452 In India too, the government’s withdrawal left the field of gambling and
speculation open. Consequently, it was the competing interests and monopolistic ambitions

of private players that gradually came to determine the contours of these practices. Its most
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notable example was observed in the clash between the EICA and the Shree Mahajan
Association in 1926.

The EICA vs. the Mahajan Association
As a direct challenge to the EICA’s authority, the Shree Mahajan Association set up its
offices on June 25th, 1925, at New Sutta Gulli, off Sheikh Memon Street, in a place called

Motishaw Chawl in Bombay. In 1925, the president of the EICA, Sir Purshottamdas
Thakurdas, wrote a letter to the government of Bombay and directed their attention to the
activities of the Mahajan Association; practices he deemed to be gambling. He wrote a
second letter to the government on October 28th, 1925, urging them to take strict action.
Following this, the Association was raided on 21st January 1926 and 327 brokers and
merchants were arrested under the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887. Though
acquitted soon after, the government of Bombay appealed the decision in October 1928.
The charge against the Association was that it dealt in American futures, teji mandi, and
kachi khandi, transactions which in the opinion of the prosecution, were pure forms of
gambling. Interestingly, it was was the EICA that pressured the government to apply the
Bombay Gaming Act against these traders. This made their contracts criminal and not just
voidable, as per the terms of the Cotton Contracts Act of 1918.

In terms of trade, the Mahajan handled a large volume of kachi khandi as opposed to the
pucca kandhi contracts carried by the EICA. According to the Magistrate who first tried
the case, the difference between the two was that ‘in Kachi Khandi the minimum unit for
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forward business is five bales and in Pucca Khandi it is one hundred bales.’453
Additionally, the contracts of the Mahajan Association were ‘narrow’ —they were only for
fully good broach cotton and could not be substituted for fully good Bengal or fine fair
staple Oomra varieties—and their contracts were cleared weekly rather than fortnightly, as
was the case for the EICA. But as the appellate Judge in the case, Justice Mirza observed,
the most important difference was that ‘kacha, as applied to cotton soudas, has come to

acquire a special significance in the bazaar as meaning cotton soudas in which no delivery
is taken or given or contemplated.’

454

But the Mahajan contended that their practice of

settling differences was no different from the EICA; the only difference was the volume.
This made their exchange lucrative for small traders who could not trade in the volume
required by the EICA. The prosecution on the other hand alleged that the settlements of the
EICA happened once every fifteen days, as opposed to the weekly or sometimes even daily
clearances of the Mahajan. More importantly, they insisted the contracts of the EICA were
carried over, i.e., they were not terminated after settling differences in price, but prolonged
to the point that delivery was made. This was different from kacha khandi, where contracts
were terminated following settlement. The prosecution therefore insisted that though the
Mahajan and the EICA indulged in similar practices, for the EICA settling contracts
fortnightly through price differences was a method of hedging and was ‘intended to be for
the protection of the brokers and intermediate parties and for regulating and controlling
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transactions periodically before the due date.’455 To that end, a member of the EICA turned
witness for the prosecution, admitted that on their exchange:
[H]edge contracts are settled by settling off once against the other and not by
delivery and a large number of hedge contracts are settled from day to day. This
may be so, but the difference as I understand it, is that in legitimate business Hedge
or cover contracts are ancillary or subsidiary to the main contract and are merely
designed to protect the operators against loss.456

Since the Mahajan did not carry over their contracts, nor show any intention of delivering
actual cotton, their trade was deemed suspicious. Their weekly and sometimes daily
practice of settling contracts as per the rate released by the market at Sewri Bazaar, gave
their operations the appearance of number betting. This impression was reinforced by the
fact that at the time of the police raid, the Association did not own a godown for storing
the cotton being hypothetically traded. It was only two days after the raids that the Mahajan
passed a resolution to ‘carry over contracts’, and a week after they rented a godown.
Though the Shree Mahajan Association was convicted under the provisions of the Bombay
Prevention of Gambling Act, they received only a light slap on the wrist in the form of a
fine of Rs. 50. They assured the Court that they had rented a godown and had every
intention of delivering cotton. To the ire of the EICA, they continued their operations, till
in 1930 a Committee was formed under Sir Gilbert Wiles to review the workings of the
Cotton Contracts Act of 1918. On the basis of this Committee’s recommendations, the

government of Bombay introduced a Bill in July 1931, whose objects, amongst many, was
to declare trade conducted under any other Association but the EICA criminal. M.L
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Dantewala tells us that the Mahajan Association was quick to rally support on its behalf
and were successful in amending Section 6. of the contemplated Bill. The section, which
originally read ‘no forward contract shall be entered into except by or through the agency
of a member of the Association [EICA]’, was amended to ‘no forward contract shall be
entered into except by or through the agency of a member of the Association or any other
association’. 457 The bill thus became a dead letter.

The episode highlights that by the 1920s, while law remained the medium of narrative, the
story of colonial gambling was no longer simply of statist definition or intervention.
Instead, it was private agents who used the law and the colonial court apparatus to define
their trade and set its standards of legitimacy and accuse their competitors of gambling.
The ubiquity of this line of attack was not limited to business alone, as even in horse racing,
the fear regarding private lawsuits kept the Calcutta and Western Union Turf Club on their
toes.458

Government apprehension regarding the definition and legitimacy of betting and wagering
peaked, however, in the sphere of market activity. In fact, when endorsing the provisions
of the Bombay Cotton Contracts Control Act of 1918, Sir Purshottamdas Thakurdas
convinced the provincial government by reassuring them that unlike the Frauds Act (1863),
this Bill would would hand the powers of regulating the trade to the ‘representatives of
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commercial interests only’ and not the government.459 Such contestations also broaden our
understanding of the inner workings of law, business, culture and community—categories
that continue to animate the scholarship on Indian commerce. According to Tirthankar
Roy, historiography has largely understood the working of ‘key institutions’ of Indian
commerce through endogenous (caste norms and community networks) and exogenous
(colonial legislation) factors.460 While the inner working of native commerce was

structured by symbolic capital, its external presentation was directed by governmental
intervention that came in the form of colonial law. Similarly, Ritu Birla argues that colonial
law successfully sequestered the embedded sphere of native commerce into the private
sphere of culture and the public sphere of commerce—-‘the unmarked space of universal
capital’.461 While binaries like culture/commerce or private/public were imperfectly sealed,
this characterization assumes that the field of symbolic capital resisted the externality of
colonial law and State intervention. However, as this history suggests, community was not
always a homogenous organizing principle, nor were the courts and colonial legal
apparatus the exclusive weapons of an interventionist State. Instead, it was often members
from within an ‘endogamous’ and putatively coherent ‘community’ that used ‘exogamous’
institutions to intervene in commerce and define the norms of legitimacy and illegitimacy.
To that end, Mitra Sharafi demonstrates how the Parsis, a major commercial community
of modern India, were highly litigious and much of Parsi personal law was the product of
the community bringing suits against one another. Accordingly, Sharafi concludes that the
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Parsis experienced colonial law as a forum that resolved internal questions of community
instead of as purely foreign manifestation of colonial rule.462 It would therefore be an
overdetermination to understand government/law and community in purely oppositional
terms. It is also an overdetermination to understand ‘community’ as a purely enabling
entity of symbolic capital, one that provided native agents of commerce the shield of
ascriptive unity as well as access to privileged flows of capital. If ‘community’ was the

collective subject of native capital, then its actors should also be understood as the
contracting agents of civil society, who pushed past ascribed homogeneity and adopted
colonial law to target rivals and further personal interests. The appellate judge in the suit
against the Mahajan Association, Justice Baker, observed as much when he described the
case as ‘really a fight between the East India Cotton Association and the Mahajan
Association.’

463

W. Chadwick of the Commerce department was blunter in his pithy

description of Babu Debi Prosad Khaitan’s ‘Wagering Association Bill”, as a bill designed
‘by a Marwari to prevent other Marwari’s from gambling.’464 From being a accusation
leveled against native commerce, by the second decade of the twentieth century, gambling
had become a tool in hands of commercial agents to target intracommunity rivals.
Ironically, its faded origins were first encountered in Bengal in 1897, when Babu Shew
Nandan Tewary was cornered similarly by a ‘man from Allahabad’.
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Why did accusations of gambling provide fodder for personal attacks and mudslinging?
One of the primary reasons concerned the language of legislation, which saw gambling a
social practice and therefore, a problem for and within the ‘community’. While the legal
apparatus treated these consequences as self-evident, as we shall see, they too were
produced discursively
Scandal!

Silence itself—-the things one declines to say, or is forbidden to name, the
discretion that is required between different speakers—is less the absolute limit of
discourse, the other side from which it is separated by a strict boundary, than an
element that functions alongside the things said, with them and in relation to them
within over-all strategies.465
I ask you to make connections, all you bring me are anecdotes.466

While referring to the tragedies precipitated by rain gambling, C.W Bolton mentioned a
case of suicide in 1892 and another case from 1894, in which a son stole jewelry from his
father in order to pay off his gambling debt. These were among the many examples Bolton
claimed to reserve that highlighted the social harms of rain gambling. However, when the
Police Commissioner of Calcutta, John Lambert submitted his report to Charles Elliot in
1894, he did not mention either of these incidents. Lambert had stated - ‘Still the state of
things is such that a scandal may at any time arise’.467 Were these incidents not scandal
worthy? Lambert had been scathing in his assessment and had requested legislative
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intervention to prohibit rain gambling in Calcutta. It can therefore be inferred that if he was
aware of these incidents, he would not have hesitated in citing them.

Scandal was a powerful category, one that unfailingly kindled the interest of the public
sphere. As a result, it was repeatedly deployed to describe the fallout of gambling. Tanika
Sarkar argues that the emergent public sphere of colonial Bengal was constituted and

inflected by the ‘process of scandal’, which operated in opposition to the culture of erudite
and ‘rational’ debate.468 Sarkar describes this public sphere as one of sensational reportage,
rumors and gossip that were personified in popular literature and paintings, as well as the
efflorescence of obscene farces and theatre. The Bengal government hoped to utilize this
‘process of scandal’ to its own ends and generate a public sentiment against gambling.

Responding to Alexander Mackenzie’s inquiries, the Mohammedan Literary Society
mentioned that the purdanashin women of the Surti and Memon and Moghul communities
had been drawn into the game through a network of female agents and brokers. The Society
alleged that many had to “have recourse to means of bad livelihood” to pay off their own
or their husband’s debts. The “Members of the Marwari Community” were quick to
respond, assuring the government that “Indian communities guard their females very
jealously” and that incidents of such tremendous transgression would surely have caused
‘general commotion’ and attracted police attention.469 Since the police had not filed cases
regarding such allegations, it could be assumed such stories were nothing more than rumor.
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Again, when the topic of suicides was broached, the agitators against the Bill claimed that
the government was operating without hard facts. In response, at the meeting of the Council
for the Lt. Governor of Bengal, C.W Bolton stated:
Instances of ruin and crime resulting from indulgence in rain gambling have been
mentioned, and it is impossible to doubt that many such cases have occurred. In the
memorial presented last year, to which I have already alluded, it was stated that
native bankers and merchants and young women of respectable families ruined
themselves by this pernicious habit. If the Council desires to hear specific cases, I
would mention two. In 1892 a young man committed suicide in consequence of his
inability to repay a sum of money embezzled from his employer for the purpose of
rain gambling. Two years later, another case came to notice in which a son had
stolen ornaments of large value and money from his father for the same purpose.470

Such responses were anecdotal, not meticulous. Even if true, did they firmly establish the
deleterious and widespread ills of rain gambling? Finding Bolton’s evidence ‘curious’ at
best, The Indian Daily News wondered whether “one suicide and one robbery through rain
gambling” was enough to condemn the practice.471 Such criticisms did not stem the flow
of the affect that passed as evidence. To convince the recalcitrant Charles Elliot in 1895,
The Bengalee, published an ethnographic piece documenting the tragedies that resulted in
the rain betting houses of Burabazar. The piece was written as a conversation between a
reporter and European gentleman, also an ardent gambler. A heady doze of sentimentalism
compensated for the report’s somewhat scanty details. When the reporter pressed on the
question of suicides, he received the following answer.

“You spoke of suicides; did you ever know a suicide to take place here?”
“No, not actually here, there would be no room! But I have known many men who
were once regular customers here, who are now mouldering beneath the tongueless
dust; men who have gone to their last home by their own hands. A case happened
470
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quite recently. A Chinaman came here lost all he possessed and then sought repose
in the bosom of Hooghly. Such cases are very common, and are usually recorded
as ‘Suicide by drowning’ by ‘opium poisoning’, by ‘hanging’ and what not; the
public have neither time nor desire to enquire into the cause of such suicides.
Careful enquiry would reveal the fact that many of them are attributable to this
particular form of amusement.”472
This ‘European gentleman’ was as solvent as any other government sources. Contesting
the authenticity of such anecdotes, the agitators against the Bill claimed that a ‘careful

enquiry’ would actually confirm that their practice was harmless and transparent. Bolton,
however, reassured Mackenzie that the Bill had not been contemplated in haste and was
the result of a ‘full enquiry’.473 Still, the vagueness in official language appeared
remarkable. Addressing the Marwari attendees at the meeting held at 68 Cotton Street,
Babu Sheodut Roy challenged “anyone to give a specific instance of a purdanashin lady
being driven to have recourse to a bad livelihood.”474 Babu Sheonath Chowdry laid a
similar challenge on the question of financial ruin.475 Again, S.N Banerjee responded to
these at the Council of the Lt. Governor of Bengal:

Calcutta society was not long ago convulsed by a tale of an atrocious murder
committed by a Bengali named Annoda Prosad Ghose. He murdered his sons. And
when the story of his life was published, what was the most startling fact which is
disclosed? He was a confirmed rain gambler, and lost the whole of his fortune,
amounting to two lakhs of rupees, in the rain gambling establishment. Only the
other day I was having a conversation with one of the foremost men in the Marwari
community. He said there was a respectable lady living in Bara Bazar who had
taken to rain gambling; she went through the whole of her money and then went
astray; another person embezzled his master’s money, and then expiated his guilt
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in the Presidency jail, and there are no doubt other cases which have not seen the
light.476

The public sphere refused these temptations as the incidents mentioned by Bolton and
Banerjee were not investigated or speculated upon in either native or British newspapers.
Despite the commercial profitability of such salacious scoops, The Hindoo Patriot warned
its readers that ‘for the sake of the reputation of Native women, it is to be hoped that the

memorialists [against rain gambling] will find it extremely difficult to prove such a
monstrous allegation.’477 Accusations that the game was rigged were similarly dismissed,
some labeling them as “absolutely false” and “obviously libelous”.478 Regarding the
question of debt, Marwari lobbyists insisted that the safeguards of hedging built into the
game meant that even a particularly unlucky player stood the risk of losing no more than
10-15 rupees in a season. The two-lakh figure quoted by Banerjee appeared outlandish. In
fact, the The Amrita Bazar Patrika, reported the case of Babu Dinobundhu Singh and 31
others of Bankipore, were arrested and harassed through the provisions of the Public
Gaming Act (1867), but were later released when it was found that they were not in fact
gambling but were engaged in a Hindu marriage ceremony. The paper insisted that
“hundreds of people are thus harassed”.479

The lack of hard evidence catalyzed the suspicions of the British press too. Exposing the
“sublime mediocrity” of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, Capital reported the details
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of a meeting held in August 1896, where the Municipal Commissioners were found lacking
when asked for specific details regarding the ills of rain gambling. The paper reported that
Two dissentients asked for facts and figures in support of this resolution [against
rain gambling], but apparently none were produced…Possibly the committee who
framed the resolution have some facts and figures up their sleeves, but if so, it is
only fair that the general body of tax payers […] should hear on what grounds the
opinion of the committee has been formed. How can they [the Municipal
Commissioners] present to speak of the opinion of the public without consulting
them and without using the ordinary courtesy of explaining why they have
delivered such an opinion on the public’s behalf?480
One imagines that it would be in the interest of the government to expose these ‘scandals’
that spurred their actions. As the sociologist Ari Adut argues, the function and effect of
scandals are best understood through the logic of publicity, which both accentuates and
transforms the meaning of social transgressions.481 Since a scandal was constituted by the
‘public exposure of private information’, the degree of secrecy correspondingly determined
the magnitude of the scandal.482 The government’s evidence, however, found no such
exposition. Importantly, rain gambling itself was not a hidden or secretive practice. It was
conducted openly and quite publicly on the streets of Burabazar and was known to the
government since at least 1894. Exposing the existence of rain gambling did not give
publicity to a secret. Rain gambling was indeed a vice, but as The Englishman remarked-
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“condemning the practice is one thing, stopping it another.”483 However, the stories of
financial ruin and sexual transgressions were instrumental in drumming up moral and
public support for the Bill. Crucially, these incidents were presented as threats to the moral
institution of the family. Heads of households were committing suicide or murdering their
children, sons were stealing from their fathers and wives were selling heirloom jewelry and
going ‘astray’. So, the discussion around gambling was actually a discussion about

something else entirely, where anecdotes, gossip and rumor constituted a more effective
armory than facts, figures and numbers. According to Max Glockman, the credibility of
both scandal and gossip are reinforced when they elaborate on predominantly held social
values and community standards as well as their transgression.484 Were Banerjee and
Bolton marshaling such tropes for political ends? The practitioners of the game raised their
own defenses and shared with the public stories of Tewary’s public gifting. A contributor
to the Indian Mirror expressed surprise when he discovered on his visit to a gaming house
that the gamblers ‘were not the demons I thought they were.’ In fact, ‘Old Tewary, almost
an octogenarian, daily feeds a large number of Sadhus’, practices that were emblematic of
his impeccable social merits.485 Armed appropriately, a speaker at the Marwari gathering
at 68 Cotton Street, Babu Sheonath Chowdry, denounced the idea that rain gambling could
ever compromise the respectability of Hindu women. Chowdry laughed at the suggestion
that “Hindu female chastity, after having withstood for countless generations every other
method of assault, had suddenly succumbed to the approaches of the wily rain gambler”.
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486

Had he forgotten that the matter of women gamblers and sexual transgression was

originally raised by a section of the Surti Muslim community in the context of purdanashin
women? Were the Surtis, a mercantile community like the Marwaris, using the bogey of
rain gambling to attack their commercial rivals, or was there merit to their accusations? A
more textured investigation regarding women gamblers, both as practitioners and as
discursive construct, is needed.

Economic Agents or Custodians of Culture
It is challenging to capture the unmediated voices of women in the available literature on
colonial Indian gambling. They appear at archival margins, presented as unsound financial
agents and prey for conmen and sharpers. Placed as victims, their subjectivity is further
mediated by their status in the native family structure. Instead of being seen as economic
agents or consumers, women were rendered domestic, private and cultural agents; the
wives or the mothers of their respective homes.487 Colonial anthropology and law were
instrumental in locating women through this lens of kinship; the latter constituted women
as the domestic subject of governance.488 In the context of gambling, they were represented
as ‘respectable women’ who had fallen from grace. This image of ‘respectability’ met the
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economic and the cultural ends of an incipient nationalism, particularly regarding the
discourse of swadeshi, which insisted on keeping western values and its commodities out
of the native home. Notwithstanding some nominal yet legitimate contestation489, it is
largely acknowledged that nationalist discourse and colonial law unproblematically
converged in reifying the native structures of patriarchy. This included the category of
‘respectability’, which in turn played a crucial role in defining the cultural ambitions of a

new urban middle class. Colonial law thus ensured that the native domestic sphere was
governed by personal, religious and customary laws which preserved and reinforced
patriarchal privileges. Defining and safeguarding the notion of ‘respectability’, particularly
for women, was crucial in maintaining this form of power. Accordingly, the ‘respectable
woman’ became the standard bearer and reservoir of an incorruptible autochthonous
culture.490 Accordingly, the ‘respectable woman’ gambler was shadowed by twin anxieties.
The first concerned her engagement with a moral vice and the second involved the exercise
of her agency as an autonomous economic subject.

S.N. Banerjee’s rhetoric played on these nascent bhadralok anxieties when he presented
women as gullible victims, ‘lured’ from of their homes, trapped in debt and then forced to
compromise on their ‘respectability’. Alexander Mackenzie on the other hand, embraced
the domestic sphere as the only place where gambling could exist respectably:
We are not entitled to interfere with rain gambling except so far as it is carried on
in a common gaming house. It is open to all the Marwaris in the place to remain in
Mitra Sharafi, “The Semi-autonomous Judge in Colonial India: Chivalric Imperialism meets Anglo-Islamic
Dower and Divorce law, in Indian Economic and Social History Review, 46, 1, (2009): 57-81.
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their own courtyards and have as many of their European friends as they please,
and to sit there with all the appurtenances for gambling and bet away till midnight
if they like. 491

Mackenzie thus attempted to flip the cultural defense and along with it the broader
questions of morality. The administration had no problem with gaming in private homes,
he claimed, just with a ‘common gaming house’. If gambling was indeed a native custom,
practiced during weddings and religious holidays (Diwali), then its place, quite
unproblematically, was in the home. In all probability, Mackenzie was duplicitous in this
offer. Even as custom, gambling was purely ritualistic and if it were to be practised
routinely it would threaten sanctity of the domestic space itself. He had to simply look to
the history of English gambling to confirm this contention. The nineteenth century
historian, John Ashton, in his History of Gambling in England, provides glimpse at how
‘homes’ were turned into ‘gaming houses’ through the clever appropriation of the domestic
veneer. Unsurprisingly, in the archives of gaming histories, this is one of those rare cases
where women were presented as perpetrators instead of as victims. In recounting the stories
of the ‘faro ladies’ of London, Ashton narrated the history of those women who ran faro (a
card game) circles from their homes. A satirical headline titled “Modern Hospitality or a
Friendly Party in High Life”, captured the unease these soirees produced amongst
Londoners condemning the overlay of commerce with domesticity.492 Faro parties were

conducted by ‘respectable’ women like Lady Archer and Lady Buckinghamshire, who
traded social capital for pecuniary returns. They threw lavish dinners where guests played
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faro, baccarat and roulette, while the hostess actively encouraged them to play on credit or
to take loans from friends. The events were held in different houses and most of the women
organizers hired their own muscle for debt collection, some of them even keeping pistols
on their own person. Ashton admits that their spouses were equal partners in the ruse.493
Yet, it was the domesticity of the settings that made women the target of newspaper
editorials, like the one in the Morning Post on January 12th, 1800, which claimed that

“society has reason to rejoice the complete downfall of the Faro Dames, who were so long
the disgrace of human nature.”494

Similar attitudes inhabited native dwellings too. Gambling had no place in Bengali and
Marwari homes and if it did, it certainly held no place for the women of that home. The
urban middle class household in Bengal was undergoing a process of material and social
transformation in the late nineteenth century that saw it embrace a new standard of morality
which refashioned the discourse on women’s pleasures. Women’s sexual pleasure in
particular was increasingly tethered to the moral fulfillment found in motherhood. The
household, sanitized of questionable traditions, reflected this new standard. Sumanta
Banerjee details how sexually explicit songs of wandering Vaishnavs, which were popular
in the homes of upper class Bengalis, were gradually marginalized towards the end of the
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Indeed, while women played a key role in organizing such evenings, their role was amplified in the public
sphere because of the corruption of the home. Ashton concludes his narrative with the thoughts of one Col.
Hanger and his sanguine verdict - “Can any woman expect to give to her husband a vigorous and healthy
offspring, whose mind, night after night, is thus distracted?
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nineteenth century.495 Charu Gupta documents a parallel process amongst Marwaris, where
sexually explicit gari songs that were sung by women during weddings or festivals like
Holi, were condemned and targeted as a site for moral reform in the late nineteenth
century.496 This condemnation fell within the broader process of reification of the domestic
function of Marwari women, who Hardgrove suggests were gradually anchored to the
concept pativrata that valorized the ethic of wifely duty and devotion.497

The social discourse that accompanied the economic mobility of nineteenth century Bengal
demands further investigation, as do the charges of the infidelity of purdahnashin women,
which were loosely coded as ‘recourse to bad livelihood’ or as ‘going astray’. Contrary to
its presentation, in reality it was not uncommon to find women from respectable
households turn to prostitution in late nineteenth century Calcutta. Scholars like Sumanta
Banerjee and Janaki Nair show that in spite of the material and moral precariousness of
prostitution, the profession promised certain freedoms for women that lay outside the
suffocating control of middle-class domesticity. Accordingly, even as a section of
upperclass women criticized the profession publicly, they coveted the economic and
personal freedoms they thought its practitioners enjoyed.498 However, from information
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gathered on these activities, which relied heavily on colonial regulatory laws such as the
Contagious Diseases Act (1868), gaming debts were rarely cited as a cause of prostitution.
As Ashwini Tambe demonstrates in her narrative regarding the horrific torture and murder
of a sex worker named Akooti, it was the debts incurred from ordinary moneylending and
usury that drove women to prostitution.499 Though far more deleterious, this form of usury
rarely faced the same manner of censure as shall be argued in the following chapter.

Expanding the scope of discussion beyond Bengal will help gauge how allegations were
circulated as familiar tropes in the discourse on gambling. In his letter to H.J Maynard, the
Judicial and General Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Madan Gopal Rai had
claimed that rain gambling ‘ruined thousands of families…the losers have in some cases
committed suicide.’500 Though Rai did not mention women directly, he did repeat an
accusation previously made in Bengal when he claimed that ‘people sell their wives’ and
children’s jewelry and stake everything on chance.”501 Similarly, the Deputy
Commissioner of Gujarat, J.R. Drummond claimed that gambling effected ‘our own young
people, servants and apprentices’ and ‘this is just the class that the native community
believes to have, of late, enjoyed an increased measure of immunity.502 His opinion was
reinforced by the testimony of W.M Hailey, the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, who filed a
report on rain and opium gambling in 1916.
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It is beyond doubt that the system invites and encourages the very poor to risk sums
which they cannot afford to lose and has a direct result in driving the unsuccessful
to crime. In view of the ruin which this practice brings to the coolie and servant
class, the more enlightened ranks of Indian society regard the presence of these
shops and the public manner in which their transactions are conducted as a blot on
our administration.503
Hailey’s report also mentioned a note by Mr. Humphry, the Deputy Commissioner of
Police, who in 1908 informed the Commissioner of Delhi about increase in petty crimes,

which the ‘respectable community’ linked to the thriving practice of unregulated gambling.
Humphrey personally made a trip to the site of activity, Eagerton Road, where he noted
particular excitement amongst large crowds that gathered on the street when the monthly
betting shops released their results in the first week of every month. Humphrey observed
that regular bettors were not men of business or even education. Instead the population
comprised chiefly of coolies, sweepers, Kahars, labourers and occasionally some
zamindars of neighbouring villages.504 He also noted that the Kahars were responsible for
several petty crimes committed in the city, and was quick to conclude that the fault lay with
reckless gambling. His note, however, made no mention of women gamblers, although he
did describe an incident where a faqir, having lost his possessions at one of these shops,
had killed a prostitute and stolen her ornaments.505
Such allegations were repeated in 1911, when Calcutta was gripped by the menace of

‘Cotton Figure Gambling’.506 The game, dubbed as a ‘get rich quick’ scheme, was reported
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to have a ‘remarkable fascination’ amongst the ‘lower orders’ of society.507 In his note
appraising the Government of India of the situation, the Chief Secretary to the Government
of Bengal, C.J.S Moore reported that “From the specimen tickets which have come to the
notice of Government, it appears that the poorest section of the community are being
widely attracted by the excitement of cotton gambling.”508 Moore repeated the testimony
of the rain gamblers from 1897, when he claimed that the amount bet rarely exceeded Rs.

1 anna. The large number of players and the total volume of play, however, still made for
a substantial haul. In fact, it was the low stakes that attracted both women and players of
the ‘poorest classes’ to try their luck. There was nothing in the report regarding
purdanashin women. In spite of the unmistakable inflection of upperclass anxieties,
provincial governments and British officials viewed deleterious gambling as largely a
subaltern and working-class problem

Interestingly, it was in native reports that frequently mentioned the threat that gambling
held for ‘respectable women’. Take for example the report of a sub-committee of the Delhi
Municipality, a body comprising of Indian ‘respectable classes’:
Not only men but women also send money through their watermen or water women,
to be staked in opium gambling, and if they have no servants they do it through
their neighbours […] Later the women become emboldened and attend the
gambling house in person, without the knowledge of their guardians and wander
about the streets and are disgraced and when their guardians come to know of it,
and scold or punish them, they generally end in suicide, by throwing themselves
down wells or running away from their homes.509
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One must also account for a degree of displacements in these accounts. If ‘respectable’
opinion had an axe to grind, it should have been with the horse racing, a game that denotes
risk, fraud, and intemperance in upperclass Bengali discourse even today. Take for example
Mrinal Sen’s 1965 film Aakash Kusum, in which anytime the lead protagonist, a young
entrepreneur from a declining middle-class family, contemplates a risky business venture,
Sen cuts to the image of a horse race. But when the issue of turf betting was raised in 1897,

S.N Banerjee absurdly declared that ‘betting on the turf is supported b the opinion of the
civilized world and a legislator wastes his breath who legislates in violent opposition to
public sentiment.’510 How true was this statement?

As early as 1871, the Police Commissioner of Calcutta, H.L Harrison, had observed that
‘poor clerks and others are plied by designing men to subscribe to a reckless course of
foreign gambling (Derby Sweeps), the worst feature of which is that it is not at all
understood in this country. ‘ 511The popularity of the turf and an unchecked pullulation of
unlicensed bookmakers and bucket shops512 was responsible for attracting a large section
of the native population to horse racing. As a result, the Governments of Bengal and
Bombay passed the Race Course Licensing Act (1912), which decreed that only
bookmakers registered with the Calcutta Turf Club and the Western Indian Turf Club could
legally handle the betting action of these courses. This, however, did not rid the practice of
moral accusations. In fact, during the discussions regarding the Bengal Cotton Ordinance
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Act in 1913, a member of the Bengal Legislative Council, Mr. Chakravarty, accused the
Stewards of the Turf club of sending agents to register bets in the neighborhoods of
Bhawanipur and Alipore, even from women.513 In the same year, an anonymously
published pamphlet titled The Curse of Race Course Gambling, leveled serious charges
against the turf authorities:
Recent numbers of the Calcutta and Bombay Sheet Racing Calendars have
published columns of closely printed names of defaulters on the turf— men who
have failed to pay their gambling debts. This list includes the names of the officers
of the Army, of the different Government Civil Departments, of mercantile
assistants, clerks etc. This list is silent on the subject of men who have shot,
poisoned or drowned themselves after being ruined through race course
gambling.514

These accusations were also framed vaguely and exploited a similar format. However,
since neither the Bombay nor the Bengal government considered horse racing a problem,
the efficacy of this rhetoric was quite impotent. A telling example of this is witnessed in
the discussions related to the Bombay Totalizator Betting Tax Bill. The Bill contemplated
giving the Government of Bombay the power to levy a 4% tax on totalizators and on
bookies that operated on the premises of these Western Indian Turf Club. The government
contended that the tax would generate six lakh rupees in revenue, a notable sum that could
be redeployed for municipal works in Bombay. Several members of the Bombay
Legislative Council, however, opposed the Bill and accused the government of tapping into

an immoral revenue stream. Mr A.N Surve was one such member. In presenting his case,
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he employed the same tropes that legislators had previously used to corner rain gambling.
However, his exchange with Ness Wadia was quite revealing:
Mr. A.N. Surve: I am told that once in Poona a man came from Bombay with one
lakh of rupees in his pocket and when he lost about rupees sixty thousand in a race
meeting his heart was broken and he fell down dead.
Mr. C.N Wadia: When did it happen
Surve: I do not know the exact date. I have asked a question whether there were
such accidental deaths in the racecourse at Poona, but it has not been answered yet.
But what I stated is from information obtained by me from non-official sources.
Wadia: May I ask what he lost
Surve: He lost 60000. That is what I was told, but of course I have no official
information on the point. I have asked a question on the point, but as I said, it has
not yet been answered. Perhaps the answer may be given during the course of this
session.
Wadia: Can the honorable member state the year in which this took place?
Surve: It occurred within the last three years.
(Laughter)515
Wadia’s mockery appears odd, given that he was the Chairman of the Bombay Mill
Association at the time. In fact, one of the accusations leveled at the same meeting was that
the government had reduced the weekend fare of railway tickets so that mill workers could
travel from Bombay to Poona to attend the races held there as well. Evidently these
workers, who otherwise corresponded to the category of ‘lower orders’ or ‘weaker

sections’ that anti-gambling laws purportedly protected, garnered little sympathy.
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So, while allegations peddling stories of suicide and crime fell flat in the case of horse
racing, it held a mystical power when it came to native games of chance. The discourse
hinged on the fears of ‘respectable’ native opinions. By including ‘respectable’ women
within the ambit of discussion, this discourse extended a protectionist appeal that the ‘lower
orders’ would not have generated on their own. More importantly, clubbing ‘respectable’
women with the ‘lower orders’, produced a homogenous category of vulnerable economic

subjects; populations described as ‘ignorant and unwary’ and the perfect target of a
swindler.516. Take for example of the statement made by Dr. Sarvadhakari, while
addressing the Bengal Legislative Council in the context of horse racing:
But on the race-courses very much more goes on than even the Turf Club Stewards
know, and the self-same school boys and zenana ladies who suffered from the evils
of cotton gambling…suffer.517

Such was the delicacy of zenana/purdanashin women, that their economic acumen was
comparable to that of schoolboys.518 The effective assumptions of the discourse rendered
further evidence redundant. Its enduring force was witnessed in verbatim repetitions in
future cases of gambling, be it Bengal, where in the case of ‘cotton gaming’ the Finance
Secretary Henry Wheeler remarked ‘its prevalence has all the makings of a scandal’.519 A
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few months later, when introducing the Bengal Cotton Gambling Ordinance, a member of
the Governor’s Council, emphasized that the Ordinance was not intended for the ‘general
enforcement of public morality’, rather, it provided ‘protection to the ignorant and unweary
and the prevention of a scandalous state of things’.520Again, as late as in 1929, in the
proceedings to amend the Public Gaming Act in Punjab, Sir Fazl-i-Husain remarked
Complaints were received by government that satta gambling is on the increase,
that it is an evil which is impoverishing the people to such an extent that it has
become a very great scandal to which can be attributed the ruin of a large number
of families in very many towns in Punjab…in Hoshiarpur satta gambling was on
the increase and the ignorance of the people made them easy victims to being run
into gambling dens.521

This constant repetition naturalized a sentiment that captured ambiguous anxieties; scandal
was inevitable when the ignorant gambled or struck contracts of a betting or wagering
nature. Scandal entailed social evils like crime, suicide and prostitution, consequences that
the law assumed to be self-evident even as they were generated through the legal transcript
itself. Both effectively and affectively, scandal rallied public opinion for the purposes of
law.

In his article titled “The Kalki Avatar of Bikrampur”, Sumit Sarkar describes an incident
from Bengal which contained all the elements of scandal even though it failed to translate
into one. Sarkar concludes that this sensationalist event, full of reformist value, was ignored
by Bengali civil society because it did not involve any conventional transgressions and
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therefore it was ‘impossible to derive any moral message’ from the incident.522 This was
not the case for rain gambling or any gambling for that matter, which corresponded to the
moral and social anxieties of a modernizing urban populace. Ironically, if the scandalous
rape and death of the underage girl Phulmoni had catalyzed the passage of the Age of
Consent Bill in 1891, in the case of the Bengal Rain-gambling Act, it was the law that
searched for a scandal to justify its enactment.523 The stories of ‘respectable’ woman gone

astray functioned as a trope, similar to the ‘mourning mother’ or the ‘rape victim’, which
Charu Gupta argues were ‘common symbolic constructs in fundamentalist nationalist and
colonial rhetoric for wider mobilization.’524 These tropes were deployed anecdotally so that
they circulated as an unending apprehension in public discourse. As Anjali Arondekar
argues, it was in the nature of the colonial archive to keep transgressive sexuality as
“obvious and elusive - undeniably anecdotal, yet rarely sustainable in any archival
form”.525 This ‘necessary absence’ and play between ‘invisibility/hyper-visibility of
sexuality’ fulfilled its functional purpose, where the truth regarding the incidents of scandal
remained immaterial to its sustenance ‘as a constantly unfolding narrative.’526

Perhaps in a final tabulation, the losses suffered through stock and commodity speculation
resulted in more cases of suicide than rain gambling. This, however, was not the point. At
a time when the legal definition of gambling had turned increasingly fungible, its social
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connotations were one of the few ways in which it was distinguished from resemblant
commercial practices. So, while many remained unsure regarding the technical differences
between forward contracting, options, wagering and gambling, they knew at least that
gambling resulted in morbid consequences, especially for ‘ignorant’, ‘weak’ and
‘vulnerable’ populations that corresponded to the ‘lower orders’, purdanashin women and
children. The investigation, however, would be left incomplete if we fail to compare the

government’s attitude regarding the capacity of such vulnerable and ‘ignorant’ populations
in spheres of contracting other than gaming. The following chapter does so by looking at
the Amendment to the Contract Act that sought to bring parity between ‘ignorant peasants’
and ‘intelligent moneylenders.’
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CHAPTER 4
Commercial Contracts: The Pedagogy of Political Economy
The man who has escaped the Marwari's grip with a whole coat on, has the
makings of a Finance Minister in him.
These words conclude a section titled ‘A Solemn Warning’ in the Marathi social reformer,
B.M Malabari’s polemical piece on the Marwaris of the Gujarat and Bombay provinces.527
His prejudice can be traced to a perception generated towards the community in the buildup and aftermath of the Deccan riots in 1875. Part of a series of rural unrests spurred by
agrarian distress, the Deccan riots turned emblematic of the balance needed when marrying
the principles of political economy to the social relations of agrarian production. The riots,
which ostensibly concerned the high indebtedness of the cotton cultivating Marathi Kunbi
peasants of Western India, spawned discussions regarding commercial farming and

contracting, land dispossession and political unrest. Having occurred shortly after the
Indigo and Santhal rebellions, the political ramifications of the Deccan riots had once more
put the sustainability of credit-based cultivation and commercial agriculture in question.
The focus of mercantile financing had shifted from opium to cotton in Western India in the
1850s, a process that was coterminous with the declining importance of Malwa opium in
the Chinese market. The cultivation of Malwa opium and its export to China began in the
mid eighteenth century and remained mostly shielded from the monopolistic ambitions of
the British East India company till the late 1820s. Its shipping through the port of Bombay
was gradually arrested following the final Anglo Maratha war in 1818, though its inland
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and sea movement continued through Sindh till the 1840s.528 Marwari merchants were
involved in every step of the trade; they financed the cultivation of the crop through loan
advances, had collection agents (gomastha) secure the produce, and had wholesale
merchants ship the processed opium. Following the abrupt decline of opium, the enterprise
re-oriented itself around cotton. This is where the story of the Deccan riots begins. While
the outcome of the riots is historiographically contested, its causal factors yield scholarly

consensus. These can be condensed in the following manner.

The introduction of the ryotwari settlement in the Deccan resulted in a degree of social
atomism that disturbed the customary arrangement of revenue collection in the region.
Previously organized on communitarian grounds, where the Patel or the village headman
would collect revenue from the village collectively, the system gave way to individual and
direct agreements between the ryot and the state. As land revenue was assessed and fixed
through the Ricardian principles of rent, the economic importance of the moneylender grew
at the expense of the Kunbi Patel farmer. The social makeup of monied capital also
transformed during this period as the urban sowcar supplemented the village vani as a
financier during the agricultural season. Both collaborated in fueling cotton cultivation by
For a wider History see, Amar Farooqui, Opium City; The Making of Early Victorian Bombay, Gurgaon:
Three Essays Press, 2006; Smuggling as Subversion: Colonialism, Indian Merchants and the Politics of Opium,
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giving individual ryots seed advances at the beginning of the cultivation process and
distress loans at the time of revenue collection. While facing rapid marginalization in the
economic sphere, the Kunbis also saw their juridical authority replaced by colonial courts;
the latter were keen on elevating the tenets of contract amongst cultivators. This shift in
legal authority favored moneylenders once more, as contractual disputes were settled
usually in favor of the vani and sowcar. Concurrently, Act XXVIII of 1855 (The Usury

Repeal Act) repealed the stipulations on interest rates in Bombay that were in operation
since 1814 and which limited interest on secured and unsecured loans to 6% and 12%
respectively.529 The high interest rates placed on advances trapped ryots in long term debt
cycles which were mostly paid in produce. By securing cotton at an undervalued rate
merchant-lenders were also able to maintain their monopolies over networks of local trade.
The ryot’s situation improved briefly in the 1860s when the global supply of cotton was
disrupted by the American Civil War. As the demand for Indian cotton grew in this period,
its price rose correspondingly. Whether these gains reached the producer is debatable.
While Kumar and Neil Charlesworth claim that the price increase allowed peasants to
temporarily escape the debt cycle, Jairus Banaji and David Hardiman insist that the bump
in price did not percolate to the small proprietor.530 Unquestionably, however, the
cultivators did experience the crash in prices once the supply of American cotton was
restored. A significant development complemented this downturn in the price of the
commodity. Sumit Guha demonstrates how land prices in Western India witnessed a
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notable uptick in the 1860’s in comparison to the 40s when there was little value or activity
in the market.531 As prices increased, title deeds were sought as securities for advances,
thus inflating the region’s total volume of debt. The legal changes that accompanied these
economic transformations also had an effect on the cultivators. From 1810, debt contracts
shifted from customary enforcement to the field of civil law and by 1840, the number of
contracts that were contested in the newly established Civil Courts had grown

exponentially.532 The process was exacerbated by the Limitations Act (1859), which
stipulated that suits for money debts be settled within a period of three years. The increase
in the number of mortgage bonds from the late 1850’s indicates that the land that was held
originally by Kunbi cultivators was, on paper, gradually transferred to the vani. The process
gained further momentum a decade later when land prices increased. During this period,
ryots were denied distress loans to meet their subsistence requirements and revenue
demands, as vanis hoped that defaulting peasants would have their land seized and
auctioned through revenue courts where its title deed could be later secured.

The immediate spark came from the Francis Settlement, which re-assessed the revenue
rates in the Deccan region and increased them substantially by including wasteland within
the ambit of rent. Even as peasants complied during the boom in the 60’s, by the 1870’s
they were unable to keep up with payments. A couple of years of inadequate rainfall,
coupled with ruthless implementation of revenue collection saw a large number of Kunbi
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peasants slip into the dispossessed sharecropper category. Things were at a boil, and in
May and June, 1875, riots targeting the vani and the sowcars erupted in the Pune and
Ahmednagar regions of the Deccan. Though moneylenders were spared of physical harm,
their homes were invaded and their debt bonds and ledgers were destroyed. There is some
disagreement over the historical interpretation regarding the outcome of these riots.
Ravinder Kumar explains them as a reaction to the progressive dispossession of

landholding Kunbi families to an ‘outsider’ community of moneylending Marwaris.
Charlesworth, on the other hand, argues that the traditional landowning elite were never
seriously threatened by the aggrandizing ambitions of the Marwaris and that only 5% of
the land under plough in the Deccan was directly owned by the Marwari sowcar. Instead,
he believes that the riots should be read as a reaction of the Kunbi’s marginalization in the
legal and social structure of the region.533 Similarly, Kumar argues that it was the colonial
legal machinery that had emboldened and abstracted the vani from the rural social
structure; his power presented little threat to the Patels earlier, since it was on the Patel's
authority that loans were recovered in the first place.

The riots precipitated the passage of the Deccan Agriculturalist Relief Act of 1879, an
emergency law that targeted predatory lending and land alienation.534 The more enduring
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the outsider tag, but mostly because the urban based Poona Sarvajanik Sabha that lent support to the raiyats,
was composed largely of the same community.
534
Title deeds attached to debt bonds were now to be valid only when the agreement was executed in front of
a court registrar. Additionally, courts were given the right to go behind the contract when they felt it had been
executed through ‘undue influence’, or if it outrightly contradicted the principles of equity. A new insolvency
law through which the ryot could declare bankruptcy, was also contemplated.
533

213

impact of the riot was the imprint it left on the colonial imaginary, as it convinced a sizable
section of colonial officials that the unrest was symptomatic of brewing socio-economic
upheavals exposed by commercial cultivation and that these tensions held longterm
political consequences. Charlesworth, however, dismisses these claims as an exaggeration,
or ‘myth’ created by a section of alarmists who instrumentally used the riots to steer
colonial agrarian policy in a more paternalist direction. Accordingly, he labels it as

somewhat of a glorified ‘grain riot’ that indicated ‘no symptoms of revolutionary or social
change’.535 Yet, as Sugato Bose rightly points out, even if the empirical evidence of transfer
and dispossession of land remains contestable, ‘indebted peasant labour, left in possession
of smallholdings but brought firmly under the sway of moneylending capital, [did]
represent a real measure of social and economic change under colonial rule’.536 Eventually,
the Deccan riots drew in the colonial state more intimately in the role of mediating this
neoteric fiscal and legal relation between the moneylender and peasant. By doing so, it
incited two coeval yet contradictory impulses that lay dormant in the government
machinery; one engaged the Government’s paternal instincts, germinating from the need
for political stability, while the other addressed its penchant for the abstractions of political
economy which was tied to the process of wealth extraction. This chapter looks closely at
the discussions held between 1892 and 1898, which finally led to the Amendment to the
Contract Act in (1899). In doing so, it examines the explicit tensions between protectionist
and free market discourses, first highlighted during the Deccan riots, particularly when it
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came to the principles of ‘free contracting’ and ‘free bargaining’. In a different context,
Andrew Sartori aptly describes this liberal contradiction as the ‘celebration of capitalistic
development as the practical foundation of freedom’, and its counter ‘critique of capitalist
development as the abolitions of the conditions of freedom.’537

In the previous chapter, I explicated the official position on rain and other forms of

gambling, which were attacked for generating debt amongst the ignorant, the poor and
vulnerable classes, who were putatively coded in official discourse as the ‘the weaker
sections of society’. I showed how various forms of native gaming were characterized as
morally degenerative and socially deleterious—it corrupted women and children, it was
responsible for bankruptcy and suicide amongst the commercial classes, it precipitated
crime (theft and murder) and it eroded the work ethic of the community at large.
Importantly, I described the nature of this discourse as one that was deliberatively vague;
the absence of specific examples underlined the ubiquity of the dangers. This chapter
contrasts that characterization with a more familiar discourse of debt, one which was
incurred by small peasants through free contracting in the context of commercial farming
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The aim is to uncover the operation of
a singular discourse—debt; a concept that was sequestered into operative categories—
social (gambling) and economic (commerce). One typified debt as a threat to the social
order, while the other regarded it as instructive for native progress and productive for
colonial enterprise. While the individual categories may appear atomistic and non-
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integrative, it is important to see them not as contradictions, especially not when their
common aim lay in vitalizing the colonial liberal order.

An Amendment for Parity
The DARA was only a palliative for the early faults that emerged in the system of
commercial agriculture. A broader and more permanent solution was still required. So,

shortly after the passage of the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885, a nationwide discussion was
broached on limiting small peasant indebtedness and land transfers without harming the
existent system of rural credit. From 1892 to 1898, the Government of India contacted
Judges, legislators and revenue and police officers for their opinions regarding an
Amendment to the Indian Contract Act. The most notable question in the discussion
concerned the expansion of the term ‘undue influence’ so that it incorporate the categories
of ‘simplicity’ and ‘ignorance’: Could contracts struck between a peasant and a
moneylender be declared void if the lender had exploited the borrowers ‘ignorance’ and
committed the latter to blatantly unfair terms?538 The question of a related change to
Section 111 of the Indian evidence Act was also put before the interlocutors, where the
onus of proving ‘good faith’ would be placed on the party that benefitted from the
agreement.

The

Amendment

also

contemplated

allowing

judges

to

declare

‘unconscionable’ contracts void, where the terms of the contract went against the putative
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tenets of equity. The question of repealing Act 28 of 1855, which had lifted the legal limit
imposed on interest charged on money contracts, was also raised.539

Many of the answers in the correspondence showed distinct sympathy towards the
condition of smallholding peasants. The more affective accounts furnished specific details
of predatory lending, which trapped ryots in long term debt cycles that were commonly

passed on to their next generation. The opinions resist racial categorization, since both sets
of officers, Indian and British, lamented the condition of the small cultivator while drawing
attention to the precarious conditions under which the rural usurer operated. The sheer
volume in responses impedes general elaboration. Instead, let me start by quoting the note
sent by the renowned legal scholar and Judge in the Calcutta High Court, Justice Syed
Ameer Ali, which also turns emblematic for the purposes of the following discussion:
Hitherto, the views of the government, as well as the Judicature, have been largely
influenced—I might say, hampered— by English legal notions; and the idea about
“freedom of contracts” has been turned almost into a fetish. Courts of Justice,
especially the inferior tribunals, often prone to take a narrow view of equitable
considerations, have either had no discretion, or felt themselves so fettered in its
exercise as to be wholly unable, unless the borrower succeeded conclusively in
establishing the bargain to be fraudulent, to reduce the interest, however
extortionate, or to modify or rescind the contract, however hard or
unconscionable….The courts seldom interfere to protect the impecunious ryot
whose necessities force him to borrow from the village bunniah grain for seed and
food, or money for marriage expenses at 50 to 100 percent. The working of the
dadni system, wherever it prevails, is well known. Cases have come before me in
which an advance of 30 maunds of paddy to be paid at the next harvest, with 50
percent addition, has swelled into the course of a few years to 150 maunds… A
person borrowed Rs. 4,000 from a Mahajan in one of the Behar districts in eight
years that amount swelled up to Rs. 32,000. There was no doubt as to the
extortionate character of the claims, but it was a “free bargain” and in the absence
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of any special circumstances, the Courts that had to deal with the case felt they had
no discretion to reduce the claim for interest.540

Once filtered through Ali’s concerns, the broad issues raised in the correspondence
regarding the Amendment can now be unpacked. Recently, post-colonial South Asian
scholarship has pointed to the concept of ‘over-legislation’, a practice and ideal in colonial

governmentality after the transfer of power in 1858. The practical problem here was the
generation of multiple laws covering a related field or a singular subject of law.541 Take for
example contracts, a subject that was covered by the workings of the Contract Act of 1872,
but which remained equally inundated by the provisions of the Public Gaming Act, The
Limitations Act, The Specific Relief Act, the Negotiable Instruments Act, and more
recently the DARA. While these laws overlapped in subject, they responded to different
legal principles as well as substantive administrative concerns. While the Civil Procedure
Code (1859) instituted a formal procedure for juridical decision making, over-legislation
served to undercut the instructive value of the code. Each ruling, therefore, responded to a
formal or substantive rationale that corresponded to each specific law. Ali felt, more often
than not, the principle elevated by most judges was a formal adherence to the ‘freedom of
contract’, and the notion of ‘free bargains’.
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Essentially aligned to mercantilist practices, the principle of ‘freedom of contract’ had been
resurrected as one of the cornerstones of ‘liberty’ in the positivist legal tradition of Europe.
Money contracts, however, overcame a more challenging and hostile history. Far from
archetypal, ‘usury’ went against medieval Christian dogma, which considered all time as
theological time and viewed the merchant’s practice of charging interest as a blasphemous
form of mortgaging.542 The belief was gradually eroded when commercial and mercantile

wealth grew exponentially through a flourishing Mediterranean trade. This new wealth
helped revive and build cities like Bruges and Antwerp in the fifteenth century.543 Antwerp
notably became a center of financial innovation, exulting novel advancements in marine
insurance and money markets by 1564.544 The latter, where profits depended on the
fluctuation of currency rates, was a particularly significant development. According to
Francesca Trivellato, this medieval form of arbitrage indicated ‘private finance’s incipient
autonomy from commodity trade.’545 By the early 18th century, under the aegis of
Montesquieu and the French Physiocrats, the medieval antipathy towards usury had been
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largely dispelled. As a result, by 1787, Jeremy Bentham could confidently declare that one
should be at ‘the liberty of making one’s own money bargains’, adding that ‘this meek and
unassuming species of liberty has been suffering much injustice.’546

In Bengal, however, the English East India Company set it’s sails against these Continental
winds. Within five years of Bentham’s public defense of the individual’s right to determine

interest on money contracts, the Government of Bengal capped the amount to 6% and 12%
for secure and unsecured loans respectively. The Governments of Madras and Bombay
followed in 1802 and 1814 respectively. The prevalence of rural usury predated the
Company, of course. According to Irfan Habib, peasants frequently borrowed to pay off
land revenue demands under the Mughals, while smaller amounts went towards personal
expenditures like marriages and festivals.547 As evidenced from the prevalent rate of near
150% charged on simple interest bonds in Bengal during the eighteenth century, only a
nominal eye regulated this market.548 It is unclear whether the limits imposed by the
Company on interest rates provided actual relief to cultivators and rural borrowers.
Interestingly, in 1855, only a few months before the conclusion of the Santhal rebellion
that had been precipitated by high tribal indebtedness, Act 28 was repealed. The repeal had
a crippling effect on the cultivators of the hinterland. The Deccan riots exposed the fallout
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of this unregulated market, and by the time of the correspondence regarding the
Amendment, several officials appeared eager to forward rebuttals to Bentham’s vision of
liberty. J. Whitmore, the District Judge of Birbhum declared that “Act 28, has most
certainly never been in touch with anything or anybody but a group of Western thinkers,
of whose ideas at the present moment the West itself is growing tired.”549 The Financial
Commissioner of the Punjab added that even England had shed its fidelity to laissez faire

economics and embraced a ‘modified socialism’, which privileged security of population
over the sanctity of individual interest.550 Ali’s critique, however, had been a distant cry
from ‘socialism’; it simply questioned the meaning of ‘freedom’ within the given standards
of liberalism itself. Was the raiyat truly ‘free’ and on ‘equal footing’ when he borrowed
money under duress and conditions of necessity; if not, how did the system maximize his
liberty? That all kinds of borrowing responded to some form of necessity, remained a foil
to Ali’s contentions. The Collector of the Godavari district forthrightly stated that ‘To say
that a lender shall not take advantage of the borrowers necessities is to strike at the root of
money-lending.”551 The subdivisional Judge of Allahabad, Pandit Suraj Narayan felt given
the risky environment in which the lender operated, the courts needed to account for his
‘necessities’ as well. These arguments obfuscated Ali’s core objection, which only when
placed against the backdrop of commercial agriculture, appears appreciably forceful. So,
the system as whole deserves closer scrutiny.
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The Commercial Problem
It would not be misleading to suggest that the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 signaled a shift
in the colonial government’s economic strategy in the Subcontinent. The Act reflected the
state’s declining faith on zamindars, both as capitalist farmers entrusted with improving
the conditions of agrarian productivity and as loyal political subjects. A related change
concerned the nature of wealth extraction, in which land revenue was heavily

complemented and somewhat sidelined by usuriously financed commercial agriculture as
the primary mode of the surplus appropriation. Commercial agriculture heralded India as a
site for cheaply produced cash crops that would service globally integrated manufacturing
industries located overseas. While commercial agriculture expanded unprecedentedly from
the 1870’s, its origins can be traced to the infrastructural advancements of the 1850’s.
Primary among them were the introduction of technologies like the telegraph and the
railways that provided peasants of the hinterland information regarding the real time prices
of commodities as well as the facility to transport them to coastal trading ports.
Additionally, the railways nurtured national grain markets that allowed cultivators to shift
their land acreage from food crops to cash crops like cotton, jute, poppy, tea, sugar, oil
seeds and tobacco.552 With the notable exception of tea, which was cultivated in
plantations, many of these crops were produced through a ‘putting out system’, where
merchant financed the ryot through advances, but the ryot still controlled the means and
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organization of production. It was the intricacy of this system that bred the phenomena of
widespread rural debt.

Brilliantly thick descriptions of the arrangement are found in Omkar Goswami’s and
Saugata Mukherji’s studies on jute cultivation in Eastern India.553 To give an idea of the
system’s complexity, Goswami shows how between the fields and the consumer, “jute

went through nine layers of intermediaries, three transport systems, the mill sector with its
conflicting entrepreneurial groups, speculators, shippers, balers, eleven industry and trade
associations, and importers.’554 Importantly, the chain demonstrates just how far removed
the average Bengali peasant was from the market for which he/she produced. Sugato Bose
views this as a ‘conceptual problem’, one where ‘agrarian society with an extensive
subsistence base…[was] at the same time tied firmly to a far-flung market.’555 The reason,
he observes, was that the market came to the peasant rather than the other way around.
Only a fifth of the peasant’s produce in jute, for example, was sold directly by the
cultivators in local hats, that too by jotedars (large peasants). The rest was procured by a
series of intermediaries like the farias (itinerant jute peddlers), beparis (merchants) and
aratdars (secondary market merchants). While some farias were self-financed, most were
local level purchasers or commission agents for arhatdars. Who were these arhatdars that
purchased raw produce? Rajat Ray insists that unlike in the case of oilseeds, cotton and
most importantly food grains, jute was dominated by European baling houses, commission
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agents and the mill owners of Bengal.556 Since mills were unwilling to purchase jute from
non-European brokers, even native Marwari merchants connected to the trade were forced
to pay a brokerage fee to European agents to process their product. However, Goswami
argues that in spite of the power wielded by the European Baling Houses, the day-to-day
movement of the raw jute trade remained primarily in Marwari hands, the lower end
occupied by the Marwari aratdar and the upper end in the hands of whole sale Marwari

exporters. The dominance of the Marwaris in procuring, storing, and marketing raw
commodities (particularly jute and grain) increased significantly after the First World
War.557 The nodes of control made little difference for the average Bengali ryot, since his
labour and marketing power remained subordinate to the monopsony of the commission
agent and moneylender. Eventually, the manner in which the crop was acquired remained
tied to the system of credit that fueled its production. Like jute, cash crops for export like
opium, cotton, sugar, oil seeds and tobacco were cultivated through credit forwarded
through financial instruments like satta patras or karjapatras. These instruments or direct
cash loans were advanced to peasants to cover their costs of production, which included
seed purchases, maintenance of drought animals, labour charges for weeding and
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harvesting of crops, etc. Why the Marwaris came to dominate this credit market is
explained by the command this tightly knit banking community held over streams of liquid
capital. The capital circulated through negotiable instruments like the hundi and its intracommunity availability was sustained through bonds of kinship.558 While other commercial
communities, notably the Parsis employed capital in industrial investments that promised
long term returns, the Marwaris preferred to keep their capital liquid in order to work in a

‘high risk geographical and economic environment.’559 Accordingly, Marwari financiers
held control over financial networks tucked within the hinterland, like in the case of cotton,
where Europeans dominated the overseas operations but held little control over the
channels that brought the crop from the interior to the ports.560

Let us now turn to the operation of cash advancements and how it came to dominate peasant
labor. The earliest and most coercive form of this system was witnessed during indigo
cultivation in Bihar and Bengal in the late eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries.
European planters would advance cash payments to small proprietors so that they grow
indigo on lands over which they held tenant rights. The advance represented a contract
which gave the planters the right to dictate the crop the ryot should grow. It did not,
however, grant any formal right over the cultivator’s title deed on the land or lock the price
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of the indigo purchased, it only ensured the acreage of land on which it was grown. Indigo
was not the only crop that was cultivated through this arrangement. The sahukars in
Saurashtra, for example, denied raiyats seed and food advances if they did not agree to
plant cotton on their lands.561 These arrangements reflect the skewed relations between
land and labour in the early nineteenth century, where it was the labour that was coveted,
not the land. In the absence of a formal Contract law, Act V of 1830 made the breach of

contract a criminal charge, though it was only a veneer for the brute force employed by
European planters and Bengali factory officers operating the system. The cash
advancements led to the maintenance of a debt ledger and a loan account for the peasant
that was (partly) cleared when he/she delivered the crop. The first signs of systemic
resentment appeared in the early 1850s, when the price of grain grew higher than that of
indigo. Peasants demanded the right to self-determination, many preferring to grow the
more remunerative rice crop instead of indigo. Extra-legal coercion implemented through
illegal confinement and torture failed to dent their resolve and by 1859 the cultivators
declared open rebellion against the planter’s demands. Armed with stamp paper
agreements and books of accounts, the planters took the ryots to court, accusing them of a
breach of contract. A majority of these cases were dismissed by the judges and others were
withdrawn by the planters themselves.562
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The rebellion catalyzed an immediate vigor, one that led to formalizing a nationwide
Contract Act. By 1866, a committee headed by John Romilly completed the first draft of
the Act and the task was completed by Sir Henry Maine in 1872. Informed by her close
reading of Maine’s Village Communities, Karuna Mantena argues that Maine’s ideological
commitment differed from past Utilitarians who had harnessed law to effect social and
political changes in the colony. Maine, on the other hand, viewed the relation between the

east and west through the prism of ’cultural relativism’, an idea that informed the doctrine
of ‘indirect rule’ that held sway during Maine’s time as Law Member to the Viceroy’s
Council.563 He was, however, forceful in replacing the authority of customary
arrangements with codified law for governing the legality of agreements. The Contract Act
was thus modeled on the principles of English common law, which was felt to be
appropriate for adjudicating commercial disputes that developed over the course of colonial
modernity. Tirthankar Roy, however, sees things differently. He argues that commercial
laws like the Contract Act borrowed generously from ‘secular’ mercantile conventions that
predated British colonialism. Drawing on the lineage of an active coastal trade, Roy argues
that ‘custom’ played little to no part in the deals struck between Indian, Portuguese, or
Arab merchants, since the communities held very few customs in common.564 So, while
the Contract Act of 1872 did integrate parts of Common Law, it also incorporated
significant departures from its principles. Crucially, one of them concerned the principal
of ignorance - ‘an act performed in ignorance of a proposal but consistent with it could
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count as acceptance of the proposal’.565 The other addressed penalties regarding a ‘breach
of contract’.

With an eye on the conditions of indigo cultivation in Bihar and Bengal, ‘breach of
contract’ initially fell within the purview of criminal law in the 1830’s. Though the
institution of the Civil Procedure Code and the Contract Act shifted it to civil law, the

provisions for imprisonment continued till 1926 in India, as opposed to England, where
penal punishment was abolished early as 1875.566 The discrepancy was due to laws like the
Workman’s Breach of Contract Act of 1859, a law designed to subordinate the labour of
plantation workers and indentured laborers in the tea estates of Assam and British overseas
colonies.567 The Act provided for three months of imprisonment when a worker, who
having accepted an advance for his/her labor, ran away or refused to work for their
employer. The penal consequences of this debt bond bolstered this system of indenture. As
a result, when the government of Bengal contemplated abolishing imprisonment of
purdanasheen women for breach of contract in the 1880’s, the association of Bengal’s
landed gentry, the British Indian Association, warned against its general application. They
argued that the revocation would ‘sap the foundations of Indian society in the relations
between the debtor and creditor.’568 The alarm was unwarranted, as imprisonment for
breach of contracts continued undisturbed through the nineteenth and early twentieth
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centuries. Evidence of this appears in the testimony of the Judicial Commissioner of
Burma, H.F Ashton, who conveyed in a lengthy note sent to the Chief Commissioner in
1893, how small proprietors were rapidly falling under the yoke of serfdom:
In the last stage the peasant proprietor becomes a mere serf and signs a service
bond, which enables the moneylender landlord to imprison him for debt if he ceases
to work for his creditor.569

The discussion regarding the Amendment to the Contract Act in 1893, seemed aware of
the problems the administration had actively fanned. Officials acknowledged that the
financial and juridical apparatus that facilitated commercial cultivation had also pincered
the peasant and aggrandized his rapid decline into servitude. Some, like Durga Dat Joshi,
the Munsif of Bilgram, documented the odious operation of debt bonds and its pervasive
circulation in the countryside:
As regards the agriculturist his dealing with the money-lender begin and end thus.
He always lives from hand to mouth. It is very seldom that he has any savings. So
at the commencement of every ‘rabi’ or ‘kharif’ he goes to the time honored
mahajan for the loan of the seed grains. This done he is need of irrigation expenses.
Unless the money-lender advances cash in time the poor agriculturalist is undone.
Very often he has to obtain grain loans for sustenance of his family and himself.
And when the harvest time comes the landlord (himself an impecunious man)
presses hard for his rents. He will not wait till the tenant can sell his grain in the
best markets. So the latter has no option but to propitiate the mahajan. The latter
pays the rent. This done, he assesses the grain at mahajani rate (which is more
disadvantageous than the bazar rate).570

At this point, the peasant was firmly under the grip of the mahajan. Apart from interest,
the latter would fix a penalty for an impending default. Following default, the mahajan

Judicial, November 1897, Proc. Nos. J &P. 2241/97, BL.
Note from Durga Dat Joshi, Munsif Bilgram 11th August 1893, 570 Judicial, November 1897, Proc. Nos. J &P.
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would approach a civil court and attach the peasant’s standing crop as the terms of penalty.
Joshi's conclusion was cynical, describing migration as the only option where the peasant
would repeat the same story ‘under another landlord and a ubiquitous money-lender’. The
universal problem then was the operation of these credit and cash advances which enabled
merchants/moneylenders to acquire the peasant’s crop. Credit instruments like the satta
patras (forward contracts) were instrumental in allowing the merchant/moneylender to

maintain price domination over the ryot’s produce.571 According to Report of the Bengal
Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 1928 (RBPBEC), though satta patras were
‘undertakings to deliver fixed quantities of produce at much below than market price’,
since they met the peasant’s need of food, seed and labour during a time of insolvency,
‘borrowing on such unfair terms was possible.’572 Satta patras were comparably equitable
to the terms in certain distress loans extended to ryots lacking securities. The Secretaries
of the Berar Sarvajanik Sabha informed the Commissioner of Hyderabad in 1894, of
“Laoni agreements” where the peasant received a third or fourth of his crop’s market rate
in lieu of a cash advance.573 These were similar to the contracts penned by the dadandars
in Bengal, in which an excessively high interest was disguised in the procurement price of
the peasant’s produce.574
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While credit advances crippled the agriculturalist at the time of planting, his powers of
negotiation remained as anemic during harvest. In the monsoon months of Sravan, Bhadra,
Aswin, when the jute crop was weeded and harvested and the aaman rice crop was
transplanted in Bengal, the rate of interest on cash loans jumped from 2-3% a month to
almost 16-17%.575 It was during harvest, however, when the peasant needed immediate
liquidity to meet his/her many cash obligations. The least of them involved the

expenditures on id and durga puja, festivals which coincided with the jute harvest. The
heavier payments included rental and land revenue payments. On paper at least, rental dues
had plateaued towards the end of the nineteenth century, especially after the passing of the
Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885. One of its more significant inclusions had granted ryots with
occupancy status to pay their rent in cash instead of produce. In many cases, however,
monetary rents still exceeded the concomitant rise of crop prices or the bump in prices was
mitigated by the increased cost of cultivation precipitated by the decrease in productivity
of the land and a shrinkage in available acreage.576 The punctual enforcement of revenue
collection by intractable revenue officers exacerbated the peasant’s problems. As early as
1822, the Commissioner of the Deccan Districts, William Chaplin, observed that ‘the ryots
in many villages, though usually frugal and provident are much in debt to sowcars and
merchants owing to the oppression of revenue contractors.’577 In 1894, the Judicial
Commissioner of Burma confirmed similarly, when conveying that most Collectors
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regarded the moneylender an adjunct, not an encumbrance to the system of revenue
collection.578 Apart from revenue, peasants were also burdened by the illegal exactions
charged by landlords. In Bengal, for example, cess was demanded by zamindars in the form
of abwabs, the levying of which grew increasingly common once the Tenancy Act placed
checks on the enhancement in rental rates. Apart from extracting surplus from the ryots,
abwabs were also the ‘the symbolic demonstration of the landlord’s power’ over his

estate.579 The tightest squeeze, however, came from the moneylenders themselves who
turned remarkably inflexible regarding loan repayment during the harvest period. Faced
with the threat of court proceeding, cultivators were forced to sell their produce at farm
gate prices instead of holding their crop till market demand generated a better purchasing
rate. The outcome squarely benefitted the merchant/usurer, who secured his supply of raw
commodity well below its market value. Importantly, this crunch in the ryot’s liquidity was
forcibly maintained.580 Rent and revenue demands as well as the Government’s currency
policy, precipitated by its constant interference in native money markets, further limited
the small peasant’s capacity as a consumer. This had a stunting effect in growing domestic
markets for the consumption of Indian agricultural goods.581 Officials once again
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recognized their role in debilitating the peasant’s ability in marketing his/her crop. Justice
Chatterji of the Chief Court of Punjab held the government’s fiscal policy responsible for
requiring landowners to have ‘ready money at stated times of the year’, lacking which he
turned to the moneylender.582 As Shahid Amin notes, for the sugarcane farmers in
Gorakhpur, ‘in a world dominated by consumption, seed and rental loans, the rigid
enforcement of qist payment by a colonial regime assumed a force of its own.’583 The

Inspector General of Registration of Madras, Srinivasa Raghavaiyangar, had therefore
suggested that along with the Amendment to the Contract Act, the government should also
revise the ‘installments fixed for the payment of land revenue, with greater reference to the
periods at which the ryots sell their produce in different parts of the country’.584 These
aspirations, more often than not, were thwarted through powerful lobbies, as Rajat Ray
demonstrates through an example drawn from Dacca in 1914.585

Apart from cash loans, small peasants also relied on grain advances to meet their food
requirements through the year. The preponderance of widespread subsistence advances in
late nineteenth and early twentieth century is explained by Shahid Amin as the ‘great
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difference between the working time and production time’ in peasant economies.586 In a
detailed study of sugarcane cultivation in Western Uttar Pradesh, Amin shows how the
production cycle of the crop enveloped and exceeded labour time. Mechanized
manufacturing and the glut in rural consumption had led to a decline in artisanal
manufacturing, which meant that the sugarcane cultivators who had earlier interspersed
their labour between farming and artisanal labour, now required subsistence loans to see

them through unproductive periods. In this context, the RBPBEC also confirmed that even
the smallholding jute cultivators in Bengal ‘from the time of sowing till the crops are
harvested [are] practically left without any income and needs financial help that
moneylenders provide.’587

The evidence of subsistence loans reinforces the credibility of two ongoing arguments—
the alienation faced by peasants in holding and marketing their produce and their feeble
position as consumers. Why were grain cultivators unable to store enough produce to see
them through lean seasons? The lack of storage facilities was a pervasive reason, but the
confluence of artificial strains was likely more responsible for this anomaly too. A
compelling factor concerned the shift in rent collection that had moved from cash to
produce rents towards the end of the nineteenth century.588 The transition in many cases
was enabled by dominant agricultural groups like the Moga Jats, the Kunbi Patels, the
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Jotedars in North Bengal and the Gurjars in Central provinces. These landed communities
were looking to tussle monopsony away from merchant moneylenders and control the
marketing of grain themselves. The nature of native money markets and the structure of
credit financing, however, impeded the success of these groups from displacing the
commercial class’ hold over procurement, storage, and marketing of grains. Rajat Ray’s
analysis of the ‘Bazaar’ and Tirthankar Roy’s study of the seasonal velocity of the money

markets go a long way in explaining why.589 Ray, demarcates the commercial operations
in late nineteenth and early twentieth century in India into three distinct spheres; the
European dominated overseas markets, the indigenous ‘Bazaar’, and the small peasant
commodity and artisanal industry in rural India. The ‘bazaar’ was the indigenous money
market, which was dominated by native banking and mercantile communities, and which
sustained the trade in grains, cotton, piece goods and precious metals. It did so through
negotiable instruments like the hundi, which were bills of exchange discounted by big
merchant houses and native bankers (shroffs). It was the ‘bazaar’ that financed the
hinterlands, ‘linking them by its wide ranging hundi-arhat operations to the European
banks and firms at the port.’590 When it came to rural usury, however, money was circulated
in cash instead of through hundis; the latter was limited to metropolitan exchanges, mostly
amongst bankers themselves.591 So, while the finance and procurement of raw agricultural
commodity remained within the operating field of the ‘bazaar’, the ‘financial structure of
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each sector was so different that credit did not flow from one sector to the other, except
through bottlenecks.’592 The argument is reinforced by the fluctuating interest rates on
similarly structured loans in urban and rural Punjab.593 The disparity was caused by the
large volume of unsecured rural lending, which urban bankers found too risky to handle.
Instead of partaking in rural moneylending directly, they preferred to have their capital
trickle down through the hands of arhatiyas and commission agents who, being familiar

with the social structures of the village, were better placed to recover the advances. These
(kutcha) arhatiyas or commission agents were also financed by Managing Houses or by
European wholesale exporters and would procure produce either directly from the peasants
or from smaller itinerant traders like the faria or bepari (as in the case of jute) on behalf of
mills and export houses. The First World War and the Great Depression jarred this
arrangement, as export houses like the Ralli Brothers and Volkart gradually withdrew their
agencies and capital from the interior. This left the procurement of produce, particularly
grain, in the hands of native financiers who supplied capital to commission agents for
inland procurements.594 The commission agent (kutchha arhaitiya) procured for the urban
pucca arhatiya, who often complemented his function of procurement with goladari - the
storage of grain - a service that richer peasants availed off in lieu of short term advances.595
These goladars or pucca arhatiyas, were the nodal links in the produce trade, as they
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collected produce from commission agents, stored it, sold it to mills and export houses and
often (particularly in the case of grain) traded it through exchanges. They even made
advances on the basis of their holdings. Crucially, by the early twentieth century, they
became credit intermediaries who supplied kutcha arhatiyas with the capital drawn from
the hundis negotiated from banking centers like Burabazar.

The withdrawal of European export firms had pushed the grain trade in native hands in the
early twentieth century. While it was the Marwari and Bhatia communities who controlled
the trade in staples in the Bombay Province, in Bengal and Bihar rice was controlled by
the credit apparatus of the Marwari amdawalas.596 The virtual monopoly of the indigenous
mercantile and banking classes over grain made it one of the most speculated commodities
in colonial India in the early twentieth century. The speculation conducted either through
futures exchanges (badni ki satta) or through options (teji-mundi) was dependent on
amount of grain stored in the khattis (grain pits) of various goladars. While speculative
activities on grain exchanges peaked at the close of the First World War, its occurrence
witnessed a steady increase from the late nineteenth century itself. When reporting on the
impact of rain and opium betting in the North-west Provinces and the Punjab in 1901, the
Deputy Commissioner of Jullunder, Lt. Col. Rennick, claimed that several grain traders
from Rohtak had been ruined by rain gambling. He was contradicted, by the Deputy
Commissioner of Rawalpindi, H.P Leigh, who clarified that it was not rain gambling but
‘the practice of betting on the prices realizable the large central markets for wheat’ that was
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responsible for the losses.597 He was careful to add that this form of speculation was
‘regarded by respectable public opinion with indifference.’ The confluence of wartime
shortage and artificial inflation, however, had an unsettling effect on ‘respectable opinion’,
and when the price of rice shot up in Bengal in 1918, Marwari speculators gained notoriety
for hoarding the commodity and cornering its market.

Only when a trader had monopolized a commodity, mostly by hoarding it beyond a critical
point, could he corner a market successfully. Its effectivity then, was premised on it being
sudden and secretive. The profits from a corner, however, were dependent on the trader’s
ability to silently amass futures contracts in the same commodity.598 Take wheat for
example. A trader looking to corner the wheat market would buy wheat futures from those
looking to sell.599 Many of these sellers would sell with the expectation that the price of
wheat would fall in the months before the contract expired, at which point they would buy
it at a cheaper price and make their delivery. If, however, a trader who stocked wheat
futures had also managed to successfully hoard the commodity, there would be no wheat
for sellers to buy, which would cause them to default on the day of delivery. These sellers
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were therefore ‘cornered’.600 In most cases they would buy back the wheat at a highly
inflated price from the person to whom they had sold the futures in the first place. As is
obvious, to pull off a corner, a degree of secrecy was needed regarding the details of a
trader’s stock. As a result, it was crucial to secure produce through regular and clandestine
channels. It was why native merchants preferred to finance their agents with channels of
capital that circulated outside the ambit of the Imperial Bank, since ‘the Bank’s practice of

advancing against produce gave too much publicity to the transaction’ and merchants were
unwilling to disclose how much grain they actually held.601 This was also why some usurers
often did not write down the terms of loan agreements, like in the case of ‘paddy loans’,
where even in the absence of a legal pledge, ‘the lender generally sends a man round at the
time of the harvest and takes away his share of the crop’.602 In the context of wheat, Stokes
relays the observation of the settlement officer of Jhansi from 1893, who claimed that
‘wheat is grown mainly for the bania and revenue collector’.603 The fact that the peasants
of Bundelkhand, who were mostly subsistence farmers of millet, which was grown through
techniques of extensive cultivation, switched to an exchange oriented commodity,

Often, futures did not involve the physical delivery of the commodity on the date of the contract’s expiry
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suggested to Stokes that ‘the engine of debt was driving the expansion of the cultivated
area and of cash-cropping to artificially high levels’ in the region.604

This scramble for monopsony over grain, exacted either through rent or through debt
repayments generated a perennial shortage of food grains for actual cultivators. Although
the phenomenon was exacerbated during and after the First World War, it was by no means

a twentieth century phenomenon. In fact, grain advances like the bhojer dheri, where
interest ran as high as 50% p.a., were quite common in Bengal by the late nineteenth
century.605 This avaricious acquisition of produce generated its own vicious cycle, where
having repaid his/her debt to the moneylender, the peasant was immediately forced to incur
another one to secure his subsistence for the coming season. This cycle of domination had
prevented cotton growing farmers of small talukas like Dhulia in Maharashtra, from
realizing the profits of the cotton boom of the 1860’s.606 Little seemed to have changed
thirty years later. Having realized how rental dues, loan repayments and food shortages had
cornered the ryots of his district, the munsif of Tilhar (NWP), Ahmad Ali Khas, notified
his superiors of the peasant’s brow beaten position:
In Hamirpur and Jalaun districts […] a well-known moneylending class called
Marwaris, have of late become landholders. Here I found that the entire produce of
tenants holding goes to his landlord, who takes it in payment of rent, and partly in
satisfaction of his bond debt. The poor tenant has in fact no grain left to live upon
or to sow the next crop; and consequently, applies to his creditors again for beej
and khawai bonds.607
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The preponderance such agreements stirred doubts regarding the sanctity of the
moneylender’s necessities in the context of unsecured lending. Noting that ‘the highest
interest on seed loans were charged usually after a drought or failure of harvest’, a district
judge of the N.W Provinces, T.A Redfern concluded that it was ‘greed’ and not the risk of
unsecured lending that spawned high rates of interest on unsecured advances.608 The
usurer’s dubious circumvention of legal safeguards soured opinions further. The provisions

of the DARA were almost immediately enervated by the baniya and sowcar, who
continued demanding title deeds as securities for loans or shifted their preference from
mortgages to direct sales of land.609 Land also became the collateral for dadan loans, where
interest was embedded in the price differential between the selling price of the title deed
and the cost of its re-purchase.610 In other cases, lenders arranged lien settlements that gave
them possession but non-alienable rights over occupancy settlements, and the ryot’s labor
power behaved as the underlying security.611 The manipulation of interest rates were also
creatively managed. While the Negotiable Instruments Act prohibited compound interest,
there was no equivalent law for money contracts. Specific laws that were operational in
certain districts did, however, openly prohibit compound interest. The Santhal Parganas
was one such place, where section 24 of Regulation V of 1893 placed conditions on the
terms of lending.612 Still, the Deputy Commissioner of the region, R. Carstairs complained
that the moneylenders would draw ryots outside the boundary of the Santhal Pargana and
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execute bonds where the law was inapplicable.613 His distress was compounded by the
discovery that written bonds often mis-stated the loaned principal. In many cases it was
greatly exaggerated to justify the amount collected in interest; the ryot’s illiteracy, disabled
him in verifying the terms of the contract at the time of drafting. The munsif of Lucknow
(South), Mirza Ismail alerted his superiors of another cunning, which limited the power of
even those judges who reserved sympathy for the borrower:

Since compound interest is not allowed…when a debtor executes a bond in his
creditor’s favor, a certain rate of interest is agreed upon for six months; if the money
is not paid by that date, the interest is agreed to be added to the principal, thus
forming a new principal and then interest is to be calculated on the new principal.614

A conspicuous reason that enabled lenders to skirt various legal safeguards was the help
they received at the lower end of the colonial judicial order. Syed Ali had cautioned the
government that ‘mahajans regularly combined moneylending with the legal profession’,
a warning that was borne out in the reports of other officers as well. The Superintendent of
Police, Rawalpindi, Lt. Col. Montgomery and H.F Ashton, the Judicial Commissioner of
Burma, directed their suspicions towards subordinate judicial officers and insisted that
since they were recruited from the banking classes, the sympathies of such officers lay with
the moneylender and not the borrower. Ashton referred to them as the ‘white clothed
classes, Brahmins and Bunniahs, writers and traders (all ready to lend money if they can),
the very persons to whom the ryot has been cast as prey.’615 In spite of the blame dished
by such superior officers, some munsifs did express regret regarding the ryot’s habitual
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defeat in court. Interestingly, their conclusions targeted officials of an even lower position.
While the munsif of the lower court of Deoband, Mohanlal Hukhu only hinted that the
‘scribes and marginal witnesses of a bond are generally the friends or dependents of the
lender’ the testimony of the munsif at Allahabad, Babu Prag Das articulated the ambit of
this nexus more fully:
The asami (accused) more often than otherwise places implicit confidence in his
mahajan, and leaves blank stamp paper with him, on which the terms of the contract
are to be drawn up as much as the mahajan likes. Ignorant of all writing, he takes
for granted all that is written on it as read to him by the village patwari or the village
scribe, who frequently are bound in close bonds of interest to the moneylender.616

The quagmire of coercion and legal overreach that had sunk indigo cultivators in the early
nineteenth century had yet to dry by the twentieth. The ryot was outmatched in both capital
and cunning and could hardly be described as a ‘free’ agent who transacted on an ‘even
footing’ with the moneylender. The proof of his bondage was reinforced by his limitations
in finding alternative sources of credit. Lenders rarely sued to recover loans, as their interest
lay in securing produce payments, land titles or creating service bonds through the capital
they advanced. Ahmad Ali Khas, however, insisted that in Tilhar, moneylenders showed
tremendous alacrity when they sensed that a borrower had approached different mahajan
to contract a fresh loan. This was truer in the case of the zamindar turned moneylender,
who exerted greater fiduciary powers over the ryots settled on his estate - ‘If he stands in

need of further loan, he must apply to his old creditor… if he does not do this and goes to
some other money-lender, the former at once puts him into court.’ The veracity of this
observation demands qualification. Stokes, for example, suggests that the credit market in
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the North-West Provinces was competitive and that small peasants had access to both the
moneylender’s and the rich peasant’s capital. For Punjab, Neeladri Bhattacharya argues
that the structure of credit financing should be seen as a ‘structural subordination of petty
producers to money capital in general, not their individual bondage to particular
creditors’.617 Even J.C. Jack confirmed in his study of the district of Faridpur in 1916 that
peasants were indebted to more than one moneylender, often as high as three, each holding

a different asset as collateral (jewelry, land etc.).618

This long appraisal substantiates some of Ali’s concerns regarding the candor of rural credit
relations. He admitted that necessity (the lender’s necessity) informed financial agreements
but questioned those agreements where ‘necessity’ itself was induced by one of the
transacting parties. His views were echoed by other officers engaged in correspondence,
like the munsif of Shahabad, Pandit Tribhuwan Nath, who claimed that peasants usually
‘has not the option of rejecting the terms of the mahajan even if he finds them unreasonable,
unfair and hard’. So, ‘though he [the ryot] gives his consent he cannot have given his ‘free
consent’ to the terms in both equity and law.’619 In the eyes of such officers, the distinctions
between free market contracting and taking a loan at gun point was fast fading.620
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Bipartisan opinion, however, was eager to hold the asymmetry between the peasant and
moneylender’s intelligence accountable for gestating the structural faults in commercial
farming. The discovery was old, and the arguments were therefore recycled. Officials
reviewing the incidents of the Deccan riots had alleged that ‘sharp witted usurers’ had
manipulated the legal system against a ‘dumb witted peasantry’.621 The complaint was
repeated in the Famine Commission Reports of the 1880’s and was littered in the official

correspondence regarding the Amendment to the Contract Act of 1899. Sample a limited
selection. Pandit Tribuwan Nath claimed that the ‘the mahajan is always too clever for the
ignorant and simple khudkashtkar’ while a subordinate Judge in Lucknow, Pandit Bhakt
Narayan, described the peasants of the ‘interior’ of Oudh as ‘needy and poor’ and as
‘illiterate rustics’. A munsif at Lucknow, Kali Charan Bose, commented on the ‘disparity
of intelligence between the moneylending class and the poor agriculturalist’. The munsif at
Tilhar, Ahmad Ali Khas insisted that in many districts the ‘executants of bonds are illiterate
and unable to understand the contracts they enter into’, a statement that found resonance in
Justice Chatterjee’s note from the Punjab, who claimed that the ‘difficulties of agriculturist
debtors in their dealings with moneylenders arise from…their utter ignorance and want of
education.’ Importantly, both ‘simplicity’ and ‘ignorance’ were read legally; that is to say,
how contracts struck with ‘minors’ were void because of their ‘ignorance’ regarding both
the nature and the concept of a legally enforceable agreement. These opinions reinforced
the conviction for an Amendment that accounted for the borrower’s ‘simplicity’; or as the
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Deputy Commissioner of Gurudaspur, J.R Machonachie put it, an Amendment that could
provide ‘protection to the ignorant and stupid against the knowing and intelligent.’622

Who could be charged with restoring this parity? Instead of new alternatives, some officers
desired the elevation of a fallen authority—the zamindar. Tanika Sarkar argues that the
zamindars of Bengal were progressively sidelined after 1858, a process that she believes

prompted this class to abandon the promises of liberal reform initiated by the Brahmo
Samaj and embrace a conservative, nationalist Hindu revivalism towards the end of the
nineteenth century.623 The first notable clip to their sovereignty came from the Rent Act
(Act X, 1859), which created three distinct tenurial classifications for the Bengali ryot. In
defining the ryot’s legal liabilities, the Act gave peasants who had cultivated a particular
plot of land uninterrupted for a period of 12 years, occupancy rights and a fixed rental rate
over their land. Act XI (Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act) was passed in the same year and
stabilized the sale of land for arrears of revenue in Bengal, which according to B.B
Chaudhuri conspicuously strengthened the security of land for the creditor class.624 The
Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 served a crucial blow to the zamindar’s authority. It cornered
landlords who had evaded the provisions of the Rent Act by moving peasants from one
plot to another; the Act now guaranteed possession or khudkasht status to peasants who
cultivated any plot of land in a village for over 12 years. It also provided small peasants
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with legal safeguards such as compensation for land improvements, streamlining cases
regarding revenue disputes and fixing the revision of rental rates to an interval of 15 years.
Most importantly, it sanctified the payment of rent in cash instead of produce for occupancy
peasants. Unofficially yet effectively, the Act instituted a settlement plan modeled closer
to the Ryotwari system than the Permanent Settlement in Bengal and gave legal formality
to those arrangements that were previously deemed customary. In doing so, it signaled ‘an

end to high landlordism, and with it, the increasing displacement of a rent-based
mechanism of surplus extraction by credit-based ones.’625 The political and economic
demotion of the zamindar disturbed a section of native administrators that saw him as a
paternalist figure who did not function with the same ruthless liability of the mahajan. The
concern seeped into Ali’s memorandum as well. With pronounced apprehension he
informed the Bengal administration that ‘old families are being sold out and their estates
are being bought up by moneylenders and pleaders’. He reminded them that these families
‘have stood by the Government in times of emergency’ and were a ‘stable propertied class’
who acted as the only ‘medium of communication between itself [the government] and a
vast and generally ignorant population with whom it cannot otherwise be ever in touch.’626
The key to helping the ryot, according to Ali, lay in restoring the status of these original
landlords.

British officials, however, had withdrawn hopes regarding the zamindar and were
unwilling to be persuaded otherwise. Functionally he was the relic of an unproductive era,
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unlike the moneylender who was crucial to the ongoing machination. In fact, the
zamindar’s non-industrious and apathetic spirit was invoked to demonstrate that most rural
usurers did not exploit a blatantly ‘ignorant’ party. The Commissioner of Jullundar, Lt. Col
C.F. Massy, for example, was an officer who found that a borrower’s ‘simplicity’ was
absent in several rural transactions. With the N.W Provinces and Bengal in mind, Massy
refuted the terms of the Amendment, arguing that the zamindars of these estates were

‘sufficiently intelligent to justify us in assuming that they are competent to look after their
own interests’.627 Even zamindars with small holdings extracted limited sympathy in spite
of testimonies which stated that most money disputes involved suits against ‘petty
landlords, cultivators, laborers and clerks on small pay’.628 The Divisional Judge of the
Chief Court of Punjab, H.M Wood, directed attention towards the ‘Rajput zamindar’, when
he claimed that such landowners did not require special protections, since it was their
‘wasteful expenditures’ that was the likely cause of their indebtedness. The Magistrate of
Howrah, E.W Colins reported that his districts were scattered with ‘unthrifty people’,
burdened by loans taken for ‘marriages and shows’. The Deputy Commissioner of Kangra,
A. Anderson, believed that an intervention in the existent system of rural credit would have
been justified if the money ‘were used in improving land, or bettering circumstances of
cultivation.’ However, he failed to see ‘why we should feel sorry because we made a
zamindar waste only 200 rather than 400 on a marriage.’629 The congealment of such
opinions over the late nineteenth century outlined an impression of native proprietors as an
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extravagant and improvident class of people, an opinion that was then reflected onto
occupancy cultivators and petty landholders too. The veracity of these claims, however,
were only marginally confirmed through official figures. The Report of the Deccan Riots
Commission concluded that the expenditure on festivals and weddings had only fractionally
contributed to the volume of debt in 1875. Similarly, social expenditures contributed to
only 6% of the debt held by jute cultivators in Bengal in the early twentieth century.630

Even the RBPBEC admitted that though the peasant regularly borrowed for nonagricultural expenditures, ‘social and religious ceremonies make but small contributions to
the total indebtedness.’631 Lavish social expenditures may have met with official
disapproval, but the officers in questions were overlooking a key point. Spending on social
ceremonies elevated honor and prestige. The fact that the ‘peasant’s ability to borrow
depended on his social standing in the community’, was acknowledged by the Bombay
Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee too and remains a reality in contemporary South
Asia as well.632 Importantly, social expenditures included, but were not limited to social
ceremonies. As seen in stories like Dena Paona or Pui Macha, many of the small holders
and petty professionals borrowed incessantly to pay off the dowry demanded by their
daughter’s in-laws. Their desperate thirst for liquidity was not spent in wasteful pomp,
rather it mitigated the ill treatment they feared their daughters would receive.
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Since zamindars were not to be entrusted with protecting the ‘ignorant’ from the
‘knowing’, some officials chose to repose their faith in Judges. They could, it was argued,
restructure a contract, or declare it void when they found its terms as ‘unconscionable’. In
this respect, the Acting Collector of Anantapur, F.A Nicholas, pleaded with the government
to follow the precedent set by Austria and Germany, where the Usury Law of 1880 asked

courts not to enforce those claims that took ‘ advantage of the necessities, improvidence or
inexperience of another to obtain unusual terms for a loan or a rate of interest higher than
that ordinarily prevailing.’633 Ironically, the recommendation was more popular amongst
police and revenue officials than the Judges themselves. While some Judges, like R.S
Aikman from the North-West Provinces, argued that a court should investigate when they
found interest rates to exceed 24% on simple bonds and 12% on mortgaged loans, most
were weary of the imprecise guidelines that were to inform their decisions. The District
Judges of South Malabar wrote in unison that ‘simplicity implies a condition in which
intelligence and comprehension of full bearing and effects of a contract are defective, much
in the same way that they are assumed to be defective in a person underage.’ When thus
understood, ‘simplicity’ was already factored in the Contract Act, which voided such
agreements. If the criteria were expanded to accommodate common ignorance or illiteracy,
then ‘the difficulty will lie in the practical determination by the Courts of what degree of
simplicity is entitled to protection’, and judicial decisions would turn inconsistent and
arbitrary.634 Uprooting the certainties of legal language would have resulted in systemic
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difficulties too. The Officiating Registrar of the High Court in Calcutta informed the Home
Department that in the collated opinions of the Judges of Bengal, the volume of litigation
concerning disputed contracts was already too high, since ‘the debtor avails himself of
every opportunity of contesting the claim on all possible grounds’.635 Now, if ryots were
to learn that a contract could be invalidated through a personal appeal made to the
sympathies of a Judge, this number would increase and bring the legal machinery to a

standstill. As it is, felt the Judicial Commissioner of the N.W Provinces, ‘dishonest
borrowers’ had already inundated the court with ‘frivolous and baseless pleas’.636
Outranking all other concerns was the fact that:
The Judges consider any such change undesirable, because the Court, not knowing
the facts beforehand, might view with suspicion many circumstances not really
suspicious, and might thus be led into useless inquiries entailing much waste of
time and expense.637

The warning regarding the limits of judicial omnipotence resonated with tones of market
determinacy, an argument which was later amplified by Frederich Hayek while critiquing
the system of bureaucratic state planning.638 A Subordinate Judge from Nainital, John
Edge, put it quite bluntly when he admitted that a 20% rate of interest on a loan with good
security may be high, while even 70% on an unsecured loan could be low with respect to
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‘the risk the lender was running of losing not only interest but principle’. ‘What I desire to
point out’, he asserted, ‘is that neither a Judge nor any one else could say that the agreed
rate of interest was unconscionable, unless he had before him the circumstances under
which the loan was applied for and made.’639 The Subordinate Judge of Sultanpur felt that
the Amendment was laudable but regretted that ‘no criteria can be fixed as to the rate of
interest, as it differs in different districts.’ Reflecting on similar complications, the

Divisional Judge of Amritsar, T.A. Troward argued that ‘two courts would seldom think
alike and the element of chance [in decisions] would be too great’. Though many agreed
that credit markets were for all purposes ‘unfree’, the majority treated it as an honest and
equitable index for setting interest rates. So, the grounds for modifying or regulating its
operations were treaded upon lightly. A precedent was set by Justice Mahmood and Justice
Straight in Lalli vs. Ram Pershad (1886) for reducing the rate of interest in accordance
with the laws of Equity. The Registrar of the Judicial Commissioner’s Court (Lucknow),
C.J Hoskins, however, remained unconvinced by the lower court’s ability to reproduce the
Judges’ reasonings faithfully.640 The mistrust harbored against native judicial officers
convinced a majority of British Judges that tampering with private contracts would cause
irrevocable damage to channels of rural credit. Once more, the buck was passed onto the
Legislature, which showed limited enthusiasm in passing a new Usury Act. Instead, they
circled to a familiar and occupying concern, that of land. Certain law makers were eager to
assume the paternalist mantle that they denied the landed gentry and which the judiciary
was unwilling to accept. Neeladri Bhattacharya notes that within the colonial versions of
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patriarchal power, ‘the father’s right over children and the male’s right over women—
remained interconnected’.641 We may safely expand this version to also include the father’s
custody over property.

Paternal and utilitarian ideologies arrived to the colony coterminously but worked on
different registers. Eric Stokes identified the first wave of paternalists as the ‘romantic

generation’; officials who tempered Cornwallis’ authoritarian reforms with Burke’s calls
for cultural relativism and historical continuity.642 Ironically, even as paternal impulses
peaked in the provinces settled under the ryotwari system, figures like Malcolm and Munro
reserved mixed feelings regarding the ryot’s proprietary rights over land. While Locke had
placed private property’s normative claims within the domain of natural rights, Munro held
this entitlement as the product of political power itself.643 In this sense, first the Company
and then the Crown were the real owners and the supra-landlords of the subcontinent. The
position was periodically re-asserted through the nineteenth century and naturally bled into
the question of land alienation. Before Malcolm Darling stated the argument boldly, some
officials had already sensed that proprietary and tenurial titles had expanded the prosperity
and creditworthiness of cultivators, which in turn contributed to their indebtedness.644 Its
most cited iteration came from 1852, when the Superintendent of the Revenue Survey in

Neeladri Bhattacharya, The Great Agrarian Conquest; The Colonial Reshaping of a Rural World, Delhi:
Permanent Black, 2019, p. 49
642
Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1959. Apprehensive of
convoluted procedures and a tiered bureaucracy, their own preference lay in centralizing authority in the
hands of a few officials like the Collector, who could be entrusted with both judicial and revenue
responsibilities. This form of ‘discretionary government’ maintained continuity from the time of the
Mughals and was believed to be better suited for the ryot. p. 15.
643
Sartori, Liberalism in Empire p. 96.
644
Malcolm Darling, The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt, New Delh: Manohar Book Service, 1977.
641

253

Southern Mahratta, Captain G. Wingate, ‘advocated exempting immovable property from
attachment or sale for debt.’645 In 1873, Sir Raymond West, described the cultivator’s right
to alienate property as a ‘fatal boon’ since it ‘it gave the peasant too much access to credit’,
which ‘he or she was not capable of handling appropriately.’646 The Deccan riots
highlighted the prescience of these warnings and the chorus to limit transferability grew
significantly amongst the rank and file of the bureaucracy by the 1890’s. These officials

identified the ryot’s eagerness to mortgage land for short term loans as the primary reason
for the fragmentation of large estates and pullulation of small holdings. However, as Partha
Chatterji argues in the case of Bengal, land fragmentation itself was precipitated by the
increasing gap between the rental and revenue rates; the former having outpaced the latter
once wastelands were reclaimed and settled. More importantly, peasants who had been
newly settled on khas (government) land often lacked the means to cultivate large holdings
through either family or hired labour. As a result, the process of transfers, sale and subinfeudation of land had turned common even amongst the nonproprietary tenurial class.647
The concern regarding fragmentation and alienation had notably and problematically
peaked in the Punjab’s canal colonies. Many felt that the government’s investment in
irrigation had converted previously arid land into a newly minted asset for the cultivators
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of the region. L.W. Dane, the Settlement Collector of Peshawar, also held the government’s
decision to limit revenue demand to half of the total assessment and its choice to impose
collection in cash ‘at rates specially designed to favor the cultivator’ responsible for the
inflating the market.648 Such interventions had piqued the interest of the non-cultivating
commercial classes who were eager to acquire land that now generated sizable quantitates
of cotton, sugar and wheat. Dane believed he had struck two birds when he advised the

Government to ‘make alienated land subject to reassessment as to put on a full land
revenue’, a portion of which could then be remitted ‘on all fields and holdings in the
possession of old agriculturalists’. Though his recommendation did not see legislative
light, the Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1900, an ineffective yet paternalist intervention
made on behalf of the cultivators of Punjab, did build on other suggestions made in the
discussions regarding the Amendment to the Contract Act.649 E.W Parker, the Divisional
Judge of the Jhelum division, had for example, recommended that ‘the best way to protect
the agriculturalist would be to take away their power of alienating their land without the
sanction of the Collector’, which was ‘in accordance with the original land law of India,
which regarded the Government as the ultimate proprietor’.650 Justice Channing of the
Chief Court of Punjab, proposed that the ‘alienation of ancestral landed property should
not be binding for more than 14 years or for the life of the alienor… unless sanctioned by
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the Collector’. These proposals made it to the Land Alienation Act in Punjab and were later
included in the Amendment to the Bengal Tenancy Act in 1928.651

The thrust of these arguments placed land ownership within the state’s custody and viewed
its alienation, transfer and distribution as questions that were to be determined politically.
Such paternal outlooks, however, operated alongside liberal theories of private property.

The latter was tied to an equally firm ideological pole and drew sentimental sustenance
from the image of the ‘English yeoman’. In finding his colonial equivalent, liberal
ideologues conflated ritual authority with proprietary claims, and thereby fabricated a
lineage of private proprietorship in the subcontinent. Bhavani Raman deftly narrates the
translative maneuvers that rendered the mirasidar in the Madras Province into the homolingual idiom and the historical landscape of English feudal proprietorship.652 Mahmood
Mamdani and Karuna Mantena’s works regarding ‘indirect rule’ in Africa and India further
demonstrate how a ‘customary proprietary regime’ enabled colonial governments to
selectively elevate custom when it complimented colonial liberal requirements. In his close
reading of the Permanent Settlement in Bengal, Sartori notes a shift from the 1860s when
‘custom’s enduring capacity to establish prescriptive rights’ in property was worked into
the discourse of political economy in order to produce an autochthonous ‘agrarian civil
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society’.653 Impetus was provided by ‘enlightened paternalists’ like George Campbell, who
in his 1869 essay titled The Irish Land, defended the ‘tenant’s customary right to value of
improvements made at their own expense, and to a right of occupancy at a fair rate’.654 The
argument was extended to India, and its application, claims Sartori, was embedded in the
provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885, an Act that fostered a class of ‘raiyat
capitalists with tenurial rights over occupancy holdings’.655 The elevation of the ryot’s

status from a ‘mere laborer’ to a capitalist farmer was accompanied by the gradual elision
of the zamindar within the colonial political and economic framework. Sartori claims that
the ryot’s newly won capitalist title emerged from within a distinct, albeit marginal liberal
tradition, that he traces to The Second Treatise, in which Locke had established the
normative property constituting powers of labour.656

Missing in Sartori’s thesis are the tensions and reciprocities that developed between custom
and capital under the umbrella of commercial agriculture. In the end, the ‘liberal
Sartori, Liberalism in Empire p. 90.
Ibid. p. 92.
655
Ibid. p. 85.
656
In the Second Treatise, Locke argues that the labour invested on agricultural improvement over land creates
a proprietary right over that land for the one responsible for its improvement. For Locke, the proprietary right
that emerges from labour inputs is the natural right of the laborer. Following Locke, Sartori suggests that “we
read the politics of raiyat rights as an ideological framework through which specific normative potentialities of
participation in commodity production could be articulated in the form of demands for the legal constitution
of occupancy raiyats as a definite economic class of independent producers.” (p.110). Liberal doctrines of
political economy enabled this by grasping that ‘social relationships of interdependence in modern capitalist
society are themselves abstract’ and could therefore be translated into an ever-expanding liberal idiom. (p.196)
By centering the ryot as the target of the colonial liberal project, Sartori illuminates the suppling effects of liberal
abstractions, which rendered even ‘concrete institutional entailments’ within its lexicon. So, the normative
claims of proprietorship the ‘Bengali Muslim peasants’ asserted over their land received institutional force from
tenets of political economy, although it was expressed through an ethical discourse of ‘piety’ with no liberal
discursive equivalent. A more contemporary example may be gleaned from the ongoing farmer’s movement in
North India, where the rights of small holding cultivators and their ability to market produce is expressed
through the concrete, communitarian yet distinctly ‘illiberal’ institution of the ‘khap’, which at present provides
the movement with its organizational force.
653
654

257

abstractions’ that Sartori treats as the ideological expressions of capital, were bound to
collide with the concreteness of custom. The latter drew force from substantive and
locationally bound practices, as opposed to capital, whose nature remained unbound. This
abstract and de-territorial quality of capital had made George Simmel remark that ‘the
stranger everywhere appears as the trader, or the trader as the stranger’.657 It was also what
dressed the moneylender as the ‘outsider’, one who clashed with landed local communities.

How were liberal doctrines to translate this disembodiment within bounded social relations
that presented themselves as customs? An iteration of the incompatibility was evidenced
by the real-world operation of damdupat, the Hindu customary law that forbid the
collection of interest that exceeded the principle. As the munsif of Ghazipur, Sris Chandra
Bose, asked for the usury laws existent prior to 1855 be reinstated, he admitted that these
laws were ‘opposed to theories of political economists [but] are consistent with all the
customs and traditions of Indian people’.658 How accurate was his assessment? Though
ubiquitous on paper, concrete examples of damdupat were hard to come by. A Judge from
the Calcutta High Court, John Edge candidly admitted that while the custom may have
been cited in a few cases in Bombay, ‘[i]n eight years’ experience in this High Court I
cannot call to my recollection any case in which that rule of Hindu law has been held to
apply in these Provinces, although several of the Judges… have wished that we could apply
that rule.’659
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While the Tenancy Act of 1885 gave legal sanction to rights that were earlier regarded as
customary, it also gave peasants the ‘fatal boon’ of occupancy securities just ten years after
the deleterious fallout of the Deccan riots. The ostensible aim may have been to safeguard
the smallholder’s economic and legal rights over his/her land but the consequences of the
Act exceeded political concerns alone. As British ideologues grew increasingly

disheartened with the prospects of developing a class of capitalist landlords, some believed
that the only way to attract capital to agriculture was to make property freely
transferable.660 As it is, the ‘right of occupancy and use of land became a salable
commodity’ towards the late nineteenth century and by strengthening this trend, the
Tenancy Act of 1885 inflated the value of the land market in Bengal.661 Owing to the firm
protest of zamindars these rights were not made formally salable, although they did act as
collateral for private loans.662 This is confirmed by Ashton’s note from 1893, in which he
regretted that the Tenancy Act had ‘failed to check the transfer of occupancy right to the
trading and money-lending classes’. In fact, the transfers in occupancy holdings was ‘very
much greater than have been officially admitted’ and that there were many ryots ‘who have
already succumbed or may hereafter succumb to the temptation to mortgage their
“occupancy right” for short loans or for ancestral debts’.663 The Report of the Indian
Irrigation Commission (1903) further noted that occupancy ryots were effecting transfers
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in the form of sub-leases and added ‘if the subleases be valid as legal security for private
advances, takavi might also be advanced on the strength of some similar form of
conveyance to a government officer.’664 The Government attempted to stop these
transactions through the Bengal Act II in 1918. Finding the law unsuccessful in its purpose,
it gave legal recognition to these transactions in the Amendment to the Tenancy Act in
1928. The genealogy demonstrates, however, that legislation did not create the conditions

for this property market as much as formalize exchanges that were already taking place.665

Why did the state itself not become a creditor, especially when it found regulating private
credit from the outside so challenging? It tried, but it was too removed and informationally
ill equipped to understand the relations that structured rural credit.666 As a result, its
attempts appeared insincere. In spite of the underdevelopment in public banking, tentative
forays were made into agrarian lending through the Land Improvements Act in 1871. The
Act sanctioned advances with an interest rate of 6.25 for the purposes of land improvement,
particularly irrigation works and for the reclamation of wasteland. The plan for these loans
drew on the Mughal system of taqavi (takavi), which were advances authorized by Mughal
revenue officers for meeting the peasant’s seed and cattle costs.667 Eleven years into its
working, Sir Charles Crosthwaite, declared the Act a complete failure, as ‘the total
advances under the Act for the whole of India do not come to more than four and half or
664
665
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five lakhs at the outside during the year.’668 According to the Famine Commission’s Report
in 1880, apart from procedural problems, it was the recalcitrance of Collectors to lend
without security that led to its inefficiency.669 Act 26 of 1871 was followed by the Northern
India Takkavi Act (1879), the Land Improvements Loans Act of 1883 and eventually by
the Cooperative Credit Societies Act of 1904. None of these proved to be effective
competition against private usury, and by beginning of the twentieth century the

Government had almost completely withdrawn itself from financing improvements or
funding agrarian production.670 The Government, on its own part, provided a list of reasons
for its failures. The Bengal Banking Report remarked that ‘moneylenders are willing to
make loans for even unproductive purposes’, like social ceremonies, subsistence costs and
capital required to meet a separate loan, which the Government was unwilling to do.671
While reviewing the workings of the Land Improvements Loans Act of 1883, Sir Stuert
Bayly claimed that the Government’s operations were severely impeded by the lack of
securities against which an advance could be made. This was particularly true for Northern
India, where ‘the ryot has no transferable interest in his land which he can offer as security,
and the only interest he can offer—his crops—are previously hypothecated to the
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landlord.’672 These problems were alien to mahajans and zamindars turned usurers who
were deeply embedded in rural society. The RBPBEC estimated that by 1928 in Bengal
‘about 80 percent of the numbers of loans advanced by moneylenders is unsecured and 20
percent secured’, although ‘the value of the secured loans bears to that of the unsecured
loans would be nine to ten’.673 Again, in the context of the Loans Act of 1883, the
Commissioner of Berar, Mr. Jones, claimed that private usurers saw the Government as

competition and denied advances to peasants who borrowed from it.674 While the RBPBEC
admitted that cooperative societies were gaining some traction amongst rural borrowers, ‘a
great many people are still lured to the moneylender’ because he would lend in secret,
without security, without enquiring about the purpose of the loan and without demanding
punctual repayment.675 This, however, was an incomplete assessment. To chalk the success
of private usury to coercion, social dominance or to informational superiority would be a
narrative disservice, since it was also the cultural reputation of the baniya and the symbiotic
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relationship he shared with his borrowers that became compelling reasons for the faith
reposed on his capital. The fact was acknowledged by officials like R.S Aikman in 1893,
who reminded the Government that ‘all moneylenders aren’t village shylocks…many
fulfill useful functions.’676 In fact, in reconstructing the figure of the ‘Paternal Sheth’,
David Hardiman insists that we read the peasant-baniya relationship beyond a transactional
exchange; the Sheth was ‘expected’ to provide peasants with subsistence loans in times of

crisis.677 The characterization is corroborated by the relative absence of widespread antimoneylender uprisings in late colonial and even post-colonial India. When they did occur,
they threw up two demands. One was the destruction of accounts and ledgers, and the other
was the continuance of subsistence loans. For Bose, this ‘entitlement to food grains was
precisely what inequitable credit relations were meant to assure.’678

Was the rate of land dispossession enough to generate the kind of concern it did in the
closing decade of the nineteenth century? Indeed, the threat of political instability was
serious enough for the Government of Punjab to pass the Land Alienation Act in 1900 and
for the Government of India to amend the Contract Act in 1899. Was this fear empirically
grounded? Bengal, for example, did see rapid movements in the land market, especially in
transfers in occupancy tenures. B.B Chaudhari, characterizes the period following the
Tenancy Act as undergoing a ‘process of depeasantization’, where a large number of ryots
mortgaged their occupancy rights as securities for advances and continued cultivation as
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sharecroppers and bargadars.679 Rajat and Ratnalekha Ray, however, feel this to be an
overestimation, as the majority of agricultural production remained in the hands of tenurial
cultivators.680 It is true that the activity in the land markets of Eastern India peaked only in
the 1920’s, yet dispossession remained an occupying concern for the provincial
government even during the late nineteenth century. Eventually, the socio-economic
changes in agrarian production witnessed at the end of the nineteenth century were more

to do with establishing monopoly over agricultural commodities than land. Given that
usurers were not interested in evicting peasants or repurposing their land for noncultivating purposes, it made little sense for them to keep capital idle by entering into direct
purchases. It was only during exceptional periods of crisis, when the lender feared that
loans were irrecoverable, did he take actual possession. This was witnessed, for example,
during the period between 1893-1903 when ‘droughts, floods and famine that swept the
Narmada valley’681 or when raw jute prices collapsed following the Depression in the
1930’s and a large section of Bengali ryots slipped into the dispossessed category.682 It was
more common for peasants who mortgaged their proprietary or occupancy tenures to
continue possession and cultivation with inferior rights, which usually translated as higher
effective rents collected in produce.683 In fact, by the twentieth century in Bengal, the
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annual collections of interest payments were much heavier than the payments made in
rent.684 As already argued, such interest was often secured in produce instead of cash (like
in the case of paddy loans). In fact, the RBPBEC acknowledged that even when the
borrower had not taken a dadan loan, he was virtually bound to sell his produce to his
creditor, ‘especially when the creditor was a trader.’685 It is also undeniable that the fear
of land alienation and its political fallout was more than spectral for many within the

colonial administration.686 For those looking to restore the balance of power between the
usurer and peasant, the disparity in social and economic status and more crucially, in
intelligence between the two, appeared overwhelming. The only solution to a real or lasting
protection, they felt, lay in the drastic reformulation of the law of contract itself. Ashton
was one such officer, whose paternal concern was expressed through stadial rhetoric, one
that characterized peasants as minors who were yet to come of age:

[N]ative cultivators, who are mere children in many respects compared with the
moneylenders and traders with who they have to deal, are entrusted with unlimited power
to alienate they occupancy right, and palliatives are offered for criticism when these
cultivators act in the very manner that they may be expected to act in the situation in which
they are placed.687
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Dead Letters
So far, the argument has covered the discussions conducted from 1892-94 regarding the
Amendment to the Contract Act. On the basis of these discussions, a draft bill was prepared
in 1898 that addressed questions regarding the borrower’s ‘simplicity’, ‘ignorance’ and
‘necessity’ as well as the lenders ability to ‘dominate’, ‘act in good faith’ or be ‘on equal
footing’ visa vis the borrower. Though the bill covered a majority of the concerns raised in

the correspondence from 1892-94, it was met with general disapproval when it was
circulated in 1898. Clauses regarding the lender’s ability to ‘dominate’ the borrower or
whether the lender and borrower ‘contract on equal footing’ were dismissed as being vague
or procedurally unenforceable. The Rangoon Chamber of Commerce could not imagine a
situation in which a lender did not hold some sort of leverage over the borrower - ‘Any
person who has money to lend is in a position to dominate anyone in need of money.’688 If
every lender was in a position to ‘dominate’ the borrower, contracting on ‘equal footing’
was also impossible. The question of ‘simplicity’ and ‘ignorance’ were dropped entirely.
The final assessment of the reviewing officers was that as a principle of law, ‘undue
influence’ was ‘excessively difficult, probably impossible to state in a language that may
not be misunderstood.’689 While still in agreement with the principles and sentiments that
called for the Amendment in the first place, a majority remained convinced that the
Government of India ran the risk of ‘spoiling the Contract Act and produce results in
regions beyond the sphere of question of agricultural indebtedness.’690 Specifically
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targeted laws like the DARA or the Sailors and Merchants Shipping Act were deemed more
effective, since they targeted vulnerable groups without jeopardizing the overall system.
As a result, the Amendment was watered down to banality. Its only notable inclusion was
the changes made to Section 74, in which relief would be provided against ‘penalty’ for
‘breach of contract’, where ‘penalty’ was construed as a new and ‘unconscionable’ rate of
interest imposed on money loans after the date of default.691 Regarding the term

‘domination’, it was decided that ‘when a person who is in a position to dominate the will
of another, enters into a contract with him, and the transaction appears… to be
unconscionable, the burden of proving that such contract was not induced by undue
influence shall lie upon the person in a position to dominate the will of the other.’ This
clause specified, however, that the relation between the lender and borrower was not
fiduciary and that the onus to prove adequate ‘consideration’ in a contract was not
something that the lender had to prove. Crucially, the Amendment of 1899 provided two
examples through which the law was to be interpreted. The second example or ‘example
d’, was particularly telling:
A. applies to a banker for a loan at a time when there is stringency in the money
market. The banker declines to make the loan except at an unusually high rate of
interest. A. accepts the loan on these terms. This is a transaction in the ordinary
course of business, and the contract is not induced by undue influence.692
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It sapped the Amendment from effecting the radical protection it had promised in its decade
long contemplation. It became a historical footnote—a ‘dead letter’ which the RBPBEC
described as ‘halfhearted’ and one that ‘did not touch a fringe of the problem’.693 This
verdict held for the Usurious Loans Act of 1918, which extended to the whole of India as
well. Following the Depression and based on the recommendations of various Banking
Enquiry Reports, Provincial governments took the initiative of passing targeted laws to

relieve borrowers.694 It is generally agreed, however, that the situation had changed quite
drastically in the 1930’s: The First World War and the Depression forced several European
Managing Houses to withdraw their buying and shipping operations, while the price of
commercially cultivated crops like jute and cotton either crashed or fluctuated wildly in
global markets. The rise of nationalist political parties like the Congress and the Krishak
Praja Party in state legislatures also impacted the general direction of government policies.
Though credit-based cultivation continued, its heydays that extended from the 1860’s to
the 1920’s, were now behind it.

The failures of the Amendment to the Contract Act and the subsequent laws attempting to
provide relief and protection to small holding borrowers need to be assessed vis a vis the
success of commercial farming as a mode of production and expropriation. Over a series
of publications, Jairus Banaji has urged readers to treat commercial farming as an instance
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of a well-developed system commercial capitalism.695 For Banaji, commercial capital was
not subservient to or an agent of industrial capitalism, since its role exceeded that of the
circulation of wealth generated by industry.696 This was even truer for the distinctly
colonial system of commercial farming. Banaji builds on Henry Bernstein’s arguments
regarding the exploitation of peasant household labor and A.V Chayanov’s concept of
‘vertical concentration’ of producers.697 Chayanov, and later Bernstein were the first to

show how ‘trading and finance capitalism’ integrated small peasant farms within a
capitalist commodity market and ‘established the domination of capital over sections of the
peasantry, with no necessary effects on the organization of production.’698 As has already
been argued, cash crops like poppy, indigo, jute, sugar and cotton, were not cultivated in
plantations (like tea or rubber) where the process of primitive accumulation had divested
peasants of the means of production and converted him/her into hired wage labor. Instead,
even as the smallholding peasant retained control over the means of production and the
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way in which it was organized (household form), the ‘aggregate labor of the household’
was exploited through a system of price domination, where monied capital appropriated
the peasant’s produce at an extremely undervalued price. According to Banaji this system
of appropriation represented the ‘formal (if not real) subsumption of labour by capital’,699
and the debt relations produced through ‘advances’ should be read as the wages earned by
laborers in conventional systems of capitalist farming. The reason it has not, argues Banaji,

is due to the tendency of several Marxist historians to mistakenly conflate the ‘relations of
production’ with ‘forms of exploitation’, although:
[…]the deployment of labour is correlated with modes of production in complex
ways. Not only are modes of production not reducible to forms of exploitation, but
the historical forms of exploitation of labour (relations of production in the
conventional sense) lie at a completely different level of abstraction from the
numerous and specific ways in which labour is or can be deployed.700
By drawing a distinction between the two categories, Banaji’s formulation resists historical
teleology; mercantile or commercial capital that was organized through a putting-out
system was not simply the ‘pre-history’ of an industrial mode of production, nor was it a
‘pre-capitalist’ form of appropriation.701. Even in the absence of plantations or industrial
scale enterprises (like the latifundia), cash crops were produced through smallholding
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peasant labor for a global commodity market. In this system, middlemen like the baniya,
the mahajan, arhatiyas, beparis and goladars were:
[…] scarcely extraneous, dispensable elements of a system that could have worked
just as easily without them. They were the system. They were how the chains of
commercial capitalism straddling the world’s main commodity markets were
structured.702

Importantly, the system was cost effective. Till the 1920s most Managing Houses acquired

raw commodities from bazaar intermediaries at exceptionally low prices. As a result, the
commercial cultivation of crops like sugar or cotton never transitioned to slave/indenturedplantation forms as they had existed in America (cotton) and the Caribbean (sugar). Several
testimonies affirm this fact, the earliest of them coming from B.B Chaudhuri who quotes
an indigo planter in the 1850’s as saying ‘No European farmer could produce either
sugarcane or tobacco or any raw material as cheaply as the ryots.’703 Banaji himself draws
attention to the observations of Samuel Smith, the founder of Smith, Edwards and Co., one
of the largest cotton broker firms in Liverpool in the early twentieth century, to make a
similar point regarding cotton.704 Krishna Bharadwaj claims that the labor intensive jute
crop was mostly cultivated through the household labour of Bengali ryots who held 1.25
acres of land on average.705 While speaking of the cost efficiency of this system, Omkar
Goswami argues that ‘subjugating peasants to a capitalistic wage labour system was not
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necessary for procuring jute at low prices…Small wonder, then, that the mills never
considered it necessary to eliminate middlemen and radically transform the structure of
upcountry trade.706 The case was similar for sugarcane growers in Western Uttar Pradesh
who remained perpetually indebted to the khandsaris who provided them with subsistence
loans which they recovered through the undervalued purchase of their crops. By doing so,
they were able to ‘maintain a firm grip upon them [cultivators] and prevent the delivery of

cane to the sugar factory’, where the peasants would have received a fairer price for their
produce.707 More recently, Fahad Bishara has documented a similar phenomenon amongst
smallholding Arab Pemba farmers in Zanzibar in the early twentieth century. The
cultivators were under the sway of Gujarati mercantile capital and survived off subsistence
loans that were recovered through the acquisition of cloves and coconuts.708 Given the
centrality of mercantile credit to agrarian production and the importance of its networks in
acquiring, storing, trading commodities, Bishara admits that ‘any legislation that targeted
the moneylender, was doomed to lifeless existence in the books itself.’709 By 1933, after
almost 2.3 million coconut and clove trees had been directly acquired by Indian
moneylenders and as the threat of a nativist backlash seemed imminent, the British
Government in Zanzibar passed the Land Alienation Decree in 1934. Bishara claims that
in official discourse, the Indian usurer was referred to as a ‘rent seeking parasite’ and a
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‘profit motivated miser’; quite hypocritical for a state that greatly valued this class’
importance for the purposes of wealth extraction and the movement of commodities.710

Eventually, the paternal concerns regarding smallholding peasants dissipated once
demands of commercial cultivation were confronted. It was the efficiency of relative costs,
both for the production and acquisition of crops that won out at the end.711 Crucially, it was

a distinctly colonial legal and economic framework that actively produced and maintained
the peasant’s indebted condition. These smallholders bore great affinity to the ‘weaker
sections’ who were indebted to the rain gambling houses, bucket shops and spot betting
circles in Bombay, Calcutta and Delhi. They were also described as being ‘simple’,
‘ignorant’, ‘children’. However, while the debt of the petty gambler was viewed and
mediated as a social problem, the peasant’s debt was considered economically productive,
especially because of his ‘ignorance’, which was functionally determinant. Even though
material gains may have driven governmental policy, in discourse, it was the rationality of
political economy on which the system was justified. When documenting the reasons for
the failure of the Usurious Loans Act of 1918, the RBPBEC admitted that it was the:
[…] baffling effects of the decisions of the High Courts and Privy Council which
have practically made the Act a dead letter. The trend of rulings is to impress on
subordinate courts that they have no power to interfere with contracts solemnly
entered upon; discretion of courts is fettered by judicial decisions which are tending
in favor of creditors; rulings of the Privy Council stand in the way of reducing rate
of interest unless certain things can be proved etc.712

Ibid. p. 229.
It was not a particular commercial class of moneylenders, like the Marwaris, who were being protected. The
moneylending operations in Bengal, for example, was mostly concentrated in the hands of zamindars and
patnidars by the twentieth century.
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This was a repetition of Justice Ameer Alis assessment from 1892, when the question
regarding the Amendment to the Contract Act first arose. At the time, Ali had criticized
the overzealous defense of ‘freedom of contract’ and ‘free bargaining’ in a country like
India. Excited by the first draft of the Amendment bill, he went against the opinions of his
fellow colleagues regarding the inclusion of the terms ‘domination’ and ‘equal footing’:

I fail to see why a Court of Equity dealing with a contract between persons, one of
whom is in a position to dominate over the other, should avoid, and how it can
avoid dealing with the two questions together [….] The theory of free contract does
not appear to be wholly beneficent in its consequences even in England, where
people deal with each other more or less on terms of equality. That theory, however,
is wholly unsuited to the social and economic conditions of India.713

Pleased by the promise of the draft bill, he returned it with a message conveying his
approval and deprecated any changes ‘which would detract from its usefulness.’714 It is
more than likely he was disappointed by the Amendment as it came to pass.
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CHAPTER 5
The Ignorant Student

Eventually, the Amendment to the Contract Act did not elide the question of inequality.
Instead, the discussions held from 1892 to 1898 concluded that the contract generated
equivalence in the absence of equality. The contract was an agent of colligation, one that
stitched together asymmetrical relations faultlessly; it produced a relation amongst
heterogenous individuals in a manner that mediated their unequal positions without
annulling them. It explained inequality as a social and economic reality and understood the
contract as an agent for organizing both market society and the practices of government
around it. It was only when social and economic heterogeneity—inequality—was taken as
a pre-given that the principles of contract made sense. In fact, two Justices of the Chief

Court of the Punjab were amused that many had only just uncovered this truth. Justice Roe
felt that ‘taking advantage of another’s necessities is the principle of most persons engaged
in business, and not merely of moneylenders dealing with agriculturalists’.715 Justice
Channing elaborated further:
In the vast majority of non-commercial contracts, the parties are not on equal terms
with reference to the contract: the experienced horse dealer, the retail tradesman,
the professional jeweler are not usually on equal terms with those with whom they
deal, but so long as they are not guilty of fraud or misrepresentation complete
fairness is not required to make their bargains binding.716
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To tamper with this principle amounted to disassembling the Act entirely, so felt the
Inspector General of Registration in Madras. His note addressed the objective of the bill,
which was to provide relief to ryots by declaring a contract void when ‘a rich and powerful
zamindar induced poor and ignorant ryots holding under him to grow certain produce and
deliver it to him at an inadequate price to which no independent ryot would have
consented.’ He felt, however, that:

The power proposed to be given to the courts might doubtless enable them to afford relief
against really hard bargains in some cases, but it would, at the same time, introduce an
element of uncertainty in regard to the enforcement of legitimate contracts and hamper the
operations of legitimate trade, where superior knowledge and skill, so essential to success,
cannot be treated as disqualifying circumstances.717

The Lt. Governor of the Punjab, Dennis Fitzpatrick, staged a reasoned battle on both sides
of the principle. He drew out the benefits and drawbacks of intervention and noninterference in a credit market where ‘simple’ and ‘ignorant’ peasants were ‘dominated’
by the moneylender. He even wondered whether the introduction of ‘some sort of laesio
enormis into the substantive law’ was the key to balancing political and the economic needs
of the Government. The principle of laesio enormis was an obscure and poorly cited Roman
legislative principle that voided a contract if the price of purchase was well below the actual

From the Inspector General of Registration to the Chief Secretary to Government, dated Madras, 27th
August 1894, Np. 2475-G, Amendment to the Contract Act, Judicial Department, 21st October, 1897, Proc.
No. 2241/97, IOR. Emphasis mine.
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value of a commodity. This principle, however, went against conventional Roman
jurisprudence that acknowledged the right of contracting parties to outwit one another in
bargains. Fitzpatrick’s passing invocation of laesio enormis ascertains his awareness of
commercial farming and the peasant’s inability to command the market price for his/her
produce. However, despite the sympathy he felt for the ryots of his province, he found it
difficult to insert his substantive concerns within the formal procedure of law without

making the terms of contracting vague and therefore defunct. There was also the question
of maintaining consistency in equivalent spheres of commercial activity—‘the law does
not protect a vendor who sells his property for an inadequate value in order to meet some
pressing necessities, [then] what equity is there in protecting a debtor who borrows money
at a very high rate of interest for meeting a similar demand.’718 Burdened by these
considerations, he sublimated his protectionist sentiment as an unenforceable ideal and
concluded:

I am not prepared to go too far as to set aside a contract merely because one of the parties
to it is so feeble or simple minded as to enter into an unequal contract, and the other…
takes advantage of his weakness or simplicity.719

Note on modification in general law relating to interest, by Babu Lulal Chandra Deb, Government Pleader,
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As a tool for only mediating and not homogenizing difference, the contract became
synecdochic for a market whose logic was ‘strategic’.720 This logic pivoted on the
abstractions of political economy, one that replaced concrete social identities
(peasant/landlord) with abstract economic identities (borrower/lender). Clearly, as Ritu
Birla argues, the function of the ‘globalization of contract law’ was to recode political
subjects ‘first and foremost as economic agents’. This abstracted individual was then

projected onto a collective called ‘civil society’, which came to be seen as ‘an arrangement
of economic men.’721 Birla’s use of ‘economic men’ comes from her informed use of
Foucault’s Homo economicus or the ‘subjects of interest’. ‘Subjects of interest’ were the
atoms of civil society and their ‘interest’ was both non-transferable and irreducible.722

Michel Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, p. 42. Foucault makes a difference between strategic logic (market
logic) and dialectical logic: ‘Dialectical logic puts to work contradictory terms within the homogeneous. I suggest
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contradictory.
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Importantly, homo economicus was not a natural category; it was laboriously produced
through political economy and its attendant regime of truth (veridiction).723 So, having
reduced the ‘ignorant peasant’ to the irreducible—a borrower—the rationale of liberal
governmentality demanded that the Government wash its hands off further intervention
that contradicted the logic of the credit market itself.

A substantive contradiction still remained, one that engaged the moral rhetoric of Empire.
The universalist logic of Empire had converted difference—cultural, spatial, racial—into
temporal difference corresponding to a stadial thesis. So, if European Enlightenment
represented the final stage of civilization—modernity—non-European cultural and
political forms were to be understood in terms of the temporal distance they maintained to
the former. When difference was coded as time, races, cultures, practices and communities
could be categorized as ‘backward’, ‘medieval’ and ‘primitive’. The justification of
colonial violence was maintained through this discourse, where conquest became the
‘white man’s burden’ and colonial violence introduced the non-European ‘other’ to
modernity. While the civilizing rhetoric of Empire partly dissipated in the period of
‘indirect rule’, the temporal ordering of cultures remained active, nonetheless. Dipesh
Chakrabarty sees the influence of this rhetoric in the post-colonial contemporary too, where
temporal monikers like ‘developing’ consign non-European cultural and political forms to

these atomized ‘subjects of interest’ were arranged collectively, they came to represent market society. So, the
technique of liberal governmentality both individuated and totalized simultaneously.
723
‘Verediction is not a law (loi) but the set of rules enabling one to establish which statements in a given
discourse can be described as true or false.’ Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, p. 35.
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languish in the ‘waiting room of history’.724 This developmentalist rhetoric keeps the time
of the post-colonial as ‘belated’, one that is still ‘catching up’ to the West.725

If colonialism was a vehicle of transition (from the non-modern to the modern) then its
mode of expansion and its tools of transformation involved the dissemination of the
principles of political economy. Though harsh, these doctrines were valued as pedagogical.

So, the moral or substantive goal of political economy was not to simply mediate an
existent heterogeneity, but to homogenize this difference through the promise of a shared
modernity. Prathama Banerjee’s The Politics of Time is perhaps one of the best expositions
of this discourse. In the context of the Santhal Hul rebellion in the mid-nineteenth century,
Banerjee argues how usury was considered a necessary tool for ‘civilizing’ the ‘primitive’.
Refracting Simmel's arguments regarding the ‘civilizing force of money’ through her
narrative, Banerjee demonstrates the efficacy of this belief amongst both British officials
and the newly educated Bengali middle class. For the latter, the Santhals were the
‘primitives within’— an internal marker of difference from where modern autochthonous
(Bengali) history writing could begin. For the primitive to overcome their temporal
condition, the abstracting quality of money was considered instructive since it replaced the
goals of immediate desire with long term accumulation.726 Money therefore cultivated the
habits of saving, thriftiness and non-material consumption. As a result, the terribly unequal
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terms of usury the Santhal’s were subject to were justified by members of the Bengali
intelligentsia, like Soshee Chunder Dutt, who believed that ‘it was moneylenders rather
than missionaries who could civilize the aborigine.’727 His assessment was not very
different from that made by Robert K Pringle, the architect of the land settlement and
revenue policy of the Deccan, who described the vani or the village moneylender as the
only link between ‘civilization’ and ‘barbarianism’.728 The historical trajectory of these

arguments lead back to one of the architects of the discipline itself, Adam Smith, who
famously advocated against government regulation in grain prices even during periods of
extreme inflation, since high prices would cultivate practices of thrift and frugality amongst
consumers during lean seasons.729 The manifest agents of political economy—money,
contracts, markets—were the agents of transformation through which the pre-modern
learnt the rationalities required to be seen as modern.

Along with fulfilling its historical objective—transforming the ‘bazaar’ into the market—
the principles of political economy also imparted a new morality. Much like Dutt and
Pringle, officials were keen to identify the moral benefits of usury on agrarian society at
large. Here, it is important to acknowledge David Graeber’s observation that the moral and
theological force behind the statement ‘one should pay one’s debts’ was gradually
converted to an ethic of personal responsibility during the early period of finance
capitalism.730 This was blueprint of a secular morality, a ‘Protestant ethic’ where financial
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and economic practice were signs of virtue. A similar language of duty and ethic is found
in the correspondence regarding the Amendment to the Contract Act. The instructional
value of the contract and the progress it generated were included in the notes of several
officers. The Settlement Collector of Peshawar warned that ‘it is a dangerous course to
pursue to set aside the general rules of evidence as to contracts in writing’.731 A munsif in
Lucknow, Bharat Singh stated that ‘It is more desirable to bind people to the terms of

written agreements entered into by them and not to encourage them by special provisions
to go behind what they ought to know was their duty to consider thoroughly before
committing themselves to it.’732 Such was the fidelity of these officers for the sanctity of
writing and the commercial ‘progress’ it evidenced that they eagerly overlooked the fact
that in many of these contracts the borrower was illiterate and could not read or understand
the terms to which he had agreed. Some, like Justice Channing, were unwilling to consider
illiteracy as a justifiable excuse for hampering the commercial development of a society,
and with it, the moral progress of its people:
[The peasant] knows perfectly what he is doing but he thinks that perhaps he may
be able to beg off performance of his promises…it hardly needs to be pointed out
that the character of almost any people would deteriorate under such a system.733

For K.J L Mackenzie, the Commissioner of Hyderabad, usury and its crippling debt were
uncomfortable necessities that introduced the ‘ignorant peasant’ to the ethics of modernity.
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Similar to the official discourse regarding the hedonistic ‘primitive’ that Prathama Banerjee
reports in the Santhal Parganas, Mackenzie also believed that peasant debt was ‘frequently
most recklessly incurred’ and that, ‘self-denial and thrift’ amongst peasants ‘are seldom
practiced.’734 Progress therefore connoted a realization of personal (commercial)
responsibility, which also translated as ethical agency—‘a hermeneutics of the self.’735 In
the Statement and Reasons regarding the Amendment to the Bombay Gaming Act (1890),

the drafting members were careful to include that ‘All gambling contracts ought to be
suppressed by Courts of Equity, since they are not only prohibited by Statute, but may be
justly found to be immoral, as the practice tends to idleness, dissipation and the ruin of
families.’736 The efficacy and influence of these ideas are also witnessed in Sartori’s
discussion of A.F.M Abdul Hai Bhawali’s influential pamphlet, Usmam, Adarsha Krishak
(Usman, the Ideal Farmer), published in Mymensingh 1920.737 ‘Usman’s financial position
is very good, and he is free of debt’, Bhawali tells us, which he attributes to his religious
piety. Piety and religiosity, argues Sartori, led to building a better commercial self, one that
was shaped by everyday personal habits like— ‘giving up tobacco and pan, hygiene,
thriftiness, agricultural self-sufficiency, commercial savvy, unremitting diligence and, of
course, religious discipline.’738 The ethical development of Usman was made possible
through reform of his personal (commercial) self; as he allowed the lessons of political
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economy to act through him, he gained recognition as pious Muslim and as a rational,
‘modern’ agent.

The contradiction between the strategic logic of the market and the substantive rhetoric of
Empire therefore generated a diachronic discourse. For Empire, the tenets of political
economy facilitated the transition of the pre-modern to the modern and the technologies of

political economy - money, contracts etc. - homogenized the differences between precapitalist and capitalist society through the medium of instruction. Within the internal logic
of political economy, however, this difference was productive, and it was the function of
the contract to mediate without annulling them. So, as a pedagogical device, political
economy looked to instruct the ignorant without alleviating his ignorance; the subject
remained perpetually ignorant and perpetually a student. One amongst several insightful
observations in Banerjee’s monograph was that the ‘primitive’ was introduced to
commerce and usury in a manner where the ‘experience of exchange [w]as necessarily
unequal’.739 It would appear, however, that since a majority of contracts already assumed
that exchange was unequal, they also rendered one of the transacting parties as ‘primitive’,
or more accurately, ‘ignorant’ or ‘simple’.

What was the nature of this simplicity? B.B Chaudhuri cites the testimony of an indigo
planter as early as the 1850’s who claimed that ‘No European farmer could produce either
sugarcane or tobacco or any raw material as cheaply as the ryots.’740 As has been already
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argued, small proprietorship was the key to the cheap production of several cash crops like
jute, sugar, oilseeds, cotton and grains. This system was deemed more manageable and cost
effective than extensive cultivation carried out through a plantation mode. So, when it came
to the production of commodities, the peasant was anything but a commercial simpleton.
His ‘ignorance’ kicked in during the post-production process which involved the sale of
his produce; far from ontological, his ‘belatedness’ began at the doors of the market.

Therefore, one of the many gifts of political economy was to render the commercially
savvy into the commercial simpleton. It is also important to acknowledge the force of
Banaji’s arguments once more. By putting the entirety of colonial capitalist expropriation
on trial, he demonstrates that the discourse that appeared eager to parse systems and
communities into non-coeval temporalities - pre-capital and capital - relied quite
significantly on the former for building global commodity markets and the industries that
relied on them in the first place. In the words of Bentham, the ‘agenda’ was cost efficiency,
not systemic transformation; the goal was the large-scale production of cash crops and their
cheap acquisition, not the arrangement of a mode of production that would see small
holdings turn to latifundias or see labour intensive production move to machine managed
cultivation. Sabyasachi Bhattacharya labeled this attitude as ‘pragmatic’, where even
theoretically inconsistent philosophies served an ‘identical economic interest.’741 So, the
rationalities and practices deemed pre-capitalist remained central to the strategic logic of
political economy, not something it needed to overcome. Titles of heterogeneity—precapitalist, pre-modern etc.—were both produced and then mediated by this discourse,
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rationally. Importantly, these temporal bifurcations harbored a long shelf life which
continued into the post colonial period. Commenting on the Nehruvian period of planning,
Ron Inden gives evidence of the lament of planners like S. Ambirajan who felt that ‘even
today, there is not one homogenous economy in the country, but a medieval rural economy,
and alongside of it, a half heartedly modern economy.’742 Quite rightly, Inden clarifies that
the ‘medieval here is not an unwanted past that survives into the present but an unwanted

condition of modernism that modernists dispose of by projecting it onto the past.’743

Only that the ‘medieval’ is not an unwanted condition at all. Quite the opposite, categories
like ‘pre-modern’ and ‘medieval’ offers potential for expropriation in the name of
mediation and modernization. To paraphrase Dipesh Chakrabarty, the discourse of political
economy was successful in generating ‘backwardness as a historical advantage’ for
globally distributed commodity markets.744 When nationalist politics harnessed this same
pre-capitalist ‘backwardness’ for their own ends in the early twentieth century, they had
employed a strategic reversal.745

From Homo Ludens to Homo Economicus
Why did the fidelity of the colonial government, which refused to entertain questions of
intelligence, simplicity, or weakness in the context of commercial contracts, slip when it
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came to gaming contracts? Why were the principles of political economy, which promoted
free contracting with the aim of building a market society in the colony, stop short of
extending the same weight to contracts struck in the rain betting houses and the spot betting
bucket shops in Calcutta and Bombay? In spite of the efforts made by the Marwaris to
demonstrate the similarity between the practices of rain betting and commercial practices
like teji mandi, options and derivative trading, it was maintained that the former were not

to be treated as commercial practices. During a review meeting regarding the Rain
Gambling Bill in 1897, a member of the Council of the Lt. Governor of Bengal, Mr. Wallis,
complained that bill was pushed through without consulting the ‘commercial bodies and
Trade Associations’ of Calcutta. To this, S.N Banerjee provided the following response.

His chief grievance seems [to be] that particular Associations representing particular
interests were not consulted. Suppose the government were to introduce a Bill relating to
mercantile matters, would it be any answer to the Bill being proceeded with that to the
British Indian Association and the Indian Association or the two distinguished
Muhammadan Associations which are so ably represented here, had not been consulted? I
do not suppose the Honorable Member in charge of the Bill would waste his time in sending
such a Bill round the consideration of bodies who could not be presumed to have any
particular knowledge of the matter.746
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Banerjee statement sequestered and sealed arguably resemblant practices into digestible
categories—social and commercial. It was, in all effect, a ‘distribution of the sensible’ and
the Marwari’s attempts to highlight the similarities between rain gambling and betting
conducted in the options markets of opium (teji mandi) was their attempt at redistribution,
or dissensus.747

Banerjee was not the first and certainly not the last to lay down this distinction. The need
to delimit gambling as a ‘wasteful’ social activity grew when commodity, equity and
share/stock speculation began attracting people from non-commercial and non-mercantile
backgrounds. Correspondingly, as the burgeoning leisure industry of gaming expanded its
footprints amongst the working class, the discursive contours between what is ‘work’ and
what is ‘play’ also grew deeper. The distinction was largely impressionistic since the legal
definitions regarding the two practices continued to result in a fair bit of slippage and
showed hints of clarity only after an event or rupture. Let me provide a contemporary
example of this. During the financial crash of 2007-08, where predatory lending and the
collapse in the value of mortgage-backed securities effected a crash in global markets,
analysts were quick to point out that the practices of certain bankers, especially from the
Lehman Brothers, was ‘nothing but gambling’. When did the switch occur; when did
prudent and legitimate commerce turn to risky and illegitimate play? If the housing bubble
had not burst as explosively as it did, would the actions of the bankers still be described as
gambling? The answer to this neoteric Sorites paradox is still awaited.
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While the legal and technical differences between gambling and speculation is difficult to
articulate in the sphere of market activity, the difference between trading in futures and
rain betting appeared more obvious. It was the latter that became the object of
representation, one in which gambling was depicted as a social malaise and a wasteful
activity that trapped the weak, turned them to crime and destroyed their industrious

potential. The vague rhetoric of this discourse appears marked in comparison to the detail
furnished by the Banking Enquiry Reports that elaborated the problem of small peasant
debt. Yet, statistics and named cases were not required to convey the dangers of gambling;
the discourse assumed that the facts and faults of the practice were so well known that they
did not require formal substantiation. Importantly, in narrating the effects of gambling
(crime, suicide, prostitution) the discourse also produced a subject of reform—the gambler.
The gambler was to be distinguished from the informed speculator, the cautious market
actor, the compiler of capital. As a result, the human sciences, especially psychoanalysis
and sociology, began understanding this subject differently. From being a universal
practice, something everyone indulged in once in a while, gambling and betting was
mapped onto an individual with propensities. In line with the broader trajectory of modern
criminological discourse, here too, the question had shifted from ‘what have you done’ to
‘who are you’.748
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For psychoanalysis, the answer to the question ‘who are you’ was ‘a neurotic’; more
specifically, a masochistic neurotic. It was Freud who first made the observation in 1928,
in his influential article titled ‘Dostoevsky and Parricide’.749 He used Dostoevsky’s life and
novel, The Gambler, to illustrate the point.750 According to Freud, Dostoevsky’s selfdestructive gambling sprees were signs of a neurosis marked by guilt and shame and
followed by remorse and loathing. The masochist in Dostoevsky motivated him to lose,

and by doing so, validated his superego’s punishment and triumph over the ego. Freud thus
paved a disciplinary path that other analysts would follow, which viewed the ‘neurotic’
gambler’s real intention as loss.751 It was impossible for this figure to be ‘rational’, for his
motivations were antithetical to the spirit of accumulation.

While psychoanalysis cordoned off the gambler from the field of legitimate and ‘rational’
market behavior, sociology, and its attendant disciplines, furthered this distance. For
scholars like Erving Goffman, Girda Reith, George Simmel and Roger Caillos, gambling
represented an escape from the repetitive and constricting life in (industrial) capitalist
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(Dostoevsky) for having wished his father’s death.
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society. These theorists understood and represented gambling as a form of experience that
was removed from the everyday. The task, therefore, was to uncover the broad structures
common to this experience. Gambling came to be marked by risk, thrill, excitement, and
transcendence, as well as by tension, dizziness and boredom. Simmel felt that much like
the ‘adventurer’, the gambler’s temporality was removed from work time.752 For Goffman,
gambling was a variant of the experiential quotient-‘action’, and one of its salient features

was its ability to generate tension through its premise (to square off), which was then
resolved through the conclusion (settlement).753 For Caillois, gambling produced the
feeling of ilinx (whirlpool), which temporarily distorted how the individual perceived the
ordinary.754 Reith described this feeling as ‘vertigo’; a disorientation created by the
uneasiness and pleasure that only risk and thrill could provide. Broadly, gambling was the
way a worker/citizen seized control of his/her destiny by experiencing the thrill of risk, an
experience that was progressively disappearing in the ‘iron cage’ of modern capitalism.755
Even J Huizinga’s extensive study titled Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in
Culture, understood ‘play’ as generating a productive agonism within the ‘cultural’ sphere
of human activity, expressed through poetry, sport, music, literature, and art.756
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These epistemological boundaries erected between work and play were challenged, notably
in the works of Walter Benjamin and Edward C. Devereux Jr. In a short article titled 'On
Some Motifs in Baudelaire’ Benjamin drew an unlikely connection between work and
play.757 Instead of viewing gambling as an antonym or an ancillary to capitalist ethics
regarding money, work or time, Benjamin drew his attention to how the worker and
gambler were victims of a similar anomy inflicted by industrial capitalism.
The latter [the factory worker], to be sure, lacks any touch of adventure, of
the mirage that lures the gambler. But it certainly does not lack the futility,
the emptiness, the inability to complete something which is inherent in the
activity of a wage slave in a factory. Gambling even contains the work
man’s gesture that is produced by the automatic operation, for there can be
no game without the quick movement of the hand by which the take is put
down or a card is picked up.758
While Benjamin’s observations remained limited to the phenomenological and aesthetic
similarities between the factory and the gaming house, it was Edward C. Devereux Jr’s

structural-functionalist analysis of the betting industry that attempted to holistically
disclose the role of gambling within the capitalist system of early nineteenth century
America.759 In 1949, the year that Devereux completed his thesis, finance capital had
expanded its demographic grounds in America. Most exchange markets, such as the
Chicago Board of Trade, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and Wall Street had abandoned
their exclusivist policies which earlier prevented public access.760 As a result, pedigree or

business standing were dropped as criteria for those who wanted to trade in commodity
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exchanges. Besides, the Protestant ethic, that Weber had identified as central in attributing
validity to the principles surrounding industrial capital, faced a significant challenge when
it encountered the amplified proliferation of everyday risk embodied in the discourse of
finance and speculation. The tension between two alternate philosophies surrounding work
and thrift on the one hand and spending and risk on the other, provided Devereux with an
entry point to understanding and explaining why this discordance in the social and

economic structure was only an apparent one.
Instead of pleasure, Devereux approached gambling as a means for generating strain or
tension for players. Importantly, he believed that this strain was emblematic of similar
strains that existed within the larger system. He was aware that certain principles of
industrial capitalism, also woven into the doctrines of Protestantism, had become
antagonistic to the logic that drove speculation and investment in the age of ‘consumer

capitalism’ which the New Deal had inaugurated. He expressed these contradictions as
value conflicts, witnessed in the tension between thrift and budgeting v. consumption, or
in prudence and discipline v. risk. According to him, some of the ‘Protestant vocabulary of
motives’ began loosing ground during the period.761 Let me focus on two particular
contradictions that appear particularly applicable for the current argument regarding
colonial gambling.
The first concerns the conflict between work and reward. That gambling had eroded native
industriousness (including that of children) was littered in every government report,
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whether in Burma, Punjab, Bengal or Bombay. Addressing the Punjab Legislative Council
in March 1929, Sir Fazl-i-Husain reiterated that ‘people who took to [gambling] were being
misled’ and that ‘the way to get rich was by putting in honest work and not by putting in
money into a ghara out of which they expect to get a 1000 rupees.’762 However, as the
discussions regarding the Amendment to the Contract Act attest, government officials were
equally aware of this inconsistency in commercial agriculture; they knew that it was the

merchant and usurer who benefitted off the ryot’s toil. How could an important moral
lesson of capitalism—the work ethic—be kept relevant when it was inconsistently
observed and was in many cases absent in the system as a whole? When the discourse
regarding ‘work ethic’, however, was shifted to the disavowal of ‘luck’ or ‘chance’ in
economic practice, it was possible to have one’s cake and eat it too. While neither ‘chance’
nor ‘luck’ generated active hostility in the sphere of commercial speculation, their presence
in gambling were taken as values that apparently contradicted the ethics on which a
capitalist society was to be built. As the editors of the volume Gambling, Work and Leisure
argue:
Since these values cannot be attacked in their relation to the latter [financial
speculation], it is only with regard to gambling, where the same values crop
up in segregated contexts [that] they can safely be attacked, thus safely
‘grounding’ the tensions and ambivalences they produce, and
simultaneously reinforcing and bolstering the dominant system.”763

Telescoping the argument back to the question of ‘free contracting’, the discourse on
native gambling created a similar field for State action. Crucially, it allowed the colonial
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government to hold diachronic positions; that the colony—inhabited by ‘weak’, ‘ignorant’
and ‘simple’ subjects—was ill suited and ill prepared for the principle of ‘free contracting’,
while also maintaining that ‘free contracting’, when witnessed in the field of commercial
agriculture, was necessary for commercial progress and education.
The second value conflict emerges in the field of thrift v. spending. The moral and ethical
values of thrift, saving and restraint from conspicuous consumption (touted regularly in
the colony) were contradicted by the values of consumption, where both government and
market forces sought to liberate the capital and savings of ordinary citizens. The
importance placed on ordinary consumption was fully elaborated during the Keynesian
era of economic reconstruction that followed the Great Depression. Its contemporary
relevance is gleaned from the stimulus checks provided by the Biden administration
following the economic disruptions caused by the Covid 19 pandemic. The money was

given with the idea that it would be spent and not saved. If the nineteenth century liberal
motto was to ‘live dangerously’, then its economic counterpart in the early twentieth was
to ‘spend frivolously’.764 It was only through spending could the petty consumer’s capital
enter ‘the market’, lead to its expansion and nourish the sectors of industry and
employment.
The ethical and utilitarian conflict between consumption and thrift is again observed in the
discourse concerning colonial gambling. Gambling amongst the ‘weaker sections’

Birth of Biopolitics, p. 66. “Live dangerously,” that is to say, individuals are constantly exposed to danger,
or rather, they are conditioned to experience their situation, their life, their present and their future as
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invoked moral rebuke because it was taken as a sign of reckless, wasteful and unethical
expenditure. This money could be saved or spent more judiciously. However, as various
commodity markets grew in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in India, their
exchanges required the capital of small investors as well as their security; ‘market makers’
and sellers could only hedge when they had a large pool of people who acted as
intermediary holders of a speculative contract, thereby minimizing the sellers risk and

stabilizing the price of the commodity. So, for newly formed associations like the EICA
(East India Cotton Association), market expansion meant attracting petty capital to
derivative markets (in futures, but also in options). How did a discourse that valued thrift
and attacked chance pivot effectively?
An interesting epistemological process was underway in the early twentieth century that
responded to these very needs. A body of astro-meterological texts that predicted the

chances and quantity of rain fall and was earlier employed by rain gamblers in the
nineteenth century, had shifted their content to predicting the price of commodities for teji
mandi markets at the beginning of the twentieth century. In doing so, they were
instrumental in turning a class of bettors off the rain gambling houses of Calcutta and
Bombay and onto the speculative markets of cotton, grain and silver. This demographic
relocation was matched by a change in legal and economic discourse which saw the

wasteful ‘petty gambler’ make way for the useful ‘small speculator’. The following
sections reconstructs the path to this transition.
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Rain to Grain
The Marwaris of Calcutta employed an unexpected defense when the ban on rain
gambling was first contemplated in 1896. Rain gambling aided in the study of weather,
they argued, and if turned into a discipline, it could even advance the study of
meteorology. Ostensibly, the aim of the argument was to present the practice as ‘game of
skill’, like horse racing, or whist or bridge. This would have earned it legal legitimacy as
well as dispelling the unsavory reputation it had accrued. In a “Letter to the Editor” of
The Statesman, a Marwari author claimed that through regular play, a gambler would
soon transform into a ‘weather prophet’, and that “maritime disasters would be less
excessive if the weather was part of the curriculum of study imposed on shipmasters.”765
The “Members of the Marwari Community” stated that “rain gambling conduces to the
promotion of science” and even offered to share their methods of prognostication with

the government, given that they were “more highly valued and relied on than the reports
of the Meteorological Department”.766 Even if the actual practices strayed far from the
methods deemed ‘scientific’, rain gamblers took their epistemic claims and offers
seriously. To that end, the Chief Secretary of the Government in Bengal, C.W. Bolton,
wrote to the Secretary to the Government of India in April 1897, informing him that:
[…] so systemized and general has rain gambling become that a guide to it was
published in the past year, which professed to instruct the public in the study and
forecast of the weather, and to furnish tips for the rainy season.767
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How did the British press respond to these proposals? Unequivocally dismissive, The
Englishman derisively regarded the plea “set up for it by its apologists that it further[ed]
the interests of science by directing attention to the state of the weather [had] only to be
mentioned to be mentioned to be laughed out of court.’768 The contrast of the rational space
of the courtroom amplified just how ludicrous the claim sounded. British observers like
Major Henry Hobbs continued in a jocular vein:

They (the Marwaris) had little faith in barometers or other scientific
instruments that were dear to the Western mind, but they had their own
gadgets such as certain plants, which, like seaweed, were supposed to know
all about it. The most popular of their prophets were ordinary leeches which
they kept in a bottle of water. When the leeches floated to the top, it was a
sure sign of rain.769
In an era of instruments, the sensory had little place or authority, a fact that was apparent
to an avid meteorological enthusiast back as early as the 1830s, who exclaimed, 'nothing
is more deceitful than the testimony of the senses: we can judge of the difference of

climates only by numerical calculations’.770

It is worth pursuing the claims of the rain gamblers and hunting down their texts. The
veracity of their claims—were their methods as accurate as meteorological predictions—
is not what is at stake. Instead, their relevance is gleaned through their function. They
indicate the presence and circulation of a parallel episteme, which in turn offers us a

window into the influences, motivations and world views of the gamblers who visited these
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rain betting houses in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Accordingly, effort
should be directed in unearthing the foundations of these knowledge forms and tracing
their evolving genealogy.

Oral Texts and Weather Proverbs
Bolton mentioned the publication of ‘a guide’ to rain gambling, for which he provided no

name. Regrettably, this singular text remains in the secret depths of the archive and will be
hopefully revealed through further dredging. For now, it acts as the lodestar for the
following reconstruction that interrogates a similar body of literature.

What we do know is that a body of astro-meteorological oral texts like the Bhaḍalīvākyo,
Ghāgha aura Bhaḍḍarī, Khanār vacana and Ḍāker vacana, were in circulation since at
least the late nineteenth century. Amongst other information, these texts contained a sizable
number of weather proverbs, sayings (vacanas) and wisdoms, written in an accessible
language, mostly as couplets. Such literature was printed and available as pamphlets and
small textbooks and as researched studies during the early twentieth century.771 It is
arduous to establish set paths of circulation or the volume in readership of such literature,
a fact that Projit Mukharji signals in his study of grimoire ‘occult’ market literature in the
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early nineteenth century.772 Still, one may reasonably assume that such texts populated the
epistemic landscape of the rain gamblers in question.

A certain variety of astro-meteorological texts extended from Gujarat in the West to Assam
in the East, with only some variation in their content and lineage. Published in 1949,
Ramnaresh Tripathi’s Ghāgha aura Bhaḍḍarī attempted to sort out these differences and

impose proper nomenclature on this promiscuous genre.773 Tripathi starts his introduction
with several caveats. First, like other publications on this theme, he reminds the reader of
the functional importance of monsoon literature in an agrarian and unevenly irrigated
country like India. He then revealed his method of study, which involved talking to various
astrologers (jyotiṣa), visiting several Pundits and scouring the countryside of Northern
India to hunt down local weather-related proverbs. In all this, Tripathi confesses, he cannot
tell where myths end and history begins. So, he advises his readers to consume the legends,
albeit with a pinch of salt.

While both Ghāgha and Bhaḍḍarī are described as famous astrologers (jyotiṣa) by Tripathi,
he treats their lives and sayings separately. He sees the former’s influence more forcefully
in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Bengal and Assam while the latter crops up in the West, most
notably in Gujarat, Rajasthan and Punjab. Ghāgha’s sayings are mostly to do with rural
life, farming techniques, descriptions of caste and how to maintain caste order, everyday
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village wisdoms as well as jokes and signs of foolishness. On the other hand, Tripathi
ascribes all monsoon and weather-related proverbs to the sayings of Bhaḍḍarī. But this is
where his rigor ends. In all other respects, the legends of both Bhaḍḍarī and Ghāgha
display quite a bit of overlap. For example, Tripathi tells us that oral histories and faded
genealogies trace the lineage of both figures to a mixed heritage—brahmin astrologer and
ahir (low caste) woman—-and locate them at nearly the same place (in some cases

Champaran in Bihar and Kannauj in Uttar Pradesh). Tripathi also claims that Ghāgha was
referred to as Khanā and Ḍāk in Bengal and Assam respectively; in both regions, the figure
is a woman. This is the same for Bhaḍḍarī, who in Rajputana in particular, is thought to be
a woman too.

However, Tripathi may have overlooked a more fundamental difference in the epistemic
worlds of the texts that circulated in Western India (Rajasthan, Gujarat and Punjab) as
opposed to those originating in the East (Bengal, Bihar, Assam). The Western body of
texts—Bhaḍalīvākyo, Bhaḍalī tārī varṣāvāṇī, Meghamālā— refer back to astral texts like
the Gargasaṁhitā and omen or Śakuni literature like the Vasantarājaśakuna, composed in
the 11th century in Rajasthan. Unknowingly, even Tripathi admits that, to the best of his
knowledge, the only ‘book’ attributed to Bhaḍḍarī was the Śakuna vicāra.774 Given his
association with rain and monsoon literature, Bhaḍḍarī demands closer scrutiny.

The Sayings of Bhaḍalī
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In the texts originating from Gujarat and Rajasthan, Bhaḍḍarī, is popularly referred to as
Bhaḍalī. Here too, his/her status remain contested and debatable. Most texts refer to
him/her as a weather prophet, a relative of Varahamira and the son of an unnamed but
prodigious woman astrologer, in the court of the Chalukya King Jaysimha Siddharaja (11th
century Patan). However, Tripathi, once again places Bhaḍalī in North India, more
specifically in Benares. The commonly circulating story, he reports, involves Varahamira,

who, having foreseen the birth of a great jyotiṣa on a particular day of the year, desired to
father the child himself. Accordingly, he set forth from Benares to his native home in Ujjain
to copulate on that particular day. He miscalculated the time of the journey, however, and
was therefore compelled to stop at a village on route, where he made love to a ahir woman
who then birthed Bhaḍalī. Gujarati oral histories differ entirely. Again, with all caveats in
place, both Bhaḍalīvākyo and Bhaḍalī tārī varṣāvāṇī, claim Bhaḍalī to be the offspring
Ughad or Hudadh, a famous astrologer from Gurjeshwar in Marwar.775 Other oral histories
describe Bhaḍalī as the son of a dacoit, while several claim that she was a woman, born in
a Bhangi or Chandal family. What all of this indicates is that despite minor variations, each
story builds on certain identifiable tropes. It comes as no surprise that in spite of the spatial
range of Bhaḍalī sayings, Tripathi also noticed a pronounced influence of both Maithali
and Marwari in the linguistic structure of the couplets.776

What about the Eastern set of texts - the Khanār vacana and Ḍāker vacana? Here, the
lineage is drawn to the Kṛṣiparāśara, whose origins Ryosuke Furui ascribes to Bihar and
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Bengal in the early 12th century.777 While also an instance of the ‘astral sciences’, Furui
makes no mention of the śakuni literature that influenced the Bhaḍalī corpus. Quite
impressively, he reconstructs the lineage of the Kṛṣiparāśara by pulling apart its multiple
influences. Some of it, especially knowledge regarding rainfall and wind patterns, he draws
to the Bṛhatsaṁhitā. However, while the Bṛhatsaṁhitā bases its predictions regarding
signs of rainfall to theories of the womb (garbha), no such knowledge is found in the

Kṛṣiparāśara. Instead, the text builds on a different set of astrological literature which he
is hesitant to locate with certainty. This uncertainty lingers regarding the question of
authorship too. His informed conjecture bears affinity to the mixed lineages of the Bhaḍalī
canon, as he takes the evidence of the Bṛhaddharmapurāṇa to suggest that the text was the
work of a social group called the gaṇaka (calculators), who themselves were produced
from the union of vaiśyā women and śākadvīpī brāhmaṇas.778 According to Katerina
Guenzi, the śākadvīpī themselves were ‘outsiders’, most probably from Iran who were
associated with ‘the cult of the Sun (Surya) and the occupations of astrologer (jyotiṣa),
Ayurvedic doctor (vaidya), and tantric priest (tāntrika).’779 Furui accordingly reads the
functional importance of the Kṛṣiparāśara as one of establishing lineage for an etic
community amongst the agriculturalists in Bengal and for producing hegemonic power for
migrants gifted with brahmadeya land grants. In her detailed study of Khanār vacanas,
Rita Chaudhari also notes affinities in content between the sayings of Khanā and the
Kṛṣiparāśara, apart from finding philological similarities in these texts as well. This pushes
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her to place this set of oral literature in 12th century Bengal, around the same time as the
Kṛṣiparāśara.

Knowledge forms of Kṛṣi and Śakuni Texts
An impressionistic survey falls short of generating fixed categories for this body of
literature. Barring small differences in lineage, style and specificities of content, the

sayings of Bhaḍalī and that of Khanā and Ḍāk appear similar. The texts layer their claims
through two discernible categories—-astral knowledge and the observations regarding
local cultivating practices and natural weather phenomena. In the case of the Kṛṣiparāśara,
Furui suggests an intermingling of local and supralocal knowledge forms, which he then
map onto the cycles of rainfall. So, long durée predictions of rainfall, or signs of weather
related calamities like draught and floods are based on the astral signs gleaned from lunar
cycles, planetary movements and wind directions, while short term predictions are
indicated by observable natural phenomena. In terms of stated intentions, the audience of
these texts appear to be the average cultivator. Apart from direct reference to the kheḍut
and chāṣi that the couplets call out to, support for this hypothesis also comes from the
simple rhyming language of the proverbs themselves.

It is also difficult establish a hierarchy of authority in terms of knowledge forms. Furui
argues that while the lineage of phalit (prognostic) astral literature provided such texts with
epistemic legitimacy, one should not discount the value of the observed phenomena either.
The latter concerned itself with practical information on how to spot signs of imminent
304

rain; signs like snakes climbing trees, insects evacuating their nests, frogs croaking etc. In
the context of omen or Śakuni literature, Ron Inden insists that the intermingling of
cosmological and terrestrial knowledge forms should be viewed through a sliding scale of
importance; the cosmological and planetary signs being more portentous than natural or
observable phenomena.780 Then again, from the sayings that emanating from Rajputana,
we find proverbs such as these:

सूरज तेज सतेज झाड बोले अनियाली
मही माट गल जाये, पवि निर बैठे छाली
कीडी मैले ईंड, चीटी रे त पे िहावै
कााँसो कामि दौड़, आम लीलो रं ग आवे
डे डरो डहक बाड़ा चढ़ै , नबसहर चढ़ बैठै बड़ा
पंनडया ज्योनतस झूठा पड़ै , धि बरसै इतरा गुणा
‘If the heat of the sun increases suddenly, if the ducks start quacking, if ghee begins to
melt, if the goats turn their backs to the wind, if ants start leaving with their eggs, if
sparrows bathe in mud, if the flowers of the khas grass turn dull, if the color of the sky
turns dark blue, if frogs retreat into their holes and if snakes start climbing trees, then it
will rain heavily.’781

These were the signs of the imminent rain. However, it is the last line that really stands out
- ‘the words of jyotiṣa-s are often false, but these signs never are.’782 Even within a corpus
that drew authority from astral sciences, in parts, such authority cedes to practical and
natural wisdoms.
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This is not to suggest that astral signs only indicated portentous phenomena or long durée
trends. There are several couplets, based on lunar calculations that also predicted the
possibility of rain, if not on that day itself, but in the coming days. For example:
िौमी माह अाँधेररया, मूल ररच्छ को भेद।
तौ भादौं िौमी नदवस, जल बरसै नबि खेद।।
If on the ninth day of māgha badī, the mūla constellation is visible, then on the ninth day
of bhādauṁ, it shall certainly rain.783

We may assume that this corpus of texts informed and inspired modern compilations and
publications in the field of jyotiḥ-śāstra (astral sciences), like the ones identified by Charu
Singh in her unpublished dissertation.784 In mapping the publication and circuits of
transmission of Hindi ‘scientific’ literature in the early twentieth century north India, Singh
pays close attention to the boom in phalit jyotiṣa texts like the Vṛṣṭiprabodha. Composed

by Mithilal Vyas and published in Ahmedabad in 1908, the Vṛṣṭiprabodha provided its
readers with astral prognostic wisdoms for detecting rainfall, improving agriculture and for
watching out for signs (śakuna) of both plenty (subhik) and famine (durbhik).785 Like the
above mentioned Ghāgha, Bhaḍalī, Khanā and Ḍāk literature, such modern nineteenthcentury texts moulded their knowledge on jyotiḥ-śāstra literature, while specifying the
‘modern’ aspects of their work, which were suited for practical and everyday use. It could
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be therefore be described as an instance of ‘useful knowledge’, a category that Maxine
Berg discovers in pre-capitalist networks of circulation and which she describes as the
combination of ‘tacit’ and ‘codified’ knowledge deployed for practical use.786
Interestingly, while the contents of the Vṛṣṭiprabodha claimed to disclose and systematize
rural and agrarian knowledge forms, Singh argues that the text gained maximum popularity
in Bombay and Calcutta, while its influence was also witnessed in a few North Indian small

towns too.787 Importantly, Marwari Hindi periodicals like the Marwari and Bharatmitra
reprinted Mithalal’s preface so that his work could reach a wider audience.788

While the proverbs and couplets in such agrarian and weather manuals did not speak of
commerce in particular, some of them did provide indications related to the price of
commodities, especially during times of akāla or distress.
माघ उज्यारी दू ज नदि, बादर नबज्जु समाय।
तो भाखैं यो भड्डरी, अन्न जु महाँगो लाय।।
If on the day of māgha dūja, lightning gathers in the clouds, then, says Bhaḍḍari, the grain
shall surely be dear.789
माघ छठी गरजै िहीं, महाँगो होय कपास।
सातें दे खा निममली, तो िाहीं कछु आस।।
If there is no rain on the sixth day of māgha, cotton shall be dear. If the skies remain clear
on the seventh, then there is no hope.790
Maxine Berg, ‘Useful Knowledge, Industrial Enlightenment’, p. 118
Ibid. p. 11
788
Singh, p.12
789
Ibid. Duja refers to the second day of a Lunar fortnight.
786
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Notable changes, however, began occurring by the end of the nineteenth century as some
‘weather’ proverbs directly addressed the concerns of traders, arhatiyas and commercial
agents instead of cultivators. For example, in a compilation of Marwari weather proverbs
by Pandit Lalchandra in 1892, we find sayings directly related to rainfall, like—-‘If it is
cloudy on Friday and remains so till Saturday next, Dunk says to Bhadli that it must rain’.791

But peppered amongst them are proverbs that provide price information too. For example:
सांविमास सुररयो बाजै
भादरवे परवाई आसूमास
समंटरो बाजै काती साख
सवाई
When North-East wind blows in sāwana (August) Eastern wind in bhādauṁ (September)
and the sea wind in āsoja (October) the crop is 20 annas in kārtika (November).’792

Or:

माहा महािे पडे ि सीत
मेंगा अिाज जानियै मात
If the month of Māhā (January) is not cold, know friend that grain will be dear.’793 Or the
saying रोनहणी रे ली रूपये री अधेली —-‘Rain in Rohiṇī and the crop is eight annas or reduced
by half’.794

791
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While modeled on the couplets attributed to Bhaḍalī and Khanā, the inclusion of price
information indicates either a shift in audience or a repurposing of such literature for a
different context.

Teji-Mandi: Astral Prognostication for Small Speculators
It is on the back of such literature that by the early twentieth century, we begin to see books

and pamphlets like Tejī-mandī Prakāśa, Tejī-mandī Darpaṇa and Tejī-mandī Vigyāna
come into circulation. As mentioned, Tejī-mandī or options trading was a derivative trade
on the futures markets of commodities (first in opium and then later in cotton). Tejī was
the bullish ‘put’ option and Mandī was the bearish ‘call’ option, and Tejī-mandī was a
double option. A lucid example of its operations was documented by a retired judge of the
Bombay High Court, Faiz B Tyabji in 1919.
On the 1st of January B pays to A Rs. 20, and, in consideration of this payment, A
agrees to sell to B the double option (of becoming on the first of June either the
purchaser or the seller of the goods) at Rs 100. (i) On the 1st of June, if the market
rate of the goods is Rs 120, B will decide to purchase; he will then get the goods at
Rs, 100 from A and (having already paid Rs 20 for acquiring the option) the goods
will cost in all Rs. 120 and he will therefore neither lose nor gain by the transaction.
(ii) If, on the other hand, the market price on 1st June is Rs 80, B will decide to be
the seller, and A will have to purchase the goods from B paying to B Rs. 100 for
them. So that B will again neither gain nor lose by the whole transaction. (iii) B
will however gain should the price be above 120, or below 80. (iv) He will lose
should the price be between 81 and 119.795

Faiz B Tyabji, Indian Contracts Act, (1919), p. 158, cited in Law of Pakki and Katchi Adat and Teji Mandi
Contracts, p. 173. The Committee headed by Gilbert Wiles, tasked with reviewing the operation of the Cotton
795

Contracts Act of 1918, defined the practice as “a right to buy or sell cotton at some tie in the future when a fall
or rise in the market price makes it profitable for the buyer too the option to do so. A Teji or call option is an
option to buy cotton. A Mandi or put option covers the right to sell cotton. And a Teji Mandi or Double option
gives the buyer the right to buy or sell as the market may suit him.” Dholakia, Futures Trading and Futures

Markets in Cotton.

309

If seen through the logic of betting, the seller of Tejī-mandī essentially backed the stability
of the market while the buyer backed its volatility; if the market was stable then the seller
would profit, and if the former was volatile, it was the other way around. The practice
apparently dated to the last decade of the 18th century, where contracts of this nature were
drawn on Malwa opium, a business known as Nazarānā (premium) transactions.796
According to Ramniklal Mody, the author of The Law of Pucci and Katchi Adat and Teji-

Mandi Contracts, these speculations ‘appear to have been carried on to an immense extent
and as ordinary branch of their usual business, by most of the great banking houses in
India.’797 While the Tejī-mandī contract enjoyed informal existence in India during the 19th
century, it attracted legal attention of the Bombay High Court in 1912 through Jessiram
Jagannath vs. Tulsidas Damodhar.798 After passing through a period of legal liminality it
was granted formal recognition in 1926 through the ruling of the Privy Council in
Shobhagmal Gianmal vs Mukundchand Birla799 and was officially recognized in the
Bombay Cotton Contract Act of 1932.

Options trading differed from the more conventional trade in futures. In the latter, the
contract promised to deliver a traded commodity in the future. These contracts, however,
were ‘broad’, which meant that it traded in a ‘standardized’ commodity (cotton) and not a
specific variety (oomra cotton). The fact that the futures trade remained agnostic to the
‘gradual differences in harvest quality’ indicates to Lubinski and Rischbieter that such

Ibid. p. 219.
Law of Pakki and Katchi Adat and Teji Mandi Contracts, p. 169.
798
Ibid., p. 174.
799
Ibid.
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contracts were ‘in theory always deliverable and thus fungible.’800 Importantly, as
established through the episode concerning the Shree Mahajan Association and the EICA,
unlike spot or forward contracts, futures did not insist on actual delivery of the commodity
and were often settled through negotiating the difference in the contract price and the
market price of the commodity on the day on which the contract expired. Options contracts
drawn in Tejī-mandī markets functioned similarly, in the sense that the exchange of actual

commodities was seldom, if at all, practiced. Players could, by paying the cost of premium,
purchase the ‘option’ - or the right to buy or sell a commodity at some time in the future
when a fall or rise in the market price of that commodity would make the purchase
profitable; when the actual date arrived, the purchaser of Tejī-mandī could settle through
the difference between the contract and market price.

A majority of the Tejī-mandī texts of the early twentieth century were either written in
Gujarati or in Hindi and drew on the same epistemic universe of the weather texts discussed
previously. Given the novelty of options trading, such texts did not make hang their
professional claims on ‘ancient’ or ‘traditional’ authorities. Gujarati texts like the Tejīmandī Darpaṇa, however, asserted that the knowledge it shared with its readers were to be
believed because the writer was a ‘Jain’ jyotiṣa—well versed in astral sciences, and having
had five or six years of real trading experience.801 Written by Pandit Prahladat Sharma and
published in Lucknow in 1913, the Tejī-mandī Prakāśa, drew a more direct connection to
the authority of the previously discussed weather texts. In it, the author claims that:

800
801

Sound Speculators, p. 815.
Teji-mandi Darpan, B.S Shah
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हम जो अपिे ग्राहक को सुचिा दे ते है , वो शकुिो द्वारा सुचिा नमलती है . शकुिो को आप
टे लीग्राि की खबर समझ लीनजये. शकुिो का प्रभाव रुई, कपास, चााँदी, गुर वस्तुओ पर
पड़ता है. इिके व्यापारी सौद्दे करिे के समाये हमारे गए ज़रूर पूछ नलया करे ताकी उिको
नवशेष लाभ होिे की आषा है .
‘The information we give our clients come to us through śakuna (signs or omens). Consider
these śakunas our telegraph. These signs spread their influence over cotton, yarn, silver
and gud. Investors looking to make a deal in these items should consult with us before
doing so.’802

Importantly, the model of knowledge in these texts made it easy and accessible lay
speculators and small investors. Many of the texts were dialogic; they encouraged their
readers to write back to the authors and confirm whether their tips actually worked. A
database was thus being collated. Information flowed both ways, allowing both the authors
and brokerage houses to construct an inductive model that charted the movements of
derivative markets and the practices of small investors who entered them blindly. As a

modular form, induction naturally lent itself to the epistemic claims and rhetorical
strategies of astro-meteorological knowledge. This is best exemplified in a book published
in 1949 titled Market Forecasting: a Scientific Exposition of the Movement of Heavenly
Bodies on Fluctuations of Value. The author, Fakir Chandra Dutt intended his study to be
‘scientific’, a term he highlighted in the title itself. Importantly, this is one of the first books
of this genre to be written in English, thus allowing the author to expand his epistemic
footprint. Other strategies went in this direction as well. For example, Dutt drew on Jevon’s
sunspot theory and its relation to weather and crop cycles to show how cosmic observations
were crucial in determining terrestrial price movements. Unaware of the oncoming

802
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discourse on the anthropocene, Dutt remained convinced that it was planetary and
cosmological laws that impacted the course of day to day human activities, not the other
way round:
It is reasonable to infer that certain phenomena in nature and in human life will
recur at regular periods in accordance with the movements of heavenly bodies, just
as day and night and summer and winter follow the course of the sun.803

He continues:
The chief aim of the present work is to show that the laws of planetary influence
can be equally employed in forecasting the rise and fall in prices of commodities,
stocks and shares…It is possible, examining the records of market prices in bygone
years and compare them with the then relative positions of the planets, to formulate
an empirical law by which we may predict when certain celestial configurations
shall recur and certain effects on the Market will immediately follow.804

The model was again inductive—much like astrological laws that were discovered through
long durée observations, laws of the market were also revealed only by observing temporal
patterns in the movement of prices. Dutt claimed that his book was an exploration in
discovering these ‘basic laws’. Following through, he claimed that ‘cotton for example has
a price period of up to 10-11 years…iron follows a periodicity of about the same years’.805
These, he argued, coincided with the periodic cycle of the appearance and disappearance
of sunspots that Jevons had noted. Dutt was careful to forewarn his readers that his
predictions may not always be accurate. However, since he was gifted at reading price

Fakir.Chandra Dutt, Market Forecasting: a Scientific Exposition of the Movement of Heavenly Bodies on
Fluctuations of Value, Calcutta: A. Basu, 1949. p. 3
804
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movements in accordance with the ‘movement of the moon’s North node’ as per ‘the signs
of the zodiac’, he assured them of general profitability.

Such inductive models were useful ways of establishing epistemic authority and in
encouraging the participation of a new class of speculators onto budding commodity
exchanges. Crucially, such ‘formally irrational’ models remain as influential today as they

were during Dutt’s time, even as trading practices move towards a dazzling point of
sophistication. As Arjun Appadurai argues, while the models for financial risk management
grows more technical, such models are still unable to negate the fundamental ‘uncertainty’
in market movements. As a result, market actors continue to use:
[…] detailed charts, which are regarded by others as entirely unscientific, [but] have
very good standing in financial markets and in reality, are no different from the
charts of astrologers, psychics, or tarot card operators or other diagrammatic
formats for prognostication. In short, they are mechanical techniques of prediction
with no interest in causal or explanatory principles.806

Reconstructing an Audience
Certain clues help image exactly who these texts on commodity speculation were both
addressing and attracting to the exchanges. For example, the Tejī-mandī Prakāśa includes
a full-page address to its readers, one that was clumsily inserted within the main body of
the text. From them, we can assume that the book was either published by or held some

connection with a brokerage house, as it informed its readers that if they found the book’s
prognostic tips useful, they should correspond with the author directly and wire him

Arjun Appadurai, “The Ghost in the Financial Machine”, Public Culture, (2011) 23 (3 (65)): 517–539. p.
528.
806
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money which would be then invested productively. As further reassurance, the author
informed his readers that - नजस वख्त नवशेष तेजी मंदी का शकुि हो जाये, उसी वख्त तार के
जररये आपका सौदा बदला नदया जायेगा [the second a particular sign for Tejī-mandī is
detected, we will change your position in the market that very moment]. Accordingly, the
author implores his readers to ‘have belief’ and ‘just send one rupee’ following which,
‘you yourself will praise us’ [‘एक रुपैय्या भेज कर नवश्वास कर लीनजये निर आप खुद ही
प्रशंसा करें गे].807

While reviewing the workings of the Cotton Contracts Act (1922) in 1930, the reviewing
committee headed by Sir Gilbert Wiles asked notable figures of the cotton trade, like Sir
Purshotamdas Thakurdas, on their opinion of Tejī-mandī contracts. At the time, it was
Thakurdas’ opinion that ‘because of the peculiar genius of the few operators who ‘eat’ teji
mandi' that it ‘is a valuable asset to the cotton trade’.808 He further stated that teji mandi
transactions:
[…] help the building and carrying of cotton to later months by bringing into the
cotton trade the resources of the small traders and merchants and this mass selling
or buying act as a brake on violent fluctuations in cotton prices. Incidentally, this
large pooling of resources of small men also helps to fetch better prices for the
cotton growers.809
In emphasizing its useful function, Thakurdas specified how Tejī-mandī attracted ‘small
traders and merchants’ to the trade. But was the petty capital entering these markets really

Mishra, Tejī-mandī Prakāśa, p. 41.
Madhu Pavaskar, ‘Options Trading in Commodities’ Economic and Political Weekly, Jul. 22-28, 2006,
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that of ‘traders and merchants’? In Tejī-mandī, players were told that their liability was
limited to the cost of the premium required to purchase the option. This was akin to the
price of a lottery ticket. They were also promised non-linear payments in return for their
investment, much like the ‘bucket shops’ promised its players in the early decades of the
twentieth century.810 As per his survey in 1948, M.L. Dantwala believed that ‘in no other
cotton market of the world are the premium for the option business as low as those in

Bombay’.811 Judging from Tejī-mandī Prakāśa, the amount invested could be as low as
one rupee, while the promised returns were exceptionally high.

It would be impetuous to assume that all those who indulged in options betting were either
traders or merchants, albeit of small capital. While a Gujarati text from 1927, Tejī-mandī
Vigyāna (the Science of Teji-mandi) refers to its readers as vyāpārīs or traders, its
pedagogical form and mode of addressal reveal that the vyāpārī in question was a class of
casual investor rather than an established commercial agent. In fact, the language of
instruction appears to be directed at novice speculators, even gamblers: ‘કે ટલાક વાયદાનો
વ્યાપારીઓ એવા હથગઢી હોય છે કે 'બસ, એ વાયદાના વ્યાપારમાાં પઇસા ખોયા છે તો હવેજ
વ્યાપારમાથહી પઇસા લેવવા છે’ [some speculators are so stubborn that they think that ‘if I
have lost money in the futures of X commodity, then I must recover it from that very

business’]. ‘એમ કહી વાયદાના વ્યાપારમાાં તન ધન અને જીવન સવવસ્ વ ખર્ચી નાખે છે’ [having
decide so, they expend money, effort, their lives and everything in this losing business].812
A non-linear payment is where the amount spent, and the amount earned is on an unequal scale.
Dantwala, A Hundred Years of Indian Cotton, p. 103.
812
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This is usually the sort of diagnosis reserved for habitual gamblers or ‘sentimental’ bettors;
players who having lost a significant amount of money on a slot machine remain
determined to win back their money from the very same machine.

The final, and possibly most telling clue comes from the previously discussed case of
Emperor vs. Thavarmal Roopchand. What finally convinced the judges that the operations

of the the Shree Mahajan Association were not legitimate, rather were in the nature of pure
gambling, was to do with the class of players involved in the Association’s practices. The
evidence for this came to the judges through a plant by the police itself. They noted:
But in this case, we have also the instance of Akbar bhai, a pan seller, who was
given a marked note by the police for the purpose of betting on Teji Mandi. The
accused admits this contract and the market note was found in his shop. The entry
appears in accused’s books at p. 63… Owing to the police raid this transaction was
not carried through. Akbar is a pan seller and not a dealer in cotton. He says himself
he knows nothing of cotton dealings. No enquiry was made as to his solvency. He
went there on January 21st (Friday) and was told to come on Monday to see if he
had made profits. The learned Magistrate admits at p. 48 of his judgment that Akbar
who, it is evident, entered into a transaction in Kacha Khandi for forty bales, neither
contemplated giving nor taking delivery, but he holds that the accused is a broker
and placed the transaction with his other constituents.813
While Akbar bhai, the pan seller, may not have read the Tejī-mandī literature being
discussed, he fell within the class that such exchanges were targeting. Perhaps he was
also the kind of person who such texts were trying to reach.

The Incitement to Capital: From Petty Gamblers to Small Speculators

813
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In Emperor vs. Thavarmal Roopchand, Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas was directly pitted
against the Shree Mahajan Association and their practices, which at the time, he described
as gambling. This, however, did not prevent him from defending the benefits and useful
needs of Tejī-mandī to the Wiles Committee just a few years later. How do we read his
defense? Perhaps, it points to a phenomenon that has passed unnoticed in the scholarship
regarding Indian capitalism. Studies that have focused on the role of big business houses,

individual industrialists and the role of post-colonial state planning, have partly ignored the
everyday processes that drew petty capital into the emergent markets of the twentieth
century; technologies that redirected small capital away from ‘savings’ and redeployed
them as investments. The process entailed the refashioning of an instinct for risk, one that
was often embodied hysterically in the discourse of improvident gambling. But this same
gaming instinct, one that leeched out risk, had now turned useful.

In an article titled ‘Ghost in the Financial Machine’ Arjun Appadurai is struck by the fact
that Max Weber, a pillar in the field of law and economy, had almost completely
overlooked the question of chance and risk management in his writings. This, however, is
not entirely correct. In his twenties, Weber wrote two pieces on the function and operation
of futures markets in commodities and equity. Reacting to the ban imposed on grain trading
following the price crash in Germany in 1893, a young Weber came out with a robust
defense of the futures markets in 1896. He listed the many useful functions of futures
speculation, which he claimed balanced the market by arresting violent swings in
commodity prices, allowed people with limited capital to enter the market (as buyers) and
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thus provide it with liquidity and facilitated market expansion by elongating the chain of
intermediary holders of a contract. But the most crucial function of futures speculation,
thought Weber, was its ability to offset risk by allowing producers and sellers to hedge
their deals, which he demonstrated through the use of the ‘millers’ example.814 The points
raised were similar to the defense presented by Thakurdas before the Wiles Committee.
Options, however, carried an added advantage because the capital required to enter the

market and the liability that the speculator took upon themselves was even lesser than the
one in futures.

Unlike ‘spot’ or ‘cash and carry’ transactions, a speculator in futures did not have to
produce the money at the time of contracting. All that was required was the ‘margin’, a
smaller amount that clearing houses took as collateral.815 Also, since most transactions did
not end with actual delivery of the hypothetically purchased commodity and were settled
only through price differences, such speculation attracted a large class of people who in all

‘A miller who, for example, has purchased a great quantity of grain “cash and carry” for the purpose of
milling it, is exposed to the danger that grain prices will sink even as he is grinding the grain. This naturally has
a direct and rapid effect back on grain prices, an effect that is so swift that, when it comes to selling the flour
prepared from that grain supply, the miller would suffer income losses. He guards himself against that by
arranging, at the same time that he purchases his grain, to sell grain for the very same terminal date at which he
hopes to bring his flour to the market. If the grain prices fall, he will be sure to sell his flour at a loss, but he
gains a corresponding amount back, in that he can buy the grain that he is selling as a futures trade for a
correspondingly cheaper price. If grain prices, on the contrary rise, the futures trade he has made, and which
he must now cover with more expensive purchases, bring him a loss, but he gains from the increased sale price
of flour. Although from the outset the specific intent was in any case to arrange a compensatory deal, and not
to furnish some goods out of one’s own supply, and, although clearly a speculation is being made that there will
be a difference between the two, nonetheless the business goal of securing oneself against the danger of
fluctuations in prices is surely a highly realistic and prudent one. And neglecting the insurance that comes from
this form of futures trading would be just as little prudent as would be, for example, neglecting to take out
insurance against the danger of fire.’ Max Weber, ‘Commerce on the Stock and Commodity Exchanges’,
Theory and Society, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Jun., 2000), pp. 339-371, p. 357.
815
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other respect, were illiterate of market movements. Weber was aware of this and even
pointed it out:
Trading in futures is easily susceptible to an artificial manipulation of prices, in the
egoistic interests of great banking houses or individual speculators. The whole
horde of small speculators armed with practically nothing […] realizes very clearly
that this rise in prices will at some point make way for the opposite, but they hope
that this will occur after they have realized their dealings at a profit.816

He therefore concluded:
The general charges that can really be made against trading in futures as such
almost all lead back to the way they facilitate an attraction of speculators to the
market who are incapable of good judgement and without financial resources.817
Weber thus acknowledged how futures speculation held the propensity to draw in ‘people
incapable of good judgement’—the ignorant. However, for him this was only the ‘reverse
of the expansion of the market’ argument; it was only by drawing in novice and ignorant
laymen could the market expand. In his review of Weber’s writings on speculation, Steven
Lestition notes Weber’s unease regarding this aspect of the trade, which increased the
public’s ‘mania for gambling.’ Still, given its importance, Weber felt that a complete ban
on futures speculation involved throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Instead, it was
easier to regulate ‘the kind of person who traded on the exchanges.’818

Still, the desire to regulate the ‘kind of person’ was more idealistic than practical. As
realized by the paternalist administrators of the nineteenth century, who had similarly
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wanted to shield the ‘ignorant’ peasant from ‘intelligent’ moneylenders, it was the very
‘ignorance’ of the peasant that made the contract profitable and therefore furthered the
needs of commercial agriculture. Again, it was a similar ‘ignorance’ of the small speculator
and the petty capitalist that propelled the expansion of markets and commodity exchanges
in the early twentieth century. Condensed to bare bones, for the market to function and
more importantly, for it to expand, it required a critical mass of people who were just along

for the ride; who for all purposes were ignorant of its ‘real’ mechanism, its ‘real’ operation,
its ‘real’ function. Yet, since they distributed risk, hedged liability, stabilized prices and,
most crucially, formed a ready pool buyers onto whom sellers and market makers could
offset derivatives, their participation was necessary. Bluntly put, in a zero sum game like
the market such speculators were cannon fodder. This is why Appadurai also feels the true
essence of the market is the bearish instinct of short selling, an instinct laced with
pessimism that always looks towards an impending crash.819

Appadurai’s observations indicates just how little things have changed. Much like Weber
observed for Europe, Indian analysts in the early twentieth century also noted the moral
and political contradictions of having an ‘ignorant’ class of investors, who because of their
ignorance were crucial to market operations. While appreciative of the need for Tejī-mandī,
Dantwala asserted in the context of the cotton trade that the ‘very limitation to risk brings
in a large number of gullible outsiders who, more often than not, are the poorer for the

Appadurai therefore asks: ‘Can outliers be model social types?’ My tentative answer is that in a historical
moment when the exploitation of risk for the maximization of profit is the central feature of the reigning game,
those who are willing to bet against the majority are even better exemplars of the general ethos.’ “The Ghost in
the Financial Machine”, p. 534.
819
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business.’820 Similarly, in his book titled Futures Trading and Futures Markets in Cotton,
H.L Dholakhia reaffirms the merits of Tejī-mandī, which ‘widened the field of demand’ in
commodities by bringing more people to the market. This he insisted increased the overall
volume of business. On the other hand, he admitted that:
[…] teji mandi allures a layman to take a chance and thereby add to artificial
transactions…From the standpoint of the buyer, the teji mandi business is both
commercially healthy and economically sound. But the question whether it might
not bring about the economic ruin of small people is a serious question demanding
some deliberation from the authorities concerned, particularly from the
government.821

Dholakhia was one of the many writers who brought economic legitimacy to speculation
during the early 1940’s when the government had banned speculation in cotton and food
grains during the Second World War. In fact, his book on futures trading in cotton even
carried an appreciative foreword by Purshottamdas Thakurdas, who hailed the study as
‘systematic’ and ‘impartial’, though not ‘exhaustive’. Thakurdas did hope, however, that
research like Dholakhia’s would inaugurate a slew of other such studies. But such
economic treatises, which grounded speculation as a fundamental economic practice, were
cheerfully augmented by the proliferation of astrological literature that initiated small
speculators into market practices. Not only did they target a different group of people, they
also provided an easier pathway for such people to identify with risk and negotiate a
technical world that they may not have otherwise understood. They brought ‘gullible’ and
‘small people’ to the doors of a market, which in turn benefitted from their ignorance. As

Dantwala, A Hundred Years of Indian Cotton, p. 103. Emphasis mine.
H.L. Dholakia, Futures Trading and Futures Markets in Cotton, Bombay: New Book Company, 1942, p.
242.
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seen in from the debates in the Amendment to the Contract Act (1899), at the cost of
equality, it was the role of the contract to mediate, justify and produce equivalence for this
ignorance. Since the market needed these small investors, the astro-metrological texts
which previously advised the rain bettors in the gambling houses of Calcutta and Bombay,
were now, by drawing a similar class of people to the Tejī-mandī markets in cotton,
fulfilling their intended function. Alongside the prohibitory anti-gaming laws, they too

were inciting capital.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion
To make categorical distinctions between gambling and speculation in the period under
study appears arduous. This, however, does not imply that efforts were not made to separate
the practices both legally and conceptually. While sticking to the assertion that such

divisions were more apparent than hones, the thesis has recounted the legal, normative and
discursive strategies that attempted such sequestering. Accordingly, the thesis is divided
into two distinct yet interconnected part. The first covers the legal history of gambling and
documents a governmental strategy that went from the point to of excessive detailing and
definition to a more contingent and practical rule by executive order. Narrating this history,
from Burma to Bombay and Calcutta to Delhi uncovers also reveals a historical process
and a Statist imagination, since the legal definition regarding gambling as practice
remained both muddied and trepidatious. In the early years, this ambivalence was spurred
by the European interests in safeguarding leisures like whist, rummy, sweepstakes and
most crucially, horse racing. By the early twentieth century, however, when rain betting
and spot betting in bucket shops rose coterminously with commodity speculation through
forward contracts and futures and options exchanges, the ability to distinguish between
legitimate betting (speculation) and illegitimate speculation (gambling) through a legal
definition was almost completely abandoned.
Thinking through the historical paradox raised by Radhika Singha— why did the period
following the Revolt of 1857 result in the a spree of legislative codification instead of rule
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through executive authority— the first part of this dissertation, quite conjecturally, drew a
connection between the rise of analytical linguistics and analytical jurisprudence in the late
nineteenth century. Accordingly, the decision to obsessively define, rather, the will to
capture the world in words, was something that that jumped across in judicial, police and
legislative files, particularly when gambling was strategically spoken of as an ‘object’ of
criminalization (a common gaming house, or an instrument) rather than as an activity. By

highlighting the demands made by the executive and judicial branches for clear definitions
regarding categories of gambling—‘place’, the ’common gaming house’ ‘instruments of
gambling’— the dissertation narrates a conceptual bedrock of colonial policing; a belief in
the ability to transform forms of native practice into objective and therefore controlled
varieties of description. Further, I link this legal imagination to the spree of colonial
codification following the transfer of power in 1858. Accordingly, the decision to define,
limit and criminalize gambling through the spaces in which it was practiced or through the
instruments that were used in its conduct was animated by an implicit faith in the
Legislature’s ability to descriptively capture practice before it was enacted. This
emblematized in the context of ‘space’, where the term ‘place’ was fine-tuned through out
the nineteenth century and even in the early twentieth, especially in while criminalizing the
game of ti in British Burma. As the dissertation explicates, however, gambling could not
be spoken of ‘objectively’ as its practitioners used legal loopholes to manipulate the
practice beyond legal descriptions.
By the late nineteenth century, when rain gambling first made its appearance in Bombay
and Calcutta, this regime of classification and definition finally hit its limits. It started with
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a a case from Bhooleshwar, Bombay, where Justice K.T Telang ruled that even clocks and
liminal objects used for the purposes of betting were to be classified as ‘instruments of
gambling’. As the definition of what could be considered an ‘instrument of gambling’
began expanding, the policing powers of state authorities moved from a regulative to
constitutive regime; instead of regulating an existent practice of gambling, the government
could constitute certain practices as gambling when the need arose. By highlighting the

role of Justice Telang and later S.N Banerjee, I have also shown how it was an early class
of nationalist legislators and officials who identified and targeted native gambling as an
object of internal reform. So, unlike their British counterparts, the targeted attacks on
games of chance, especially rain gambling came from native members of Legislative
Councils, whether S.N Banerjee in Bengal or Madan Gopal in the Punjab. Ironically, these
legislators steered clear of criminalizing or even criticizing British games and horse racing
in particular, even when they were presented with evidence of their greater popularity and
chances of risk.
The strategy of executive overreach, one that began with the case of rain gambling, was
finally operationalized as a pan Indian policy by the first decade of the twentieth century,
which I demonstrate by narrating the history of early commodity speculation and the rise
of bucket shop betting in Delhi, the Punjab and in parts of Bombay. As argued in the thesis,
the rise of bucket shops presented the government with a conceptual problem regarding
betting in general; was it a form of gambling, or, especially in the case of actuary and
forward trading, a form of hedging and speculation? The question was complicated by a
recurring and overlapping cast of characters, arhatiyas, goladars, amdawalas, seths and
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baniyas, often from the Marwari community, who ran spot and commodity speculation,
rain betting houses and the procurement and trade of agricultural commodities—bringing
them from the hinterlands to the ports of trade. Accordingly, the question of separating
legitimate from illegitimate, legal from criminal and stated from the subterranean became
a question of political contingency and was determined through historically contextual
needs. Going against an established grain of Indian economic historiography, I have shown

through this dissertation that the trajectory of Indian commerce needs to be decoupled from
both the law and the State, especially when the latter are considered as fixed points of
authority or as agents of standardization or modernization. Instead, by employing a
genealogical method of reconstruction, the thesis places weighted emphasis on forms of
motivations that leave the faintest historical trace; envy, rivalry, thrill and deception.
From this perspective, for the historian pursuing the question ‘what is gambling’, at least

in the commercial context, is likely walk off the edge of a cliff and into an endless abyss.
As suggested in the introduction, the question inches towards a Sorites paradox, one where
the addition or subtraction of a particular element does not change the essential nature of
the descriptive predicate. This is not to say, however, that there exists no putative
differences in practices that are easily distinguishable, such as futures trading and horse
racing or rain betting. However, as this dissertation argues, the impressionistic differences
in such practices, which appear natural and commonplace, are the product of the discursive
maneuvers and normative strategies that helped parse a common field of risk, chance,
prognostication and profitability into distinct yet promiscuous categories.
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An understandable frustration may have stirred in readers who encounter a conclusion on
colonial gambling and speculation that hesitates from defining or committing to a settled
description of either practice. That however, is not the intention and would therefore be a
misreading. Instead, what the dissertation has argued is that the putative impressions
regarding gambling or speculation remains contingent (when was speculation useful and
gambling harmful and vice versa) and structured by personal rivalries, interests of

monopolies and most crucially, on the extra legal/political normative and discursive tactics
that grew around the practices over the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Importantly, none of these inspire a settled point of difference and are therefore
independently inconclusive in defining either gambling or speculation. Essentially, the
scholastic aesthetic and the argumentative method is influenced significantly by Foucault’s
oeuvre, one that attentive readers may have noted due to its consistent references. While I
remain hesitant in attributing ‘method’ or coherence to Foucault’s body of work, one that
speaks outside of constant discordance, I do believe that his historical process paid
particular care to hints, conjectures and the arrangement of discursive technologies whose
efficacy are not measured through their popularity as much as their occurrence in the first
place. Accordingly, if the study of madness and its discursive constitution indicated the
technologies that structured what it meant to be sane, or if the disciplinary regime of the
prison system were refracted back upon ideas of childhood, schooling and the industrial
labour force, if the contingent and volatile emotions of pettiness and jealousy forged the
weapons of reason, then, in that vein, this study elaborates the discursive and historically
contingent manner in which native gambling and speculation evolved in parallel in the late
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, never to be separated and only to refine and feed
off their common instincts. Accordingly, it is my contention that it would be misleading to
understand the history of commercial speculation by understanding when it was separated
from a social history of gambling, just as it would be erroneous to see gambling as the pre
capitalist remnants of a practice that was rationalized for the purposes of commerce.
Undeniably, however, gambling and commercial speculation continue to imply separate
practices that circulate in different realms of discourse. To that end, the second part of the
dissertation draws out the normative factors that sequestered gambling from speculation in
the absence of a settled legal definition. Again, the intentions behind this seperation
remains doubtful as the instincts for play and the structure of bucket shop betting were
carried over to the options markets in commodities in the early twentieth century. So, the
relationship between gaming and speculation remained that of a ‘parasitical economy’, not

one of categorical and perpetual barriers. Gaming contracts relating to rain betting, spot
betting on commodities and horse racing were spoken of in terms of their clientele, their
function in society, the harm they precipitated and their moral and ethical standing in
civilized discourse. The process was aided by constituting gambling discursively, not as a
category in law. Accordingly, this discourse was inflected by silence, anecdote, scandal
and phobia. As argued, it was the silence regarding gambling, the non-instantiation of its
particular harms that implicated it as a constantly circulating scandal. As opposed to this,
I drew the example of commercial contracts as exemplified in the discussion surrounding
the Amendment to the Contract Act (1899), which sought to provide relief to indebted
peasants from the hands of rural moneylenders. While nowhere near exhaustive of the
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varied dimensions in which the contract operated in the colony, I used this juxtaposition
for two reasons. First, it showed the differences that were built into a common objective of
building a universally legible ‘contracting society’ in the colony. While in the context of
gaming and spot betting, contracts were attacked for being incomprehensible and therefore
exploitative of an ‘ignorant’ working class population, this same paternalist protections
went missing when the contracting ability of a similar set of ‘ignorant’ agents, the small

peasant, was being discussed. Crucially, I used the third and fourth chapter to demonstrate
the manner in which a common discourse covering the subjects of of risk, liability,
ignorance and political unrest were parsed by the operationist concerns of colonial policing
and the discourse of political economy. Crudely then, the discourse on gambling allowed
Empire to admit that ‘free contracting’ was unsuitable to colonial subjects and therefore
required legal curtailment. This allowed the tenets of political economy to endorse the
stadial thesis where ‘free contracting’ was epitomized as a pedagogical goal towards
building a market society.
Moving past the differences in the attitudes presented towards gaming and commercial
contracts, we arrive to an interesting set of similarities. While the thesis has been unable to
stitch these together as a coherent argument, it has laid a trail of bread crumbs that may be
followed in the future. Sensitive to these connections, the dissertation consciously
compared the distinctions between the betting contracts in rain gambling houses and spot
betting bucket shops to the contracts extended by rural usurers to small holding
agriculturalists. The similarity here does not start and end with the clientele; an ‘ignorant’
and vulnerable class of contracting subjects. Rather, it shows a process which acted on a
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more organized and monied class of native agents and entrepreneurs, dividing their
practices between social and therefore criminal practices (gambling) and useful and
therefore commercial practices like usury and exchange trading. Here, we witness a history
of an overlapping class of nameless and therefore shadowy market agents who remained
central to the commodity trade; financing, procuring, transporting, storing, marketing,
trading and gambling in commodities. These mid-level arhaityas, mahajans, goladars and

muccadams, were crucial intermediaries to the commodity trade. What I have indicated
through the thesis is the layered regime of legal, political and social technologies that acted
haphazardly upon these agents, sorting and slotting their practices as useful and wasteful,
legal and illegal. Again, unlike the established scholarship in this field, I insist that we
move away from a legalist or statist imagination in configuring the trajectory of these
agents. Instead, as suggested, I have focused more on the personal rivalries, the
intracommunity disputes and the prospects of monopoly to see the ways in which at times
gambling and speculation were talked of as separate practices, even while the distinctions
mostly remained unclear. To understand both commodity production and its speculation, a
deeper and more exhaustive study on the role of these middle men is required. I aim to do
so as when taking this thesis further.

Again, what remains common to this set of actors is a shared epistemological field, one
that I have indicated in my study on astro-meteorology, which I have linked to corpus of
jyotish texts informed both by the Kṛṣiparāśara in the east and śakuni literature in the west
of India. As argued, such literature was instrumental in informing a class of bettors and
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gamblers in both the rain betting houses of Calcutta and Bombay and the bucket shops of
Delhi and the Punjab. It is this kind of literature that was retooled and repurposed for
options and commodity trading in the early twentieth century, when established exchanges
threw open their trade to small investors in the trade of commodities like cotton, jute, sugar,
grains and silver. Importantly, as I have shown both through publications like the Tejīmandī Prakāśa and by the admissions of small exchanges like the Shree Mahajan

Association, these texts targeted a novice and inexperienced class of speculators and were
often published by brokerage houses or were commissioned by large speculators
themselves.
The thesis also lays weighted emphasis on understanding astrology as more than ritualistic,
especially when it came to the prognostication on commodity prices or for other betting
practices. The influence of such astrologically informed and determined thinking is

constantly encountered in present day Indian commercial ventures. Its most recent iteration
came when the shadowy influence of by a ‘mysterious baba’ from the Himalayas was
discovered on the CEO and Managing Director of the National Stock Exchange, Chitra
Radhakrishna, in February this year. It is also common to hear stories of entrepreneurs and
businessmen, who on the advise of an astrologer, have added syllables to their names,
inaugurated a venture on a particular date or changed the location of both their business
and residence.
It would not be an overestimation to see the presence and influence of astrology on almost
every mundane practice in colonial South Asia. I would argue, in fact that this ubiquity has
contributed significantly to its under theorization, where its presence is noted as an
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instantiation of colonial modernity, akin to breaking a coconut before the launch of a
satellite or garnishing the recently purchased Dassault Rafale aircrafts with lemon and
chillis to ward off the evil eye. Let me provide a more topical example. It is rumored that
the Home Minister of India and the erstwhile chief political strategist of the Bharatiya
Janata Party, Amit Shah, abandoned his plush fifth floor office in the party headquarters
and chose to relocate to the ground floor during the 2019 parliamentary elections on the

advice of a prominent astrologer.822 Apparently, the decision to hold the recently concluded
West Bengal state elections in eight rather than the traditionally five phases was prompted
similarly. Though unconfirmed, many attribute similar astrological and numerological
motivations to the new parliamentary building in Delhi holding 888 legislators, a number
that is considered similarly auspicious. What is important to note, is that all this operates
alongside a discourse that describes the BJP as a political juggernaut and Amit Shah as a
political mastermind who has transformed the Indian political scene by fine-tuning
electoral campaigns into a science and the party into a political machine. The evidence of
these parallel descriptive forms arouses natural curiosity regarding the status and function
of astrology within the newly developing science of psephology: Is astrology some
ritualistic fluff, or to paraphrase Appadurai, is the it the ‘ghost’ in the political machine
that is the BJP?

822

The Telegraph, Wednesday, 20th July 2022.
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The answer appears more straightforward when placed within the realm of commerce and
market activity. While it is impossible to comprehensively account for the reason why an
actor takes the position that they do in the market, it is safe to assume that the decisions are
not always purely motivated from a standard or rational financial reading of the market.
Astrological literature regarding Teji-mandi was therefore functional in rehabilitating a
class of ‘gamblers’ as speculators in commodity exchanges. Just as the gambler’s bet is

often determined by a horse is named after his/her daughter or a number that corresponds
to a birthday, similarly, the formal yet irrational system of astrology made market
movements legible to an untrained class of people. In fact, it is precisely the energy, the
reasonings and these epistemological universes of a gambler that were exploited by early
options markets to bring in a class of petty and small investors. As the dissertation has
argued, the reasons that morally denigrated and legally criminalized the practice and
aesthetics of petty gambling were reworked when it came to options and futures trading in
the commodity markets of the early twentieth century. Markets needed liquidity, it needed
people to hold intermediary contracts against whom sellers and market makers could hedge
and it needed the a volume of traders to stabilize the price of a commodity in the long term.
More importantly, it needed suckers; the ignorant, the untutored, the impulsive and the
unaware. Eventually, every market needed a large class of ‘gamblers’. Accordingly, these
markets targeted a small investors by tapping into the same energy, epistemic universe and
possibly the same fantasies that they may have reserved for gambling; short cuts and get
rich quick.
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It is important to be mindful of this history, a history of capital that goes beyond the history
of capitalists, entrepreneurs and state planning. It accounts for the ways in which the money
of the non-commercial and traditionally non-market actor came into the market in the first
place. In its final tabulation and in its most abstract form, the market is where everyone’s
money is. Crucially, the market maintains a studied indifference to how that money came
in in the first place. In fact, as this dissertation argues, alongside building its own

‘rationalist’ discourse through a disciplinary study of economics, the market
accommodates and even actively encourages a certain ‘ignorance’ amongst its members.
As I have suggested in the fourth and fifth chapters, the market mediates inequality without
seeking to annul it because the market grows through such inequality. While the idea may
seem common enough, what I stressed upon was the market’s ability to mediate almost any
kind of inequality, even that of temporality. Accordingly, in seeing the growth of a panIndian market in commodities during the colonial period, one needs to reconcile what I
have called the strategic logic of the market with the substantive political and legal claims
of empire. When understood strategically, It is unclear whether the logic of the market
placed as much emphasis on the political discourse of colonialism that saw law,
governance, education, infrastructure as part of a modernizing project. It is unclear whether
it would be apt to describe ‘the market’ as modern at all, given that it is a forum that
abstracts and therefore mediates between practices that are otherwise parsed as ‘premodern’ ‘pre-capitalist’, ‘irrational’, ‘rational’ and ‘modern’. Therefore, as an agent of
abstraction, it is not law or politics but only the market that has the ability to take a social
and ‘pre-capitalist’ practice like gambling and produce equivalence with hedging and
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speculation. In doing so, it retains the ability to transform the gambler and her/his rationale,
epistemic world, emotions and cultural proclivities, into a final abstraction—the bearer of
capital.
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APPENDIX A: LEGISLATION
Below is a selected list of the key laws, and their provisions that were enacted to
criminalize gambling in India. Apart from Section 294 A of the Indian Penal Code, the
listed Acts were applied in the province in which they were enacted. The Public Gaming
Act (Act III of 1867) applied in the United Provinces, East Punjab, Delhi and the Central
Provinces.

THE CALCUTTA POLICE ACT, (Act IV of 1866)

s. 52: "Gambling on public streets” (repealed by Bengal Act II of 1867)

THE PUBLIC GAMING ACT (Act III of 1867)

s.1: “Common gaming-house .Common gaming-house means any house, walled
enclosure, room or place in which cards, dice, tables or other instruments of gaming are
kept or used for the profit or gain of the person owning, occupying, using or keeping such
house, enclosure, room or place, whether by way of charge for the use of the instruments
of gaming, or of the house, enclosure, room or place or otherwise howsoever.

s.3: Penalty for owning or keeping, or having charge of a gaming-house .Whoever,
being the owner or occupier, or having the use, of any house, walled enclosure, room or
place, situate within the limits to which this Act applies, opens, keeps or uses the same as
a common gaming-house; and whoever, being the owner or occupier of any such house,
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walled enclosure, room or place as aforesaid, knowingly or willfully permits the same to
be opened, occupied, used or kept by any other person as a common gaming-house; and
whoever has the care or management of, or in any manner assists in conducting, the
business of any house, walled enclosure, room or place as aforesaid, opened, occupied,
used or kept for the purpose aforesaid; and whoever advances or furnishes money for the
purpose of gaming with persons frequenting such house, walled enclosure, room or place;

shall be liable to a fine not exceeding two hundred rupees, or to imprisonment for any term
not exceeding three months.
s.13: Gaming and setting birds and animals to fight in public streets .A police officer
may apprehend without warrant any person found playing for money or other valuable
thing, with cards, dice, counters or other instruments of gaming, used in playing any game
not being a game of mere skill, in any public street, place or thoroughfare situated within
the limits aforesaid, or any person setting any birds or animals to fight in any public street,
place, or thoroughfare situated within the limits aforesaid, or any person there present
aiding and abetting such public fighting of birds and animals.
Such person when apprehended shall be brought without delay before a Magistrate, and
shall be liable to a fine not exceeding fifty rupees, or to imprisonment, either simple or
rigorous, for any term not exceeding one calendar month;
Destruction of instruments of gaming found in public streets .And such police officer
may seize all instruments of gaming found in such public place or on the person of those
whom he shall so arrest, and the Magistrate may, on conviction of the offender, order
such instruments to be forthwith destroyed.
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BURMA GAMING ACT (Act XVI of 1884)

s. 2: Taking part in the game of “ti,” or in any other game or pretended game of a like
nature, shall be deemed gaming and playing within the meaning of Act III of 1867.
s.6: In section 13 of Act II of 1867—-

a) for the words ‘public street, place or thoroughfare,” where they first occur, the words
“street or thoroughfare or place to which the public access” shall be substituted; and
b) in the last clause for the words “such public place” the words “such place shall be
substituted.

BOMBAY PREVENTION OF GAMBLING ACT 1887 (Act IV of 1887 applied to
Bombay Province and Gujarat)

s. 3 "Gaming" defined. - [ln this Act "gaming" include wagering or betting except
wagering or betting upon a horse-race when such wagering or betting takes place(a)

on the day on which such race is to be run, and

(b)

in an enclosure which the licensee of the race course, on which such race is to be
run, has set apart for the purpose under the terms of license issued under section 4
of the [Bombay Race Courses Licensing Act, 1912], in respect of such race course.
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Any transaction by which a person in any capacity whatever employs another in any
capacity whatever or engages for another in any capacity whatever the wager or bet whether
with such licensee or with any other person shall be deemed “gaming”.

BENGAL RAIN GAMBLING ACT OF 1897

s. 2: (1) To the definition of “common gaming house” in section 3 of the Calcutta Police
Act, 1866, the following shall be added, namely:— “or in which rain gambling, that is to
say wagering on the occurrence or non occurrence of rain is carried on for the profit or gain
of any such persons as aforesaid.”
(2) After the said definitions the following shall be inserted, namely:—

“Gaming shall include rain gambling;”
“‘Instruments of gaming’ shall include books or registers in which rain gambling wagers
are entered, all other documents containing evidence of such wagers and any thing used
as a means of rain gambling.”

BENGAL PUBLIC GAMING ACT (ACT II OF 1867 as Amended in 1913)

s. 2: For the definitions of “common gaming-house,” “gaming” and “instruments of
gaming” in section 59 of the Howrah Offences Act, 1857, section 3 of the Calcutta Police
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Act, 1866, and Section 1 of the Bengal Public Gambling Act of 1867, the following shall
be substituted, namely:—
“gaming” includes wagering or betting [*except wagering or betting upon a horse race,
when such wagering or betting takes place]
a)
b)

on the day on which such race is to be run
in an enclosure which the Stewards controlling such race have, with the sanction
of the Local Government, set apart for that purpose]

BOMBAY COTTON CONTRACTS ACT (Act IV of 1932)

s. 3: Definitions. - In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or
context,(a) "Bombay" means the City of Bombay and the Island of Salsette;
(c) "Board of Directors" means a board of directors of a recognized cotta association
constituted under section 5 and acting through at least a quorum of their members at a
meeting of that board duly called and constituted;

(d) "Certified godown" means a godown maintained by a cotton association for storing
cotton Certified under the by-laws of the association;
(e) "Contract" means a contract made or to be performed in whole or in part in Bombay
relating to the sale or purchase of cotton and includes options in cotton, but does not include
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such contracts as the [Provincial Government] may, by notification in the [Official
Gazette] declare to be excluded from the provisions of this Act;
(f) "Cotton Association" means any association, organisation or a body of individuals,
whether incorporated or not, established or formed for the purpose of "regulating and
controlling business in the sale, purchase or other transactions in cotton;
(g) "Forward contract" means a contract for the delivery of cotton at some future date;
(h) "Option in cotton" means a contract made or to be performed in whole or in part in
Bombay for the purchase or sale of a right to buy, or a right to sell or a right to buy or sell
cotton in future, and includes a teji, a mandi or a teji-mandi in cotton;
(i) "Ready contract" means a contract in which immediate delivery of cotton is
contemplated;

(j) "Recognized cotton association" means-a cotton association which is for the time being
recognized by the [Provincial Government] , as provided in section 4.
s.4: Recognition. - (1) A cotton association, desirous of being recognized for the
purposes of this Act, shall make an application in writing to the [Provincial
Government] for such recognition and shall submit by-laws for the regulation and
control of transactions in cotton and furnish such information in regard to such

recognition as the [Provincial Government] may from time to time require.

(2) The [Provincial Government] may give or refuse such recognition.
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(3) The [Provincial Government] shall refuse recognition unless-

(a) it is provided in the by laws submitted by the cotton association under sub-section (1)
that not less than one-fourth of the total number of the Board of Directors of the cotton
association applying for recognition shall be growers of cotton to be appointed in the
manner prescribed in the said by-laws and approved by the [Provincial Government]; and
(b) the [Provincial Government] is satisfied that the sole possession and effective
management, control and regulation of the markets of the cotton association applying for
recognition and of the market places of the said cotton association are vested in the said
cotton association.
(4) The [Provincial Government] shall also refuse recognition unless the bye-laws
Submitted by the cotton association under sub-section (1) shall have been published in
the [Official Gazette] at least one month before the date of such recognition:

Provided that when, in the opinion of the [Provincial Government], the conditions
precedent to recognition specified in sub-clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (3) are
satisfied in the case of a cotton association applying for recognition under subsection (1)
and the bye-laws of the said cotton association are similar in all other material respects to

the articles and by-laws of the East India Cotton Association, Limited, deemed or which
have been deemed under the provisions of sub-section (7) to be bye-laws of a recognized
cotton association the [Provincial Government] may dispense with the publication,
required under this sub-section of the bye-laws of the cotton association applying for
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recognition and may give recognition to such association and the bye-laws of such
association shall then be deemed to be bye-laws published under the provisions of this
sub-section.

(5) When the [Provincial Government] has dispensed with the publication of the by-laws
of a cotton association and has given recognition to such association under the provisions

of the proviso to sub-section (4), such bye-laws shall be published in the [Official
Gazette] next following the giving of recognition to such association.

(6) The [Provincial Government] may, at any time after having given to a cotton
association an opportunity to explain why recognition should not be withdrawn, withdraw
the recognition given to the said cotton association and such cotton association shall

thereupon cease to be a recognised cotton association.

(7) It is hereby declared that the East India Cotton Association Limited, is a recognised
cotton association for the purposes and subject to the provisions of this Act and the
articles and bye-laws of the said Association shall, so far as they relate to matters for
which bye-laws may be made under the provisions of sections 5 and 6, be deemed to be
bye-laws of a recognized cotton association:

Provided that, if, within such time after the coming into operation of this Act as
the [Provincial Government] shall by order in writing specify, the said Association shall
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not have complied with the conditions precedent to recognition specified in clauses (a)
and (b) of sub-section (3), the said association shall cease to be a recognized cotton
association and the said articles and bye-laws of the said association shall cease to be bylaws of a recognized cotton association:

Explanation. - A grower of cotton shall not include a person who deals in forward

contracts.

s.5: Recognized association to have Board of Directors: power to make bye-laws. (1) In every recognized cotton association there shall be a Board of Directors. Subject to
the sanction of the [Provincial Government] , a recognized cotton association may make
and may from time to time add to, vary or rescind bye-laws providing for -

(a) the constitution of the Board of Directors,
(b) the powers and duties of the Board of Directors and the manner which its business shall
be conducted,
(c) the number and constitution of electoral panels and the representation upon such panels,
and
(d) the method of appointment of members to the Boards of Directors.
(2) By-laws made, added to, varied or rescinded under sub-section (1) shall be Laid
[before each of the Chambers of the Provincial Legislatures] at the session [thereof] next
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following and shall be liable to be modified or rescinded by a resolution [in which both
Chambers concur] If any by-law is so modified or rescinded, the [Provincial
Government] may sanction such modified by-law and re-publish the same accordingly or
may sanction such rescission.

S.6: Power of Board of Directors to make bye-laws. - (1) The Board of Directors may,

subject to the sanction of the [Provincial Government], make and from time to time, add
to, vary or rescind by-laws for the regulation and control of transactions on cotton.

(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision such
by-laws may provide for-

(a) The admission of various classes of members of a recognized cotton association and
the exclusion, suspension, expulsion and re-admission of such members;
(b) the opening and closing of markets in cotton and the times during which such markets
shall be opened or closed and regulating the hours of trade;
(c) a clearing house for the periodical settlement of contracts or differences thereunder and
for the passing on of delivery orders and for any purpose in connection with options in-

cotton, and the regulation and maintenance of such clearing house;
(d) the number and classes of contracts in respect of which settlements shall be made or
differences paid through the clearing house;
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(e) fixing, altering or postponing settling days;
(f) determining and declaring the market rates for cotton of any and every description;
(g) the terms, conditions and incidents of contracts and the forms of such contracts as are
in writing;
(h) regulating the making performance and cancellation of contracts, including contracts
between a commission agent and his constituent, or between a broker and his constituent,
or between a jethawala or muccadum and his constituent, or between a member and a nonmember of a recognized cotton association, and the consequences of insolvency on the part
of a seller or buyer or intermediary, the consequences of a breach or omission by a seller
or buyer and the responsibility of commission agents, muccadums and brokers not parties
to such contracts;
(i) the prohibition of specified classes or types of dealings in cotton by a member of a
recognized cotton association;
(j) the settlement of claims and dispute by arbitration and appeals against awards;
(k) the levy and recovery of subscriptions, fees, fines and penalties;
(l) disciplinary measures against members of a recognized cotton association, including
suspension, expulsion, fines and non-monetary penalties, for breach of any bye-law made

by the Board of Directors;
(m) regulating the course of business between parties to contracts in any capacity;
(n) the institution, maintenance and control of certified godowns; and
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(o) regulating the making, performance and cancellation of option in cotton.
(3) If any person committing a breach of any bye-law of a recognized cotton association
is a company, every director and officer of such company shall also be deemed to have
committed such breach, unless he proves that the breach was committed without his
knowledge and control
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